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This dissertation bridges literary and cultural studies in order to offer a critical reading of 
the fascination with angels that appears in America at the beginning and end of the Cold War.  
Though the contemporary wave of interest spans genres of mass entertainment, pop psychology, 
and high modernist literature and film, I find angelic representations to be consistent.  Invested in 
the idea of a separated intelligence, these representations expose larger concerns with personal 
sovereignty and historical determinism.  From fantasy to true story, the encounter with the pure 
and providential spectator consecrates the subject within a special temporality, a temporality of 
imagination and reception.  Angelic illumination thus answers a crisis of attention that renders 
the human paralyzed.  In all of the texts considered the attendant spirit confers personal 
chosenness and historical beginning through the act of judgment, an idea I discuss in reference to 
the theories of agency of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Immanual Kant. 
One distinguishing feature of the angelic spectrum is that popular and highbrow 
treatments differ radically in their attitudes toward angelic revelation.  It’s a Wonderful Life and 
other movies of the sentimental fantasy genre, the true stories books, the self-help books, and the 
TV drama Touched by an Angel represent the angel-guardian as a figure of completion that 
assimilates an unsteady future to the rational structures of the past.  Implicit already in Tony 
Kushner’s Broadway hit Angels in America and fully expressed in the angelic poetry since the 
second world war, angels appear as expressions of partialness, ruin, and decay.  I analyze the 
 iii
differences between sentimental and tragic appropriations of angels by investigating them in 
relation to the logic of allegory. A paradoxically populist-hierarchical way of reading, allegorical 
thinking defines both the angels of annunciatory blessing and the angels of impotence and 
destruction.  Through a final engagement with the work of Walter Benjamin, I argue that as a 
way of reading experience through its own alterity, allegory is itself an angelic hermeneutic. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
“What is all this shit about angels?” 
 
- George Carlin 
 
In his 1999 album “You Are All Diseased” America’s most obnoxious stand-up comic 
finally gave blatant form to a question that had been stirring for some time among critics and 
consumers of American popular culture.  Though the nation had in the 1980’s witnessed the 
advent of “God bless America” in political rhetoric and become used to the advance of New 
Ageism into both private and public spheres, it was still unprepared for the sweeping parade of 
religious extra-terrestrials that rose with the dust of the Berlin Wall.  In the 1970’s Nina 
Auerbach could write, “We no longer adore angels; we do not even like them” (64).  By the 
1990’s, however, angels seemed to possess - as one bookseller put it - a “universal appeal” that 
“[crossed] age and denominational lines” (Bachleda, 31).1  Those who noticed but took 
exception to the appeal experienced a universal perplexity.  What indeed was going on with this 
so-called “angel craze”?  Why this interest – serious interest – in figures that to skeptics seemed 
purposeless and unconvicing, fluffy expressions of sanctimony and cultural regression?   
If anything, Carlin’s question was tardy.  The poll he referred to in his 1999 monologue, 
indicating that three out of four Americans actually believed in angels, had been anticipated over 
five years earlier.  In 1999 the Barna Research Group announced that 75% of Americans 
“believe angels exist and have an effect on people’s lives” (Lazar).  But the big news had come 
                                                 
1 That the 1990’s - present angel fascination is in fact generalized is suggested by the fact that it spans geographical, 
age, race, faith, and class demographics.  Teenagers in New York took to wearing angel wings at the same time that 
the over-sixty crowd in Pittsburgh was attending talks on angel encounters and baby boomers in California were 
buying angel candles.  As this dissertation will discuss, angels haven’t penetrated every demographic equally nor in 
the same way, but their presence is exclusive to none. 
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 earlier.  Shortly after Christmas in 1993, Time magazine had unveiled the first unexpected 
statistics about angels in America: 69% of Americans believed in angels, and 46% believed they 
had their own guardian angel.  Books testifying to true encounters with angels – where the angel 
saves the witness from some peril, or more often simply fixes his or her tire – had hit bookstores 
across malls and airports.  A few were beginning to emerge counselling readers on how to turn 
this encounter into a meaningful relationship through the intimacy of daily conversation.  Little 
gold angel pins had begun to circulate.  Even Hillary Clinton claimed to wear one, for the wings, 
and had made angels the theme of the White House Christmas tree that year.  The fixation was 
apparent, even before the angel events that would follow through the rest of the decade: the 
release of the unflagging hit CBS drama, Touched by an Angel; endless remakes of angel films 
from the forties and fifties; the Vatican tour of angel art, “The Invisible Made Visible,” and the 
proliferation of Renaissance angels among greeting cards and calendars; the assimilation of the 
angel moniker by self-help activist groups, business investors, technology firms, and Oprah; and 
the emergence across the country of stores solely devoted to peddling angelic merchandise.  
Angels were almost a national theme. 
 They were a theme whose source of authority, however, was not self-evident.  While 
efforts were made on the part of both angel-critics and angel-sympathizers to contextualize this 
phenomenon within broader social and cultural trends, none of them took pains to analyze the 
texts themselves with any degree of care or sensitivity.  Beneath the reactions to angels one 
could perceive a vague panic that established modes of thought were somehow under threat, and 
with this a sharp re-affirmation of those modes as means of containing it.  What appeared was a 
divide between neo-enlightenment discourses denigrating the taste in angels as populist escapism 
and socially conscious movements who saw in them a call to action.  Carlin’s own response – 
2 
 that since the sixties Americans have taken so many drugs that they are now experiencing a 
collective flashback manifesting itself as a belief in angels – represents a flippant version of the 
critical stance dismissing angels as so much irrationalist blather.  Wendy Kaminer’s Sleeping 
with Extraterrestrials: The Rise of Irrationalism and the Perils of Piety is at the forefront of 
those promoting this argument.  Kaminer associates angels with the rise of a therapeutic culture 
based on the “celebration of subjectivism.”  For her, the angel fascination and other pop 
spirituality movements undermine critical thinking and intellectual inquiry in order to promote a 
facile spiritual relativism and its narcissistic raptures.  The goal is security, as grounded by a 
“divine benevolent despotism,” and the price is freedom.  Others are equally critical, if less hand-
wringing.  On the academic front lines, Harold Bloom - in perhaps the best known relevant 
academic text, the 1996 Omens of Millennium - reads angels as part of the New Age’s “endlessly 
entertaining saturnalia of ill-defined yearnings,” a “debasement” of a Gnostic tradition that is 
more effectively studied on its own.  For Mark Edmundson in Nightmare on Main Street, 
published a year later, angels are simply a “mental vacation” from an American Gothic also more 
effectively studied on its own.  In such circles and in general, very little intellectual play has 
been given to the phenomenon as text as opposed to indication or symptom.2
The alternative explanatory stance tends to situate angelic interest in relation to global 
threats instead of cultural decadence.  As Peter Kreeft, a philosophy professor at Boston College, 
put it: “these are desperate times” (Gibbs, 58).  Encounter books speak vaguely of “all the 
personal and world problems we are facing” (Webber, 13) as the reason for an increased interest 
in celestial creatures.  “Now,” Webber adds, “it’s safe to come out of the angelic closet.”  This 
                                                 
2 I should add that discrete angelic texts have received a great deal of critical attention, especially Tony Kushner’s 
Angels in America (which counts as “literature”), but also popular works such as Touched by an Angel have enjoyed 
a certain degree of research and analysis.  When the “angel-craze” is addressed as a whole in academia, however, it 
is dealt with briefly and dismissively. 
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 double edge of world crisis and spiritual readiness defines the lay religious response.  Those 
working in religious studies often give more specific answers: “This is a religious experience, 
which society manifests in times of transition,” says Bruce Chilton, professor of religion at Bard 
and an Episcopal priest (Carvajal 8), in this case the transition to a “postindustrial economy – the 
likelihood that a person will change jobs and careers, the likelihood of changing spouses several 
times.”  Eileen Elias Freeman, a pop angel author who also holds a degree in theology, offers a 
broader vision of the current destruction, attributing the renewal of angelic voices to rampant 
“depersonalization” from media over-saturation and to a global political and ecological crisis in 
which “we are killing our future.”  Retired rabbi Morris Margolies, author of a book on angels in 
Judaism, A Gathering of Angels, draws a historical parallel: “We’re living in an era very similar 
to the Maccabean era for the Jews, where disaster confronts us on all sides” (in Gibbs 62).3  In 
essence a more specific version of the broad arguments of the pop laity, Margolies’s historical 
parallel articulates the angel craze as a religious expression of material forces.  Whether taken as 
real “oases of peace” in Freeman’s terms or as signals of distress,4 the angels of this perspective 
demand our rightful attention – almost exclusively, however, as messengers of more serious 
issues afoot. 
As the title of this dissertation suggests, I will be reading the recent output of angels with 
both of these perspectives in mind.  I take seriously the irrational, naïve component of angelic 
expression as well as its tragic, socially critical inflection.  Where I diverge from both of these 
                                                 
3 The Maccabean era was a disastrous period involving colonial represssion and with that a loss of tradition, a 
disaster of Hellenist conformism and Judaic decadence ultimately resulting in uprising and civil war.  It was also a 
time when angels were becoming more interesting in a way that would explode in the years following 
4 Though grounded in the religion, aspects of the sympathetic response echo the view of piety advanced by Marx in 
his introduction to Toward a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, that “religious suffering is the expression of 
real suffering and at the same time the protest against real suffering.  Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, 
the heart of a heartless world, as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions” (24). 
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 positions, however, is in my insistence that the specificity of angelic representation warrants 
careful and imaginative attention, and on its own terms. 
It is the end of 2003 as I write this.  The latest poll, published in Fall 2002, shows if 
anything a rise in angelic fascination.  According to Scripps Howard News Service and Ohio 
University, 77% of Americans now say they believe in angels, 73% not simply “in general” but 
as actual entities that “come into the world even in these modern days” (see “Angels beliefs on 
the rise”).  What is most surprising, however, is the demographic consistency.  A fad often 
assumed as belonging to the province of white elderly women, the belief in angels is reported in 
more than fifty percent of every polled demographic (broken down by age, race, gender, faith, 
family status, location, education and income) except Jews (32%) and those with no religious 
preference (47%).  Where women account for 81% of those saying they belive, men are behind 
only at 72%; those with a lower income were more likely to believe, but the spread between 
those with incomes below $25,000 and those with incomes above $80,000 was only 15%; in 
education those most likely to believe reported having “some college” (82%), but of the lowest 
educational demographic, those with post-graduate study, a full 63% said “Yes” when asked, 
“Do you believe that angels, that is, some kind of heavenly beings who visit Earth, in fact 
exist?”5
The popular significance of angels, then, is established and widespread.  Yet, of those 
doing post-graduate study, no one among the 63% or otherwise has to this date has attempted a 
substantial work that would “read” this phenomenon.  It is true that angels have enjoyed some 
attention recently as a figurative and theoretical tool for analyzing topics as diverse as the 
                                                 
5 The poll, by Scripps Howard News Service and the E.W. Scripps School of Journalism at Ohio University 
sponsored the survey, which was conducted by telephone from randomly selected households in all states and the 
District of Columbia, and included 1,127 adults and a 4% margin of error.  Though the sample is small, the results 
do suggest that the angel craze cannot be “contained” by an one major demographic. 
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 semiotics of human sexuality, the sublimity of the diva, the rise of “bot” culture in information 
sciences, and the pedagogical ideal of perfect communication.  Michel Serres’s sumptuous 1995 
art book on angels is especially valuable in its attempt to connect the interest in angels with the 
rise of “globalism,” particularly in its morphology of the Information Age.  But his book is 
primarily meditative, rather than analytical, and – like the above texts – it does not deal with the 
contemporary texts in which these ideas take shape.  The attention these works give the angel has 
a stated source other than its current cultural uproar.  Making use of the current fascination for 
their own purposes, these critics respond to the special status the angel possesses historically as a 
literary and philosophical figure. Throughout centuries understood as “immaterial substances,” 
angels have been invoked in relation to the some of the most famous and insoluble questions in 
philosophic history, notably the mind/body problem and the question of the relation between the 
universal and the particular.  They have arisen in conjunction with two of the most important 
concepts in Western theology, the beliefs in a unified but dualist universe and in the immortality 
of the individual soul.  Those doing work in literary and cultural theory have begun, it seems, to 
rediscover the rich, various and - especially for those educated since the Second World War – 
taxing body of thinking on angels in theological, philosophical, and poetic discourses. 
 In other words, a profound disjunction emerges within the analytic consideration of the 
angelic figure.  As they appear in theoretical works, angels pose a formidable challenge.  When it 
comes to popular texts, however, angels are easy.  Above all, the two traditions - so the critical as 
literature might convince us - have little to say to each other. 
This dissertation is an attempt to put the popular and the literary-philosophical treatment 
of angels in conversation.  As I see it, the idea of the angel – whether in high-, low-, or midddle-
brow venues – is configured in remarkably coherent ways.  Across the range of genres, angels 
6 
 portray the fantasy of minds separated from bodies, minds whose knowledge comes from pure 
forms rather than sensual experience.  Angels from Averroës to Sophy Burnham know through 
intuition, and they know disinterestedly.  This “global” intelligence of angels manifests itself in 
different ways, but above all as a particular form of aesthetic judgment.  As the 1946 movie 
Stairway to Heaven puts it, angels see things “all at once and in a poet’s eye.”  As simple divine 
beings, angels see the whole within the fragmentary – the entirety of a personal or collective 
history flashing up within the moment.  One can see the appeal of this at once totalizing and de-
familiarizing form of vision for literary and filmic analysis, but also for popular discourses like 
self-help counseling, near-death narrative, and “born again” conversion stories.  All define their 
angels through the particular way of reading that they embody: a consecrating and spectatorial 
relation to time and space, and through its significance as a means of connecting historical 
intelligence with individual experience. 
I do not deal with all of the above discourses in this dissertation.  Rather, I take the angel 
as a representation of the imagination and of a particular kind of work that it performs and read it 
through a select cross-section of American cultural texts, both high and low.  My method, 
however, remains constant: to treat the figure of the angel in each text simultaneously as object 
of analysis and idea.  I see this as the purpose of literary and filmic criticism, to move in a given 
interpretation toward the principles of that interpretation – to read a text from within, under the 
assumption that it is its own philosophy.  This applies equally to the cross-section as to the 
individual works; thus, I try to bring together canonical and “evanescent” texts in each of the 
chapters in order to demonstrate their mutual illumination.  The one exception is the final 
chapter, which describes a particular formation of the angel that is, for the most part, unique to 
more hermetic cultural forms. 
7 
  In exploring the interstices of the popular and the “literary” I have not been disappointed.  
I have not found the angel in any of its versions to be reducible to either religious or spiritualist 
consolationism.  Nor have I found it transparent either as fantasy or as cry for help; in fact, as I 
will elaborate below, the figure of the angel says as much about the nature of crisis and fantasy 
as either say about it.  The foremost difficulty this endlessly fertile topic has posed, however, has 
been how to narrow it.  Neither a reception or audience study, historical analysis, or series of 
case studies organized around a central theme, my dissertation is a narrative meant to be read in 
sequence.  It moves from an elaboration of angels as appearances within conditions of crisis to 
angels as expressions of that crisis.  At the beginning the angel consistently features as a pure 
intelligence that delivers distinctions to a world and a subject in a state of confusion.  By the end, 
the angel indicates its own impossibility as attending and illuminating messenger.  In opening up 
the fantasy within crisis, the angel names the otherness and the division at the core of the process 
of judgment that it is its job to deliver. 
The issue of crisis is where I begin, because so often in angelic narrative, that is exactly 
where beginning happens.  In current narratives, the angel usually appears to a subject in a 
quandary or condition of loss of faith, which is experienced as an existential problem.  Suicide, 
confession, accident, these are some of the situations that in the past century have tended to 
exemplify this quandary.  For each of these descriptions implies a collapse of lived intelligibility, 
a felt contradiction between the individual and external restriction, whether in the form of the 
body and physical world (terminal illness, a no-exit trap or intrigue) or conceptual forces (the 
conventions of the past, or the forward machinery of “progress”).  In each case decision appears 
simultaneously necessary and inaccessible. 
 This expression of existential quandary through the imagery of containment is especially 
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 telling, given the timing of angelic eruption in recent American history.  We see angelic interest 
cropping up not only in the decade/s following the Cold War, but also in the decades 
inaugurating it.  Angels were popular in film, poetry, and popular song from the early 1940’s 
through the 50’s, with their greatest period of interest being the immediate post-war into the 
early years of the midcentury.  They are only occasionally used as a device during the 60’s, 70’s, 
and early 80’s.  I focus on texts from both sides of the “war,” partly because the recent angel 
craze references works from the earlier period, but also for another, more important reason.  I 
read both angelic fascinations as responses to changes in the social organization of power that 
began during World War II.  As bookends of the Cold War, angels appear to frame a transitional 
chaos whose implications would be governed and suppressed by that period’s binarist logic.  
Focus on the arms race and détente provided narratives of power and containment vis-à-vis 
science and the state, while domestically the battles over Civil Rights concentrated the country’s 
self-reflective energies.  These energies emerge at the ends of each of these wars in angelic 
images and stories expressive of a particular anxiety of containment, resulting in profound 
personal dissociation.  The supernatural visitation both highlights this dissociation and relieves it.  
Simultaneously, the subject is freed from and assimilated to containing structures by the pure 
intelligence.  The imagination, judgment’s daemon and interlocutor, has done its work; crisis has 
become memory. 
 
The word “crisis” in its root stems from the Greek krisis: to decide, to judge.  At the heart 
of the angelic story is a problem of judgment, a difficulty assimilating the universalist codes of 
reason to intuited information and particulars.  In some ways, the very identification of a 
situation as crisis suggests a gap between received orders of thought and new realities.  The 
9 
 angel appears in reference to a specific kind of crisis, however - or perhaps I should say to a 
crisis as it is perceived in a specific kind of way.  Cast in relation to the idea of a separated, 
sacred intelligence, the problem of decision-making invokes the question of attention, of the 
mystery of willing rather than the difficulty of thinking.  Angels do not solve problems.  They do 
not because – consistently in their cultural representations, both current and historical – they 
cannot create.  Instead, they direct the attention of their charges and their communities to 
something that is, always, already there.  Symbols since the early Muslim Aristotelians and the 
later Scholastics of the active intelligence,6 angels are theorized as actualizing something that is 
already potential, whether a truth or an identity.  Their task is merely to bring it to existence 
through the power of their attention, which exalts each things it holds in its arms or in its gaze.  
Angels are the midwives of judgment, never its parents. 
 For the most part, these spirits have been taken up in the past half-century as figures of 
attention in two distinct ways.  The first is as attention-directors.  Like the stars that they have 
since classical times been seen to inspirit, angels function in their recognizable capacity as 
guides, selecting among a field of choices the one we are to take, pointing the way.  So we find, 
for instance, “Digital Angel” tracking devices, miniature GPS satellite receivers that could prove 
useful to the military, pilots, farmers, motorists, and parents willing to implant them in their 
children against the eventuality of a kidnapping.  Echoing the horn-blowing capacity of the 
heavenly choirs, the angel moniker has been used for “intelligent” traffic light systems designed 
to redirect the flow of cars during sensitive times of day, such as rush-hour.  The realm of 
                                                 
6 In Aristotle’s ladder of the causal powers, the angels would be the secondary unmoved movers: powers 
subordinate to God (the Unomved Mover) who initiate a chain of movement which results in the excitation of life 
and the judging action of the individual soul.  Aquinas would later reformulate the definition of the angel as 
secondary unmoved mover as being “infinite from above, finite from below.”  Aristotle’s is essentially a creation 
narrative, an attempt to ground the dynamic expression of difference – birth and change – within a teleological 
determinism upholding eternal law. 
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 science even has lately baptised the “guardian angel gene,” anti-carcinogenic P53, a “quality-
control officer”7 responsible for triggering the repair of mutated cells and for commanding the 
self-destruction of cells beyond repair.  In business, “angel investors” were in a position to bless 
particular would-be corporations, contributing significantly to their success and to the technology 
start-up boom of the 1990’s.8  The idea of angels in this regard helped to coat the risk that such 
parties took, as questions of risk and prediction are among the primary reasons we cry for 
judgment in the first place.  And in politics Americans saw the manipulation of the guardian 
angel pin by the Nicole Braun Simpson Campaign against domestic violence – both during the 
trial (her sister took the stand wearing it “for Nicole”) and after (OJ’s trophies were on tour for 
the campaign, following which they were to be melted down into little guardian angel pins and 
sold, profits going to raise awareness about domestic violence) - and of angelic figures in the 
Elian Gonzalez “Save the Whales”-esque murals, where Miami and its spectators could gaze at 
Elian surrounded by angels frolicking with dolphins.  Ironically, the secular sphere uses the idea 
of angels to organize its operations, from the smallest cell to the cosmos.  And its use of them is 
apt: as mediators between global intelligence and local action, the general and the particular, 
                                                 
7 Specifically the Washington Post dubbed it the “molecular equivalent of a quality-control officer,” a “safeguard 
against random changes,” and a “master-control molecule” that essentially protects against cell anarchy 
(Rensberger).  This concept of the “master-control” is also implicit in the naming of the GPS devices and the traffic 
lighting system co-ordinators that bear “angel” in their title.  The connection with judgment, which requires co-
ordination and central processing of multiple particulars within a holistic view, is here evident.  Interestingly, the 
interplay between angels and the scientific world has historically been inspired by theoretical issues of organization.  
At the beginning of the twentieth century Darwin’s partner, A.R. Wallace used the idea of angels to launch his early 
theory of intelligent design.  In his post-Darwinian work Wallace refers to angels as “organising spirits” who 
mediated the random mutations of evolutionary narrative with the plans of a master intelligence.  In “an infinite 
series of grades of being” the angels manifest the power of the Deity through their agency in the material universe.  
In elaborating this claim Wallace draws as much from New Thought spiritualism as from evolutionary science, 
especially in his focus on “thought-transference” as the angelic means of influencing human action and the idea of 
the Almighty as the “all-soul.”  His ideas diverge from Darwin’s most importantly, however, in their emphasis on 
evolution as a form of progress, which requires the idea of divine intention if one is to read biological history in this 
way. 
8 The general title “angel investors” also worked its way into the specific titles of various groups.  In California, for 
instance, a budding entrepreneur could contact the Sacramento Angels, Sierra Angels, Acorn Angels, Angel’s 
Forum, Band of Angels, Breakfast Angels, or BayAngels.com (see Chan). 
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 angels stand particularly well for the judgments that each of these areas are describing or calling 
us to make. 
 The second function of angels as heralds of the gaze is a mirror image of the first.  In this 
case, rather than directing the attention of their charges, they bestow attention upon them.  This 
capacity refers itself to the human as object instead of subject.  As attending audience, angels 
elevate the status of each individual whom they grace.  The emotion of loneliness so often 
invoked to explain the recent burgeoning interest in angels is relevant here.  Writers of true-
encounters-with-angels books and how-to-contact-your-guardian-angel self-help books 
frequently appeal to the isolation of the reader as a universal problem that the companionship of 
angels can palliate.  One can see this in recent angelic publishing history, apparent in the 1995 
retitling of Billy Graham’s 1975 book of Biblical and modern angel stories, Angels: God’s Secret 
Agents, as Angels: Ringing Assurance that We Are Not Alone.  Even outside the angel industry, 
however, this idea has taken wing.  Memoirist and social critic Richard Rodriguez has, in a PBS 
newshour interview, likened the recent fascination with angels to the contemporary interest in 
animals for the same reason: “Was there ever another era of history where humans seemed so 
desperate to make contact with angels and to talk to animals - a sign of our modern curiosity, 
yes, but evidence too of our utter loneliness” (10/1/97).  The angel’s status as consecrating 
spectator perhaps also fuels the obsessive lust for collecting angels that – while collecting has 
always had something of the neurotic idée fixe about it – seems more than just fetishistic.9  For 
angels are above all figures of grace.  Beyond idiosyncratic self-expression or eccentric hobby, 
                                                 
9 We can see this emphasis on the innumerability of the angelic host reflected in the tendency of collectors to suffuse 
their lived space with a hyperabundance of angel figurines.  This is not just the isolated bust of David on the coffee 
table, whose single form is set up as an object of contemplation of the human.  Oprah’s donation to a Wisconsin 
museum of five hundred angel figures (see Hart 1) is actually a quite modest amount.  Stories abound of people 
knocking out walls and windows in their homes to accommodate enough space for collectibles in their angel rooms.  
And signs in angel stores from San Diego to Virginia Beach proclaim what might be a pop anthem of lonely 
reassurance, “Angels Are Everywhere.” 
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 the pious collection of angels confers on each of us a sovereign, even adulatory, distinction. 
 The dual role of the angelic, allowing us to distinguish judge the world and to find 
ourselves judged and distinguished in a world beyond it, recalls an idea inseparable from angels 
as they have come to us in Western culture: that of the immortal soul.  Since its origin in 
Zoroastrian religion - the religion that was one of the original sources for the angelic idea proper 
- the belief in a separable, personal, and everlasting soul has been directly referrable to the belief 
in a last judgment.  Guardian spirits as well as psychopomps of the dead, Zoroaster’s angels also 
embody the personal ideal which each soul strives toward and with which it ultimately becomes 
one; thus angels minister to this reckoning both during and after our lifetimes.  In them our acts – 
which in Hellenistic discourse belonged to the province of the soul and its judgments – are 
unified into a singular identity (and accountability). 
 The self-aggrandizing urges of the belief in personal attendant angels also express 
themselves in the belief in personal immortality – a belief that has experienced something of a 
renaissance in the recent taste for ghosts, cloning, and various forms of life writing, as well as 
angels.  Easily attributable to a fear of death, the fascination with personal permanence says 
much about what the fear of death might mean.  As the great leveller, death empties all 
distinctions, undoes hierarchy, flattens space and time.  From this perspective, it is not so much 
relinquishing the experience of living that we fear, as relinquishing the feeling that our 
experiences are ours.  The idea of the immortal soul takes care of all that.  In this idea our 
thoughts and responses belong to us forever whether we want them to or not, and in the 
moralized afterlife they name our position in the cosmic order of things. 
 The Zoroastrian version of the final judgment (and its version is also the first version) 
stands out with a single image: the vision of the individual soul at the bridge to the afterworld 
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 waiting to meet the sum of its acts.  They will appear in human form, either as a beautiful woman 
or as a wretched hag.  Virtue, or Vice.  Such a figure is allegory, the storyteller of eternal order 
and individual action and, like the angel, an interpreter between conditions of dividedness and 
ideals of unity, visible and invisible.  Allegory arises originally in somewhat crude form in 
Zoroastrian thinking specifically in references to its angels and their counterparts, the demonic 
daevas.  The latter, together with the archangelic amesha spentas and the lowest order of angels, 
the yazatas, are personifications of abstract ideas who rule the world of appearance.10  They 
answer the prayers of the pious, descending to them on paths of gold.  Conceived within 
Zoroaster’s radically dualist cosmology, these personifications experience the most heightened 
form of literal existence by engaging in battle, the legendary war in heaven that begins the story 
of Paradise Lost.  The cosmic battle allegorizes the personal one and its dramatization of 
subjective recompense, in which the soul becomes liberated from the body at death and judged 
by the figure of its own deeds as destined for heaven or hell. 
 Heaven and hell have less of a hold on contemporary angelic thinking, which emphasizes 
personal distinction over eternal judgment.  What is important in the latter half of the twentieth 
century is the allegorical presumption that the unity of the will is under the aegis of a distant and 
abstract agency rather than the individual’s rational mind.  Immortal souls achieve complete 
expression of their power only in contact with the infinite.11  This is an idea that would be 
developed further in later Judaic and Christian thought.  In Judaism, the allegorical impulse 
                                                 
10 Such allegorical treatment of angels was particularly important in art of the Renaissance and Pre-Raphaelites, two 
other moments of angelic fascination, and reappears today in tarot decks, greeting cards, self-help books, and 
incense lines, to name a few.  For example Magnifiscents’ “Angelic Series” includes “Joy,” “Peace,” “Love,” 
“Inspiration,” and “Hope.”  These are fairly typical modern representatives of angelic allegories, abstractions that 
are so universalized as to be removed from any real concrete application and which pander to the larger abstraction 
of good feeling.  The Zoroastrian virtues, by contrast, include Good Thought/Good Mind, Holy Truth, 
Power/Material Sovereignty, Toil-Mind/Holy Work, Completeness/Wholeness/Health/Salvation, and 
Life/Immortality. 
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 occurs similarly in a field of resonance between double worlds and within a divided 
consciousness seeking its perfection in the revelation of hidden meaning.  Erich Auerbach in 
Mimesis contrasts Jewish and Greek thinking in this matter.  Referring specifically to Homer, 
Auerbach writes, “Later allegorizing trends have tried their arts of interpretation upon him, but to 
no avail.  He resists any such treatment; the interpretations are forced and foreign, they do not 
crystallize into a unified doctrine” (13-14).  That is, opaque narrative lends itself to “a calm 
acceptance of the basic facts of human existence” rather than to a “passionate impulse to rebel 
against them or to embrace them in an ecstasy of submission.”  Both passionate rebellion and an 
ecstasy of submission are enabled by a significant contribution to an idea of angels that is 
distinctly Jewish: the idea of angel as divine messenger, holy utterance.12  More than 
Zoroastrianism, which shares with it its categorization as a religion of the book, Judaism 
demonstrates the deep relation between angels and revealed text, the consecrating 
communication.  As a  system of signs that creates meaning through negation, written language 
provokes both submission (the letter of the law) and rebellion (argument, interpretation).  The 
Jewish scribal tradition of scriptural exegesis incorporated both these urges in its development of 
allegory as a way of reading.  Through allegory and the allegorists, then, the subject could 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 In his writings on allegory and the daemonic, Angus Fletcher puts it this way: allegory demonstrates that “control 
over our acts is an illusion, an eternally unsatisfied search for perfection” (64). 
12 Angels in the Judaic tradition present some difficulty, in that the Jewish scriptures themselves cannot be 
exclusively determined separate from the Zoroastrian thinking as it influenced the Jews through Babylonian 
appropriations during the Exile, at the end of the Exile under the Persian King Cyrus, and under Hellenistic 
cosmopolitanism, which promoted further Persian-Jewish syncretism.  It is clear that the post-exilic books of the 
Jewish Bible are replete with angelic appearances, and that the appearances themselves (in Ezekiel, Daniel, Isaiah 
and Zechariah especially) are more fantastical and hyperbolic.  But even the pre-exilic texts may show the influence 
of Persian metaphysics. Since the seventeenth century scholars – among them Spinoza - have speculated that the 
Pentateuch was actually a composite text; in the nineteenth century, Edouard Reese, Karl Heinrich Graf, and Julius 
Wellhausen suggested that it included material written both before and after the years in captivity, in the sixth-fifth 
centuries B.C.E., a view that is generally accepted.  Important aspects of this theory have been challenged since 
then, but more in the way of modification.  For the most part the idea that the Pentateuch is purely a pre-exilic 
documented is less commonly advanced. ( See the Introduction to Joseph Blenkinsopp’s The Pentateuch: An 
Introduction to the First Five Books of the Bible for a helpful history of Biblical scholarship on this problem.)  What 
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 confront and wrestle with his condition of chosenness. 13   In that chosenness he would discover 
the secret of his own will, evident above all in its own self-negation: sacrifice and submission. 
 Writing much earlier than Auerbach, the nineteenth century German Idealist philosopher 
Friedrich Schelling also compares Greek monochromatic representation with the allegorical 
tradition of a religion springing from the Middle East, in this case Christianity.  His discussion 
makes more apparent than does Auerbach’s, however, the connection between allegory, angels 
and the question of action in a divided and indeterminate landscape.  To do this Schelling 
distinguishes the world of myth, the cosmogony of the Greek gods, from the world of history, the 
revelation of the angels. 
The mythology of the Greeks was a self-enclosed world of 
symbols of ideas, which can be intuited in reality only as gods.  
Pure limitation on the one hand and undivided absoluteness on the 
other is the determining law for each individual god, just as for the 
world of the gods as a whole. . .  Things stand quite differently in a 
religion that directs itself to the infinite directly in and for itself, 
and in which the finite is conceived not as a symbol of the infinite, 
and simultaneously for its own sake, but rather only as an allegory 
of the former and in complete subordination to it.  The whole in 
which the ideas of such a religion become objective is necessarily 
infinite, and not a world completed and limited on all sides.  Its 
                                                                                                                                                             
seems distinctly Jewish is the formulation of angels as agents of divine communication without image and 
personality. 
13 Both Judaism and Zoroastrianism referred exceptionality – as personal immortal or ethnic chosen -  directly to the 
apprehension of divine intelligence; they did so differently, but found common ground in the allegorical 
representation of the name-blessing.  In Judaism the angels (unnamed before the exile) eventually took poetic titles 
that described the attributes of God.  Zoroastrianism angels took on the names of “the first internal elements of the 
mental universe” (Mills 23), the bases of its immortal order and the logic by which it conferred immortality. 
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 figures do not endure, but rather appear; they are not eternal beings 
of nature, but rather historical figures in whom the divine reveals 
itself only temporarily and whose fleeting appearance can be held 
fast only through faith, but never transformed into an absolute 
presence. (62) 
These apparition-like figures, as Schelling later clarifies, are the angels, facilitators of the 
“supersensual dreams” belonging to the Christian sensibility he is describing.  “Christianity, 
which is possible only within absolute disunion, is at its inception already founded on miracles” 
(69), i.e. founded on the cohering of two worlds into one through a moment of illumination and 
blessing.  The angels, presiding over this unifying event, enable the apprehension of the divine 
that in an allegorical world cannot be determined but only revealed. 
To make this point, Schelling – unlike Auerbach - keeps to the romantic aesthetic 
opposing the allegorical and the symbolic, a distinction important at the time for the 
categorization of all artistic modes within a universal system.  But the legendary opposition 
serves another function here, which is to distinguish the static symbol from the symbol charged 
as act.  As Schelling makes clear, allegory implies a dynamic system, limited but not completed.  
Allegorical emblems form a narrative of striving and achievement in a world characterized by 
incompleteness; set existentially in time, doubleness becomes discontinuity.  As a fundamentally 
non-temporal mode, on the other hand, the symbol does not traffic with either narrative or its 
agents.  Beautifully non-ethical, it poses questions of meaning, but not of judgment.  Or, to use 
Auerbach’s distinction between Homer and the Bible, it can be analyzed, but not interpreted.  
And because of this, while the mythic fixities of the symbol may be apropos, they are never 
historical.  History finds itself instead in the allegorical system, a discontinuity of temporal and 
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 mental worlds unified only through a transcendent absence – the miraculous, the infinite, the 
divine.  This “unfathomable” vision is, as Schelling insists, definitively esoteric, but for this 
reason, also disorienting.14  Allegory, a poetic system deriving from the presumption of a 
revealed and an invisible world, moves its pilgrim toward the possibility of emerging into that 
other world, a world ineffably correspondent to the given one in which he travels.  But this 
divide also presupposes a foundational difference that gives the lie to those resemblances and 
correspondences, and so its pilgrim travels through a maze of deception, balking at appearances, 
searching for self-evidence.  He finds it in the angel – not delivering the promise of allegory, but 
emerging out of its own undoing. 
 
 The “fleeting appearance” of angels makes its presence felt in a number of different ways 
in contemporary literature and culture.  This dissertation will look at the breadth of them.  I focus 
on the two periods since the second world war that have seen flurries of interest in angels.  The 
first begins during the war and follows immediately from it, disappearing by the mid to late 
fifties.  The second period begins around the time of the collapse of the Berlin Wall; it continues, 
with bated force, until the current moment early in the twenty-first century.  Angels usher in the 
Cold War and usher it out again, presenting before us the threshold of an unknown order. 
For angels to arise in the popular imagination during transitional times like these is not 
                                                 
14 Michel Foucault, in The Order of Things, describes the disorder resulting from the duality inherent in allegorical 
form.  He credits the semiotic rupture between “similitude and sign” in the seventeenth century with the appearance 
of two new subjects, one of them essentially an allegorist: the madman who confronts the disorder of signs, and the 
poet who manages this disorder.  “At the fringes of a knowledge that separates beings, signs, and similitudes, and as 
though to limit its power, the madman fulfils the function of homosemanticism: he groups all signs together and 
leads them with a resemblance that never ceases to proliferate.  The poet fulfills the opposite function: his is the 
allegorical role; beneath the language of signs and beneath the interplay of their precisely delineated distinctions, he 
strains his ears to catch that ‘other language,’ the language, without words or discourse, of resemblance” (49-50, 
Foucault’s italics).  Allegoria, in Greek “other-speaking,” speaking through the other, is the signifying system of the 
hidden, moving forward always through its semiotic gestures towards a sacred not-there.  The poet, whose skills are 
divinatory as well as discursive, is the only one who can speak in this tongue, and imagine that he understands it. 
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 unusual, especially during transition in the nature and source of institutional power.  The first 
great period of widespread angelic fervor15 occurred in Palestine after the Exile ended in 538  
B.C.E. and before the emergence of rabbinic Judaism in the first and second centuries of the 
common era.  This was the time when the “intertestamentary” biblical books were written – 
notably the Book of Tobit and the Book of Enoch, and when separatist cults like the Essene-
based group that produced the angel-ridden and apocalyptic Dead Sea Scrolls flourished.  
Multiple pieties competed within an uneven terrain of power, each seeking a return to authentic 
tradition while coexisting with and often incorporating foreign influences.  It was in this climate 
that the vision of angels at this time was produced by the early followers of Jesus Christ.16  
Another awakening of interest in angels occurred in the sixteenth and especially the seventeenth 
centuries.  In Holland pamphlets circulated telling people how to initiate angelic visions and 
encounters, in Italy angels experienced a sea change with the creation of the cherubic putti, and 
in England Spenser, Bunyan, and Milton assured the status of angels at the level of the literati.  
All of the Renaissance upheavals giving birth to new formations in the economic, religious, 
political, and global orders resulted in increasing centralization and rationalization of power 
structures across an also broadening and increasingly diversified base.  And the last distinctive 
angel upwelling before the recent crazes occurred in the Victorian era.  These angels have much 
in common with those of the New Age; abstract and sentimental, they return to allegories of 
                                                 
15 That is, where there is a definable rise in angelic images and ideas across multiple sectors of society and distinct 
from standard representations of them in religious and cultural expression. 
16 A significant exception would be the letters authored by Paul, who (especially in the letter to the Colosseans) 
opposes angel worship as a threat to Christ as intermediary.  This is a position that was replicated in the Reformation 
and even today as evangelists decry the angel craze as a religious decadence.  In some ways it is strange that 
Christology and angelology should coexist – but not because one threatens to take the place of the other, but because 
their philosophies are so opposed.  Christ’s redemption presupposes a universally fallen humanity; angels (with the 
exception of those that guard sacred  places from the human) discriminate amongst individuals – exalting some, 
condemning others.  Technically, then, the only appropriate angels in Christianity are those who herald the divine, 
i.e. Christ himself.  In this sense the Reformation’s stance suggested a doctrinal purity.  More likely, however, is the 
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 transcendence, offering a romance of pure ideas.  Unlike the fiercely otherworldly angels of the 
Middle Ages, these “forget-me-nots of the sky” (to borrow Longfellow’s phrase) generalize their 
subjects through idealized and intentional cultural anachronism, harnessing for the status quo the 
otherworldly power of an imagined bygone age.  The worldly power of the moment, let alone the 
future, seems itself too heavy. 
 Though they announce the birth of something beyond, angels focus their attention on the 
past.  This is putting it crudely.  More accurately, they look upon any temporality as though it 
were the past.  From Capra’s It’s a Wonderful Life, which brilliantly converts a crisis of the 
moment (what am I going to do?) to an affirming thought-experiment about personal history, to 
the born-yesterday, backward-looking angels in Kushner’s Angels in America who try to halt 
progress, to the little cherubs, the young contemplating the world with the eyes of the old, angels 
frame the moment and its futurity as though it were already judged, already proven historically.  
Their gaze may be sentimental or apocalyptic or prophetic; whatever the nature of its 
objectification, angels attend to the moment with retroactive gravity.  The allegorical journey is 
at any moment available to them in its completion, while the subject struggles on toward infinity. 
 That there are limits as well as possibilities in such a way of thinking – which is as much 
a way of looking – goes without saying.  In granting a moment of the present or imagined future 
the quality of the fait accompli, one approaches it with acquiescence and passivity.  We can 
never act in the past, just as we cannot act and think at the same moment.  Instead, we receive it 
as we would information.  Reality, in this context, becomes a matter of intelligence.  As the poet 
Rilke wrote in his angelic Duino Elegies, “where once an enduring house stood now a cerebral 
structure crosses our path.”  This cerebral structure is the memory, in which the house appears to 
                                                                                                                                                             
coincidence in all these occasions of a belief in salvation by faith alone, in which the concept of free will – a concept 
which angels exist in reference to - becomes irrelevant at best and at worst deeply threatening. 
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 us in its pure image and idea rather than its existence.  Endowing the present moment with the 
quality of memory invests it with the power and status of this ideational separation from the 
present, turning participation into spectatorship, action into awe.  To elaborate more fully, 
angelic benediction splits the present, dividing it between its phenomenal occurrence and its 
judgment in the eyes of the angel; appearing as though already enacted, it appeals to the power of 
the imagination.  Whether we understand this imaginative receptivity to enable a different kind 
of action, in turn, depends on how we read the nature of this divide. 
While the representation of the idea of angelic vision is largely consistent, there is a 
spectrum of attitudes toward it.  For some texts, the angelic touch of history keeps the past alive 
– such are the faux-angels of departed spirits, for instance in Field of Dreams or A Guy Named 
Joe, which position the past not as a ghost come to beg the present for its due, but as a spirit 
invisibly operating at the heart of things.  Other celebratory versions look to the angel’s gaze of 
pastness as making the present destiny and the future knowable – hence the figure of the prophet.  
But there are texts that see the angel tragically as well, notably Walter Benjamin’s allegory of the 
Angel of History.  In his essay the angel is itself rendered impotent by what its backwards-
looking flight into the future means it is not seeing: which is “progress.”  “Don’t mingle, don’t 
migrate,” Tony Kushner’s angel tells us.  The vision of the separate intelligence calls our 
attention to inaction, stasis, and inertia in the midst of crisis.  Yet even in Benjamin’s reading 
there is possibility.  Like certain other texts, it is precisely this angelic not-seeing that, in 
representing a world stripped of its normalizing roles and conventions, prepares a different path 
for the will to follow.  Where a given “angel text” falls in this spectrum depends, interestingly, 
on the form of its dissemination.  Popular culture tends to use them optimistically.  The angels of 
true-encounter narrative, television, and popular film spell providence and good fortune in their 
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 graces; the angels of what could be called high modernist texts, however – both literary and 
visual – discover only decadence.  In popular culture limitation serves as an enchanted vessel 
that discloses in its depths an interior infinite.  In the modernist literature, limits are seen as such; 
finitude signals a no-exit of repetition and disaster.  For this reason the angels themselves appear 
differently.  As I describe them in the first three chapters, the angels of family, self, and society 
appear in all their naïve splendor.  The angels of history, however, as the fourth chapter shows, 
are incomplete, halted, or deformed.  Each type of angel allegorizes the sight that it beholds and 
the subject whom it serves as ideal spirit, whether that subject receives it or remain separated 
from its intelligence. 
 My dissertation proceeds, roughly, from positive to negative treatments, though most of 
the truly powerful and influential angel texts contain elements of both.  Each chapter is 
dominated by a different angelic figure: the guardian-messenger angel, the fallen angel, the 
wrestling angel, and the impotent angel.  Each of these figures, in its turn, unlocks a different 
aspect of allegory that modernity attempts to solve, the problem of the relation between reason 
and action. 
The first chapter focuses on the idea of allegorical journey, establishing in its discussion 
of this movement the nature of the double worlds and their relation time.  Specifically, I focus on 
the conceit of the crashed car, which so dominates recent literature of true encounters with 
angels, but also as it opens up the angelic revelations in films of the sentimental fantasy genre, 
especially The Preacher’s Wife and above all It’s a Wonderful Life.  This chapter also unpacks 
the essential features of the angel in general – reading its attention as a form of chosenness, 
naming, and beginning, which I discuss in reference to the thinking of Immanuel Kant and 
Thomas Aquinas.  The second chapter elaborates the conceptual basis of allegorical thinking as a 
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 form of agency.  In some ways this is the most complicated of the chapters.  Largely devoted to 
analyzing the angel self-help books of the 1990’s, it isolates in them an attempt to imagine the 
human in angelic terms as a separated intelligence.  As an attempt to solve a specifically inward 
crisis and division through an angelized rationalism, the self-help books find themselves dogged 
by the problem of illusion, a problem that St. Augustine and René Descartes similarly make clear 
belongs in the domain of the fallen angel Satan.  I argue that in demonizing the idea of self-
projection implicit in their human angelism, these post-recovery books are trying to find a way 
out of the fierce dualism of the recovery movement, and failing.  The third chapter takes up the 
notion of the allegorical subject as fool, and the specific kind of thinking this allows – though 
with the important change that it is the human, and not the angel, who functions as fool.  I pair 
the TV show Touched by an Angel and Kushner’s Angels in America in order to talk about texts 
that appropriate angels for explicitly socially conscious purposes, and to do so position their 
subjects in struggle with the angel as naïve voice of truth.  The play marks a departure from the 
earlier texts in rejecting its angel and her historical simplicity, recognizing that the angelic 
emphasis on receptivity and the imagination may be productive for theater, but is antithetical to 
an activist ideology.  In the fourth chapter I build on Kushner’s idea, but in texts that maintain 
their engagement with the angel, now presented as impotent and unreachable.  This chapter 
examines the fundamental incompleteness of allegory through a different kind of receptiveness 
than the other chapters describe, that of entering into the disorder, the chaos, the ruin and the 
crisis to which the angel responds.  The writers most invested in this vision in America are poets, 
inspired by a Latin American marvelous realism that has its own relationship with angels.  In 
their work and in other writings of Benjamin the thwarted angel reveals a surprising ancestry in 
the bird of prey; in his claws impotence is unveiled as patience, waiting for the opening to seize 
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 history in all its decay and transport it into the future. 
Each chapter is devoted to a different formation of the angel as it is currently represented 
and to the different genres in which it appears.  The sequence of the chapters, however, follows 
the dissertaton’s unifying problematic.  In working through the idea of judgment, the chapters 
mimic the process of judgment itself.  The first chapter, in dealing with angelic encounter, 
echoes the initial moment of sensory contact in response to which the subject’s reaction takes 
place.  The second follows the course of sense-impressions to cognition, thought, 
conceptualization.  The third translates thought to will, exploring angels in terms of their ethical 
valuation.  And the fourth apprehends judgment in its collapse, probing it from the perspective 
articulated in Benjamin’s work on allegory that any idea or practice reveals its essence more in 
its destruction than in its successful operation.  For this reason the fourth chapter is in many ways 
the key to all the others.  In the ruins of its expression and performance what judgment reveals is 
its dependence on its own antithesis: a non-rational simplicity outside of the imagination but 
without which the imagination cannot function.  This simple other appears in the first three 
chapters respectively as the perception of formlessness, the revelation of intuition, and the 
truthfulness of the naïve; all of these illuminations define the nature of the contact between 
human and angel, arousing the imaginative activity that such encounter represents.  They are 
disruptive, as all fantasy is essentially disruptive, but like all fantasy they also perform a divine 
function, acting as the “Otherness – that is, with the big ‘O’ – that sense of something divine in 
other people that can make you even more whole.”17  This is the angelic message, that the 
                                                 
17 Rabbi Norman J. Cohen in interview with Tony Kushner (229). 
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 reduction of judgment to the unknowable provides the unity and the immediacy that makes 
judgment possible,18 and with it, distinctive action19 – the act worth remembering. 
The fourth chapter is different from the others in its emphasis on partialness, on ruin and 
exposure.  Where the first three present an angelic reality external to the system the subject 
inhabits, in the fourth the system appears outside of itself.  Allegory’s “other-speaking” unearths 
this interior division, spreading it before us on the surfaces of things, making it an image for our 
beholding and - separated from our experience - for our choosing as well.  This is a kind of 
death, the angel frozen in a prism of air, blocked from his life-giving annunciation.  Far away 
from the crisis, the attendant angel hovers without power to move our own attentions.  It is only 
by our own wills that we may turn to look at him, in his decrepitude now the object rather than 
the agent of our intelligence.  What we see in this tattered illumination, and what we choose to 
do with it, is a subject of our most infinite and invisible determinations. 
                                                 
18 In De Anima Aristotle emphasizes the importance of indivisibility of subject and time for the process of judgment: 
“the judging sense must be undivided, and must also judge without an interval” (III.ii). 
19 Writing in regards to the longstanding ontological argument between realism and idealism, Henri Bergson 
explains the connection between imagination and action.  In Matter and Memory he describes theories of science 
and theories of consciousness as both positing very different ideas of the image.  Scientific realism sees the image as 
sense impression, idealism sees it as representation of things.  The first identifies the image as a response to the 
outside world, the second as an interpretation of it.  The gulf is wide between these two, and between their failures 
as systems.  Bergson uncovers in realism the inability to account for reception as a form of intelligence, concluding 
that realism is “bound to make perception an accident, and, consequently, a mystery” (27).  In counterpoint, idealist 
thinking cannot account for objective law and its practicability, thus rendering science itself an accident “and its 
success a mystery.”  The only way he discovers out of this Scylla and Charybdis of mutual mystifications is to cease 
considering perception as a means of knowledge, and instead understand it as a mode of action.  Image perception 
demonstrates its nature in practice, in decisions and their performance.  In other words, image is something that 
effects, that has power. 
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 2. Roadside Annunciations 
 
On the day that George Bailey contemplates suicide a number of daily life pitfalls beset 
him.  Viewers of It’s a Wonderful Life’s may remember George tangling with the bannister knob; 
Janie endlessly playing the same holiday piece on the piano; Mary shouting at him to leave the 
house and the crying children alone; and the schoolteacher’s husband punching him in the jaw.  
All of this follows the dramatic event of the eight-thousand-dollar deposit missing from the 
Building and Loan, an event that George reads to mean “banktruptcy, scandal, prison.”  Each of 
these lesser, essentially domestic events represents some form of George’s life crisis, precipitated 
by the threat of public shame and exile.  In doing so, each event also crystallizes the state of 
emergency already implicit in his life’s narrative and essential personhood.  Frank Capra 
presents to us a Faust story in reverse, in which a young man with much promise and ambition 
but also much responsibility falls lower with each effort to resist self-inflation and defer the call 
of personal freedom.  Such internal resistance and deferral, the movie suggests, inevitably 
produce an adult night terror, a state of environmental siege on the boundaries of the self, its 
perception and its will. 
 To understand It’s a Wonderful Life as a prototype of contemporary angelic narrative 
means looking to those aspects of the film that establish the angel’s necessity.  From the 
perspective of an audience familiar with the movie’s cultic status, the angel must seem to 
embody some essence in the film as a whole.  The audience must feel that the entire purpose as 
well as structure of the movie would collapse without its presence.  In other words, we read the 
film as angel-text only when we read it as asking specifically for the idea of an angel, not just for 
a miracle or other divine intervention.  The essence of the angelic annunciation, in fact, is its 
cognitive basis, changing the subject’s perception of his life, rather than his life itself.  If the 
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 latter – if the angel served strictly as a novelty of the plot - it would be merely mechanical.  Such 
a representation would be deeply contradictory.  For the angel has, in its many traditions and 
guises, been represented as an anti-mechanical figure.  Whether as a herald of the unexpected 
and unknown, bridging old and new orders at the moment of their discontinuity, as the 
interruptor of profane passage or life-denying trains of thought, or as the expression of a divinely 
occasioned chosenness, the angel appears in opposition to mechanical determinism.  In films of 
the sentimental fantasy genre, to which It’s a Wonderful Life belongs, the last, expressive role 
typifies the function of the angel.  Angelic intervention enables the plot to unfold as an 
expression of the character and identity of the human protagonist, not at all as a function of some 
saving grace to which the protagonist is beholden.  The angel is handmaid to the human, not the 
other way around, his calling-benediction an expression of the generative power of the 
annunciated subject.  For the driving preoccupation of angel-films as a whole is the question of 
the relation between the subject as a particular being and the realization of this particularity in 
the life he lives.  Not just agents of cosmic decision, angels help call this realization into being.  
Put in other terms, fate produces the deus ex machina; angels answer to the personal soul. 
In keeping with this trajectory, Capra’s angel arrives in the event of mechanical failure, at 
the moment where the very concept of mechanism fails to move the story forward, fails to 
account for the continuity and coherence of human being in the world.  So in angel films as well 
as angel stories, the angel appears unexpendable.  It arrives on the scene presumptuously, 
familiarly, as if already present in the sequence of events that precipitate its arrival, just as 
Clarence – watching It’s a Wonderful Life with its uninitiated audience – has already been 
present in them for us.  The angel becomes visible only in the wake of the dissolution and 
exposure these events produce. 
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 The events of December 24th lead George to such dissolution and exposure – to a pre-
angelic breakdown.  This is the day that his brother Harry Bailey receives the Congressional 
Medal of Honor while George falls steadily into a mire that threatens to exile him from the very 
community for which he had sacrificed his dreams of freedom.  Even before he gets knocked 
down by the schoolteacher’s husband, he sits weeping at the bar, praying for help and admitting 
“I’m at the end of my rope.”  The reminder of his brother’s success just before his own threatens 
to become destroyed, the chaos and eccentricity of his home and family, Potter’s comment that 
he’s worth more dead than alive, all produce the feeling that he has lost control over every role 
that has ever defined him.  Yet for the audience, for the movie and the narrative itself, these 
mounting catastrophes are not enough to define George’s crisis as a proto-angelic one.  We 
require another form of collapse in order for the angel to articulate his presence convincingly, 
believably, necessarily.  The crucial moment that – for us - prepares George Bailey to receive his 
angel diverges from these other crises of place and identity.  This moment occurs outside the 
known community, on the road.  It is anonymous and brief.  George has just drunkenly left 
Martini’s Bar, Martini having solicitously tried to get him to stay and rest after he’d been 
punched by Mr. Welch.  George staggers out, into his car and the snowstorm.  In the next shot 
we see the black car careening into a tree.  He totters around, repeatedly trying to shut the 
driver’s side door that formerly had refused to open, when a man with an umbrella walks out of 
his house, comes up and begins to berate him.  “Now look what you did.  My great-grandfather 
planted this tree!  Hey you!  Hey you! Come back here you drunken fool!  Get this car outta 
here!” 
 This moment diverges from the previous ones.  Before the incident with the car, George 
has been recognized as George in all his various roles, with each of his acts named and read 
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 within those roles.  Even in his infractions he belongs to community, family, and friends.  The 
man with the tree, however, hails him as an unknown.  “Hey you!”  This is the first time that 
George Bailey ceases to be George Bailey, becoming instead an anonymous outcast who violates 
the community’s history (“my great-grandfather planted that tree”) rather than heroically 
defining it.  For a second George appears as the ghost he will later become in the film’s 
nightmare sequence, rushing around seeking in people’s lives and voices an echo of his own 
name.  It is as this stranded, nameless individual that George stumbles onto the bridge, narrowly 
missing being run over.  In the middle of an escalating white-out he finds himself on the edge of 
self-annihilation, and about to meet his angel. 
 George Bailey’s collapse is a general one, but it is not collapse in general that petitions or 
aesthetically justifies angelic arrival.  The narrative we have here isolates a moment of 
dissociation of the individual and collective history as a prelude to exceptional visitation.  The 
disturbing anonymity is significant, not just as a form of “unlearning”20 prefatory to learning that 
our hero is about to discover, but more importantly as a way to set up a universal context that 
will then be undone as George realizes his special role in the town.  The figure is anonymous; he 
could be anybody – not just to the enraged tree-owner, but to us.  What we find, however, and 
what drives the action from that point onwards, is that in fact he isn’t just anybody.  The 
appearance of Clarence at just that moment proves it.  What we first understood as a crisis of 
constriction – no options, no freedom, walls closing in – becomes reframed as a crisis of 
possibility.  There is nothing that limits George Bailey as George Bailey at this moment, until 
Clarence takes him under his not-yet-existent wing. 
                                                 
20 I take this term from Carlos Castaneda’s Journey to Ixtlan.  According to his teacher Don Juan, “unlearning” 
describes the necessary erasure of the ideas and systems with which we organize and interpret experience, in order 
to “see” it at a level of gnostic illumination. 
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  Towards the beginning of Wim Wenders’ Wings of Desire we hear a child’s voice asking 
questions.  “Why am I me and not you?  Why am I here and not there?”  These are not adult 
questions, these questions questioning the “illusion of a world before the world.”  As the camera 
worms its way through the rooms of a house, pausing before a child smiling and watching TV, 
we see this illusion and hear this voice.  And as the camera moves on we find these questions – 
which come right before a montage of soliloquys in cars - humming beneath the worldly surfaces 
of adult thoughts and meditations that the rest of the film will trace.  Like Wings of Desire, It’s a 
Wonderful Life presents a pageant of the mystery the child questions, the mystery of personal 
singularity, of self-possession speaking from a particular place, of knowing the ground beneath 
our feet.  This pageant subjectivizes a larger problem, that of understanding why, among a range 
of unknown and infinite possibility, things happen the way they do: how it is that history 
happens.  In these movies the advent of the angel specifically makes the question of historical 
eventfulness a question about the self, for in angelic annunciation history answers always to its 
perception and apprehension.  If the only one capable of answer this question is the founding 
prophet, we must grasp how it is the prophet comes into his vision, and what must happen for 
that vision to become his own.  This is where George Bailey’s snow-covered confusion finally 
breaks down, tottering on the threshold of the angel’s familiar and unerring greeting. 
 
I.  Conceiving Motions 
 In the early 1990’s a chorus of angel stories appeared, nonfiction stories describing 
people’s encounters with angels.  Such stories of course were not unknown.  Many of the 
anthologies in fact reprinted stories from previous times and decades, ranging from the Biblical 
into the modern era.  Billy Graham’s Angels: God’s Secret Agents had made a mark in 1975, 
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 only to be reissued with greater fanfare in 1994.  Beginning primarily with the 1990 publication 
by Ballantine of Sophy Burnham’s A Book of Angels: Reflections on Angels Past and Present 
and True Stories of How They Touch Our Lives, the true encounter craze gave voice to a host of 
stories testifying to angelic rescues and visitations, whether miraculous and full-blown or subtle 
and uncanny. 21  Among the panoply of short-circuits, lost ways, and near-misses, one narrative 
type stands out: the scenario of the stranded motorist. 
 The theme of the stranded motorist evolved from stories of serious crisis.  Tales of angels 
rescuing sailors lost at sea, of wayfarers lost on the road, and of hikers lost in the woods 
eventually produced stories of travellers lost without a car.  In Angel Letters Burnham herself 
comments on the number of tales of “encounters of near accidents and flat tires” she received for 
the book.  As a rule, these stories tended to situate angels outside of the borders of civilization.  
We find them, to quote the movie Michael, “by the side of the road in the middle of nowhere.”22  
                                                 
21 The history of the word “encounter” is illuminating.  Through its origins in “countenance” it refers to a kind of 
face-to-face meeting, especially one that involves conflict or battle.  This circulates especially during early modern 
British writing, apparent in Milton in 1667: “hov’ring a space, till winds the signal blow / To join their dark 
encounter in mid-air” (Paradise Lost, ii 718, cited in the Oxford English Dictionary), and in travel accounts from the 
late sixteenth to the close of the seventeenth centuries, equipped with strapping titles like “Great and bloody news 
from Turnham-Green, or, a relation of sharp encounter between the Earl of Pembrook and his company, with the 
constable and watch belonging to the parish of Chiswick on the 18 instant, in which conflict one Mr. Halfpenny, a 
constable of the said parish, were mortally wounded. . . : with several other remarkable circumstances” (1680).  This 
is the historical moment in which with the newspaper “news” is created, born in cataclysmic rupture between the 
new world and the old.  It accrued the sense of news also in the seventeenth century as “an idea that suddenly 
presents itself, as it were by accident; a happy thought” (OED), extended also at that time in its reference to a casual 
and accidental meeting (accidental in a lighter way than for Mr. Halfpenny) - encounter as undesigned and 
unforeseen (a sense now enshrined in the Los Angeles Airport’s Barbarella-inspired Encounter Restaurant).  The 
association with transit and movement is apparent in the Shakespearean uses of the word also, and in ways even 
closer on the surface to angelic annunciations, as an accosting or address, the style or manner of this address, and 
especially as an amorous interview.  Though these senses became obsolete, they resurfaced in the way that 
“encounter” was later appropriated (starting in 1967) in the phrases “encounter therapy” and “encounter groups.”  
Here the ethos of being “moved” through a form of emotive communion - with others as well as with the self - takes 
shape.  The idea of being “touched” central to this kind of encounter seems to carry with it all the other layers of 
meaning, of confrontation, spontaneity, and change.  It is out of this history that the series of books testifying to 
personal encounters with angels, pervasive during the first half of the 1990's, emerges. 
22 These same words appear in one story reprinted in Sophy Burnham’s Angel Letters.  “In November 1985 I was 
traveling with my ten-year old daughter to my parents’ home, which is a one and a half hours’ drive.  Dusk was 
descending as we started up the four-lane mountain highway.  Suddenly we heard a loud pop and the steering wheel 
shook as I guided the car off the road onto the shoulder.  Getting out of the car, I saw I had a flat tire and was in the 
middle of nowhere” (17).  This image is more detailed in the grocery store “minimag” account of Adele and Jay 
31 
 Many of the tales read as though they could take place anywhere; they obliterate all identifying 
traces, and position such obliteration as a precondition for angelic encounter.  The erasure of a 
shared, consensual knowledge – the knowledge of geography and place – becomes necessary for 
the reception of the exceptional, singularizing knowledge that the angel provides.  So, in 
conjunction with the collapse of the driving machine, the driving snow appears as a favorite 
scenic component – as in It’s a Wonderful Life, whiting out all perceptual definition and 
direction.23  One of the first major collections of angels stories to inaugurate the recent trend 
begins with such a story, a tale of a car breakdown in the middle of a blizzard.  In Where Angels 
Walk: True Stories of Heavenly Visitors, Joan Wester Anderson opens her bestseller with a 
narrative of a road trip gone bad.  “The Beginning,” a story she tells in her travelling lectures and 
which is included in the Reader’s Digest video of angel stories, describes the predicament of two 
young men – Tim and Jim - driving home from college for Christmas break. Just west of Fort 
Wayne, Indiana, in the face of a mounting snowstorm, their car sputters to a stop.  Highlighting 
the defamiliarization as well as the danger, Anderson writes, “It was as if they had landed on an 
alien, snow-covered planet.”  The two boys huddle together panicking in the subzero 
temperatures, when suddenly a tow truck appears and its driver – calm, uncurious, and almost 
completely hidden by mounds of snow clothing - offers to haul them back to their friend’s house.  
They rush inside to get money to pay him, but upon returning outside discover that the tow truck 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rodriquez’s fateful trip through the Florida everglades.  Jay – who had just undergone bypass surgery and thus was 
not fit for physical exertion, informed his wife they had a problem: “About one hour into desolate Alligator Alley in 
Everglades country with not a service station visible for at least another hour, Jay announced we had a flat tire” 
(McCall 24).  Adele Rodriguez magnifies the stakes of this isolation later, pointing out that though “The picture we 
presented to passing traffic was certainly not one of a major crisis,” “What if something had happened to him in the 
middle of the Everglades with absolutely nothing around for miles and miles?” (25, 27).  The formless, 
undifferentiated, and empty location, then, acts as one of the primary sources and markers of crisis in these stories, 
even when the “picture” seems otherwise. 
23 Additionally, as George stumbles onto the bridge he nearly gets run over by a car.  The driver angrily shouts out, 
“Hey what’s the matter with ya, look where you’re going!”  Reading this structurally, the combination of anonymity 
and spatial confusion seems almost to push George over the edge. 
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 had gone – “no taillights disappearing into the distance, no engine noise echoing through the 
silent streets, nothing at all the mark the tow truck’s presence.”  There was only one pair of tire 
marks in the snow, “and they belonged to Tim’s car…” 
Two details set the story apart.  The first is that one of the boys is Anderson’s son.  The 
story of the anxious mother waiting at home parallels the story of the lost boys.  Just after 
midnight she prays for help for her son, right at the moment that (accounting for the one hour 
time difference between Eastern and Central Standard Time) the tow truck appears.  The story 
thus establishes Anderson’s personal connection to angels and explains the inspiration for her 
belief in them – or more accurately, for her attention to that belief.  Anderson is, after all, about 
to become she-who-gathers-angel-stories, a messenger of the messengers, and requires her own 
creation narrative.  The other detail returns us to George Bailey: Anderson’s story takes place on 
Christmas Eve.  “It was just past midnight on December 24, 1983.”  This is not just a sacred but 
a liminal day, in its self-understanding as the moment of transformation before the birth of the 
king and the next generation in the divine lineage.  Though both Clarence and the tow truck 
driver act specifically as guardian angels, they also perform an annunciating function as well.  
Clarence presents to George the negative of his own existence, an experience of anonymity that 
in counterpoint hails his birth as true father of Bedford Falls.  Anderson’s angel rescues her 
status as mother from the intrepidities of male youth (driving from Connecticut to Illinois in 
blizzard conditions), thus enacting a miraculous rebirth of both mother and child.  As tales of 
angelic annunciation, then, both It’s a Wonderful Life and Anderson’s “Beginning” detail and 
confirm their function as stories about parents and sons. 
In angelic narratives, themes of annunciation and parenthood are inextricable.  Both 
picture the theme of supreme beginning in the material world, of a temporal eruption that confers 
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 a kind of eternal return.  It is as if the advent of divine news cannot be rendered apart from the 
ideas of chosenness and personal immortality.  Revelation in these narratives presumes the 
concept of the creative “soul” so important in the history of divine and imaginative encounter.  
As I will elaborate in this chapter, this conception of the divine messenger as agent of personal 
self-determination and continuity fundamentally proposes a theory of identity and agency (and, 
as I will slowly elaborate through the course of this dissertation, of history).  At the moment, 
however, what appears most startlingly is the impregnating performance of the message and its 
designations.  We see this most prominently in the Judeo-Christian tradition and sacred texts.  
Gabriel appears before Mary with the both terrifying and marvelous news of her mothering God; 
an angel comes to Hagar to save her in the desert, motivating her with the promise that her son 
Ishmael will father a new race; an angel stays the hand of Abraham poised to sacrifice his only 
son; an angel wrestles with Jacob, after which he renames him “Israel,” prince, at once naming 
both the group and the man.  These are all theological events that share the following: 1) a 
definition of a people - whether through ethnic, religious or universal human categories, 2) an 
assertion of “parenthood” as simultaneously a receptive and a (re)generative act, and 3) the 
bestowing of the seed as a kind of news or intelligence.  The overall story that these elements 
relate involves the coming of a singularity in the form of a word or name (Abraham, now the 
“father of nations”; “and you shall call your son Ishmael”; Mary, “mother of God”; “Thy name 
shall be called no more Jacob, but Israel”) promising individuating power.  The annunciation, as 
both the message and its bearing, mediates between God and individual, life and destiny, people 
and representative.  Within the variations of this super-narrative, angels deliver to their subjects 
the sign of a choice proliferation (their call is itself a sign) as if their words were seeds already 
reflecting, not just anticipating, their fecund significance.  For the prophets who receive the 
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 divine calling, discriminatory revelation is its own blessing, gracing each with an identity that 
has the power to name itself. 
 In the periods that I am focusing on - the years following the end of the Cold War and 
the last world war - much of the angelic cinema that has emerged has taken male figures as the 
protagonists of its angelic annunciations.  Given the already sentimental nature of the majority of 
these films, and of the popular invocation of angels in general, one can imagine that having a 
female receive an angel visitor would render the emotion so cloying as to be almost grotesque.24  
On the screen, where the presentation of gender seems at times to swallow the camera whole, 
feminized sentiment must make a pact with masculinized distance if it is to retain any dignity.  
This is not just a question of balance; the medium of film demands to be experienced at both the 
levels of spectatorship and participation, a doubleness which the immediacy of the image 
constantly challenges.  Women, since at least the Victorian era always the express 
representatives of the angelic human, render the angel either superfluous25 or too close an 
identification – except in those cases which I will discuss later in this chapter where the angel is 
counterpoised to the female subject through an erotic separation.  Written texts, on the other 
hand, having the detaching mechanisms of narration, irony, and the word itself at their disposal, 
can take greater liberties with their angels and other sentimental visitations.  In fact female 
protagonists seem to be a favorite in recent fiction about angels (see for instance The Vintner’s 
Luck or Ann Enright’s The Wig My Father Wore).  None of this fiction, however, has attained 
the iconic force of the angel films, and it is possible that the films get more quickly to the heart 
                                                 
24 The major exceptions are the 1947 The Bishop’s Wife and its 1996 remake, The Preacher’s Wife.  The relationship 
between the angels and the wives is romantic rather than sentimental, however; in each the true sentimental 
relationship, where the angel acts as guarantor of memory and destiny, is with the minister. 
25 The need to maintain distinctions among primary cast members is perhaps best articulated by a moment of 
theater-interchange.  Mary Martin, when informed that she was to sing opposite Mario Pinza in Roger’s and 
Hammerstein’s Broadway version of South Pacific, joked, “What do you want – two basses?” 
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 of the affair: angels are figures of foundational power; such power rightfully belongs to men.  In 
either case, the kind of male protagonist that typifies the genre belongs to a specific breed, one 
best expressed in the style of acting that Jimmy Stewart did so well, and could hardly do 
differently.  This style could be defined as a certain awkwardness, a sense of barely contained 
eccentric spirit pushing at the boundaries that circumscribe it - much as George Bailey crows 
about “shaking the dust” of Bedford Falls.  David Niven, who originally had been considered to 
play the angel in The Bishop’s Wife and lost the role to an insistent Cary Grant,26 portrays the 
discouraged bishop with a similar lack of grace.  Grant was right to insist on the casting: his 
debonair polish better suited the angel as an achieved form of being.  The bishop, ridden with 
inconsistency and hesitancy, lacks the necessary smoothness to contain the power that is 
potential within him.  Such barely inhibited inner excess is not the same passionate restraint that 
we see in the figures Steve Cohan identified as the new “boys,” postwar cinematic youths whose 
inner majesty struggles against the anachronistic structures of an adult world, a rebellion 
emblematized by the T-shirt and jeans of James Dean or Marlon Brando.27  George, Henry, and 
others prophet-protagonists like them are adult spirits (“You were born older George”) whose ill-
adjustment to convention ultimately serves to reinvigorate convention with charm and personal 
power.  Awkward keeps cozier company with the past than cool. 
 Though this affect - perfected in Jimmy Stewart’s simultaneously expansive yet jerky 
movements, unpredictable lope, and trademark quivery drawl (as though he were always slightly 
drunk) - does not necessarily feminize its male leads, it does align them with a distinctly 
feminine role.  Potter even calls attention to this role when he refers to George as having been 
“trapped into frittering his life away playing nursemaid to a lot of garlic-eaters.”  From the 
                                                 
26 Grant apparently threatened to leave the project if the original roles were to be switched, as director Henry Koster 
at one point proposed, and had to be paid an addition hundred grand to remain. 
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 beginning George paternally watches out for others’ mistakes – his brother, Mr. Gower, Uncle 
Billy, gives them homes, confers life.  In the comforting real-day world of Bedford Falls the 
traditional Italian Martini looks up to George, an eager boyish grin on his face, in contrast to the 
Nighttown world of George’s absence, where the bruiser Nick replaces Martini’s filial piety with 
a challenging, powerful irreverence.  Nick is now George’s rival, the father of law, discipline, 
and fast physical consumption inverting the paternal logic of George Bailey’s reflective, 
nurturing production.  He is George’s negation as parent, his masculine cool the opposite of the 
latter’s feminine awkwardness.  It is Clarence, the eternal (and immortal) child, who reclaims the 
latter power for George.  At the end of these sentimental angel films the annunciated figures give 
birth – to the community they lead and in which they function as prophet, and in reaffirming 
their own status as fathers.  (The less typical 1995 Australian film Angel Baby in fact describes 
the story of a manic depressive whose schizophrenic girlfriend dies at the end of the film giving 
birth to an angelic spirit with whom she’d been in communication.  Harry, however, remains the 
central focus of the narrative, and it is his coming into fatherhood and subsequent suicide that 
define this story of spirit becoming actualized in the material world.)   Children in general 
occupy critical roles in this genre.  Zuzu and her petals, the orphaned girl in Angels in the 
Outfield (1951) and the orphaned boy in its 1994 remake, the little girl angel waiting to be born 
in For Heaven’s Sake (1950), the daughter in The Bishop’s Wife and the son and soon-to-be-
adopted son in The Preacher’s Wife are some examples.  The surge in emphasis on family values 
in general and fatherhood in particular proper to both periods that saw a rise in angel films 
accounts in part for this prevalence.  But the coincidence between these and the foundational 
angelic annunciations where “thy seed will multiply as the sands of the sea and in thee will all 
the families of the earth be blessed” suggests a deeper connection between social generation and 
                                                                                                                                                             
27 See Cohan’s discussion of cinematic male types in Masked Men. 
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 personal crisis inherent in the idea of the angel as messenger and conceived in relation to the 
human.  In doing so, this connection also ultimately leads us toward an explanation of what so 
many contemporary annunciation stories have to do with cars. 
 We see in the annunciation the collapse of pregnancy as condition and expectation to its 
conception, the moment of beginning.  In the angel’s message, where in Augustine’s famous 
terms Gabriel impregnates Mary “through the ear,” the utterance folds into itself both the fact it 
declares and the occasion to which it responds.  In other words, it defines a unique event: 
creation that exists outside of the laws of causality.  The angelic message celebrates a genuine 
beginning where causal agency lies within the event itself – or, more accurately, in the hailing 
that follows it.28  Conception comes into being via its after-the-fact judgment and demonstration.  
Seen in this context the immaculate conception appears to merit the fierce defense of Catholic 
theologians not just as a justification of the purity and godliness of the blessed mother, but as a 
figure of religious self-evidence.  Mary’s annunciation is not just a particular species of miracle, 
                                                 
28 Althusser’s concept of ideological hailing, as outlined in his essay “Ideological State Apparatus,” comes close to 
this idea in his insistence that the hailing of the self as subject simultaneously creates that self as subject.  For 
Althussser the “call” calls into existence.  In this the affinities between the figure of the angel and the logic of the 
state become evident.  Bureaucrats of the heavenly kingdom, angels can be seen as “representing” the ultimate 
Subject, God – who is Subjectivity itself, premier autonomy.  I would contrast this, however, with the Thomist idea 
of God as Being or Esse, which I will discuss later in this chapter.  For now, let me point out the difference between 
subjective hailing within an ideological system and existential  hailing as it appears in the more angelic 
annunciation.  Althusser’s discussion identifies the interpellation as a linguistically contractual act: when the 
policeman hails the passerby, “Nine times out of ten he will turn around.”  The subject recognizes the call, and 
hence recognizes the relationship between himself and the state that that call assumes and articulates, and without 
which it could not exist as such.  Annunciation narratives tend to emphasize a logic of reception rather than 
subjectification.  They start from the idea of that tenth person.  Sarah laughed, Mary (in so many Renaissance 
paintings) looks vaguely taken aback, George and Henry refuse to believe in the angel, encounter heroes wonder 
deliciously if in fact it really was an angel that they saw.  There is a sublime apprehension, initially taking the form 
of anxiety and wonder but eventually transforming into an amazed perception and beholding.  The initial disbelief is 
necessary, however, in order to establish the benediction as a state of grace outside of belief, a condition of being for 
which belief is irrelevent.  Althusser’s interpellation requires the act of belief as part of its logic.  A hailing based on 
recognition proposes a model of socialization that is logocentric, mediated entirely by the projection and recognition 
of symbols; while just barely escaping determinism, his schema nevertheless contains all social creation and 
response within the same signifying system.  Angelic annunciation is more properly allegorical, operating 
simultaneously on symbolic and material orders (divine utterance and human reality) that are fundamentally 
heterogeneous, if analogically related.  For this reason the imagination becomes significant, finding a place in an 
annunciation premised on conceiving rather than (re)cognizing. 
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 but the very definition of miraculous happening.  Gabriel’s message then becomes the beacon of 
such self-evidence – a promise, yes, but more than a promise; it is a promise that fulfills itself in 
its very communication.  In this temporal conflation a posteriori response attains the status and 
power of a priori law.  We call such conflation revelation, a communication that - in manifesting 
the extraordinary power to generate what it proclaims - can be understood as truth.  From this 
perspective, truth requires the address of the human by the divine, effecting the simultaneous 
relation and participation of the two orders of existence, which in these narratives might be 
understood as appearance and reality.  Thus the self-evidently miraculous nature of divine self-
presentation in the angelic word finds its inseparable analogue in the virgin conception, in the ex-
nihilo creation of paternity as consecrating power.     
Paternal influence, in It’s A Wonderful Life, initially arises as a source of anxiety.  Like 
Ray Kinsella in Phil Robinson’s Field of Dreams, George Bailey lives in fear of replicating his 
father’s life, which he sees as provincial, limiting, and anachronistic.  Together he and Harry 
Bailey tell a story that is the reverse of the Jacob and Esau: neither son wants the father’s 
blessing.  Their desire for flight is motivated by the belief that origins inhibit rather than open up 
possibility, that the past does not provide access to the world.  Rather, the weary Mr. Bailey 
testifies to the extent to which, as an emblem of small-time capitalism, he is about to be 
superseded by capitalism’s newer formation, apparent in the centralizing grasp of Potter.  In 
many ways the entire project of the film is to revive the blessing of the father, make it 
contemporary, to convince George to reject the paternal claims of Potter on him in favor of the 
legacy of the Building and Loan, and through George to affirm that legacy against the intrusions 
of the hour.  This means, in a sense, that the movie must somehow convey a temporal collapse 
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 and confusion if it is to read and awaken the present through a point of presumed origin.  It must, 
in effect, refigure time through the experience of crisis. 
 “The time is out of joint.”  Hamlet, still reeling from the visitations of his ghostly father, 
describes his own quandary in words that might almost be a definition of crisis.  The past, a 
previous event and the subjectivity belonging to that event, haunts the present.  It lingers because 
it is defined by a crime, an event that stands in a relation of excess to the time of its occurrence.  
This is the way with ghost narratives.  Built on issues of memory and trauma (“Remember me” 
old Hamlet’s ghost continually intones), the ghostly is motivated by a need for repetition, 
imitation, mimesis – the need to make visible what has been left invisible, what has been 
forgotten, repressed, or unknown.  The ghost, essentially, is imprisoned by time and its mortal 
relegations – “But that I am forbid / To tell the secrets of my prison-house, / I could a tale 
unfold”. . .  Trapped in an immaterial existence whose intelligence is yet tied to the world of 
physical experience, the ghost requires the action of humans in order to be freed.  In particular, it 
requires the action of progeny, those who inherit the sins of the fathers and who have access to 
the crimes they have witnessed. 
 I will say much more about the ghostly in relation to the angelic later in this chapter.  I 
bring it up here, however, in order to begin to note the relation between spirits, temporal 
discontiguity, and the condition of inaction that this discontiguity brings on.  Such narratives are 
premised on the idea of spiritual being as necessary for any kind of temporal or historical 
relation, whether that being take the form of memory or imagination.  Each, of course, is 
necessary for the other, and ghosts and angels frequently populate the same texts.  (The number 
of references to angels in Hamlet, for instance, outdoes that of any other Shakespeare play.)  
Often, the ghost will act as a prelude to the angel, figuring a crisis of memory and identity that in 
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 a sense calls the angelic imaginary.  This is certainly what happens in It’s a Wonderful Life.  The 
entire local problem, the missing $8000, involves an error of memory.  Uncle Billy, with so 
many strings tied around his fingers, forgets what each is supposed to represent.  This failure of 
continuity and particularization sets plot-wise in motion what will later appear graphically – the 
nullification of individual identity following the collapse of consensual markers.  In the scene at 
the bridge, George, already becoming anonymous and at the brink of self-erasure, appears to us 
stumbling down the walkway, moving away from the camera in the middle of thick round 
chunks of falling snow.  We see his back, as if he has at this point become enigmatic, some man 
sloshing through the wind and wetness.  This tableau (the camera remains stationary) also evokes 
the idea of suicide: we remain, as George heads into the encroaching blankness, almost seeming 
to disappear.  The camera cuts briefly to face him as he looks down into the water, but then 
immediately the water itself is beneath us, the mimetic expression of his formless despair and 
feeling of no escape.  It is at this point that Clarence appears, leaning against the bridge, and – 
following a series of striking intercuts between his placid face and George’s increasingly wild 
one - we see a splash in the water. 
 The world Clarence subsequently presents to George is a shattered one, an effort of the 
imagination to conceive memory without any collective basis or affirmation.  The life in which 
you had never been born reveals itself as the purest experience of singularity, and also the purest 
experience of anachronism.  George, like Clarence in his nineteenth-century garb or the angel 
Dudley with his dated dance moves, finds himself in a world in which he cannot translate, where 
in fact no one can remember him.  Significantly, though this world pictures his mother and his 
would-be wife, the gravestone of his brother and the slummy quarters of his friends, this also has 
to be a world without his children.  It is a world sired by the wrong father: Pottersville, city of 
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 raucous lights, the madding crowd, a hapless and frenetic modernity.  Here we can see how the 
movie maps its competing social realities in terms of temporality.  Nostalgia abounds for the 
Bailey version of benevolent capitalism, paranoia for the unchecked individualism we see in the 
Nighttown sequence.  But, as Robin Wood cautions us, each ideological-temporality shadows the 
other.  “The film recognizes explicitly that behind every Bedford Falls lurks a Pottersville” (65).  
What Wood calls the “generic familiarity” of both the pastoral and noir conventions makes each 
equally compelling as a projection of the fate of Capra’s upstate New York town, hence 
simultaneous in the viewer’s imagination.29  This shadowplay is important.  George’s mounting 
experience of chaos and mania results from the disappearance of the personal history that orders 
his existence, but the film shows “explicitly” that such history and such order depend on the 
ideas of space and, more importantly, time, with which we confront experience.  Awareness of 
location and historical moment orient us to our place in the collectivity.  Thus what on one level 
the audience sees as the unmoored psychic confusion of It’s a Wonderful Life’s protagonist, 
becomes even more powerful when read in conjunction with the temporal confusion that the 
movie’s ghostly palimpsest of “past” and “future” presents.   
 It is customary to divide Capra’s film according to two basic kinds of existence.  Much 
like The Wizard of Oz, the movie begins in real time, shifts to fantasy, and then moves back – 
with the duration of the intervening fantasy (at least in It’s a Wonderful Life) almost completely 
telescoped.  Yet we know from the beginning that we’re watching the first part of the movie with 
Clarence.  As we discover later, our viewing of George’s life story takes place during the time 
                                                 
29 It is worth pointing out that the mutual acceptability (and hence interprenetration) of country and city in the film’s 
vision supports the argument Raymond Williams makes in his famous work, The Country and the City.  Williams 
writes that while seemingly opposed, rural and urban narratives ultimately tell the same story – that of the loss of 
self-determination under the onward historical march of capitalist production.  This story can be read separately in 
each, however – which Williams does.  Wood’s point is that Bailey Park and Pottersville must be interpreted and 
experienced together in order to grasp the critique of bourgeois family values that the movie (whether or not Capra 
intended it) launches. 
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 between his prayer and Clarence’s appearance.  This interval, which is the interval of George’s 
breakdown – being hit in the jaw, running into the tree, almost jumping over the bridge – 
becomes charmed in a special kind of way.  It is the one period in the film that operates in two 
orders of time at once, the time of diegetic action and the time of angelic perception.30  
Spectatorial intelligence guards the subject acting under a sense of doomed determinism and bad 
faith, a guardianship that becomes apparent when we finally see Clarence watching at the end of 
the sequence.  It is also the time of crisis, prefatory to the noir fantasy where crisis becomes 
magnified into revelation and, ultimately, re-orientation (which is also a re-conception, as 
George learns to “see” his life through different principles).  Taking place under angelic 
auspices, George’s breakdown can be read specifically as a mechanical breakdown, a collapse of 
the deterministic ethic under which physical laws are seen to operate.  And in a sense the 
governance of causality must be usurped if a true beginning – a beginning that does not in turn 
refer back to something before itself as its cause and progenitor – is to take narrative form. 
 
                                                 
30 One of the better examples of what this perception looks like comes from Milton’s Paradise Lost.  In the 
famous scene where Michael shows Adam the spectacle of human history laid out before him, we see the emphasis 
on simultaneity, rather than chronology, of events.  Thus the narrative portrays an image of surveying and beholding 
in totality.  “So both ascend in the visions of God: it was a hill / Of Paradise the highest, from whose top / The 
hemisphere of earth in clearest ken / Stretched out to amplest reach of prospect lay . . . His eye might there 
command wherever stood / City of old or modern fame . . .” (XI, 376-80, 385).  This vision prepares Adam for the 
coming of the “Promised Seed.”  Unfolding from the top of “this specular Mount,” it is a mirror of history, for 
history begins from this moment; and the angel - not separable from the sight he in essence announces - is this 
mirror too.  Adam is appropriately grateful for the enlightening, thanking Michael, after the tour of biblical history 
to the coming of Christ, for the self-understanding of his fallen dependence and possibility of redemption through 
right meekness.  His preface to this piece of thanksgiving is interesting: “How soon hath thy prediction, seer blest, / 
Measured this transient world, the race of time, / Till time stand fixed: beyond is all abyss, / Eternity, whose end no 
eye can reach. / Greatly instructed I shall hence depart, / Greatly in peace of thought, and have my fill / Of 
knowledge, what this vessel can contain; / Beyond which was my folly to aspire” (XII, 553-60).  Transience, like the 
passing of images through a mirror, leads to eternity.  The mirror is after all the boundary of image and reality, 
visible and invisible, through which each passes and relates to the other.   As messenger, the angel mediates these 
orders of existence. Yet the angel’s very mediation calls attention to a distance (for the messenger is, since Hermes, 
always a distance runner) between perception and understanding that is potentially provocative of existential crisis.  
So it is that, in the vision of the angel the “race of time” - Adam’s children – see themselves reaching eternal life, 
but in Adam fail to comprehend it.  He sees human history mapped out before him, but finds it “all abyss,” dark and 
fathomless.  Angelic revelation exceeds Adam’s ken, producing an experience of amazement that, like the vision 
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 II.  Fahrvergnügenus Interruptus 
 The various encounter stories involving miraculous car rescues follow this same logic of 
breakdown as necessary for the reception of grace, and the idea of grace.  During the time of 
crisis or impending crisis – the wheels spinning out of control, an unknown accident just up 
ahead – the angel makes its presence felt simultaneous with the threshold state.  It appears as a 
“hunch,” a soft but clear inner voice directing the driver, as a commanding outer voice like the 
one in Angels in the Outfield,31 as a superhuman figure that only the car’s occupant can see who 
physically stops her car in its tracks,32 hands on the wheel navigating the driver through the 
accident itself, the mysterious figure – police officer with unregistered badge, tow truck driver, 
“unassuming Hispanic man” – who appears to wake, warn, or guide her.  The angel is a 
mysteriously locked steering wheel that  prevents the driver from hitting a car in his blind spot, 
the missing car that diverted the driver’s path, the yellow snow-removal vehicle that prevents 
him from entering the scene of accident.33  Each time following the near-death experience the 
driver realizes that the sensation or apparition must have been an angel, that the special condition 
of emergency revealed a direct communion with angelic order.  There were blue and green 
colors, like those C.S. Lewis associated with angels we’re told, a special sweet smell, or most 
often simply an absence of conventional explanation for these extraordinary perceptions (“From 
                                                                                                                                                             
Clarence presents to George, requires limitation and containment. 
31 “I wonder what shape I would have been in, had I not obeyed my angel’s orders!” one woman comments in 
Anderson 47. 
32 Or in the case of Linda and Wynter Rowe, “six gigantic angels, with their hands interlocked, blocking the 
guardrail” (Webber & Webber 53). 
33 The yellow snowplow makes an appearance in Father O’Neill’s story, mentioned below, and in Elsie’s story, 
printed in Hope Price’s Angels: True Stories of How They Touch Our Lives.  Elsie’s is fairly classic, including 
blizzard conditions, an articulation of the problem (“Decision time!”), and then the appearance, out of nowhere, of a 
big yellow snowplow (19).  For O’Neill, the novelty is that the second time he sees the yellow snowplow it is May 
and there isn’t any snow.  Good encounter stories seem to favor one of these two options, the magnification of threat 
through the trope of the blizzard or barren, desolate landscape, or the magnification of grace through the use of the 
uncanny and inexplicable.  Anderson’s story does both, of course, balancing horror and the marvelous through the 
voice of the mother, for whom the experience was rendered more intense because it took place – both at the time she 
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 all that we know about this accident,” the investigators said later, “we will never know how 
Kailey Smith survived,” quoted in Tyler, 22.34  “All of a sudden I realized that we were on 
Highway 308, on the left side of the Bayou Lafouche. . .  The highway on the right side of the 
bayou is Highway 1.  The woman couldn’t possibly have turned right onto a shell road, because 
she would have been in the bayou.  There are no shell roads on the right side, only bayouside 
homes.  Yet we both saw her.  She definitely turned right!” quoted in Burnham’s Angel Letters 
30).   
The best stories include this negative proof, most often the inexplicable disappearance of 
the angel and his vehicle (and, Smith’s story notwithstanding, in angel car stories the angel is 
usually male).  Yet they also include as positive proof the presence of a certain “feeling” 
following the encounter.  Generally this is described as a sense of “peace” or “reassurance,” a 
“sudden understanding” (without a direct object), and more rarely as the feeling of no longer 
being alone.  The descriptions are vague and stunningly vacuous, one-word abstract nouns that 
highlight the presence of (positive) feeling in general more than anything else.  The writers seem 
almost wary of being too specific; the very presence of the feeling, like the very presence of the 
angel, is what they want to emphasize.  The effect of this is significant.  The power of the danger 
becomes converted to a sense of personal power, as if the feeling of emergency itself could be 
appropriated to the person, harnessed as spirit rather than threat. 
Here the conversion of feeling to the idea of feeling becomes important.  The 
particularity of the situation – which by contrast is alertly detailed in the stories – is responsible 
                                                                                                                                                             
was pacing around in her kitchen, and later, in having it recounted to her – entirely in her imagination.  Hence the 
unknown enters in double force, as both otherworldly defamiliarization and pregnant suggestiveness. 
34 In case the reader misses it, Kelsey Tyler’s There’s an Angel on Your Shoulder tries to phrase the point that there 
is no possible natural explanation in just so many words repeatedly in her book: “’There’s really no other 
explanation, is there?’ ‘Not really.’” (43); “There was no earthly explanation for what had happened that night in 
Boston” (49); “’Is there any other explanation?’” Ann shook her head slowly.  ‘Amazing isn’t it?’” (125); etc. 
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 for the potency of the subject’s experience from the beginning.  In order for it to be translated to 
the individual, however, it has to be generalized.  Angels, as bodiless minds who give names, 
though they so often have none,35 perform this service as effortlessly as they do the actual 
rescues themselves.  In fact, the angel itself is usually the least detailed character in the story – 
almost purposefully anonymous.  He is described in generic terms as a “nice-looking,” 
nondescript young man; if white (as is usual in this demographic) he is often blond.  Writers go 
out of their way to point up his ordinary appearance, such as a plain button-down blue shirt, and 
his quietness.  The angel’s youth is consistently noted, however, as is his sportiness.  “It was then 
that Judith saw the angel – at the front of her car.  He looked like a clean-cut, boy-next-door 
football player” (Webber & Webber 48).  And in the beginning of one story the “rather pleasant-
looking man about age twenty-five” that we first meet is further defined as “perfectly ordinary in 
his sports clothes and average blond hair and blue eyes” (Burnham Angel Letters 19, 20).  The 
angel is appealing, sexual in a purely abstract, non-threatening way, his physicality diverted into 
the contained and agreeable realms of sports (evoking especially the reassuring etiquette of the 
“good” sport).  In keeping with this trend, the baseball cap features as a single item of 
description.  (See Father Dennis O’Neill’s story, reprinted in both Burnham’s Angel Letters and 
in Tyler’s There’s an Angel on Your Shoulder, or the heartrending “Encounter 22: The Boy and 
the Bus” in Tyler.)  The angel’s sporty bearing is simultaneously concrete and unspecific, 
suggesting masculinity without sexual interest and a collective rather than personal engagement 
with physical affairs.  In the end there can be only one personal.  Given the formidable lack of 
                                                 
35 For the purposes of these narratives, at least, angels function as nameless beings.  Though unsustainable in longer 
narratives such as the film or the novel, this tendency remains constant throughout angelic annunciation stories – the 
nameless men who appear to Abraham, for instance, the angel who wrestles with Jacob, the angel who appears to 
Hagar.  Even the famous angel of the Virgin mother’s annunciation was identified with Gabriel only later.  
Mohammed names Gabriel as the source and spirit of his own revelations, but then the transmission of the Koran is 
far more than an annunciation.  As I’ll discuss in chapter two, however, angels in the self-help books do take on 
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 imagination with which the recent literature of encounter describes him, the angel clearly is of 
interest not as character, but as concept.  Whereas the human narrators make themselves of 
general interest to the (general) reader by strongly asserting details of location and purpose, or at 
least specific feelings prior to the encounter (annoyance, apprehension, sanguinity), the angel 
remains portable, self-erasing, not too filled-in.  He remains, in other words, spirit. 
Of course, though the humans identify themselves through emotional and directional 
specifics, they are not exactly characters either.  The emotional and situational specificity if 
anything subsitutes for those markers of personality which narrative forms (however brief) 
usually strive to represent.  And this brings us to a second result of the emphasis on feeling per 
se that we find in the angelic literature of encounter.  These are essentially internal stories - 
psychological, if at times reductively so.  C.S. Lewis points out that in essence this is the 
psychology afforded by allegory.  Arising from the “divided will,” allegorical instrospection 
devotes its attention to the “raw material, the passions and emotions which contend for mastery,” 
for “the gaze turned inward with a moral purpose does not discover character” (61).  What is 
interesting about these narratives, however, is how little “moral purpose” actually defines their 
project, how little they struggle with good and evil.  Even in It’s a Wonderful Life, though we are 
told that suicide violates both earthly and divine law, and even more so the bitter apostasy of 
wishing that one had never been born, the conflict we see (and here it takes the form of real 
passion) is reduced to a question of negation or affirmation.36  Feeling in Capra’s film, albeit 
differently than in the encounter narratives, articulates the transformation from one to the other.  
                                                                                                                                                             
names (learning the angel’s name in fact is a sought-after stage of the communication), very unlike the rescuing 
angels of the true encounter tales. 
36 In the second chapter I’ll also discuss how the binary between affirmation and negation that gives life to these 
stories becomes the premise for a worked out system of moral thinking and judgment.  In the encounter books and 
movies like It’s a Wonderful Life, moral associations are implied visually (Pottersville as alliance with negation, for 
instance), but are used to launch the main point, which is the revelation of singularity, rather than the other way 
around. 
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 Both the film and the stories, however, use the image and scene of car breakdown to allegorize 
the “raw material” of (ghostly) negation, the feeling of lawlessness into which the angel lands 
concretely.  Lewis’s sequence of events is also reversed.  The breakdown is the occasion rather 
than the enactment of the introspective urge.  After all, these are not plot-progressive mystery 
plays but image-driven accounts of a moment as “turning-point.”  Once the driver resumes her 
road trip the introspection begins, expressed in “feelings” (peace, reassurance, understanding) 
that are wholly interior, that name the experience of interiority itself.  Thus physical encounter 
ushers in an experience that is celebrated as a distinctly immaterial one, but without thereby 
losing any of its particularity; essentially, encounter heroes affirm their own sense of self as 
something abstract. 
I will speak later in this chapter of what consitutes the allegory of affirmation in these 
stories.  First, however, I want to say more about the question of morality, not the least because 
of the religious history of and association with angels and because of the overt Christian 
allegiances of so many of these books.37  Angel encounter narratives do not primarily concern 
themselves with good Christian morality.  Though they certainly lionize the virtues of prayer and 
generosity to strangers, they are not as interested in portraying good will as the foundation of the 
earthly shining city.  In fact, it is the presence of the angel that ruins this.  One could imagine a 
morality tale of the helpful roadside Samaritan accosting the lonely pilgrim on his journey, after 
which the saved pilgrim dedicates himself to the transmission and perpetuation of this experience 
of disinterested goodness.38  But the encounter tales are not wholly diegetic allegories (where the 
literal meaning is grounded in the “sublunar” world, and the symbolic meaning alights from the 
                                                 
37 Over half profess a distinct Christian duty, although the implication of Christian ethic in even the more New Age 
books can be felt as an invisible but protective mantle. 
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 supernatural).  Both natural and supernatural orders are real; there is no shadowplay of 
correspondences between symbol and act.  As a consequence, humanistic meta-narratives have 
no place in this interpenetrated world: the angel, like an exuberant film score, interrupts any 
morality play of that kind.  Angels cannot tell the story of altruism overcoming self-interest, 
because they are in their Western definition already conceived as disinterested servants of God, 
whose loves inherently accord with His Will, and for whom Love and Law pose no “division of 
the will.”  (How silly and at the same time how tempting to consider the image of an angel with 
an angel and a devil warring on his shoulder.)  To speak of angelic rescue is to valorize 
something other than the efforts of good will: it is to dramatize a certain consecration of the self.   
Thus the “conversion” these stories describe is not revolutionary, where we witness a 
change of heart or a rebirth, a baptism by fire altering the very structure of the self, such as the 
Pauline (from skeptic to believer) or the Dickensian (money-hoarding capitalist to benevolent 
patron).  Angels represent a conversion to right judgment rather than good intentions.  Clarence, 
it is worth noting, appears to George, not Potter.  His job is not to make George’s life wonderful, 
but simply to demonstrate to him how wonderful it is already.  The angelic miracle effects an 
organic change in perception and evaluation, not simply a wondrous but contrived transcendence 
out of a tight jam.  Many of those touched by angels speak of a reaffirmed faith in their religion 
or a newly discovered belief in angels; these transformations emblematize something profane, 
however, as well as sacred.  When the chosen resume their road trips what has mainly changed is 
their judgment of their relation to the world, allegorized in their orientation to the road itself.  
They are no longer concerned with destination and the particular feelings occasioned by the 
necessity of getting there; rather, these externally imposed denominations, these experiences of 
                                                                                                                                                             
38 A few stories do discuss the hero’s consequent decision to devote himself or herself to some greater good, but 
these are by far the exception.  In general the focus remains squarely on the magic of the blessing and the beauty of 
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 role and necessity, become converted to feelings of grace and freedom guarded by the angel as 
the figure of intuition and interior determination.  Both the road and time have become general, 
appearing as metaphysical presentations of an internal road (destiny) and personal rightness of 
time (the angelic arrival).  The driver, previously concerned with efficient causes and 
instrumental means, is now the pilgrim, beginning a journey into the world  that appears before 
her as a whole, and which – in the knowledge that her guardian angel is watching over her - she 
can wholly claim.  
It is the assertion of chosenness, more than anything else, that distances angelic 
encounters apart from questions of morality.  A quick glance at some of the narratives 
themselves shows why.  Many describe the way in which the subject is set apart from 
catastrophe that befalls others.  For instance, in the bayou story above, Stephanie Boudreaux and 
her mother avoid the wreck occasioned by a collision between an eighteen wheeler and a small 
car, both of them “in the ditch.”  No account of what happened to the drivers in those vehicles, 
though the size differential makes optimism difficult.  Here is another account that omits details 
regarding the death or injury of others, though scenic details are vividly described: “Jim was not 
quite all the way into the passing lane when he heard the crash.  The flatbed behind him had 
apparently had brake failure, and he watched, horrified, as it smashed into the truck ahead.  If 
Jim had not been helped by that strong hand on the wheel, his light van would have been 
squeezed like an accordion between those two heavy trucks” (Malz 57).  The next paragraph 
immediately follows with, “Since that experience, Jim tells me that he and his wife have both 
met Jesus as their Lord.”39  This emphasis on being set apart is not unique to angel stories about 
                                                                                                                                                             
angelic existence as guardians of the human (especially that human in particular). 
39 We see this same narrative logic in Quentin Tarantino’s 1994 Pulp Fiction,where Samuel L. Jackson, inexplicably 
un-hit by a rain of bullets four feet away, decides - after blowing away the hapless culprits - to give up crime and 
“walk the earth.” 
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 motorists; consider this story about Chantal, a mountain climber who descends a precipitous 
cliff-face through the aid of a miraculous “wall of angels”: “I later learned that the cliff face was 
considered particularly dangerous in that area, and that a number of well-prepared climbers had 
been killed like [my fiancé] Dale while trying to descend” (Freeman 140).  Tony Kushner gives 
voice to this problem of justice in a different way.  As he told Time magazine, “The question is, 
why are you saved with your guardian angel and not the woman who was shot to death shielding 
her children in Brooklyn three weeks ago?” (Gibbs 65). 
I dwell on this question of morality and justice not in order to indict these texts, but to 
point out how even ethical considerations pertinent to the belief system that so many of them 
advocate are compromised in order to assert what is most important: the principle of selection as 
dependent on an experiential disorder, rather than a rational system.  The chosen subjects are 
then – perhaps ironically – accommodated to a collective, ethical enterprise via the interiority 
such revelation produces, and which acts as its sign.  Thus the narrative movement in the 
quotation from Betty Malz (whose oft-cited book Angels Watching Over Me is categorized under 
“Contemporary Applied Christianity”) may be read then not at her own expense, but as a logical 
sequence pointing up a creative contradiction at work in the very idea of judgment itself.   
Immanuel Kant, in his writings on judgment, suggests how this difficulty appears in the 
movement between sense-impression to conceptualization through the action of fantasy.  For him 
the idea of sublime experience provokes a theory of judgment, of the human psychology of 
imagination and its service as the base of a universal, consensual determination.  In the following 
excerpt, Kant outlines a protypical pattern of sublime experience remarkably similar to that of 
the encounter narratives.  This is taken from his initial presentation of the sublime attitude in 
distinction to that of the beautiful: 
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 But in what we are wont to call sublime in nature there is such an 
absence of anything leading to particular objective principles and 
corresponding forms of nature, that it is rather in its chaos, or in its 
wildest and most irregular disorder and desolation, provided it 
gives signs of magnitude and power, that nature chiefly excites the 
ideas of the sublime.  Hence we see that the concept of the sublime 
in nature is far less important and rich in consequences than that of 
its beauty.  It gives on the whole no indication of anything final in 
nature itself, but only in the possible employment of our intuitions 
of it in inducing a feeling in our own selves of a finality quite 
independent of nature.  For the beautiful in nature we must seek a 
ground external to ourselves, but for the sublime one merely in 
ourselves and the attitude of mind that introduces sublimity into 
the representation of nature. . .  [It] involves no more than the 
development of a final employment by the imagination of its own 
representation.  (Critique of Judgement 92-3) 
Kant describes a necessary transition between external crisis – a chaos possessing magnitude and 
power – and the internal reflection by the self on its own powers of reflection.  Beauty is in the 
formal presentation of the thing, sublimity in the eye of the beholder as it responds to the 
presentation of things in their formlessness.  And it is - especially - in her ability to turn that eye 
inward on herself. 
Kant speaks of this “employment” almost cursorily, at the very least coyly: the 
representation of sublime experience “involves no more” than its exercise, as if the act of 
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 reflective judgment were already destined or inevitable in the encounter between a powerful 
breakdown of nature and the subject  endowed with all her faculties.  And in a way he is right, 
provided that the subject has the means of representing her own imagination to herself.  In 
choosing to focus his critique on nature rather than culture, however, Kant risks assimilating 
such representation to the faculty of concepts, which is supremely capable of objectifying 
phenomena (as nature for instance, or experience, as the beautiful, or the sublime), but is not 
actually capable of “representing” it.  In doing so he risks failing to recognize or admit the 
imagination on its own terms, which necessarily evade rationalization, prediction, and 
convention, at the same time that they draw on and may even ultimately reinvigorate them.  For 
Kant understands the imagination primarily in its existence as a faculty, rather than as something 
demonstrated in that faculty’s created work.  Thus his imagination remains a concept – abstract 
and remote, an idea of agency rather than an agent itself.  It is hardly ever understood as an 
actual presence.  Kant’s whole point, of course, is to make the distinction between imagining and 
conceiving (for it is this distinction that gives impulse to the sublime as the drive to overcome it), 
yet his rationalization of the imaginary – evident too in his confidence in the subject’s eventual 
“fall into reason” - betrays this distinction.  Kant has a purpose in making this move; images and 
forms do not as readily lend themselves to generalization as concepts or ideas, and the 
understated intent of the third critique is to provide a theory of democracy through an 
investigation of taste as the irreducible principle of human decision-making.  Nevertheless, if we 
are to understand what is at work in the process of collective self-determination (and heed Kant’s 
later injunction to resist the “influence” of nature by exalting our own powers above it), it 
becomes imperative for us to approach the topic of the imagination with an eye for what in it 
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 escapes our powers of determination to begin with, in order then to understand how it may guide 
our conceptions, and through what transporting machinery. 
 Any narrative of sublime encounter will offer some way of dealing with the relation 
between imagination and intelligence, but the angel narratives provide an especially compelling 
genre because in the figure of the angel we see Kant’s representation of the imagination to itself.  
In the angelic messenger the imagination sees the dramatization of its own operation - a 
miraculous mediation of mind and matter, thought and impression – as a revelatory event.  This 
self-presentation, then, is also an annunciation.  The angel appeals as a necessarily fantastic 
intelligence – fantastic in that it is at the least foreign to objective reality, if not always absolutely 
fabulous, and thus claims the idea of a thing irreducible to its image, though immanent in it.  
Angelic possibility asserts itself as a sublime power already potential within our experience of 
the world, rather than as a magical, external machination.  We can see how compelling the angel 
then appears in relation to situations of acknowledged crisis, in the face of imminent danger, 
death, and potential dismemberment occasioned by a precipitous accident or machines gone out 
of control.  In the angel we see our own capacity for making sense of things, and the greater the 
force of the outside chaos, the more elevated the personal powers by which we rationalize and 
order it. 
The most faddish prototype of the recent encounter stories poses a problem, however.  
How do you account for the potency of this final representation, and hence of the narrative itself, 
when the latter describes a natural disorder which give no “signs of magnitude or power”?  
Where does the imagination harness its power from?  And what does one make of the angel, not 
just when it gives its blessing apparently arbitrarily, but when it does so frivolously?  What does 
one make of the relentlessly trivial use of this sublime figure in stories about busted tires? 
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 A year after her own angel film came out, director Nora Ephron described the importance 
of angels in daily affairs.  She differentiated the belief in angels from the belief in God: “The 
horrible truth is that he probably doesn’t notice.  He’s got more important things to do.  But 
angels do notice.  You know, they make the tow truck come when you have a flat tire” (quoted in 
Sterngold H41).  So ubiquitous is this image of the angelic emissary from AAA that in her 1996 
comedy Michael Ephron has her angel – a slovenly chain-smoking John Travolta – make the tow 
truck come for just this purpose.  Like Ephron, angel writer Eileen Elias Freeman (and founder 
of the AngelWatchTM Network and Journal) also views the emblematic tire-change encounter as 
the most self-evident example of angels’ real guardianship over our lives: 
One thing is clear: Angels are far more than projections of the 
divine mind or literary devices.  They are real, personal beings, 
even if their corporeality is totally different from ours.  Literary 
devices and mythical beings cannot touch people’s lives and 
utterly transform them.  Ancient stories and legends are not 
capable of changing tires for stranded motorists before 
disappearing.  Angels are beings, creatures, as we are, but 
different.  (28) 
One thing is clear: Flat Tires are far more than an annoying exercise in waiting or a test of one’s 
lug-nut skills.  From these quotations one must conclude that either the flat tire has been widely 
experienced as the sublime negation of providential order and that it is generally understood to 
act as the incontrovertible ground of individual actuality and existential being, or that it 
somehow lends itself to the idea of angels proper, dramatizing and confirming their relation to us 
as figures of the imagination, messenger spirits, and counterpoints to the mechanistic thinking so 
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 important for the automotive enterprise.  If the quintessential stories of angels over the past 
century have involved crises of movement, there must be something about the roadside angelic 
tire-fix that captures the essence of those stories, even without the crises and their terrors. 
 I want to suggest what this something is through a detour.  The detour involves an angel 
film that has nothing to do with cars, but everything to do with the relation between imagination 
and reality, with the message from the angel about itself as fantasy.  One of the least successful 
angel films ever made arrived at the end of the trend in the mid-fifties.  By the beginning of that 
decade angel films no longer dealt with social reality; they had become less serious, more 
individualized.  Angels in the Outfield (1951), which describes a baseball manager’s outrageous 
breaches of etiquette, is a good example.  But it is Forever Darling (1956), starring Lucille Ball 
and Desi Arnaz, that marks the nadir of the genre (and is perhaps the last genuine angel film 
made until the 1970’s).  It achieves lows of triviality that make the tire change stories seem 
deeply consequential.  Produced by Arnaz himself and directed by Alexander Hall (who had 
fifteen years earlier directed Here Comes Mr. Jordan, one of the great all-time angel fantasies, 
and one that arguably began the trend in the 1940’s), the film awkwardly follows follows a 
storyline in which a good-looking guardian angel (James Mason, who would later play Mr. 
Jordan in the 1978 remake of Hall’s classic, Heaven Can Wait)40 descends to earth to try to help 
a bored couple rejuvenate their marriage.  The rejuvenation involves Lucy (Susan Bewell Vega, 
an attention-starved housewife) following Desi (Lorenzo Xavier Vega, a research scientist) on a 
loony expedition to test a new insecticide.  The trip is a shambles, but not her newly developed 
intention to fulfill the role of the dutiful wife who believes in her husband without benefit of 
actual judgment, and all ends well, for no good reason. 
                                                 
40 Apparently Mason dubbed this film “the worst I ever appeared in” (Parrish 102).  The critics did not disagree. 
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  Two moments in the film stand out, however, if more for the purpose of angel-watching 
than movie-watching.  One is when Lucy first meets the angel.  Like George Bailey she is 
dubious, but her skepticism expresses itself a bit differently: “If you are what you say you are, 
why do you look like James Mason?” she asks.  To which the angel responds, “I look the way 
you want me to look.”  Later in the film Ball will imagine herself opposite Mason who is starring 
in a hot-blooded jungle movie that she and Desi go to watch.  This is also a crux moment in 
terms of musical fantasy, for it is at this point that we first hear the title song, “Forever Darling” 
(which was the only commercially successful element of this production, enjoying its own play 
for some years after).  These two moments are tantalizing for their comic self-referentiality, for 
the delight in watching a movie star fantasize herself a movie star and a celebrity be celebrated 
as himself in the diegetic action of the film.  But what is most interesting is the essential message 
that these devices relay: Even your fantasies can set you on the right track; even your fantasies 
can illuminate reality, and your role to play in it.  In fact, precisely your fantasies serve as your 
guide, because only your fantasies are able to mediate external and internal worlds.  In this case 
such an insight reconciles personality to convention, individual expression (Ball’s wackiness) to 
social role.  This is the same conservative and accommodationist move Capra makes at the end 
of his film, yet both narratives have succeeded in presenting an important aspect of the 
annunciating angel as the self-representation of fantasy – the significance of the imaginary in 
determining “rightness,” and its necessity for allegorical thinking as a form of ineradicably 
representational naming and judgment.  As Claude Rains says as the heavenly agent in Here 
Comes Mr. Jordan, “This is your road, Joe.” 
 Roadside angel narratives, whether of crisis or the merest, most mechanical breakdown, 
represent a collapse of unity between personal power and social role, through allegories of the 
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 car stranded at the side of the road.  We see this nowhere more clearly than in the physical 
depiction of George Bailey, as he increasingly struggles to adapt his spirit to the limitations 
imposed upon him by his family obligations and the conventions of provincial life – a “divided 
will” that collapses the purpose of that spirit during the events of the 24th, evident in his slow and 
jerky movements and restless, haunted eyes.41  In the encounter stories the conflict of the will 
does not appear as a question of character, but rather is mapped onto the divisions of the scene 
itself and onto the temporal divisions of subjective states within the narrative.  While the stories 
of accidents or near-accidents heighten this tension, both for the narrative itself and for the angel, 
in a way the excessively quotidian nature of the tire-change stories presents this question of 
power and chaos in a more distilled form.  What they present is the question of agency within 
determinism, the question of how one engages consent (the figure of the road) as a particular 
person.  The power of this engagement appears as movement which, after its ghostly 
interruptions, resumes in a different order of time - which is to say, a different idea of being. 
 I am drawing here from Aquinas.  His writings on time – like those of many other 
Christian theologians before him – distinguish between the time of God: eternity, of the angels: 
beginning without end, and the human: motion, or time proper, complete with beginning and 
end.  But unlike these other thinkers, Aquinas ties these ideas of the three temporalities to an  
already formulated theory of being and identity.  Aquinas bases his theory on a distinction 
between esse, existential being, and essence, the being that defines a thing.  Essentially his is a 
theory of life, of source and existence.  He explicitly borrows this distinction from Aristotle’s 
theory of active and potential being, in which the knowledge potential within the self becomes 
                                                 
41 In his brief discussion of It’s a Wonderful Life as a cult film, Danny Peary comments James Stewart’s peculiar 
appeal in it.  This is, he argues, Stewart’s greatest performance (in addition to being his favorite role), because in it 
we find a blend of his prewar and postwar personas.  The optimistic, provincial “boy next door” of the thirties 
coexists with the dark, brooding neurotic of the fifties – Hitchcock’s Jimmy Stewart (165-66). 
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 actualized by the mind’s encounter with experience.42  For Aristotle, the act of knowing is the 
essential act of being; Aquinas, less interested in knowledge than in identity, understands agency 
in terms of existence itself.  That is, he comes much closer to Kant’s emphasis on feeling as the 
principle of judgment, as it is existentially called into being.  Aquinas’s interest in time, 
however, allows him to grasp the experiential quality of judgment in a way that Kantian idealism 
does not.  Aquinas writes of the three orders of time in these terms, terms of active being, three 
modes of reality.  Divine reality is eternally self-sustaining, in that its existence is also its 
essence, human reality is wholly potential with regards to its existence, dependent on succession 
and movement for its being, and angelic reality, the time of aevum, receives existence in a single 
moment which then (immediately) becomes self-sustaining, independent of time, change, and 
beginning.43  This shift articulates that of the encounter narratives – the movement from the 
feeling of change and disruption, the feeling of things happening, to the feeling of eternity, 
peaceful interiority and contemplation, the feeling of having been touched by an angel.  Within 
the cosmology of these Thomist temporalities, it becomes clear that the annunciation is a special 
kind of beginning – a beginning like that of the angels, beginning without end.  This is what the 
books’ reader seeks in such narratives: the idea of creativity as dissemination, the act of being 
chosen as a condition without end.  She looks for the generation of the receiver as eternal parent 
and agent, a generation that posits reception as agency, essence as existence.  And above all this 
the reader seeks the feeling of beginning as experience and as grace. 
                                                 
42 Aristotle’s theory of active and passive being appears in the famous discussion in De Anima, Book III.  Here he 
argues that thinking is a form of receiving (sense impressions) by and in which the act of thinking is brought into 
being.  This annunciation of the mind is curious, in that act, the condition of being an agent, depends on and is co-
existent with reception.  In much the same way the encounter heros receive the angel’s news and in that instant, in 
the moment of being acted upon by their angel, they think, conceive, and most importantly, exist.  Mind, “that part 
of the soul. . . by which the soul thinks and forms judgments,” can paradoxically only create actively in the 
condition of experiencing passively: “Mind in the passive sense is such because it becomes all things, but mind has 
another aspect in that it makes all things. . .  Mind in this sense is separable, impassive and unmixed, since it is 
essentially an activity” (III.V). 
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 This experience is also what we want from our movies.  As viewer-receptors we look for 
an experience of fantasy that only the angel can name.  It’s a Wonderful Life specifically invokes 
this idea by placing us as self-conscious viewers at the start of the film – along with Clarence, 
who through in watching will also move from passive reception to active agency, and thus earn 
his wings.  In this initial move the film tells us to expect the representation of our own 
imaginations to ourselves, and it gives us this representation in the conventional figure of the 
angel.  But Capra’s treatment of the angel is creative; like the tire-change allegory of the road, 
convention - an a priori emotional agreement between reader and text – ultimately provides the 
“force and magnitude” necessary for imaginative experience.  In his article on It’s a Wonderful 
Life, George Toles tells how this works in regards to convention in Capra’s directing method.  
Capra’s treatment of the angel is analogical. 
Toles’s analysis begins with a restating of the dominant discourse on Capra’s style, which 
claims that he projects a “false attitude” by using conventions merely as means to an emotional 
effect.  Instead of viewing them as “devices,” however, Toles suggests that they might be 
understood (like angels and their messages) as “forms that come unbidden, discovered as they 
unfold.”  In this Capra would not be rhetorically plotting the narrative of the audience’s 
responses, drawing on the teleological power that convention so easily provides, so much as 
making an artistic leap into each scene and thus announcing its special fecundity.  This maneuver 
requires that each “device” act less as deus ex machina than as illumination. 
Capra, to be sure, makes extensive use of the conventions of 
established Hollywood genres, and unlike, say, Preston Sturges, 
does so mostly in an uncynical manner.  But it has generally 
escaped notice that once his scenes have gotten underway (at least 
                                                                                                                                                             
43 See Commentary on Sentences I, d., 19, q.2, a.1. 
60 
 in It’s a Wonderful Life) the supports that these conventions might 
be expected to supply - for example, the motivating information 
for our emotional “reading” of a situation - rapidly drop away.  
Capra seizes upon conventions as the quickest route into a scene, 
just as Astaire sidles his way into a dance by a series of simple, 
orthodox steps, which are minimally communicative about the 
flights of invention that his motions will inscribe later on.  
Conventions bring the ground for scenes into preliminary focus, 
but the scene-structures that feel their way into being on that 
ground are meant to be self-sustaining.  Capra is not at all 
interested in the habitual, somewhat protected mode of response 
that conventions necessarily bring with them.  What he 
consistently strives to distill out of them is an unmediated primary 
recognition of tremendous force, which throws the convention out 
of focus and makes sudden contact with the vital truth.  (47-48) 
Speaking in the discourse of sublime encounter, Toles identifies convention as a kind of 
messenger whose elemental power enables an imaginative response, and which in turn erases 
itself in the process of enabling this response.  That Toles insists Capra uses these tools at the 
opening of each scene is important, for what we are looking at in his description of Capra’s style 
as an aesthetic event is an encounter with aevum, the temporal beginning that undoes itself 
almost immediately to yield “self-sustaining” being.  Toles is less specific about what this 
“unmediated primary recognition” consists of, about what defines the camerawork itself.  But his 
description provides a useful and compelling point of entry for the movie’s annunciation proper, 
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 the final scene in which intervention finally gives way to blessing and at last the guardian angel 
earns the status of a true messenger. 
 
III.  Christmas 
The first time I ever saw It’s a Wonderful Life was, like most Americans, on TV.  It was a 
typically busy Christmas Eve.  I had missed the first 115 minutes and glimpsed only the final 
scene, completely cut off from the larger narrative of ambition, sacrifice, and contemplated 
suicide.  All I saw was a stream of people piling money on a table like it was a collection plate – 
a boisterous round of holy devotions.  And this materialist homage was being celebrated.  A 
couple was looking tearfully at the money piling up, their tears instructing me to worship it.  
Even though I was a child, it seemed to me crass.  So I ranted internally about the 
commercialism of the Christmas season, and went back to my presents. 
Frank Capra’s classic was not a success when it was released at the close of 1946.  
Despite mostly positive reviews it failed to break even at the box office, and in the face of stiff 
competition (The Best Years of Our Lives) won no academy awards (though it was nominated for 
several, including Best Picture, Best Director, and Best Actor).  Twenty seven years later, after a 
lapse in copyright renewal left it at the mercy of the public domain, the movie was picked up by 
PBS on a lark and quickly became a Christmas season TV cult phenomenon.44  Displaced from 
the grammar of cinema to that of television, It’s A Wonderful Life was now positioned to appeal 
to a domestically situated audience, an audience geared to respond to that feeling of group 
participation petitioned by the communal outreach onscreen.  But the film lent itself to TV 
viewing in other ways.  In particular, it adapted well to the surgery of editing, commercials, and 
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 most of all the random attentiveness of the viewer’s gaze.  Even without viewer familiarity, 
isolated scenes and even stills press on the viewer’s imagination (if not initially her favor), like 
the one I witnessed years ago. 
Though confusing to the virgin viewer, the final scene is if anything heightened by 
isolated perception, by being seen as television rather than cinema.  Seen in flashes and cuts, the 
movie’s appeal to the revelatory power of the momentary and the mundane states its case even 
more intensely.  And it borrows from that special trait of television, that it brings this revelation 
into the viewer’s own home, to her personal space.  She watches TV as part of a larger collective 
audience, but still with the feeling of isolation that her responses will be hers alone, uninduced 
by those of the crowd around her.  Such a situation invokes almost a fear of crowds, of intrusion 
into the territory of the self.  It’s a Wonderful Life’s final great scene in particular plays up to 
that.  The camera simultaneously sacralizes the physical spontaneity of the converging townsfolk 
and pointedly contains the threat of its acting as a large, unpredictable force.  The sequence 
begins with an unstable array of shots at various angle and perspectives before stabilizing in a 
high angle long shot of the crowd, now emptied of cash and domesticated into song.  During the 
oncoming confusion, George and Mary are positioned at a safe remove above the happy fray - 
George in the position of honored guest,45 Mary as conductor/guardian.  The screenplay itself 
calls attention to the threat of the incoming masses: “George picks up Zuzu to protect her from 
the mob.”  “The place becomes a bedlam.”  “Ernie is trying to get some system into the chaos” 
                                                                                                                                                             
44 In New York in the 1970’s people would actually hold It’s a Wonderful Life Christmas parties.  Since 1994 a 
copyright of NBC, the movie has lost its funky cult edge. 
45 Film critic David Sterritt’s description of the significance of the final scene calls attention to the way in which, at 
the height of his recognition by the community, George is even more clearly a loner. Significantly, he is a loner 
because of his visions and imaginative difference: “On the one hand, a happy ending arrives when George sees that 
his proper place is with ordinary, uncreative people who take comfort in their own conformity.  But on the other, 
George has had an experience - the dream provided by Clarence the angel - that none of his neighbors could share.  
Even at the film’s joyful climax, George is a loner with insights that place him outside the little community taken for 
granted by the less imaginative folks who crowd around him” (13).   
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 (Basinger 318).  This danger has already been established in another climactic scene earlier in 
the film: during the mass hysteria of the stock market crash, when the frenzy of a desperate and 
unreflecting crowd (itself a massive expression of consent) threatens to gut the Building and 
Loan.  In contrast to the disciplining action in which the earlier scene ended, with George and 
Uncle Billy waving the two remaining dollars as a trophy, in this one the exuberantly flowing 
cash signals a power that is about to be named and represented through a specifically angelic 
affirmation.   
The naming is the big event in Capra’s movie; it is one of those rare films that moves 
ineluctably toward a crucial emotive revelation, and without too much transparency or heavy-
handedness.46  The tension is agile, sustaining itself through a relentless progression from the 
refined to the elemental.  The final chaos builds on this tension to give the concluding 
annunciation its power, brought to high pitch in the stream of Bedford Falls citizens pouring into 
the Bailey household, and emphasized by the alternating close-ups and noisy, overlapping 
chatter.  But this surge of populist excess is only part of what makes the final scene memorable 
and essential.  George may be hailed by the crowd as “the richest man in town,” but he isn’t truly 
named as such until we get our last sign from the angel, a gesture that picks up the elemental 
force of the human hailing and contracts it into a genuine communication as well as delivery.  
This final impression and sublime naming is Clarence’s beaten copy of Tom Sawyer.  Suddenly, 
on top of the pile of money, the book appears – the same copy we’d seen earlier in the film, now 
a heavenly confirmation instead of an anachronistic emblem. 
Twain’s novel is an appropriate choice to capture and contain the motion of the film.  It is 
appropriate, to begin with, as a signature of George’s angel, the eccentric and bumbling but 
                                                 
46 Other examples might include Cinema Paradiso, Groundhog Day, The Sixth Sense – notably, all engaging fantasy 
in some way, whether in the domain of the real or the supernatural. 
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 good-hearted Clarence Oddbody.  Its place in the canon of beloved and whimsical children’s 
books immediately attunes the audience to view Clarence in the same way - as a figure whose 
very oddness paradoxically ensures him a place within the collective identity and national self-
idealization, and as a junior, not yet fully initiated member of it.  But those familiar with the 
book will also understand its appropriateness for George himself.  As any annunciation is 
ultimately a form of titling and entitling, George’s naïvely literal angel honors him with a name 
which is exactly that - a title.  The choice, as with all of Clarence’s decisions, uncannily strikes 
home.  Because Tom Sawyer is a tale reconciling the spirit of adventure with small-town values 
it addresses the main conflict that motivates the plot in this film - the conflict between George’s 
need to see himself as a creative world-spirit and his sense of duty to the world that created him.  
The local and its modalities is not unproblematic in Twain’s novel, however, any more than 
Bedford Falls is graspable without its Pottersville alter ego.  Those who remember the book more 
sharply will recall its darkness - the darkness of provincial enclavism and the monsters it creates.  
For instance, the book carefully contextualizes Injun Joe’s sociopathic revenge and greed as a 
product of exclusion and injustice.  It represents the arrest of Muff Potter (no relation) as an act 
of frontier vigilantism.  The existence of slaves and slavery are repeatedly ironized through the 
children’s various crossings of the Mississippi.  In his identification of the parallels between 
Tom Sawyer and George Bailey, Robert Ray also points to the double-edged relation between 
romanticized convention and an inner animation.  “It’s a Wonderful Life shared Twain’s acute 
recognition of an outworn romantic myth’s capacity to disparage normal life.  If the sound of a 
train whistle made George unhappy with what he had, the steamboat had done the same for 
Twain” (194).  That Clarence’s hailing of George - both at their first encounter and in the token 
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 of his farewell - is through Twain’s Tom Sawyer, highlights the significance of the presentation 
of the book in general as a mode of annunciative grace. 
 If cars in current angelic discourse seem to represent the call to angelic arrival through a 
mechanistic breakdown, books represent the angel gathering the pieces.  The naming action of 
reading substitutes an interior, reflective movement for an external, eventful one: the time of the 
sacred (contemplari - from the templum, or temple) for the time of the historical.  Where the 
roadside rescue signals angelic guardianship and descent, the sign of our immortal reconstitution 
in the book47 provides the true hailing.  This is appropriate; books and annunciations have had a 
long history together.  In his essay on the annunciation, Thomas Moore points out how 
frequently in art Mary is depicted reading a book.  “Paintings show her in a contemplative mood, 
in her room, reading” (23).  Fra Angelico’s Annunciation (1435-45), one of the most frequently 
reprinted renderings of this scene, is a suggestive example.  Mary’s book lies open on her knee, 
facing Gabriel, an open text between them.  The open book prior to annunciation (and in some 
ways the text of its reading) invokes the idea of contemplation as a receptive state preparatory to 
receiving grace.  Moore comments, “It would seem to take a degree of expectancy and 
intellectual preparedness to glimpse the angel when he appears.”  Mary’s awakened, “mindful” 
interiority prior to being hailed as the mother of God in fact suggests her fitness for the role; 
where in the encounter stories this state follows angelic awakening, from Moore’s reading it 
makes it possible.  The godly self is the reading self, readied to participate in angelic 
communication.  But there is also a sense in which the book is the annunciation, the bestowal of 
the seed that contains its own future even before it is read.  Because it is for this reason the 
                                                 
47 In the encounter stories the final meditative or transcendent consciousness while drivine performs the same 
function, but weakly.  The shift from particular, intended experience to receptive, universal grace is palpable, but 
lacks any emblem to make it concrete.  One could argue, however, that the circulation of the encounter books 
themselves provides this token, especially since the ultimate annunciation they offer is of the readers themselves. 
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 emblem par excellence of prophecy and any religious tradition founded on the prophetic, the 
sacred book presents itself as the proper gift of the visionary spirit.  This spirit is the angelic 
messenger.  Thus by the time of Islam we see that messenger, named and established, perform 
the role of transmission of the sacred book – a much more exalted role for the angel.  In not just 
bestowing but uttering the word of not just any divine text but the foundational divine text, we 
see the angel become more than the occasional voice of the Lord – it becomes its necessary 
embodiment.   
In the story of Muhammad and Gabriel the idea of revelation as the ground beneath the 
feet of religious conception and practice reaches its apex.  As it arises in these Western 
traditions, the angel articulates their status as specifically revealed religions, where both the holy 
leaders and their followers understand their faith’s power in terms of a consecrated and 
consecrating book (a masterplot that Tony Kushner uses with great fanfare when his histrionic 
angel delivers an enormous book to his humble prophet in Angels in America).  Significantly, the 
religions of the book also have invoked allegory as a major mode of their interpretation, from 
Zoroastrianism’s allegorical pantheon to Judaism’s and Christianity’s traditions of allegorical 
exgesis to the allegorical passages of the Qur’an.48  The connection is an organic one.  As Walter 
Benjamin points out, the idea of allegory calls up the sacred script, the illuminated word, the 
very process of divine inscription (not, perhaps, unlike the virgin conception) to mobilize its 
rendering of the particularized generality.  Thus the “emblem” becomes the special language of 
allegory, the imaginative representation of abstract meaning attached to its object as through a 
divine logic.  This is the logic of the angel, who bestows both sacred emblems and the means of 
reading them, just as Gabriel conferred literacy on the illiterate Muhammed in tandem with the 
                                                 
48 These sections of mutashaabihaat concern human dealings with realms beyond its comprehension – the nature of 
God and of the afterlife – which require allegorical description in order to be conveyed to the human. 
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 sacred law.  The book is, after all, at once an object of imaginative experience and the expression 
of its action.  In the book we go beyond our imagination, seeking to grasp that which can only be 
known negatively, as words purvey their objects.  But in allegory word also functions as image, 
and so the negative referentiality of language gives way to illumination.  Thus allegorical 
language strives to convey the unknowable positively, presenting words before us as signs of 
negativity, absence, and invisibility that at the same time communicate infinite and eternal, 
absolute presence through their dual status as images.  In the religions of the book one sees the 
book as the self-revelatory origin and essence of that religion’s imagistic power.   
 The allegorical movement from negation to affirmation is paralleled by the movement in 
angel true encounter narratives from ghostly breakdown to angelic annunciation.  We can see in 
this movement how the true annunciation has to wait for the angel – who begins as ghost, the 
spirit of a departed soul – to become a proper angel, fully separate from human knowing.  It’s a 
Wonderful Life demonstrates this necessary movement beautifully.  In the scene of allegorical 
ghostly negation, so strikingly epitomized by the depersonalization and self-unmaking of Capra’s 
Nighttown sequence, the angel is most accurately not-yet, or about-to-be.  Like the angels 
watching but not yet appearing in the encounter stories, Clarence is only halfway realized – 
“angel second-class” - guarding, witnessing, and recording, rather than acting.  Only in acting are 
angels fully angelic, just as Aristotle defined them (active intelligences: pure form, which is pure 
act) and only then do they truly deliver a message.  Of all the angels in the history of the 
supernatural canon, the messenger angel is the one that best demonstrates this idea of pure act as 
it relates to the central problem of self-determination that the film’s nightmare and fantasy life 
engages.  Surrogate of a presence that can only be apprehended through words and images, the 
messenger angel epitomizes the necessary absence at the heart of judgment and free will – of 
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 which suicide, the exercise of the will towards its own destruction and against its own interest, 
may be the most dramatic case.  Significantly, Clarence only becomes a true messenger at the 
end, after George’s threatened self-annihilation and after the vision of that annihilation in the 
Pottersville sequence.  Like all personal or guardian angels, his actualization depends on that of 
his charge; appropriately, the emblem of the one doubles for the other.  Clarence’s great act as an 
angel with wings is the gift of the book on top of George’s pile of tribute, simultaneously a 
testimony of his reality, his personal and actual existence, and a hailing of George’s.  Tom 
Sawyer, and Clarence’s inscription in it to George, is the essential affirmation of both his 
achieved status as angel and that of his prophet.  The presentation of such a gift and its message, 
however, requires the messenger’s invisibility. 
Angelic invisibility differs from ghostly invisibility in significant ways.  Like the 
difference between textual negation and affirmation, the ghostly describes invisibility as a 
suppression of agency, the angelic, the sign of its happening.  Where free will is the desired but 
occluded possibility of the ghostly, it is the very precondition of the angelic and its obsession 
with judgment.  This relation between ghostly and angelic invisibilities is worth a detour, 
because both can be read as articulating themselves through the figure of the book, the text that 
speaks things that aren’t there.  In The Signifying Monkey, Henry Louis Gates, Jr. defines the 
ghostly in this manner, through the subaltern experience of illiteracy and the “trope of the talking 
book.”  According to Gates, the experience of slaves like Oloudah Equiano confronting the 
object of knowledge is like two mirrors facing each other.  For him this is a “sign of absence,” a 
silence born of the static reflection of two non-subjects - the slave who can’t read (that is, who 
by law is defined as an object, hence non-reading), and the book that won’t speak.  Gates speaks 
in the tradition of the American sublime as outlined separately by Mary Arensberg and Rob 
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 Wilson,49 as the experience of utter blankness and whitness – Melville’s whale, or Stevens’s 
snow.  Gates calls this “the null and void,” “an endless pattern of voided repetition,” and it is 
also what we see in the first parts of It’s a Wonderful Life and the true encounter books – the 
chaotic dissolution of identity and, more importantly, means of identification.  For Gates, the 
invisibility attendant on these double mirrors expresses the subaltern experience in which the 
“language of the master” is incapable of recognizing the other.  “When the master’s book looks 
to see whose face is behind the voice that Equiano speaks, it can only see an absence, an 
invisibility that dwells in an unattended looking-glass” (156).  The book is ghostly as an 
expression of closed repetition, unable to yield the other (literally allegoria means “to speak the 
other”), resistant, mirroring without communicating. 
 Where these textual mirrors evoke a problem of the will, of intention haunting physical 
reality, the angelic text finds its voice in unreflected light, in almost an excess of illumination.  
Thus the ghostly lends itself more to critique, to the exposure of invisible structures and 
processes in order to ascribe cause and responsibility; the angelic, on the other hand, in treating 
invisible structures as manifestations of an other reality whose causality escapes us, tends to 
acknowledge the worldly limitations of those structures while mystifying their otherworldly 
potential.  Because of this, angels and ghosts deal with the problem of immaterial presence 
differently.  The sign of the ghostly and the otherized is an absent presence, the shadow of 
something there but not recognized or seen - not essentially readable, except as an uncanny 
feeling that there might, in fact, be something where there appears to be nothing.  The sign of the 
angel, on the other hand, is a present absence, what Hannah Arendt in her writings on 
imagination and judgment calls “the nonappearance in the appearances” (80).  As with the stories 
of angels appearing to humans in disguise as humans (“for some have thereby entertained angels 
                                                 
49 See both of their books by the same title: The American Sublime. 
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 unawares” - and this includes Satan in disguise as the snake), the sensible contains within it 
something that goes beyond sensibility; the invisible is perceptible through the opacity of the 
visible.  (The 1998 travelling exhibit of angel art from the Vatican, touring under the catchy title 
“The Invisible Made Visible,” gets this wrong, I think.  It is ghosts who are hungry to be made 
visible.  Angels, according to the encounter books, are “shy,” not the least perhaps because they 
represent something antithetical to visibility.  In their capacity as messengers and willing 
servants they rather make something else visible, something immaterial about the human and 
human life, instead of simply their own being.)  If as spirits both angels and ghosts rely on a 
sensibility of “something more,” this something represents in each case a different kind of 
reality.  In the case of ghosts that reality, now whited out of appearance,  is a sensory-defined 
one - something definite beneath an unstable surface that already feels unreal.  In the case of 
angels we find a surface stability - the everyday - yielding an extraordinary intelligence whose 
reality - the reality of a sublime nonappearance - illumines appearance from within. 
 The difference between angels and ghosts, as we see it through their different 
manipulations of the figure of the book, describes why angelic narrative in particular begs 
allegorical reading.  The ghostly, as indicated in Gates’s use of the term “trope” to describe the 
talking book, is essentially a metaphorical representation of the sublime.  The figure of speech 
and the figure of the unknown go together; as the substitution of one type of representation for 
another, metaphor in its definition suggests a ghostly presence.50  This is particularly evident if 
                                                 
50 The substitution of presence for absence also suggests a teleology of redemption.  As Paul de Man argues, the 
very action of troping follows a redemptive logic, involving the restoration of life from death, of innocence out of 
experience.  He identifies what he calls “tropological chains” as a gesture toward infinitude, traveling from 
particulars - “individual sensations” - to “infinite generalities” (of which death is perhaps the most infinite as well as 
the most general) in his analysis of Baudelaire and Kleist’s Marionettentheater.  This is not too far afield from Erich 
Auerbach’s conception of the figura as a prophetic system of interpretation invoking a narrative of fulfillment in 
which the figura “shadows forth” events and meanings to come.  Significantly, a great number of quotationss he 
uses to illustrate this (mostly from classical Christian writers like Tertullian) use the word “shadow” to express this 
figural movement.  The figura’s prophetic genealogy and the trope’s travel narrative serve to produce, accentuate, 
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 we return to the literature on that great zone of the imagination, the sublime.  In her analysis of 
the sublime, Arensberg sees metaphor as inheriting the problem of the absence of meaning as it 
was articulated by Longinus.  She argues that since it is predicated on the collapse of direct 
referentiality later articulated in poststructuralism, metaphor is capable of grasping the affective 
ghosting of the subject that pervades American poetry.51  Metaphor (and Lewis says similar 
things about symbolism) reaches from the image toward infinity, posing the image as a shade of 
this universal reality, redeeming it through that reality.  Angelic allegory, on the other hand, 
reduces infinity to the image, and in so illuminating it allows it to speak with the infinite, 
presents it as the revelation that is the talking book.  As we shall see, this is a different attitude 
toward the status and problem of civilization.  As revelation, rather than suppression, the book 
turns its face from the ghostly past towards the direction of the angelic message – the future. 
 In contemporary culture, both high and low brow, the story of angels and their books is 
intimately tied to the stories of humans and their cars.  The idea of the the book as a certain kind 
of intelligence, contemplative, historical, and global, directly clarifies what it is the angel brings 
to the human experience of driving and the idea of the car as a certain kind of decision-making, 
                                                                                                                                                             
and glorify “the idea of innocence recovered at the far side and by way of experience, of paradise consciously 
regained after the fall” (De Man, 267).  The concept, essentially, recovers individual losses through its infinity.  This 
is a theory of meaning-production in which meaning seems almost to crawl through literal gaps and pitfalls to 
resurface in the more buoyant air of figuration, finally hailed as a spiritual and universal if not densely concrete and 
particular presence. 
51 This dynamic appears earlier in British romantic poetry, perhaps the primary progenitor of American 
Transcendentalist writing.  Thomas Weiskel, in describing the romantic sublime as an encounter with a self-
conscious modernity, also begins his book The Romantic Sublime with recourse to metaphor, this time as the 
essential principle of a sublimation.  (This is perhaps an echo of Harold Bloom’s “antithetical” reading of a Freudian 
sublime which is itself highly dependent on metaphorical substitutions).  As Weiskel explains it, the “stunning 
metaphor” of sublime action arrived in the wake of the historical withdrawal of God to offer a way of reading, a 
“compromise between old and new,” that at once compensated for this loss and legitimized its experience. 
“The affective aggrandizement of the sublime moment supports an illusion, a metaphorical union with the creator 
which suppresses the inferiority of our status as listeners. [. . .] By some such illusion of joining with the creator, we 
read and learn to think.  Sublime is one of those terms like inspiration, vision, apocalypse, imagination, the 
daemonic - and, of course, transcendence - whose continual sublimation into metaphor makes thought possible by 
enabling us to grasp experience in terms sanctioned by the past - the essential critical gesture, already sophisticated 
in antiquity” (2). 
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 vigilant, quotidian, and personal.  In pairing the two visually you see an allegory of the angelic 
message: the communication of the timeless beyond to the temporal here and now, the 
immortalization of the individual, and the process of judgment whereby particularities are 
grasped as a whole.  This pairing appears arrestingly on screen.  In a number of angel films, for 
instance, the only time the angels ever appear in cars they are also accompanied by a book.  In 
Michael, the angel in the back of the station wagon reads from a tourist book featuring all the 
local Midwestern pilgrimage sites for various world records (the world’s largest ball of twine, 
the world’s largest frying pan).  The humans up front ignore him, and when they refuse to take a 
detour for one of these world-historical sites, Michael makes the car break down.  These 
breakdowns, of course, lead them closer to their destiny, which is closer to each other.  Wim 
Wenders’s 1988 Wings of Desire (original German title Der Himmel Uber Berlin, the sky or 
heavens over Berlin) also uses the concatenation of cars and books to introduce the idea of 
unrecognized notability, as Michael does in invoking the genre of Ripley’s Believe It Or Not and 
the Guinness Book of World Records – two texts premised on the idea that nowheresville 
mundanity can produce exceptionality, like George Bailey in Bedford Falls.  (Appropriately, 
another angelic narrative of the naïve extraordinary occurs in Mark Twain’s Report from 
Paradise, in which we’re told that one of the greatest celebrations in heaven occurred upon the 
arrival of an unknown, uneducated, poverty-stricken poet from Kentucky, who was hailed with 
greater fanfare than most saints.) 
Wenders’s treatment of angels, cars, and books is extraordinarily dense and rich, and 
demands a slow analysis.  In Wings of Desire there are two scenes with angels in cars.52  The 
first takes place in a car showroom, somewhere in Berlin.  The two angels, Damiel and Cassiel, 
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 are sitting in a convertible going over the day’s events.  The scene begins with a long circling 
pan of the angels (including a brilliant reflection of the BMW insignia on a hubcap in the 
window) Cassiel, the angel who in this film remains in the cerebral, angelic world order of 
colorless perception, reads from his book the data of the day.  He begins with the times of sunrise 
and sunset, moonrise and moonset, and the water levels, and then moves on to events that had 
occurred throughout history on that day: “20 years ago today a Soviet jet fighter crashed into the 
lake at Spandau.  Fifty years ago there were” - and Damiel answers for him, “the Olympic 
Games.”  “200 years ago, Blanchard flew over the city in a balloon.”  Damiel, the angel of the 
contemporary with a sensibility for human feeling, adds, “Like the fugitives the other day.”  In 
the middle of Cassiel’s registry of collective memory, Damiel points out a couple kissing 
passionately through the showroom window.  Instantly overlapping this, the list changes.  Cassiel 
names a different kind of event: “And today on the Lilienthaler Chausee, a man, walking, slowed 
down, and looked over his shoulder into space.”  Damiel then reads from his own list - a man 
who before he kills himself sends off letters with rare postage stamps, a woman who closes her 
umbrella in the middle of the rain.  The angels are now speaking in scenes, in living snapshot 
moments of individual contemplation (“staring over his shoulder into space”) and intention.  As 
Damiel and Cassiel compare notes they become enchanted by this process of naming the 
formlessness, of selecting experience aesthetically.  Sitting in the BMW showroom, in the 
middle of German civilization’s glistening self-advertisement, they end up discussing their own 
desire for human experience – “to be alone, to remain serious, to be a savage.”  Here the film 
takes Benjamin’s famous observation, that “every document of civilization is at the same time a 
document of barbarism” to a wistful and even hopeful place.  Civilization, allegorized by the 
                                                                                                                                                             
52 Immediately prior to the first scene we see the angel Damiel in an ambulance with his hand on a pregnant 
woman’s belly as she struggles in the middle of labor.  The crisis-mobile is not quite the same thing as a car, 
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 angelic records and recordings, ultimately produces within itself the desire for savagery, for 
physical sensation untouched by ideas and motion determined by the isolated individual.  The 
task of the angel of history is not just to record and name history, but to show how historical 
perception inevitably valorizes and returns to pre-historical experience.   
 The second scene takes the angel into the moving vehicle.  Cassiel sits observing and 
recording the thoughts of an anonymous driver, who is meditating on “statelessness” as a feature 
of modern life.  Sitting in an antique car about to be used in a film about wartime Berlin starring 
Columbo, the angel finds himself in the heart of the city, in its archives and testimonies, 
memories and perceptions.  Cassiel is no longer reading from an already made record, but 
actually recording what the man is saying into his book.  His hands glow as he writes. 
Every home owner, or even every tenant, nails his name plate on 
the door, like a coat of arms, and studies the morning paper as if he 
were a world leader.  Germany has crumbled into as many small 
states as there are individuals.  And these small states are mobile.  
Everyone carries his own state with him, and demands a toll when 
another wants to enter: [at this point we cut to the angel writing, 
his hands illuminated and illuminating] a fly caught in amber, or a 
leather bottle.  So much for the border.  But one can only enter 
each state with a password.  The German soul of today can only be 
conquered and governed by one who arrives at each small state 
with the password.  Fortunately, no one is currently in a position to 
do this.  So everyone migrates, and waves his one-man-state flag in 
all earthly directions. 
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however, and he appears to the passenger, not the driver. 
 This scene shows some of Wings of Desire’s most celebrated techniques – in particular the use of 
actual pre-war film footage, which then cuts to the modern-day cuts of cars passing on the gritty 
streets.  What is interesting here is the fact that the revelation comes from the driver, not the 
angel, who simply sits passively by (though he has chosen to enter this car based on hearing the 
previous part of the man’s monologue, already selecting the car he is going to occupy and the 
voice he is going to listen to and record).  The global perspective, evident in the speaker’s 
musings on the current state of radical singularity as a potential terrain of totalitarianism, is 
highlighted, rather than articulated, by the writing presence of the angel.  Angelic illumination 
chooses its human prophets to deliver the divine message.  In this image of prophecy and its 
confirmation the film emphasizes the revelatory relation between human reflection and angelic 
memory.  The man’s thoughts as he drives through his city are fleeting, like his motion, 
dependent on angelic textualization for their historic resonance.  In this way the book is 
presented to us, the human, as witness – naming (as Clarence does the wonder of George’s life) 
what we already know. 
 The work the angelic book performs of inscribing the invisible into visibility pertains 
especially to those films whose angels are themselves already visible within the diegetic world – 
visible to the characters, not just the audience (as is the case with Wings of Desire and its 
unhappy remake, City of Angels).  The matter of angels’ visibility becomes a question of their 
belief - as it does for George Bailey and the encounter story heroes.   To believe in angels is to 
believe in our own sanctification and inscription in the future, to believe, essentially, in our own 
immortality.  What is significant in this belief, then, is not the existence of the angel per se, but 
what that existence affirms.  The annunciation after all testifies to an earthly glory, to the 
presence of divinity in this world, and to the seeds of the future in the present.  These 
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 affirmations are dramatized in the great pair of angel films where the issue of belief in the angel 
marks the point of the annunciation - The Bishop’s Wife, made a year after Capra’s film, and its 
remake The Preacher’s Wife, made the same year as Michael.  Both deal with some of the same 
issues as Wings of Desire – a culture and a civilization uncertain of its direction and the means of 
evaluating it, which is to say, of being able to exert power within it.  Though the first is arguably 
the better movie, the one I want to focus on (and what I want to close this chapter with) is the 
second, not the least because it also offers an interesting treatment of angels, books, and cars.   
Directed by Penny Marshall, The Preacher’s Wife tells the story of a good-looking angel who 
comes to earth to help a cash-strapped minister and ends up falling in love with his wife.  
Whitney Houston and Denzel Washington decided to work on The Preacher’s Wife in order to 
promote solidarity among black Americans and to raise consciousness among the non-black 
community.  At the time the most expensive “black film” ever made, the movie’s producers 
hoped to break the crossover divide by releasing this feel-good remake of a white film during the 
Christmas season.  The project didn’t work on those terms, though there have been efforts in 
recent years to revive it for the mass American audience during the holiday TV season.  One 
reason may be the films’s possible lack of interest in universalist claims, or the difficulty even 
now of depicting broad social reality through a minority community, with a few token white 
actors.  In either case, the movie generalizes through emotional rather than cosmopolitan 
conventions.  The original followed the story of a bishop desperate for a new cathedral, but who 
learns instead that in tough times money is better spent on the social good; by contrast the 
remake focuses on the good of the locality.  Gregory Hines is a greedy developer who wants to 
move his old neighborhood church to a planned community in the suburbs.  Courtney B. Vance, 
the church’s preacher, frustrated by his own ineffectuality and the recent combustion of the 
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 church boiler, prays for help.  Help arrives in the form of a debonair angel played by 
Washington, but Vance has lost so much faith that he refuses to believe in him.  As Clarence 
does with George Bailey, the angel Dudley’s major struggle with preacher Henry Biggs is to 
effect this belief, to persuade him of his reality as an angel.  The tension between the jaundiced 
Vance and the bubbly Washington – enthused finally to be back on earth – beautifully 
understates this struggle.  This tension comes to its initial head when Dudley accosts Henry at a 
despondent moment: after a tiring day marked by lack of agency, the station wagon won’t start, 
so Henry asks the Lord for a little help.  Dudley arrives and – though Henry of course refuses to 
credit him - the car starts. 
 The car scene incorporates contemporary angelic lore by beginning with a broken down 
car resuscitated by angelic presence.  (And broken-down machines run throughout this film, 
including a coffee pot as well as the boiler and the station wagon.  The only machine that works, 
significantly, is the television).  But the angel does more than start the broken-down vehicle.  As 
the pair sputter past the chintzy storefronts and one-night cheap hotels they engage in a contest 
over rules, from the preacher’s “don’t draw on the window” and “seatbelt please” to Dudley’s 
angel handbook.  These rules embody different approaches to the question of how to move 
forward, or rather, their difference poses the question, what does it mean to move forward?  The 
angel’s role is to demonstrate for Henry a way of reading progress for the community other than 
through urban planning and the destruction of the old.  Dudley does this quite literally by reading 
as they move forward in the car.  As in Wenders’s film, when the car is still, the angelic book 
reveals; when the car is moving, it records, Cassiel’s hands glowing with illuminating power.  In 
Marshall’s fantasy, the book claims the power to guide.  Its illumination in turn is confirmed by 
Dudley’s enchanting handshake at the scene’s end.  “Feel it?  Kind of like springtime and Mom’s 
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 home cooking rolled into one?”53  In the event when physical mobility fails, so this scene tells 
us, angels serve to articulate the possibility of mobility at the level of theory and ideas.   
 Dudley’s day comes, and he earns his wings in Henry’s belief, but also Henry’s 
forgetting.  The day of the Christmas sermon arrives, a sermon which will announce that the 
church is going to be destroyed, taken over by the real estate developer, and moved to the 
suburbs.  The speech is prewritten, and going to be televised.  Appropriately it is the assimilation 
of the church to TV that will signal its consent to the isolating social structures of 
commercialism, modernization, and “progress” (and this is its purpose, since Hines has arranged 
the event). But on the opening day the preacher, reading from the teleprompter, falters: 
“Christmas is supposed to be the most joyous day of the year, but for St. Matthews, today. . . St. 
Matts. . . today is supposed to be. . .”  We cut to the angel watching him from the back of the 
church, almost as if to remind us that television is about performance as much as script and that 
it is, from the point of view of the spectator, not just a rational but an imaginative occasion.  
Henry looks to the side, and begins again.  “Beloved, God never promised us a perfect life.  He’s 
saving that for the hereafter.  While we’re here on this earth, sometimes we just have to work for 
it.”  The manager for WRKL runs out, in a crisis, high-heeled boots flopping, to the TV van 
waiting outside.  “I don’t know what to do - he’s not following the script!”  Meanwhile, Henry 
invokes the power of allegory to describe this “work.”  “But the good news is that he gave us two 
secret weapons to help us to succeed: Hope,” “Hope,” the congregation echoes, “and Love.” 
“Love.”  . . . And in Love, also “Forgiveness.”  At this moment Henry looks at Dudley, who has 
fallen in love with his wife (Houston) and Dudley looks back in acceptance and as witness of his 
                                                 
53 Interestingly Michael uses similar imagery, though it makes much more of it.  To every woman who passes 
Michael smells like something warm and sweet and familiar, something “from childhood,” until finally Andie 
MacDowell exclaims, “It’s cookies!  He smells like cookies!”  Released the same year, it’s unclear whether one film 
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 forgiving.  He exits the church as Henry delivers an apology/paean to his wife and acknowledges 
finally the lesson that has been Dudley’s “work,” the recognition that we take those we love for 
granted.  “Look in wonder at those you love, for they are the face of God.”  As we see Dudley 
now alone and outside, walking down the steps, the preacher’s old fire returns, as if the angel 
was a castrating presence from which he was now freed.  And now he unveils the real secret 
weapon we have when “the path is dark and the road bends,” and offers to his flock almost an 
exact repetition of what Dudley had told him in the car. “You see, He’s - ” Henry looks up and 
almost whistles, “He’s got these angels, waiting in this looooong line, for the chance to come 
down and help each and every one of us.”  We cut to Dudley raising his hands in victory and 
saying “Yes!” over the preacher’s voice, “And they do!”  The sermon continues on the 
momentum it has built, declaring blessedness, agency, the power to save the church and begin 
again, and the power to go forward “into the new days ahead.”   
The Clintonian tinge of the last line is merely a flourish; the crux of the speech happens 
when the preacher sings the existence of angels as the source of power for the principles of hope 
and love that guide us into possibility, and with which we struggle.  He segues into the idea of 
angels by testifying to the power of angels in his life, as the personal blessing of God, at the 
moment that Dudley is exiting the church.  Yet it is a fiction.  For this is also the moment that 
rule number three (the final rule) in the angel handbook comes into play: “When I’m gone, you’ll 
have no memory of me.”54  At the same instant that Henry declares the existence of angels and 
their influence in his life, he has lost all recollection that Dudley was ever there.  (The same 
pertains to the bishop in The Bishop’s Wife, who in the midst of his Christmas sermon – also 
breaking from the book at Dudley’s inspiration – acknowledges angels at the moment when he 
                                                                                                                                                             
was borrowing from the other (and they were made by different production companies) or whether they both came 
to the same purpose of conveying angelic grace through like conventions of appetite and nostalgia. 
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 forgets his angel).  In forgetting his rules, he paradoxically follows them.  The pouring out of the 
spirit performed also by the crowd in It’s a Wonderful Life displays itself in this forgetting, just 
as the preacher “forgets” the script set up in supertitles before him.  Benediction only comes in 
the angel’s absence - whether literally, as when Clarence appears solely through his metonym 
Tom Sawyer, or psychologically, as at the end of The Preacher’s Wife when the congregation 
pours out of the church and Dudley waves to the family, now a stranger to all except the children 
(similarly, in Wings of Desire, only the children can see the angels).  In a poetic inversion, by the 
end of Capra’s film Clarence has become “an” angel (“Look Daddy!  Teacher says every time a 
bell rings. . .”), himself anonymous (the “dear friend” who gives George his book) at the end as 
George had become in the middle.  Just as Clarence’s distinctly odd body has disappeared into 
generalized annunciatory status, so does the charismatic Dudley retreat into an almost bodiless 
apprehension.  We watch Denzel Washington watching, set apart in his grey polished overcoat – 
an exalted and consecrating isolation that echoes his role as the Prince in Branagh’s Much Ado 
About Nothing.  So the guardians of memory show that forgetting is necessary in order to move 
forward, and that memory is always also a departure. 
 This is where the story of cars, books, and angels has brought us.  An allegory of 
transience and immortality, the story of movement interrupted in crisis, resumed in judgment, 
and guarded in text tells us something about the kind of audience angel and human make for 
each other.  As recorder, the angel textualizes human experience, fixing its images within a 
conceptual order that erases the means of its own translation in order to remember itself.  The 
human, unable to intelligize its own power, receives the angel as a locomotive force and agent of 
its progress.  To give audience to the angel is to step briefly across the threshold of aevum, into 
the sphere of existential being as blessing and time as luminous continuity.  This is the instant of 
                                                                                                                                                             
54 When Dudley tells him this in the car, Henry responds, “That’s my favorite part!” 
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 prophetic calling and impregnation, of a radical beginning to which the future must always 
return, and whose future is its own revelation.  To receive the angel as audience, on the other 
hand, is to assume a priestly authority that calls the image of the angel before it as witness of its 
truth and power to determine truth, to name and to decide.  The future appears as a chosen 
eternity which time crosses into via the angelic invocation.  Thus the allegory goes both ways – 
into the dual imaginaries of memory and possibility, which the angelic image renders scenic and 
immediate.  Only when he attains the force of idea, general and invisible, shining through and 
illuminating the human particularities, does the angel finally get his wings. 
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 3. Everyman’s an Angel 
 
 
“Could it be. . . Satan?”  
- Dana Carvey as “Saturday Night Live”’s Church Lady 
 
“O father, . . . 
Hast thou forgot me then, and do I seem 
Now in thine eye so foul, once deemed so fair 
In heav’n, when at th’assembly, and in sight 
Of all the Seraphim with thee combined 
In bold conspiracy against heav’n’s King, 
All on a sudden miserable pain 
Surprised thee, dim thine eyes, and dizzy swum 
In darkness, while thy head flames thick and fast 
Threw forth, till on the left side op’ning wide, 
Likest to thee in shape and count’nance bright, 
Then shining heav’nly fair, a goddess armed 
Out of thy head I sprung: amazement seized 
All th’ host of heav’n; back they recoiled afraid 
At first, and called me Sin, and for a sign 
Portentous held me; but familiar grown, 
I pleased, and with attractive graces won 
The most averse, thee chiefly, who full oft 
Thyself in me thy perfect image viewing 
Becam’st enamored. . .” 
 
- John Milton Paradise Lost (II, 727; 747-765) 
 
 
In 1992 Ballantine’s publication of Alma Daniel’s, Timothy Wyllie’s, and Andrew 
Ramer’s Ask Your Angels: A practical guide to working with the messengers of heaven to 
empower and enrich your life officially inaugurated the recent publishing trend of angel self-help 
books.  These books evolved naturally out of the tales of angel encounter; with so many 
reporting angelic communications, it was almost a matter of etiquette to expand their availability 
beyond the contingencies of time and place.  In fact it seemed that contingency - and its sublime 
voices - could be more effectively universalized if only one moved them inward.  Since the 
83 
 encounter narratives had already valorized the capacity of the “recipient” to be moved by contact 
with one’s supernatural familiar, perhaps this capacity itself could become the basis of a more 
ecumenical angelism.   
The generic parthenogenesis was easy: automotive contact blended seamlessly with auto-
conversation, that meditative brand of “talking with” your guardian angel so enticing to the new 
genre’s readership.  Little hybrid books of angel encounters now added sections about how to 
initiate and sustain your own contact with angels.  Major angel authors like Terry Lynn Taylor 
and Eileen Elias Freeman shifted their angelic typologies from instantiated companionship to 
cultivated friendship (Freeman’s Angel Healing: Working with Angels to Heal Your Life took up 
the baton from her inaugural book Touched by Angels: True Cases of Close Encounters of the 
Celestial Kind, published two years earlier).  And best of all, this new, intentional form of angel 
experience could be done in the comfort of your own home, without exposing oneself to the 
dangers and obstacles of highway driving. 
 Above all, both genres picked up on the angelic figure as a means of representing the 
experience of crisis in late twentieth century America.  The first dramatized the story of 
judgment (from which crisis originally gets its name); in the scenario of automotive breakdown 
we follow the transformation of annihilating anxiety and paralysis to elevating states of 
contemplation and reflection via the call of the angel as pure beginning.  In the second genre, the 
crisis becomes a psychological, rather than a narrative, one: a drama of decision-making – of 
integrating both passive and active modes of relating to our environments – precipitated by a 
conflict within the self, instead of between the self and the external world.  Two opposing 
processes of imagination hold battle: reception versus projection.  In this dilemma of creation 
84 
 and origination the angelic call appears subjectively, a beginning (or capacity for beginning) 
built into the structure of the psyche itself. 
The difference is important.  The vision of the encounter stories was cosmological: two 
worlds distinguished by their modalities of time – the time of appearances and the time of ideas – 
mediated by the angel.  The self-help books, in imagining this binary within the domain of the 
individual psyche, produced a very different story.  Their story frames the angelic call as 
something that can be petitioned by the human.  Grace and chosenness no longer drop from 
heaven as an expression of an individual’s prophetic status in the world.  Instead, the self-help 
books take this chosenness and offer to make it widespread.  They take a moment of mystery and 
devise a way to make it everyday life, take an outside encounter and make it the highest 
expression of internality.  They do this by defining angelic grace as an aspect of human 
psychology, an already-endowed gift of human existence, waiting only to be actualized by the 
mind’s eye as it looks deep within. 
No longer an annunciation of the self by an external power, angelic communication 
appears as the inward turning of the mind and its decisive faculties in order to – paradoxically – 
induce grace.  The change is palpable at the level of ideas as well as images.  In psychologizing 
the relationship between the angelic and the human the self-help books rely on and demand a 
different theory of reality.  The duality of worlds and temporalities in the true stories about 
angels emerges as a duality of substance in the self-help books: an idealist distinction between 
matter and spirit oriented toward the problem of unity rather than the problem of action.55  In a 
situation of internal rivenness, of conflict within the self, of inner crisis, resolution must summon 
an agent of wholeness.  Angelic conversation is this unity’s rainbow.  Starting where the true 
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 encounter stories left off – with the experience of an intense interiority and self-awareness, these 
guides to talking to angels broach our own self-consciousness as the principle of the unified self.  
In this practice we perceive what we are and what we think as one.  It is a perfect, divine 
intuition, this auto-conversation.  And it settles the dispute between rival forms of imagination.  
Establishing angelic communication as the road to self-help, the how-to-talk-to-your-guardian-
angel books glorify our capacity to receive information from within as the true means of 
achieving wholeness and realizing the self.  Reception beats out projection as the basis of the 
individual’s coming-into-power. 
 The angels in these two types of books are for this reason not the same.  Though they 
have messages to deliver, the new inward angels are not messenger angels in the sense of the true 
encounter stories.  They are closer to us than that.  In them our imaginative experience has 
moved from sense-impression to pure form, from physical apprehension to mental perception.  
This makes them subject to our power, accessible to our concentration, answerable to our call.  
And as the agency for contact shifts from the angel to the human, so does the message shift from 
revelation to intuition.  Now we are the message-bearers, the messengers themselves merely 
respondants.  Partners in a dialogue of the mind, angels may become our “best friends.”  They 
can be domesticated in this way because they are seen to express the divinity that inherently 
permeates every human soul – a divinity that is familiar, personal, and essential.  As Ginsberg 
writes in the “Footnote to Howl,” personal divinity is populist: “Everyman’s an angel.”  In 
cultivating this expression, the angelic manifestation of the divine self, we overcome our awe of 
angels as the occasional irruption of the inhuman, unassimilable to human reason and 
understanding.  In a sense, we have taken on their role.  We have become angels; the angels 
                                                                                                                                                             
55 In many ways the problem of unity is where the problem of action leads – if one understands action as depending 
on a coherent self whose judgments are traceable to a central, defining and essential power.  As this chapter will 
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 themselves, merely our reflections.  In them we see our perfection and our power.  In them we 
“visualize” our minds as autonomous beings, without history or physical knowledge, only pure, 
intuitive knowing to which reality appears as clear and distinct: immediate, coherent, and self-
evident. 
 Fundamentally an angel of the concept, then, the self-help angel is minister and emblem 
of the mind and its mastery, fulfilling the idea of judgment’s completion in Kant’s Critique of 
the representation of the imagination to itself.  Where in the first chapter such a representation 
took the form of address - the annunciating utterance, the book, and the divinely inspired oration 
- here it is an abstract reflection wholly within the realm of thought.  The angel comes back to us 
as the personification of an idea, what A.D. Nuttall in his book Two Concepts of Allegory refers 
to as “nonspecific imagery,” the “instantially viewed universal.”56  Where the roadside angels of 
the encounter books were anonymous and relentlessly typical, the self-help angels have universal 
names they aquire through our meditatively induced conversations with them, abstract qualities 
we attend to as a means of effecting change. 
Something happens, at this point, where the angels we think begin to define the process 
of thinking them.  As allegorical specimens extraordinaire, angels – global and general yet 
targeted and precise – themselves emblematize a way of thinking typical of the spiritual self-help 
genre.  The personal divine, ecumenical and conceptual, seeks the angel as the reflection of its 
own species of reflection.  This is especially true of reading practices within the genre.  When 
                                                                                                                                                             
explain later, this power in contemporary pop psychology as well as other discourses is understood to be the soul. 
56 Nuttall defines the latter as the objectification of a universal idea, when thought of as an instance of itself, an 
argument central to his definition of allegory.  It is not a tautology so much as a way to acknowledge how the 
representation of an abstract noun becomes concrete through its own adjectival forms, so that Beauty is beautiful, 
Avarice avaricious, etc.  In other words, allegory is that special means of representing metaphysical reality, a 
difficult and potentially contradictory idea that I engage later in this chapter in a discussion of angels as spiritual 
substances.  The phrase “unspecified images,” or “non-specific imagery,” builds on this idea in terms of the artwork.  
This refers to a pictorial image that is of necessity definite (and I think the same could be said for words), yet aspires 
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 they are positioned in reference to visual imagining (as they do in allegorical thought), words 
exert a particular self-reflexive quality.  In allegorical language ideas appear as instances of 
themselves, to borrow Nuttall’s terminology.  In it they view their perfect image, to borrow 
Milton’s.  This trait of allegorical representation is necessary for the angel self-help books, 
because the experience of these books is the experience of ideas.  Where the self conceives itself 
spiritually as a separated mind, self-teaching, self-sustaining, and transcendent, thinking and 
experiencing become conflated - each functioning as the highest definition of the other.  With 
this move the essential object of experience becomes the idea, the abstraction, the personified 
concept.  So it is that angels, who as messengers or annunciators initiate events but do not 
themselves receive them, typify just this idea of static experience, the experience of being and 
existence rather than of happenings, ruptures or changes, that the self-help books promise.  In 
making contact with their angels the readers make contact with angelic rationalism: the 
experience of a universe where the unchanging and the typical are operative forces, where the 
unchanging and typical are in fact the only operative forces, because only they have the power to 
name reality.  In such a universe the search for self-help requires an aid beyond that which the 
individual, weakly specific and concrete, can give herself. 
If we would help ourselves, we must become our own angels.57  This is the premise of the 
genre, and the guiding principle of its pages.  Asked to “cultivate the qualities of the divine,” the 
reader approaches the path of self-regeneration by mimicking the qualities of those beings whose 
conversation he seeks to activate.  The conversation itself serves as a vehicle for such mimicry; 
                                                                                                                                                             
to be “typical rather than individual” (73).  It aims to be, rather than to mean, to be identifiable without 
corresponding to any one actual thing.  As Nuttall makes clear, this is essentially a Platonic project. 
57  Doreen Virtue, Ph.D.’s Angel Therapy  tells us, “You are indeed an earthly angel sent here by God to perform 
miraculous deeds of love and sharing” (xiv).  And the title of of Dana Reynolds’ and Karen Blessen’s book of 
spiritual wisdom clarifies the connection between using your angels and becoming one: Be An Angel: Heavenly 
Hints for Angelic Acts from Your Guardian Spirits. 
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 in receiving the angels we receive our angelic selves.  These selves are knowable perhaps less for 
what they are than for what they do.  They exert a particular kind of power - the power of 
thought as the power of creation - premised on a rationalist idealism.  The image popular in 
many of these books of guardian angels making deals on our behalf with the guardian angels of 
others might serve as an allegory of this idealism.  It is the mind communicating with its own 
image that makes things happen, not people communicating with each other.  Platonic dualism is 
at home in this thinking.  Separated sharply from one another, mental and physical worlds are no 
longer mutually accountable.  The first appears as a self-determining, self-justifying arena in 
which idea and object are in perfect conformity with each other; the second merely appears.  The 
physical world is the shadow, the projection of ideas as appearance, and hence as illusion and 
deception.  This is indeed the main thrust of the books, to understand as illusion any 
phenomenon that cannot be immediately intuited.  Since the only phenomena that can be intuited 
are internal to the self - our thoughts, the ideas by which we think them, and above all our own 
existence as thinking subjects - this means that anything that does not belong to the “percipient” 
as percipient is potentially regardable as “false.”58  In other words, if a thing is not angelic, then 
it must be the dual opposite. 
In self-help angelism the revelation of the demon is inevitable.  Where the mind 
conceives itself as separated from experience the possibility of projection arises, and with it, the 
agent of deception.  Doubt strikes at the angelized soul.  What if these messages are not, in fact, 
angelic, these intuitions not given but made?  Manufactured?  Fabricated?  What if the 
machinery of the mind produced its own memories and visions, at will?  For indeed, what power 
                                                 
58 “Percipient” is the books’ term of choice to designate the reading angel-talker.  The word suggests a smooth 
transition from receiving (“recipient,” the more common word, is evoked here) and acting.  The passive reception of 
intelligence is reconceived as active perception, just as chatting with angels, a process these books celebrate as 
inherently “intuitive” and ultimately “automatic,” is adapted within the active discourse of self-help. 
89 
 distinguishes the reception of truth from the projection of belief?  These questions arise 
necessarily at the cusp of the angelic conversation.  At the same time that the platonic subject 
claims her own autonomy by regarding her mind as an independent force and her world as 
subject to it, at the instant that awareness of perception transcends the organs of perception, one 
glimpses a spirit of a different sort.  For, in the margins and slinking between the lines, we find 
the true angelic spirit of spiritualist self-help is a fallen one.  He appears wherever the human 
becomes angel – as the evil genius threatening the sanctity of Descartes’s cogito, as the howl of 
the Beats’ beatification, as the precarious depths lying in wait underneath our own pure 
reflection.  Like Milton’s Eve we discover in the self-contemplating self-image the threat of 
narcissism, false projection, and pride.  The angel Satan is the special guardian of this cognitivist 
dilemma.  Shadowing our own self-attention, the demon of rationalism asserts his presence as a 
symbol of our inner crisis – whispering in our ear the presence of a profound split at the base of 
the angelic psyche, suggesting that in fact active and passive are not one in us, prodding us to 
keep searching for the actualized self. 
  
A lost battalion of platonic conversationalists 
 The Prologue to Ask Your Angels begins with two stories of near-death on the highway.  
Though each story eventually names the person this happened to, they begin in the second-
person.  “You are driving on the interstate across the great southwestern desert.”  “You’re 
traveling in your station wagon with a friend beside you.”  As a book of instruction rather than 
nonfiction narrative, Ask Your Angels speaks to collective personhood.  The authors change the 
original first-person voice of the encounter stories to the second-person, making the reader 
participant rather than voyeur.  They rehearse the encounter master narrative in order to establish 
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 for the reader the reality of the stories, the fact of the marvelous in the lives of individuals.  This 
move acts as both authorization and definition: angels exist as personal visitants.  But the use of 
direct address alters the realism of this claim – it is not the historical occurrence of angelic 
annunciation that matters, but its universal possibility, not the physical event, but its presence in 
the imagination.  Built into the structure of the individual, angels arrive when we claim our 
divine inheritance. 
And in fact, it quickly becomes clear that once recalled and reframed, the true encounter 
stories have no further use in the self-help books.  The opening of Ask Your Angels is a case in 
point; within a page the objective shifts: 
Angels don’t only show up in life-threatening situations.  They’re 
with us all the time.  Polly saw an angel in her kitchen, on a sunny 
afternoon when she was baking cookies for her kids.  And Ben’s 
been talking to angels since his grandmother first told him about 
them in 1957.  Perhaps when you were young, you were in touch 
with your invisible friends but weren’t believed and learned to 
keep silent after that – and forgot.  Almost everyone has had a 
mysterious, unexplained occurrence in his life.  Your story may not 
be as dramatic as the first three examples we’ve given.  Or you 
may not even think you have a story.  But the angels come into our 
lives in different ways.  If you’ve picked up this book, the angels 
have already touched you.  And this is the beginning of your story.  
(2) 
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 The angelic authors address the reader as the child she once was, and invite her to begin where 
she left off.  They invoke the charmed past of the reader’s childhood as a way to include her in 
the community of the chosen, of those who have angel stories, like the imaginary events children 
construct.  This idea of origin appears once, the echo of memory, uncontrolled and forgotten, that 
will prove the inspiration for something beyond memory: the intentional cultivation of a 
language and perception that transcends sense-impressions.59  For this reason the status of the 
memory as fantasy or actual event is irrelevant; what matters is that we recollect it as something 
lost to mind, an absent presence at the core of our personal history.  For at the base of the angelic 
conversation one finds a forgottenness – a recovered memory (though not traumatic, and not 
positively existing) that acts as a portal to a different order of experience.  The angelic 
remembrance is necessarily incomplete, suggesting a powerful invisibility – a felt but unapparent 
motion, the moment of silence in the middle of conversation that inspires the saying “an angel 
passes overhead” (in French “un ange passe”).  In breaking the silence to say “an angel passes” 
we offer the unspoken its image and its own voice, give a nod to the fleeting presence of 
supernal interiority.60  It is this fleetingness that the self-help books attempt to rationalize and 
                                                 
59 Later in the book childhood will resurface as a divinatory grounding for the angelic journey in the story of Connie, 
who was persuaded to participate in the Angel Invocation chant because it echoed her experience “when she was 
small” of belonging to a church where people spoke in tongues.  “The sounds of this chant brought her back to some 
of those happy moments in her childhood, when she knew that angels were real” (157).   C hildhood memory also 
opens Kim O’Neill’s How to Talk With Your Angels: The very first paragraph begins, “From my earliest childhood 
recollections I can vividly remember the presence of special, unseen companions who talked with me, played with 
me, guidied me, comforted me, and protected me.   As a child, I fully accepted and believed in the reality of their 
existence” (3).  Here the memory is fully in view – but only as testimony establishing O’Neill’s narrative authority.  
In order to universalize the experience, Daniels et al rely on the possibility of forgetting as a form of inclusion, one 
which is also more powerful imagistically, more magical, in grounding metaphysical reality in an experience 
perceptible to intuition but evanescent to recollection. 
60 In his book An Angel Passes Stuart Schneiderman takes, as I do, the angel on principle as tied to a theory of 
language.  He is particularly interested in the means by which language makes an ‘effect,” writing of the angel in 
relation to this, “Perhaps the agent is simply the invisible insensible meaning – to the extent that it is visualized” 
(179).  As I argued in the first chapter, the angel is this visualization, the power of the imagination to render our 
apprehension of power, which is always itself an invisibility, however it may manifest itself. 
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 make contractual, this forgetting that they seek to sublimate.  Our mission, should we choose to 
accept it, is the recovery of the angel at the core of the self. 
The year the angel self-help books began to surface was marked in the publishing 
industry by two other events.  In 1992 Thomas Moore’s Care of the Soul made its debut, and the 
recovery genre, which had previously dominated the self-help market, began to lose ground to a 
new trend of books more directly oriented toward “spirituality.”  A 1994 Publisher’s Weekly 
article quotes Stuart Matlin, the president of Jewish Lights press, to date this change.  “Two 
years ago, bookstores cut back on recovery titles, partly because of the expectation that the 
recovery trend was about to end” (McCullough 43).  The publication in 1992 of books like 
Charlotte Davis Kasl’s Many Roads, One Journey: Moving Beyond the Twelve Steps and Lynn 
Grabhorn’s Beyond the Twelve Steps: Roadmap to a New Life (reissued in 2001) may have 
contributed to this expectation.  Wendy Kaminer’s hard-hitting critique of the self-help genre in 
general and the recovery movement in particular also appeared in 1992.  Her basic argument, 
that the recovery movement infantilizes its practitioners, is almost cagily anticipated and 
defended by Charles Allen in Powerless but Not Helpless: Working the 12 Steps with Our 
Everyday Problems, published in the same year.  His book is now out of print.  At the time, 
many publishers suggested that the spirituality trend was simply a dialectical continuation of the 
Twelve-Step genre, starting at the Eleventh Step, “conscious contact with God or a higher 
power” (Cheryl Woodruff, senior editor at Ballantine Books - perhaps the most successful 
publisher of both the angel encounter and angel self-help books, in McCullough 42). 61  
                                                 
61 Though the connections between the recovery and the spirituality movements are compelling as explanations of 
the 1980's - 1990's shift in marketing and demand, their psychology of self-improvement is radically different.  To 
begin with, recovery is a decidedly Manichaean formation.  Based on a pathology-cure model, its main focus is how 
to deal with the presence of past trauma.  In general, these books imagine this trauma as a warring or hungry self 
within, and the subject’s various problems and dysfunctions as symptoms of this primitive inner force constantly 
sabotaging the adult’s potential for happiness.  The recovery of self from this agent of malicious power requires a 
difficult and conflict-laden exorcism.  Such accounts of a “two substances” psychology are specifically countered, 
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 Consequently, natural progress on the journey manifested itself as “an increased emphasis on 
soul issues as the major trend in the post-recovery market” (41).  The increase was meteoric.  
Care of the Soul was soon followed by Soul Mates (1994) and a soul-industry all to itself, the 
grass-roots bestseller, Jack Canfield and Mark Victor Hansen’s Chicken Soup for the Soul 
(1993).  Since then Canfield and Hansen’s classic has hatched over thirty specialized offspring, 
qualifying the various souls in the world from the teenage soul to the preteen soul, the mother’s 
soul to the expectant mother’s soul, the cat and dog lover’s soul, the country soul, the single’s 
soul, etc.  (Among self-help books, sex and the single girl has clearly moved on to purer 
pastures.)  And as late as the year 2000 a Barnes and Noble bestseller list for its summer books 
listed five of its twenty top self-help books as having soul-based titles.   
The shift from recovery to soul as a staple of self-help marketing is especially clear in the 
angel self-help genre.  Early books overtly claim allegiance to the recovery planet.  Ask Your 
Angels includes a whole section on recovery and healing, focusing on addiction and featuring the 
twelve steps.  Terry Lynn Taylor’s Gurdians of Hope, like Ask Your Angels also published in 
1992, is even more expansive, giving a specific angel to each of the twelve steps, rather than 
positioning angels in relation to the twelve steps as a whole.  But the angel genre also clarifies 
how much a positive spirituality actually began to usurp negative recovery and declare its own 
kingdom.  Later Taylor books, for instance (she has a running total of eight), omit 12-step 
references entirely.  Her tone shifts from passivity in regard to a “higher” external power to 
passivity in regard to the power of one’s inner divine experiences.  The power of dreams and 
                                                                                                                                                             
however, by many of the spirituality books, which bear titles like No Enemies Within: A Creative Process for 
Discovering What’s Right about What’s Wrong (Dawna Markova, 1994).  In general, the spirituality books perceive 
substance as a single entity based on the mind, capable of turning toward or away from reality.  Weakness remains a 
form of being “stuck,” but this experience is what attracts readers to books like Beyond the Twelve Steps in the first 
place; both Kasl and Grabhorn appeal to readers who feel that even after counting an even dozen there’s still 
“something missing,” that life is “un-jazzed,” and that their experiences are static and repetitive.  This is not the 
effect of antagonism, but, as I explain below, of a misperception.  
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 prophetic receptivity replaces the traumatic admittance of dependency.  In Angel Healing, 
Doreen Virtue – another author of multiple angel titles – tellingly approaches her section on 
“Addiction” from a more clearly 1997 perspective.  She begins with the question, “What is 
substance, really?”  Virtue’s answer redefines substance from an external object holding sway 
over our desires to an internal “spark,” a “thought-form” that makes us whole.  “Feeling your 
wholeness” resolves the dilemma of “powerlessness,” thus updating the orientation of self-help 
from the problem of autonomy and mastery to that of unity and completion. 
 These problems are distinct.  The recovery genre remains fixed on a complex of denial 
and repression, seeking liberation in the act of confession and submission of the self in order to 
master the self.  It is Manichean, polarized, and agonistic.  Recovery, like the ghostly, speaks to a 
relentless repetition, a crisis of progress and adaptation initiated by personal trauma.  The 
spirituality movement, on the other hand, is existential rather than experiential.  Seemingly about 
nothing at all, its crisis is, in fact, the crisis of nothing at all.  The issue of illusion rather than 
denial filmily hovers over every gentle pronouncement, every chore of the soul.  In the 
spirituality books’ psychology, a soft duality of true and false replaces the aggressive conflict 
between good and evil.  The true, these books suggest, is a function of internal coherence and 
inner substantiality.  Wholeness and unity define positive existence; falsity reveals itself as 
fragmentation, the inability of the subject to provide his own internal principle by which parts of 
the self may be organized, ordered, and brought into consensus.  The object is harmony, not 
exorcism.    
In many ways, the goals of recovery and the goals of the New Age work together in the 
self-help nation.  The practical, self-sufficient activity of judging and acting for and by oneself  
presumes a sense of what all this busy concentration is for.  That is, the individual exerts his 
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 autonomy in reference to a larger sense of the whole and in the service of developing his role in 
it.  Both of these requirements emerge in investigations of the reading response to contemporary 
self-help literature.  Not content to take everything on faith, readers act as “bricoleurs,” exploring 
a variety of books and culling particular gems from each while rejecting others.  As Newsweek’s 
Daniel McGinn put it, “None of what they read becomes gospel; rather they mix and match 
mantras the way duffers use golf tips” (47).  In her study on readers of self-help books, 
Communications theorist Deborah Grodin identifies the value of this practice as a feeling of  
“autonomy and self-reliance” produced by the exercise of choice in this kind of reading 
experience.  Elaborating on the same idea that McGinn proposes, she writes, “my research 
indicates that readers often view self-help books as limited in their capacity to cure and that they 
feel empowered as they piece together ideas from a number of sources” (406).62
The practice of detached evaluation is counterposed, however, by a search for community 
and a sense of the larger whole.  This is the second important strand of a reader’s engagement 
with self-help textuality, Grodin argues.  Daily life has failed to give readers a “sufficient sense 
of what constitutes the common” (414).  This idea of “the common,” she continues, is not simply 
a personal or imagined community; it is something profoundly abstract.  Readers seek an 
understanding of social life in general, within which they may analyze their own personal and 
interpersonal experiences.  Notably, Grodin finds that this is something not articulated in the 
texts themselves, but - like the practice of selection - belongs solely to the reading process.  The 
angel books - which took wing a year after Grodin published her article - could then be 
understood as offering in their angels a meta-discourse for the culture of self-help reading as it is 
provoked by gaps in self-help books.  As I discussed in the first chapter, holistic intelligence is 
                                                 
62  Paul Lichterman also found the self-help books to provide an “ad-hoc forum for personal life,” stressing their use 
for the reader in providing names and discourses with which they could articulate, validate, and assess their feelings 
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 proper to the angelic vision as the figuration of an intuitive objectivity.  In reference to human 
intelligence, the angel-vision acts as an intuitive support for our judgments that is impervious to 
logical analysis and deduction, and hence remains mysterious.  The sophisticate views this 
mystery as a difficulty, the naif, as a badge of honor.  The recognition of an unknown presence 
liberates the subject from crude materialism, from appearance as inexorability, and thus opens 
the door to change.  In other words, angels speak in these texts for a specifically unarticulated, 
“invisible” interpretation that, in its very invisibility and unarticulatedness, provides a basis for 
self-improvement.  Understood in terms of the self-help reading process, power results not from 
the books’ specific insight and instructions, but from their appeal to the universal and 
universalizing capacity of the mind that reads them.  This urge to abstraction is significant; the 
books’ valorization of conceptuality and the “common” is simultaneously a theory of cognition 
and, as Grodin points out, a theory of the relation between individual and collective.  Like 
Milton’s Satan, the ambitions of the self are made in the name of (and in search of) “public 
reason just.” 
Grodin interprets these two aspects of self-help reception - the exercise of free choice and 
the search for “the common” - structurally as simultaneous and balanced poles that define the 
particular act of self-help reading.  The structural perspective allows her to position self-help 
readers as agents responding to the limitations of the society in which they live, and thus position 
self-help practice as the expression of a genuine utopian impulse.  What Grodin’s approach 
doesn’t recognize, however, is that the second pole is necessary for the first - and not merely as 
the other term of a defining dichotomy.  The very process of selection depends on a view of the 
whole, just as the recovery movement’s obsession with resolving an inner apocalypse raises the 
problem of judgment and the judging mind – of the psychology of resolution itself.  Thus the 
                                                                                                                                                             
and experiences. 
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 issue of utopianism becomes less relevant than that of cosmology; for the relation between 
readerly autonomy and readerly intelligence is worth remarking not so much for what it does 
than for what it says.  And what it says is directly tied to the hand-off from recovery to 
spirituality.  That the spirituality movement then took on a life of its own is less due to a 
“dialectical” evolution of self-help psychology, I think, than of the very thing that Grodin 
describes as the goal of self-help: the issue of social integration, which in turn reflects changes in 
the social order and its integrating institutions. 
 
Angelheaded hipsters 
In 1992 Terry Lynn Taylor described the purpose of angels in the lives of the human in 
terms their global intelligence.  Angels help accommodate us to the organizational imperatives of 
worldly success on the eve of the information age.  In Taylor’s early rhetoric, angels are 
“happiness trainers” and “prosperity brokers,” secretaries who will “reorganize” the details in 
your life for you, and mediators who will contact the guardian angels of others in order to work 
out conflicts and facilitate communication.63  One may either ask one’s angel directly, or 
visualize meetings between the angels to gain insight into the world of human relations.  This is 
the early version of Taylor’s thinking, however, especially apparent in her first two books.  By 
1998, however, her perspective on the relation between the psyche and prosperity (which is to 
                                                 
63 In the age of technology, where human communication with the machine is distinguished from human 
communication with other humans, the angelic surfaces in the fallen terrain of worldly society.  Having dropped to 
earth, the angel invests his powers in those aspects of language that are not-language.  In essence, he de-materializes 
the word or geste.  In their chapter “Angels and Agents” in The Social Life of Information, John Seely Brown and 
Paul Duguid describe this reverse incarnation as it operates in human judgment within the social processes of 
negotiation and conversation.  While Peters, focusing on the intimate and interpersonal, saw perfect communication 
as a dreamed-of ideal, these authors rely on it to explain the accidental immediacy of the impersonal language arts.  
In fact, this is what allows the person to engage in social and collective communication in the first place.  Thus 
Brown and Duguid understand negotiation to depend on communications that escape identification, that are too 
“subtle” to be perceived by the rational mind, but yet influence it. 
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 say between individual and angel) has changed.  We see a more ambivalent treatment of the 
contributions an angelic universal intelligence makes to the self-help subject and the 
achievement of her goals, one that recognizes divisions within the individual psyche as 
inseparable from divisions within the social body.  This recognition is a direct result of engaging 
the problem of choice and the question of personal freedom; as the passage below demonstrates, 
the spiritual crisis of free will immediately calls up the issue of intelligence. 
Taylor’s chapter “Accepting Varied Realities” in The Angel Experience begins with an 
account of the challenges we face in “being human” every time we open the newspaper and read 
about world social inequality (“varied realities”).  This “human mystery” – rendered mysterious 
by the idea apparent in her previous works and the genre at large that we freely “choose” the 
reality we inhabit – petitions angelic consolations, which arrive in the form of presenting the “big 
picture.”  Global consciousness produces an anxiety that is quieted by the global mind.  This 
paradox is a comfort, in that the very expansion that troubles knowledge is itself relieved by an 
expansive knowingness.  Yet the rift between consciousness and thinking, as it is posited by the 
global, is not so easily undone, however contentedly we may welcome the angelic conversation 
of large-scale perspectivizing. . . 
When I get to this level, thanks to the angels, I truly feel like a free 
spirit able to navigate wisely in the world. 
 The end of the millenium, as I mentioned earlier, is making 
some people very fearful.  Many people think that the reason the 
angels are making themselves more visibly present is that the 
world is nearing an end.  Part of this fear may be based on the 
atrocities that are happening in the world.  Even if we haven’t been 
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 directly responsible for some atrocity, we know it’s wrong to allow 
them to continue.  The atrocities are splitting our psyche.  We may 
have recently found real ways to be happy and peaceful within 
ourselves, but we listen to a discussion on the radio and find out 
that shoes we are wearing are assembled by workers in Indonesia 
who are treated like slaves.  They are only earning one dollar a day 
in abusive conditions, yet the shoe company is able to pay a sports 
celebrity $20 million to represent them in a few commercials.  I 
don’t know about you, but this kind of thing saddens my heart. I 
could rant on about widespread corporate disregard of human 
rights, but that is not my goal in this book.  My goal is that we 
wake up and understand ourselves more, and to do this we have to 
see the whole picture, and realize that there are a myriad of 
realities going on.  It is not fun to live with a split psyche.  (101-2) 
Angels are a direct result of the tension between inner freedom and external repression or 
containment.  While the First World subject glides happily in the ether of her disembodied 
consciousness, the shadow side of modernity makes its presence felt materially, as a physical 
contradiction obstructing all attempts at rationalization.  As in Plato’s allegory of the soul, Taylor 
finds herself at the helm of a chariot destabilized by two wayward horses, a split self unsteadied 
in her efforts to move freely across the sky.  Principled, angelic knowledge cannot be reconciled 
with the fracturing knowledge of the senses, and so Taylor proceeds to invoke the idea of 
wholeness – the “big picture” – as a way to refrain from judgment, to take refuge in abstraction.  
From here she throws the whole argument in the hands of a different  kind of globalism.  The 
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 passage above is immediately followed by a quote from the Dalai Lama advocating ecumenical, 
non-sectarian religion and love and compassion as the means to inner peace - a personal change 
that Taylor suggests would get us into “alignment with Spiritual Law.”  Access to the 
transcendent general saves the day.  For the same angels that mediate crises between people now 
rhetorically universalize the internal crisis of living “with a split psyche,” rendering the conflict 
between perception and judgment eclipsable by a special kind of cognition.  This is pure 
intuition, which is available in its purity only when the attention is directed inward, and which 
provides that unique experience in which thinking and feeling are one.  Thus, in conversing with 
the angels the subject approaches feelings (love and compassion) as though they were decisions.  
“I don’t think we are asked to be saints in the old-fashioned way.  We are asked to do something 
even more difficult: to enjoy life and continue loving in the face of turmoil and confusion, while 
watching old structures we depended on fall to the ground” (103).  Channeling subjective 
freedom in place of objective intervention, Taylor emphasizes the sense of being a “free spirit 
able to navigate wisely in the world.”  She effectively substitutes the feeling of freedom for its 
exercise, a feeling in which the conversant experiences herself as a cognizant being whose 
movement is separated from that of the external world.  The political and economic rhetoric has 
changed since Taylor’s earlier books: corporate contentment no longer constitutes a domestic 
mirage available to any American traveler, as increasingly capital throws up photographs of 
difference, uneven development, and worldwide “abuse.”  But the Law of the spirit – constant, 
general, and absolute – prevails, granting its subjects the unity spiritually that they lack in 
reference to the physical world.64  The angels both allegorize this law and give voice to it in their 
response to our distressed advances. 
                                                 
64 The angels’ obedience is directly reflective of the way they think and act acording to such law, apparent in their 
attraction to the principle that makes the rule, the universal idea.  The fallen angels, on the other hand, are 
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 Like the concept of spiritual substance in another discourse, spiritual law answers to a 
problem of interpreting reality: the recognition that appearances are not adequate to their own 
explanation, that the idea of a thing, its behavior and properties and power, presupposes an 
invisibility cohering it.  This “law,” essence, nature of the thing is only available to thought, not 
perception.  Immediately, then, the problem of certainty and doubt arises as a schism between 
thought and perception, a schism which invites the name of spiritual crisis.  The seeking subject 
finds herself conflicted between the “varied” contents of positive reportage and conceptual 
immutabilities.  So she moves to ground her certainty in the idea rather than the image and thus 
transcend this schism, avoiding all the questions about right action that the crisis - if looked at on 
the terms that produced it - would exact from her.  In this angelic transcendence she finds the 
beauty of passivity,65 but at a cost.  The problem of illusion has not been resolved, but on the 
contrary given autonomous form as the shadow of a perverse intentionality, bad will, the pure 
mind gone sour.  This fall of the pure mind and its separated ideas is dramatized by the fall of the 
angel, the pure intelligence.  A new creature emerges.  Around the corner, Satan – and his 
bastard child Sin - appear as the emblems of the angelized subject’s schismatic anxiety, and the 
agents of its fall. 
                                                                                                                                                             
disobedient because they attempt to rationalize these legislative ideas, making the power that apprehends them 
(reason, which operates in temporal, sequential, human time) the god, rather than the eternal laws themselves.  
While it is often argued that their ambition is to claim their own self-sufficiency and self-determination (see Rogers, 
for instance), inherent in the fallen’s disobedience is a claim for the power of thought itself.  In Shelley’s 
“Prometheus Unbound,” human thoughts and imaginings produce their own spiritual realities within the cosmos, 
and it is with the aid of these that the fallen Titan Prometheus opposes Jove and his “thought-executing ministers.”  
Again the allegorical idea of thoughts as agents (and the implicit status of the individual mind as creator) gives life 
to the fallen angel - only this time his bid for such terrain is seen as just and fiercely heroic.  In the binaristic turmoil 
of the fall of feudalism, Satan has always appeared to his Romantic fans as the revolutionary angel of independent 
reason, freedom, and democratic autonomy – an idea already anticipated in Milton. 
65 The grocery store version of self-help books are useful in that they often more clearly state the underlying values 
of the genre than longer, more detailed, and (comparatively)  more subtle books put out by serious publishing 
houses.  The angel pamphlet, simply titled Angels (New & Revised Edition containing both true encounter stories 
and tips on how to contact your own guardian angel), is blunt about this: “you should maintain a passive attitude” 
(Matthews 52), and “Maintain a passive attitude and permit contact to happen at its own pace” (53).  This book 
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Moloch in whom I am a consciousness without a body 
Satan entered modernity proper as a smooth-talking sophist, brandishing the power of the 
Logos (if not the Word).  He is the cool orator extraordinaire in Paradise Lost, the cosmopolitan 
man of the world who convinces Hawthorne’s Young Goodman Brown to walk with him in the 
forest wilds, “reasoning as we go,” and the soul-coveting white-clad con artist in Hollywood’s 
various Daniel Webster films.  In Dashiell Hammett’s Maltese Falcon, Sam Spade is introduced 
as having a face full of v’s, looking “rather pleasantly like a blond satan” (3).  The epitome of 
calculating restraint who uses passion so as not to fall prey to it, believes the femme fatale’s 
money, not her story, and above all escapes being “played for a sucker,” the private investigator 
embodies independent reason in a way that inherits the Satanic tradition.66  Both are the 
quintessential figures of doubt and suspicion, plying their trade on the fear of illusion that so 
defines the search for autonomy.  Spade’s victory is also Mephistopheles’ victory - the final 
revelation that, like the characters that surround the lone detective, the falcon itself is just a fake. 
The private detective, icon of modern American identity, is characterized by his isolation.  
Like an angel he exists as a separated intelligence, wandering the streets of rationalism gone 
astray.  Like Satan’s his job is the seduction of character into self-exposure.  And in this they 
share something more fundamental in common.  Whether in the interests of criminal 
investigation or malicious ressentiment, the seduction of intelligence operates through the logic 
of contract.  The old idea of the compact with the devil gives form to the philosophy of doubt, of 
calculating paranoia, that plays such a role in these contemporary figures of the urban and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
freely acknowledges the influence of Terry Lynn Taylor, giving an essentialized but not for that reason less valuable 
version of her thinking on angelic contact. 
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 urbane.  The satanic traffic in souls, however, is of an extremely ancient mythology, going back 
much further than the Faust legend to the Zoroastrian Zend-Avesta, in which the demon Ahriman 
tries (unsuccessfully) to tempt Zoroaster.  From there the legend migrates to post-exilic Jewish 
literature (probably resulting in the interpolation of the story of Eve and the wily snake in 
Genesis), the New Testament, and the Koran.  Though the idea of a devil-compact traces its roots 
to Persian belief systems, Maximilian Rudwin suggests that it might have held particular force 
for religions based on the idea of a covenant with God.  “The Adversary, wishing in every 
respect to counterfeit the acts of the Almighty, naturally also attempts to form a compact with 
men” (170).  In these religious systems the bargain for the individual soul appears as the supreme 
act of falsehood, threatening by cheap verisimilitude an entire society’s religious and moral 
contract.  Though one form of chosenness challenges the other, the moral outcome leaves no 
doubt as to which has the greater power.67
The threat of such compact hovers wherever rationalist, dualistic thinking attempts to 
institutionalize itself, or claim its power as first principle.  The first and most influential modern 
dualistic philosopher, René Descartes, had his own Satanic apparition.  This is the “evil genius” 
that, in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy, leads him to the famous argument that we 
can only know that we know.  In his quest to discover something utterly impregnable to the 
assault of the doubting mind (which he ultimately finds in that selfsame doubting mind), 
Descartes runs across a character who, acting as a “devil’s advocate,” tests his belief in the 
reality of the world he thinks he experiences.  “I will regard the heavens, the air, the earth, 
colors, shapes, sounds, and all external things as nothing but the bedeviling hoaxes of my 
                                                                                                                                                             
66  Interestingly, one of the three films based on Hammett’s novel was entitled Satan Met a Lady (1936, starring 
Bette Davis), before the famous version with Humphrey Bogart, titled the same as the book. 
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 dreams, with which he lays snares for my credulity” (107).  On the character of this “malicious 
deceiver,” Descartes questions the possibility of our having any absolute knowledge of anything 
outside of our own knowing.  This doubt is irretrievably a thought-experiment; unlike Berkeley, 
Descartes is completely uninterested in arguing the nonexistence of the world for its own sake.  
What is important here is that, in line with tradition, the devil serves as a test and foil for the 
disembodied subject’s affirming his faith and belief in something else. 
Accordingly, I will suppose not a supremely good God, the source 
of truth, but rather an evil genius, supremely powerful and clever, 
who has directed his entire effort at deceiving  me.  I will regard 
the heavens, the air, the earth, colors, shapes, sounds, and all 
external things as nothing but the bedeviling hoaxes of my dreams, 
with which he lays snares for my credulity.  I will regard myself as 
not having hands, or eyes, or flesh, or blood, or any senses, but as 
nevertheless falsely believing that I possess all these things.  I will 
remain resolute and steadfast in this meditation, and even if it is 
not within my power to know anything true, it certainly is within 
my power to take care resolutely to withhold my assent to what is 
false, lest this deceiver, however powerful, however clever he may 
be, have any effect on me.  (ibid.) 
In a devious, indirect, and subtle way, then, the supposition of the diabolical leads Descartes to 
doubt all that is sensory and material, eventually concluding that since the world is always 
mediated by our minds, our minds themselves are the only things about which we can have any 
                                                                                                                                                             
67  This obtains both for the earlier Theophilus legends of the Middle Ages, where the repentant bishop is saved by 
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 certainty.  The deceptive chain stops with the fact of deception itself; one must exist as a thinking 
being in order to be deceived in the first place.  Within this schema only the cogito, the mind or 
intellect, can be true.  “So modern thought starts with the disembodied, solitary thinker, lacking 
body, external world, and relationships – or at least not certain of their reality. . .  Descartes’s 
self could be a character in a Beckett play” (Levin 7-8). 
The cogito’s independence is metaphysical; it belongs to another world, a heaven of the 
inner self.  Though Descartes does not describe the thinking mind in completely celestial terms 
as infallible and purely divine, he does resurrect a specific kind of divinity in his affirmation of 
cognition as a form of revelation.  For this sin Jacques Maritain convicts him of “angelism,” the 
formulation of the human mind in the purely rational, mathematical terms of the angelic 
(Maritain’s discussion occurs in a chapter titled “Descartes, or the Incarnation of the Angel”).  
Writing with uncompromising disgust, Maritain says of Descartes that “he turned cognition and 
Thought into a hopeless perplexity, an abyss of unrest, because he conceived human Thought 
after the type of angelic Thought” (54).  As I’ve been arguing in this chapter, the idea of a 
fallible but pure mind necessitates the idea of an evil demon lurking somewhere in the corners of 
thought.  For Descartes, this demon appears not only as the isolated figure of doubt, but also as a 
problem posed by the cogito itself.  Maritain points out that Descartes lands himself in a 
dilemma by elevating the rational mind where yet no exercise of reason could be found.68  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
the intercession of Mary and the Church, and the Faust stories of the Protestant reformation, where the anguished 
doctor is most surely damned. 
68 Essentially Descartes’s reason is guilty of hubris.  In his discussion of the differences between what he terms the 
“symbolic imagination” and the “angelic imagination,” Alan Tate describes how, previous to the Renaissance 
inheritance and elaboration of Cartesian philosophy, angels had been taken up as a way to absorb this hubris without 
contradiction or ethical consequence.  “The symbolic imagination takes rise from a definite limitation of human 
rationality which was recognized in the West until the 17th Century; in this view the intellect cannot have direct 
knowledge of essences.  The only created mind that has this knowledge is the angelic mind.  If we do not believe in 
angels we shall have to invent them in order to explain by parable the remarkable appearance, in Europe, at about 
the end of the 16th Century, of a mentality which denied man’s commitment to the physical world, and set itself up 
in quasi-divine independence” (“The Symbolic Imagination” 37).  For Tate, the effects of this are clear.  “I call that 
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 cogito intuits, but does not reason.  This is the problem of judgment, that it reduces to a feeling 
wholly other than itself, and provides no means of explaining how it reaches the rational faculties 
from this feeling - just as Descartes’ dualism cannot account for how the self-knowing mind can 
then reason about the external world and make sense of its experiences.  This dilemma is not of 
itself demonic.  But it leads to something more severe – to an actual conflict.  The question of 
wilfullness arises in this gap between judgment and intuition.  If our intuitions are not necessarily 
answerable to logic or rational law, who legislates them?  Just as we doubt the origin of our 
sensory information, so we might ask where our faith in innate ideas comes from – and by what 
intention.  Is it willed by us, by a higher power, or by a demon deceiver?  And if we believe by a 
higher power, how can we know this with the same certainty that we know that we know? 
Thus the question of authorship in regards to both our ideas and our belief in them rears 
its ugly head.  It is a question never far from the spirit of self-help textuality. 
 
Moloch in whom I dream angels 
The idea of the mind as a power adequate to itself, clear and luminous in the exercise of 
ideas given it innately by a higher power, has always been foundational for the self-help genre.  
It fuels the belief that action can be reduced to information, and that text is adequate to practice.  
This belief hails most directly from the literature produced by the New Thought movement in the 
later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  New Thought (in England Higher Thought) was a 
spiritualist amalgam of charismatic-led religions, most notably Christian Science and Mind-Cure, 
whose supporters and critics were bound on the one side by William James and on the other by 
                                                                                                                                                             
human imagination angelic which tries to disintegrate or to circumvent the image in the illusory pursuit of essence” 
(ibid.).  Like Descartes, the self-help books dedicate themselves to this pursuit, and hence are vulnerable to its 
“illusion.” 
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 Mark Twain.  All shared an interest in the question of healing and a belief that the source of 
disease lay within.69 Founded in opposition to Christian denominational orthodoxy, these groups 
all conceived themselves as anti-dogmatic and open-minded.  (It might be worth recalling that 
Madame Blavatsky, who founded the Eastern-inspired and New Thought-compatible 
Theosophical Society in 1875, titled her magazine Lucifer.)  Like other nineteenth century folk 
healers, New Thought’s spiritual leaders - Phineas Parkhurst Quimby, Mary Baker Eddy, and 
Ralph Waldo Trine are the most famous - claimed healing authority from personal experience, 
rather than institutional credentials.  In this respect the current self-help anti-orthodoxy was 
already important, embedded in a folk-based critique of established religious power reminiscent 
of the Protestant Reformation.  Unlike their direct antecedents, however - Mesmerism, with its 
invasive manipulation of magnetic forces and hypnotic spell-binding, or Spiritualism, with its 
ghostly communion with the dead - New Thought movements avoided a rhetoric of possession, 
whether of source or cure.  Instead, they sought to make mediums of the patients themselves, the 
leaders offering cure through their ideas rather than their physical presence or activity.  This 
focus on self-healing through education translated especially well to dissemination through 
books.  Like the self-help books today, the method of self-healing could involve practices that 
appealed to the subject’s own available experience and so were readily teachable through verbal 
direction.  These included affirmative thinking, relaxation techniques, breathing exercises, 
meditation, general visualization, and attuning oneself to higher “vibrations” - the powers 
                                                 
69  One of the diseases to which Mind Cure in particularly was most frequently applied was the mysterious 
neurasthenia.  It is interesting to compare the outburst of this syndrome with the neuro-muscular condition that has 
flooded the 1990's, fibromyalgia.  Controversy about whether the source of fibromyalgia is mental or physiological 
has been particularly intense for this disease since there is no real treatment, psychiatric or otherwise.  As one doctor 
critical of the diagnostic put it, “We have a huge problem with Descartes here” (quoted in Groopman 88).  Perhaps 
for this reason, the most promising response has utilized a modified cognitive behavioral therapy that casts treatment 
in the form of self-help.  In the words of its founder, Daniel Rooks, the program teaches patients “how to problem-
solve,” giving them the gratification of “doing something for themselves that made them better” (ibid. 92). 
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 claimed for autosuggestion deriving from the sweep of the movement’s mentalism.70  
Paradoxically, all of these are practices that appeal to what I would call the existential rather than 
the developmental aspects of the self; educative healing and spiritual self-improvement stress 
“actualization” over change.71  For the New Thought thinker, transformation came of properly 
aligning the self with its own already given identity, its personal innate idea – in other words, the 
guardian angel. 
Though a common element in New Age literature, the New Thought enthusiasm for good 
vibrations has a special role in defining angelic response to human initiation.  These vibrations 
promise much to the eager initiate, in particular a way of defining the purpose as well as the 
satisfaction of angelic conversation itself.  In The Angel Experience (one of her eight books on 
angels), Terry Lynn Taylor explains what the idea of “vibration” accomplishes for her readers.  
She discusses the “qualities” we seek to develop in beginning a dialogue with our angels: “The 
qualities that most people list include love, compassion, tolerance, flexibility, honesty, beauty, 
peace, humor, joy, and most important, gratitude.  If you think about it, these words represent 
more than concepts: they represent a true vibration that allows us to experience our divinity” 
(26).  Like the allegorical army of angelic traits that permeates not just the angel books but angel 
incense, angel tarot cards, angel greeting cards, angel candles, etc., these qualities need to be 
                                                 
70  An example from 1909, Stanton Davis Kirkham’s The Philosophy of Self-Help: An Application of Practical 
Psychology to Daily Life describes the emphasis on vibrations as resulting from a collapse in the belief in objective 
sense-data.  “The colour of the rose and the sound of the bell are purely sensations in the percipient mind; in the 
external world, until they reach the brain and are interpreted by the mind, they are vibrations merely.  Colour and 
sound are in the eye and ear and not in the object, or to speak precisely, sensation is an act of consciousness.  Pain is 
in the mind; pleasure is in the mind” (15).  Power then comes from communing with that aspect of the self that 
converts perception to intepretation.  “The highest form of self-reliance is reliance upon the soul, which is God in 
us” (197). 
71 The only strikingly different aspect of the New Age from the New Thought self-help methodology is the former’s 
emphasis on list-making, journal-keeping, and free-writing.  Doubtless a result of changes in paper cost and 
availability, the move to what I would call “script-therapy” has been a staple of self-help books in general for some 
time.  But it seems to be hyper-present in the most recent books, coinciding with a resurgence of print culture in the 
1990's through the rise of the internet.  Writing, in fact, becomes in these books the main marker of the quotidian, 
and the means of bringing it to bear on the angel books’ theory of the self and its relation to the infinite. 
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 embodied in order to participate in and direct human action.  “More than concepts,” concepts-as-
powers represent the human divine.  Jane M. Howard, in Commune with the Angels: A Heavenly 
Handbook, puts this a different way.  “After praying, I allow myself to focus upon an aspect of 
the angels.  For example, I may think of the word ‘peace.’  In my years of meditating with the 
angels, I have come to know that their peace is a very calming influence in  my life.  So when I 
think of their peace, I find myself becoming that peace” (53).  The ontological circle is a 
captivating one, moving the reader from thought to being through the metaphysical reality of the 
concept.  Howard comes one step closer to identifying how this idea of the embodied concept, 
the quality-vibration, assures the angelic status of the human.  In her chapter on meditating with 
the angels she explains that the purpose of angelic communion is simply, “to be who you are in 
the body you live in and also to experience yourself as you really exist in a higher transcendent 
realm, the angelic realm” (60).  The angel experience, then, is not an event in the way that human 
experience is - the eruption of newness in the temporal world; it is a state or condition of being, 
in which the self becomes the object as well as the subject of the experience.  The subject 
experiences itself experiencing.  Such divinity is total and reflexive, like the songs of the 
seraphim, endlessly chanting “Holy holy holy,” or like angelic sex in Paradise Lost, where the 
angels find no obstacle “Of membrane, joint, or limb, exclusive bars: Easier than air with air, if 
Spirits embrace” (VIII, 625-6).  In these angelic frequencies we go beyond the empiricist idea 
that experience consists of things happening to a subject.  The self-evident nature of the 
vibrational angel experience persuades us that we are the things we know and feel – “when I 
think of their peace, I find myself becoming that peace.”  Like Milton’s angels we experience the 
idea of an experience (an airy easiness that makes his angelic sexuality at best unconvincing and 
at worst unseductive).  Conceptual descriptions have reality in us, it is true, but as themselves 
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 self-subsisting subjectivities through which we participate in the divine.  Each quality a persona, 
each persona an inner angel. 
In spiritual vibrations this sense of radical interiority, of inner perception as a mode of 
being, provides quasi-physical confirmation of the verbal message exchange as an angelic 
reality.  For behind every call to intuition, the question lurks, “How do you know if it’s really 
intuition?  How do you know if you really are receiving the angels?”  Doreen Virtue addresses 
this problem as a matter that can be distinguished ostensibly in terms of the positive or negative 
nature of the messages.   
If you ever find yourself channeling a spirit that belittles you, or 
pushes you to do anything that would cause pain to you or another, 
stop.  You are not channeling angels at that point. . .  Call in the 
Archangel Michael and ask him to clear away the earthbound spirit  
which you are channeling.  Do not fight the spirit with fear or 
anger, but do say prayers and visualize yourself surrounded by 
white light before having another channeling session.  Your 
greatest ally in the channeling arena is your determination to 
channel only love.  Nothing that is from love can ever hurt you. 
(180) 
Avoiding the solipsism that intuition can itself only be confirmed by more intuition, these books 
posit as their Unmoved Mover the eros of angelic vibration, both the object of our intention and 
its substantiation.  The angelic communication, after all, is not enough: the experience is not 
complete unless one knows that it is angelic communication.  In fact “knowingness,” in addition 
to “intuition,” is one of the genre’s key words defining angelic communication.  It is the first of 
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 three modes in O’Neill’s guide (including “hearing their voices” and “visual imagery”) and the 
most “common” form – “the process of intuitive information suddenly ‘popping’ into your head” 
(40).  Virtue, in her book Angel Therapy (itself channeled by “The Angelic Realm”) identifies 
knowingness as “claircognizance” (clear knowing), a type of angelic contact accompanied by 
clairvoyance (clear seeing), clairaudience (clear hearing), and clairsentience (clear feeling).  She 
suggests each form is appropriate for different types of people, ending on the claircognizant.  “If 
you are intellectually inclined, or a person who constantly searches for hidden meanings in 
situations, then you’ll want to monitor your thoughts for those heavenly moments of 
‘knowingness’ that bring you certainty in guiding your actions” (174-5).  At the end of her book 
Creating with the Angels: An Angel-Guided Journey into Creativity, Taylor includes an 
interview with Carlos Santana.  In answer to a question about whether he thinks everyone is 
creative, Santana appeals to the idea of knowingness, expressed in pointedly angelic imagery: “I 
also think that creativity comes from having made some kind of effort to listen to your inner 
voice.  If you listen to your inner voice, I think that you awaken enthusiasm and imagination, 
which is vision.  And I think that these are the two wings that we need to fly” (178).  Unlike the 
angel authors, Santana describes intuitive certainty in more conventional terms and in pictorial 
rather than conceptual allegory.  The message, however, is the same: by attending to our “inner 
voice” we (all of us) awaken our angelic powers. 
Among John Randolph Price’s twenty-two angels of various qualities that “govern our 
lives,” Isis, the Angel of Creative Wisdom, identifies his problem.  She tells him he can never 
open the Gates of Wisdom as long as his life consists of discordant frequencies.  “You are 
applying what you know to the phenomenal world of effects rather than to the inner world of 
cause.  You are highly mental, and such individuals are outer directed, basing decisions on 
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 reasoning and rational thinking.  Thus the goal is always to attack the illusion – but the opposite 
of illusion is intuition” (The Angels Within Us 5).  The problem of reality, in other words, is the 
crisis that any initiate into the angelic realm must confront.  This was an issue we saw indicated 
in the books’ move to establish angelic being in the world of childhood realism, a realism in 
which the imagination did not distinguish between the agency of external and internal images.  
Such a move begs the question of illusion, however.  Because the “turn inward” makes 
determinations among the objective images themselves inaccessible, the locus of truth and falsity 
shifts to the inner world itself, and the spirit of the self doing the imagining and determining. 
The emphasis on “knowingness” in the angel self-help genre is, to some extent, 
counterintuitive to the “practical guide” nature of the books.  At the same time that we are being 
advised to listen to our inner voices and act on intuition, we are given highly rationalized ways of 
decision-making, much more appropriate to logical analysis than gut feeling.  How to Talk with 
Your Angels, for instance, gives elaborate lists of questions to the reader to help him determine 
(among other things) whether a given significant other is marriage potential, whether or not to 
get pregnant, to evaluate a channeling experienced with a deceased family member, or whether 
he should start his own business (an obsession in this book).  Most of the question lists – fifteen 
in all - range from 20-30 angles or aspects of the issue to consider in making a judgment.  
Numbered, guided practices permeate these books, often with bullets advising the reader what to 
stop and start doing.  There are helpful tips, such as how to interpret the angels’ puns, and fill-in-
the-blank sentences to guide the reader’s thinking.  Most books make recourse to other organized 
hermeneutic systems, such as chakras, astrology, or the Twelve Steps.  In fact the entire nature of 
the self-help genre itself is opposed to intuitive ascendancy.  While the books attempt to stabilize 
this contradiction through recourse to the discourse of vibrations, they still betray an anxiety 
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 about the reader’s powers to intuit in the first place.  When it is dealt with directly, this anxiety 
appears as a demonic negation threatening the angelism of the text. 
 
Moloch whose name is the Mind 
Though he is not always seen as such, the dark prince is a Janus-faced figure.  He appears 
in his complex form at the intersection of two very different religious traditions, taking as their 
orientations the idea of dualistic war on the one hand, and on the other the spirit of covenant.  
The prince of evil and the prince of lies were not always one; in fact the latter emerged only 
when, through conquest and displacement, the first was assimilated to the latter.  In this chapter I 
read self-help spirituality through an understanding of Satan as a composite icon, whose roles as 
usurping agent and master deceiver are to some degree always in conversation with one 
another.72  This dialogue between the theories of power and theories of illusion is apparent in the 
concurrent explosions of New Age spiritualism and self-help pragmatism, where the idea of the 
“good” is determined by the idea of the “true.”  As we shall see, the conceptual system of true 
and false articulates Satan in relation to the psychological problem of illusion and deception in 
place of the moral problem of good and evil.  Yet, as in some ways the attempted resolution of 
problems intrinsic to the latter system, true and false also remain bound to its territory, just as 
resentment always lurks one step behind its more sophisticated cousin, confusion. 
The displacement of good and evil onto the realm of true and false has a long story, and 
at least two origins.  The Judaic tradition is illuminating; it is from this history that we get the 
idea of the devil as an internal traitor, instigator of internal difference.  Once a feature of 
                                                 
72 This is true literally, for instance, in the movie Dogma: the endless debates between Matt Damon as the angel of 
destruction and Ben Affleck as the angel of reason structure their picaresque journey almost in the style of the Odd 
Couple or the Honeymooners. 
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 communal identity, this association between Satan and inner betrayal eventually finds its way to 
a theory of personal identity.  In her book The Origin of Satan Elain Pagels outlines the historical 
development of the first connection.  She begins her story in early Jewish history, where the 
word “satan” originally referred to any of God’s angels who served - literally - as an “obstacle” 
or “adversary” to humans, acting as vehicles of God’s teaching (see in particular Numbers, 
Zechariah, and the Book of Job).  During periods of schism and dissent following the Babylonian 
exile, however, the word became a negative epithet to describe one’s sectarian opponents – used 
both by the mainstream and the sects to describe each other.  From the third century B.C.E. 
onwards, a time clouded by Hellenistic, Seleucid, and then Roman imperial rule, revulsion for 
these satans on the part of radical groups like the Essenes told stories of wicked angels - the 
Book of Enoch’s Watchers, for instance, including Beelzebub, Azazel, etc. - and the figure of the 
malicious contrarian was born.  And no wonder: from his exalted position as God’s agent to his 
role as ultimate betrayor the satan had indeed become a “fallen angel.”  By the time of the advent 
of Christianity such a practice of identifying the satan with “the enemy within” - or what Pagels 
has described as the “intimate enemy” - was sufficiently in place that the New Testament could  
define him as the opponent of God and man.  The tradition of linking Satan with apostasy 
prospered, fueled by multiple opportunities to apply it to Jews and eventually other Gentiles, and 
in the third century Origen gave it poetry, identifying this Satan with Isaiah’s Lucifer, a reference 
to the enslaving King of Babylon as the morning star: “How art thou fallen from heaven, O 
Lucifer, son of the morning!” (14:12, cited in Russell 130-1).  This was a significant move, both 
as a poetic framing of adversariality as a fall from grace, and as a historical reference to the fact 
that, above all, the devil comes from a Persian rather than a Judaic tradition. 
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 The origin of the devil has been granted almost as many sources as the origin of human 
beings.  The overwhelming trend, however, is to begin east of Palestine.  One very good example 
of this analysis that extends it to a dizzying range of time periods and cultures is Gerald 
Messadié’s History of the Devil.  Writing around the same time as Pagels,73 Messadié identifies a 
trajectory beginning with Zoroastrianism (also the oldest source of what are recognizably “good” 
angels) as it sharpened metaphysical potentialities in Iranian Vedism.  In Zoroastrianism he sees 
for the first time the convergence of monotheism, the identification of good and evil as 
“transcendent principles,” and the belief in the immortality of the soul.  Together these create a 
dualistic cosmology emblematized by the forces of “light” and “darkness” and oriented toward 
individual, devotional morality.  This is fueled by the expectation of an afterlife - salvation and 
damnation hanging in the balance.  In combination with the idea of penitence generated in 
ancient Babylon, according to Messadié, these beliefs would flower in the religions that would 
later dominate the “West,” appearing in complete and sophisticated form by the time of 
Augustine and his Confessions.  From Zoroaster’s Ahriman, the spirit of Evil and the “lie” who 
“leads his followers astray by untruth or druj,” he sees the devil’s historical emergence in 
postexilic Judaism, through Christianity, Gnosticism, and finally Shiite Islam.  Significantly, 
these are also the religions most fascinated with angels in general. 
Between these two analyses we can see the convergence of Satan as schism and Satan as 
illusion, producing a narrative of the devil as seducer and betrayer of our perceptions, and 
eventually, a narrative of our faculties of perception betraying us.  Zoroastrian dualism plays a 
part here, introducing a distinction between base matter and divine spirit driven by the need for 
perceptive certainty.  Persia’s emphasis on personal spirituality, through the ideas of personal 
                                                 
73  His History of the Devil was originally published in French in 1993, but was not translated into English until 
1996.  Pagels’s book is copyrighted 1995.  Neither one refers to the other. 
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 immortality, an afterlife split between a morally determined heaven and hell, and the resulting 
emphasis on individual penitence invite the possibility, realized later and most fully in the 
writings of St. Augustine of Hippo, of mapping this dualism in terms of the psyche.  In the 
contemporary self-help books this dualism takes the form of battle between a wholly receptive 
self-intuition and a self-aggrandizing projection, which I discuss below.  James Hillman, in 
demonstrating that “we cannot confront the personalism of California without first passing 
through the confessionalism of Carthage” (27), marks the contemporary fear of projection as 
Augustinian in its origin.74  Augustine’s “confessional ontology” of truth is grounded in the 
elusive unity of the subject, a sought-for singularity that I would argue must come to grips with 
the separation of personal power and personal identity that is gently dramatized by the angelic 
conversation; ironically, the subject comes to grip with this schism through the idea of Satan, 
who promises subjective power and individuality as one.  Confession, then, converts this “false” 
unity offered by the spirit of negation into a “true” one.  In light of this important antecedence, I 
want to look at a particularly relevant section of Augustine’s Confessions.  The chapter where he 
confronts his demon is also the chapter where he deals with a psychology of true and false, one 
that serves as a perfect exemplar of the satanic interplay between a psychic dualism and a theory 
of truth that I want to develop. 
In Book Seven of his Confessions, St. Augustine very carefully describes the stages of a 
spiritual crisis occasioned by contradictions he must face in the idea of spiritual being and the 
concept of evil.  The book is a rhetorical tour de force, constructing a saga of intellectual torment 
and then awakening through the experience of an inwardness that Augustine at once defines and 
                                                 
74 Hillman premises this conclusion on Augustine’s expulsion of the imaginal to the external, either as sense-
impressions or metaphysical abstraction.  Hence, “a gulf opens between subjective feelings without imaginative 
forms and the literalism of images as sensations, ideas, data without subjectivity.  They do not confess; only I can 
confess.  So anything they might say must be my projections” (29). 
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 makes perceptibly real.  Confusing and obstructing him in his path toward this inwardness is the 
perverse figure of the devil.  His role is twofold.  As himself a simple spiritual substance - but a 
fallen one - he presents a contradiction to the principle of good; through this he preys upon and 
seeks to influence the various schisms within the self presented by its own modes of spiritual and 
material thinking.  
Augustine begins Book Seven with a lachrymosa, mourning not his “dead” adolescent 
self but the not-yet-born adult capable of understanding God with clarity and distinction.  Like 
the spiritual self-help books, his model of personal development is oriented toward the unfolding 
of this spiritual vision.  “By now my adolescence, with all its shameful sins, was dead.  I was 
approaching mature manhood, but the older I grew, the more disgraceful was my self-delusion.  I 
could imagine no kind of substance except such as is normally seen by the eye” (VII, 1).  These 
first words establish the project of the chapter: to define the ground of a supersensible reality, 
and its perceptibility to the human through a particular way of seeing, the eye of the mind.  
Telescopically, this becomes a question of grasping the idea of immaterial substance.  For 
Augustine, such a substance must free itself not so much from brute physicality as from the 
conceptions that define the nature of the physical for the human psyche.75  He explains this 
personally.  “Although I did not imagine you in the shape of a human body, I could not free 
myself from the thought that you were some kind of bodily substance extended in space, either 
                                                 
75 “I was trying to find the origin of evil, but I was quite blind to the evil in my own method of research.  In my 
mind’s eye I pictured the whole of creation, both the things which are visible to us, such as the earth and the sea, the 
air and the stars, the trees and the animals which live their lives and die, and the things which we cannot see, such as 
the firmament of heaven above, with all its angels and everything in it that is spiritual - for I thought of spiritual 
things, too, as material bodies, each in its allotted place.  I imagined the whole of your creation as a vast mass made 
up of different kinds of bodies, some of them real, some of them only the bodies which in my imagination took the 
place of spirits.  I thought of this mass as something huge. . . I pictured you, O Lord, as encompassing this mass on 
all sides and penetrating it in every part, yet yourself infinite in every dimension. . . I said to myself, “Here is God, 
and here is what he has created.  God is good, utterly and entirely better than the things which he has made.  But, 
since he is good, the things that he has made are also good.  This is how he contains them all in himself and fills 
them all with his presence” (VII, 5). 
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 permeating the world or diffused in infinity beyond it” (ibid.).  He offers to God and the reader 
the burning shame of his naïveté, of imagining the spiritual through material categories of 
extension and space.  These are Augustine’s intimate enemies.  Since he is arguing from the 
insight that differences among things seen require different ways of seeing, the interplay between 
the eye of the body and the “eye of the mind” will be the driving theme of the rest of this book. 
The move to contextualize one dialogue within another is artful, shifting the boundaries 
of inner and outer conversation so that the inner self becomes identified with God, the outer with 
the aspect of the self that takes its own pictures literally.  In this way confession becomes the 
supreme act of a proto-divine subjectivity that grasps its separation from the things that it thinks.  
“For my mind ranged in imagination over shapes and forms such as are familiar to the eye, and I 
did not realize that the power of thought, by which I formed these images, was itself something 
quite different from them” (VII, 1).  This “something,” the spiritual substance as a thinking 
substance, transcends the appearances that impress it and the means by which it apprehends 
them.  Augustine discovers that the materialist reliance on categories of spatial understanding 
reveals itself as a fallen methodology.  Not only does it fail to answer the question of the source 
of evil, death and corruption, but it fails to account for the very differences that are evident in 
and define the physical world.76  Ideas belonging to the world of appearances, in other words, are 
incapable of explaining it, and thus both seduce and delude us. 
The materialist illusion can only be exorcised by an encounter with reading - not reading 
that is fully transparent, but one that bears witness almost in spite of itself.  For Augustine’s 
                                                 
76 Augustine underscores this point by detouring into the story of a friend concerning the perils of astrology (a belief 
system incorporated by his former religious companions, the Manichaeans).  According to his friend Firminus, two 
babies were born at the same instant; that is, they were born on the exact same place of the stellar map.  And yet, 
behold! their fates, as respective sons of a nobleman and a slave, were the opposite.  This story arouses Augustine’s 
disgust for the idea of judgment based on the position of bodies (however heavenly) in space, and cures his 
“stubborn resistance” to the counsel of those friends who encourage his return to scripture as the firmament of his 
meditations. 
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 autobiography is as much a reading of scripture through a life as it is a reading of a life through 
scripture.  In the ninth section of the book the text explodes with scriptural references; over half 
the text consists of quotes from the New Testament narrating the story of the Word.  Yet the 
reading experience is not of the scriptures, but of the Platonists.  Indirectly, they illuminate the 
word of Christ without any literal reference to it, just as Augustine, in turn, has no direct quotes 
from them.  He owes this possibility of indirect illumination to St. Ambrose’s Biblical exegesis, 
which he based on Paul’s distinction between the letter and the spirit of the word.  But it is also 
significant for Augustine that the Platonic texts, in their idealist view of “truth as something 
incorporeal,” themselves inspired such a reading.  Referring their works to the unity and eternity 
of spirit, he sees in the Platonists an illumination of the word of God, despite their also apparent 
indifference to it.  The very spirituality of the word permits this incorporation of heathen texts to 
Christian morality, acting as the ground of a “true” unity over and above apparent difference.  
With this new, inward vision Augustine can now read these writings as pointing to “one meaning 
only.”    
This capability of setting the mind on the “inward” meaning of a composite (and hence 
potentially self-contradictory) thing Augustine elsewhere calls intentio or attentio animi.  
Though in The Trinity the intention or attention of the soul originally refers to the fixing of the 
gaze on memory, I apply it here to suggest a way of discriminating what is read, which in this 
case is reading through the light of scriptural revelation, through and for the simplicity and self-
evidence of the Word.  When he introduces the next section with the words “these books served 
to remind me to return to my own self,” and to “enter into the depths of my soul,” he identifies 
the soul’s attention to itself with such logocentric luminosity.  Hence this inward attention 
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 becomes “confession,” the corollary and the antidote to “presumption,” the act of pride. 77  As a 
spiritual substance, the soul sees through and beyond itself.  Fixed on the light of God, it too 
understands through a glass darkly, or, following Augustine’s translation of Paul, “in an 
enigma.”  The contradictions generated by the worldly and the obscure become productive 
mysteries when viewed enigmatically - when the worldly is experienced “as though” it were 
spiritual.78  Only through this enigmatic way of seeing can Augustine light on a perceptual basis 
assimilating belief and truth.  
For I wondered how it was that I could appreciate beauty in 
material things on earth or in the heavens, and what it was that 
enabled me to make correct decisions about things that are subject 
to change and to rule that one thing ought to be like this, another 
like that.  I wondered how it was that I was able to judge them in 
this way, and I realized that above my own mind, which was liable 
to change, there was the never changing, true eternity of truth.  
(VII, 17) 
                                                 
77  Brian Stock understands the necessity of an inward encounter with the word specifically for a Christian monism: 
“In the Confessions, the emphasis is on the inner forces that prepare us for the possibility of grace and the role of 
narrative in bringing that possibility into our conscious thoughts.  One of the premises of Augustine’s thinking is 
that we can be made one with God through the assimilation of his unified Word.  This cannot take place if God is 
dual” (51).  In this light pride can be read as the perverse expression of a psychologized dualism. 
78  There is a striking series of uses of “as though” in this part of the chapter.  In section 10 “I realized that I was far 
away from you.  It was as though I were in a land where all is different from your own and I heard your voice 
calling from on high” (147); section 15 “I saw that all finite things are in you, not as though you were a place that 
contained them, but in a different manner.  They are in you because you hold all things in your truth as though they 
were in your hand, and all things are true in so far as they have being” (150); and section 17, after describing the 
sight of God through his creations he writes, “In my weakness I recoiled and fell back into my old ways, carrying 
with me nothing but the memory of something that I loved and longed for, as though I had sensed the fragrance of 
the fare but was not able to eat it” (152).”  Each time in using this phrase Augustine expresses his relation to God as 
a right or wrong exertion of the imagination.  The imagination is capable of using both material and spiritual ways of 
seeing; hence, its acts have moral implications.  Significantly in these quotes, the imagination as it represents 
experience “in truth” rather than “in space” is more pictorial and evocative - more “imaginative.”  In this way 
Augustine proposes a germinal distinction between quantitative and qualitative forms of thinking. 
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 Finally, Augustine can answer the question of the origin of evil.  Having grasped through 
the Platonists the idea that spiritual substance exists more fully than material substance because 
its being is in truth rather than space, he can meditate productively on the existence of evil and 
properly introduce the figure of Satan-Lucifer, who has lurked steadily behind this chapter’s 
confessions.  His famous conclusion is that, as the “perversion of the will when it turns away” 
from God, evil doesn’t exist; it has no substance.  It is an attribute of the mind, not a self-
subsistent being.  “The prince of sin, author of death” then becomes the image of this perversion 
-  not so much in representing as in inducing it.  He “coaxes” us into the ultimate falsehood of 
believing in the “existence of something that has no being.”79
This connection between the figure of the devil and the idea of nonbeing is crucial to my 
discussion of the angel self-help books.  It raises many points of intersection for the father of 
autobiography and the progeny of the self-help movement.  The most fundamental of these is 
their treatment of falsehood.  Augustine defines it as a way of seeing that is “perverse” because it 
uses contradiction within the psyche to misjudge the basis of reality.  As the act of hypostatizing 
the unreal, falsehood attributes actual being to sense-induced ways of thinking, or ways of 
thinking that interpret the world through its own images.  This concept of satanic falsehood 
emerges necessarily in the attempt to convert a dualist universe to a quasi-monist belief system, 
one where the free turnings of the separated mind - the spiritual substance – define all conflict as 
internal opposition, bad will.  Such conflict is unnecessary, however, as the bad will turns to a 
                                                 
79 Augustine’s famous theory of evil as privation was not new to early Christian thought (St. Jerome and Gregory of 
Nyssa, for instance, had already discussed evil as a form of nonbeing), but Augustine’s contribution was to place the 
idea within a theory of knowledge and agency.  The absence of God is a result of a free act of individual minds, 
“authors to themselves in all / both what they judge and what they choose” (Milton III, 122-3).  Augustine’s move 
had serious consequences, however.  His insistence on the freedom of the will exonerated God from any guilt by 
association, but it also suggested that evil itself was unintelligible.  Satan may have induced the will of Adam, 
whose sin leads the rest of mankind astray, but what made Satan’s own will turn away to begin with?79  The 
explanation is the privation of explanation.  As Jeffrey Burton Russell interprets it, such a question begs the issue; 
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 fantasy, something that is not there.  Augustine uses this idea of Satan to reduce the problem of 
morality to a theory of truth.  Against the false existence of evil he positions a hierarchy of 
reality, different kinds of substance whose highest is, of course, the spiritual.  What is at stake in 
this hierarchy is a theory of the conceptual unity of the universe and, in its ability to comprehend 
and judge it, the rational unity of the self. 
 
The hospital illuminates itself  imaginary walls collapse 
St. Augustine’s privationist re-reading of “good and evil” as “true and false” has been 
historically replayed in the self-help movement’s gradual replacement of recovery theory by 
“spirituality.”  Recovery is decidedly dualist, imagining the subject as caught in a dilemma of 
recognition.  Within a dialectic of denial and remembering, the problem is that there is not 
enough belief, rather than too much.  Good and evil are both real, almost palpable forces and 
principles each unto themselves.  Recovery requires acknowledging the power of the latter, 
usually manifest in the form of past trauma of addiction or abuse.  In the spirituality movement, 
illusion does the work of denial.  Coincidentally echoing the critique of the recovery movement 
for equating memory with history (as in, for instance, the assertion in The Courage to Heal that 
“if you think you were abused, you probably were”), the spiritual self-help books warn of the 
dangers of projection.  Much of what we think to be real, they insist, is only fantasy, the work of 
mental error.  We are too gullible, they say, in mistaking our beliefs for reality.  Evil, too, is a 
mistaken belief.  As Augustine says in De Trinitate (The Trinity), we musn’t project or “imagine 
by mere empty thought” (279).  How then do you distinguish?  Rather than attempt to adjudicate 
among varying sense-impressions, the books attempt to differentiate between two different 
                                                                                                                                                             
the acts of the free will cannot be determined by any source, or they would no longer be free.  Hence for Augustine 
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 aspects of the self as the source of the trouble.  As in Augustine, bad will is a function of a 
certain kind of thinking, one that mimetically responds to the external world, as opposed to 
perusing the world of images within.  In the New Age discourse of the late twentieth century, 
this difference is formulated as a competition between the “soul” and the “ego.”80  Terms derived 
from two very different discourses, it is possible to read them as claiming the value of religion 
over psychology.  But something more is at work, for these books rely on ideas obtainable 
primarily through psychology and, originally, psychoanalysis.  In demonizing the ego, the books 
reject something particular: the faculty of projection, which they associate with the ego.  In this 
they condemn not so much a part of the self (the very idea of villainizing the ego is absurd) as a 
form of mental act that it takes.  This idea of turning out and “putting into,” as it is known in 
post-Abraham psychology, becomes the locus of falseness.  By contrast the “soul” is identified 
with the act of intuiting, the taking in of an image, idea, or feeling, without need for distrust.  
Thanks to the field’s blissful Cartesianism, intuitions of the self are seen as undoubtable, as the 
basis of positive knowledge so desperately sought in a climate where both processes of judgment 
and the power of external influences are experienced as overwhelming.  In other words, a climate 
                                                                                                                                                             
“the movement of a free will cannot be analyzed causally” (201).  The non sequitur is ultimately also a tautology. 
80 This is a distinction that Thomas Moore, in his own writing on angels, casts in terms of the distinction between the 
individual as isolated and singular historical agent and the individual as it participates in communal, daily life.  
Referring to the “modern” tendency to dismiss angels as hallucinations, he cautions, “but this is an ego-centered 
point of view” (“Annunciation” 25).  He proposes instead a theological viewpoint - “the perspective of the soul” -  
with which he wants to invest everyday life.  After all the soul is, in philosophical discourse, the principle of life and 
the faculty of divine communion, receiving the intelligible forms that give life (or, in Descartes’ case, existence).  
Moore suggests that from this “soul” perspective - which watches the daily news - the rise of angelic visions marks a 
social rift between “secularism and fundamentalism gone mad.”  “How are we to find our way through rituals, 
images, beliefs, ethics, mysteries, marriage, possessions of the soul, and so on, if we have no accessible theology?” 
(25)  This call to accessibility through the angelization of daily life indicates a lapse in the putative function of the 
soul, to provide a basis for social communion.  The demonization of the ego brands it as the cause of this fall.  But if 
we read the ego through Freud, who defined it as the organizing principle of the psyche (which he saw as always a 
social act), it would perhaps be more appropriate to read it as the sign and victim of this fall.  Ego and and soul thus 
announce different ways of reading the relation between self and world, the former through the agonistic 
polarization of social relations, the latter through the communal, ritualistic folds of the “deeply quotidian.” 
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 of recovery ideology, which is appropriately the climate of totalitarianism,81 produces self-
angelism as a specific response. 
One of the major proponents of the vice of “ego-projection” is John Vincent Price, a 
Ballantine original that has influenced other angel-books writers and has some status within the 
spiritual self-help genre in general.  His twenty-two angels attribute false beliefs to “ego-
projections.”  In doing so they borrow from the thinking of the king of spiritualist self-help, 
Deepak Chopra.  In a masked criticism of watered-down object-relations theory, Chopra writes, 
“In object-referral, your internal reference point is your ego.  The ego, however, is not who you 
really are.  The ego is your self-image; it is your social mask; it is the role you are playing” (11).  
The key concept here is that of the social self.  Like George Bailey in his fear of having to 
conform to a proscribed external role, Chopra advocates an individuality sufficient to itself – a 
true spiritual substance - in the form of the “spirit” or “soul.”  It is Price’s contribution to make 
the social self the self’s own creation.  Rather than an introjection of social mores and 
                                                 
81 Messadié argues that the idea of Satan as it is produced within a good/evil dualism – one in which the recovery 
movement takes part – is responsible for theocratic formations during times of imperialism.  He describes the 
Reaganite 1980’s, when the recovery movement took off, as a moment of such formation.  Having demonstrated 
Zoroaster’s reform as an assertion of populist religion during a time of great state power, he argues that the devil 
must always be seen as helping to augment religious influence so as to make it equal to an expanding, and hence 
multicultural, state.  (During Zoroaster’s life, 628-551 B.C.E., the Iranian Empire was at its height, encompassing 
what is now the Middle East and extending into Africa, southern present-day Russia, and the Indian subcontinent.)  
In other words, a devil-conscious religion becomes a vehicle for the establishment of an actual or quasi-theocracy.  
Fear of a “Great Satan” or an “Evil Empire,” he argues, elevates the status and service of the priestly caste, thus 
allowing the nation-state to consolidate its power through the incorporation of an equally strong “ecclesiastical 
authority.”  “In the end the fallen angel is no more than the logical stratagem of a totalitarian power” (145).  While 
Messadié may be overstating the necessary connection between fascist formations and the belief in Satan, it is useful 
here to remember Nietzsche’s analysis of the origin of a value system based on the polarity good and evil.  This 
binary is always a product of a “slave morality” responding to social relations based on absolute power.  Nietzsche 
links this morality to the history of the Jews and the Christians for reasons that in turn are suggestive of Messadié’s 
account of the Zoroastrian reform and revolution.  A priest of means modest enough to declare himself “powerless” 
for having “little livestock and few men” (80), Zoroaster effected a demagogic rebellion in the name of popular 
religion and the right of the clergy to arbitrate earthly law.  This is perhaps the crux of slave morality: the claim that 
material power should be answerable to a spiritual elect, “elected” by their allegiance to that disenfranchised mass, 
“the people.”  Here, in the proposed convergence between divine judgment and social legislation, we see a dualistic 
symbology lending itself to and unveiling another major principle of moral authority - that mainstay of state 
centralization, raison d’etat.  Conceived of as the principle of the divine within the human, reason governs 
absolutely and with committed purity.  It becomes itself a separate, spiritual substance - that is, the higher pole in a 
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 expectations, the ego is the creation of a part of the self that misperceives.  It is a satanic 
“obstacle,” as well as a deceiver, which sees things “through the eye of the human personality.”  
The “human personality” is a tag for individualism, which Price rejects as an impediment to his 
belief in universal wealth.  Against the human, he posits the divine self, a consciousness that 
replaces the “ego’s projected effects” with “divine impressions of a substantial nature,” thus 
achieving an “abundance of wholeness” (59).  Price’s “I am Mercer,” divinity-within-the-human 
ontology sees the angelic self as the “separation” of the self from these projections and the false 
beliefs they create.  But the angel-self may become “blocked.”  Then the angelic archetype falls; 
“it becomes the master manipulator and works closely with the ego to deceive, mislead, and 
defraud, becoming a cunning adversary to spiritual consciousness” (Angels Within Us 38). 
Doreen Virtue similarly places the ego squarely within the rhetorical world of the devil.  
She argues that “lower-self egos” have sway over us through the demonic host of fears they 
create, all the while deceiving us that they themselves are real.  She (or rather, the angels whom 
she is channeling) exposes this “thing/not-thing” called ego as “the greatest illusion of all time.  
Yet, its power stands ready to block you with the paradox that, though not a thing, it also serves 
as the gatekeeper of the illusion of many of the experiences that you believe you have” (60).  
Virtue’s discourse here accelerates the discourse of the satanic as she goes on to describe the 
ego’s “whisperings” of our capacity to become a “demi-god of our own making,” luring the self 
into its “dens of lies.”  Sin - specifically the demonic sin of pride, or “ego” in the discourse of 
pop psychology - enters the world as an avowed auto-generation of self-projection.  For the 
angel-lovers, the demonized ego provides a self-policing psych ward where the threat of 
projections from the sovereign self that shadow angelic conversation may be contained and 
                                                                                                                                                             
dualistic theory of being, hitched to the power of the soul.  Along with the divine, of course, reason also bears the 
potential of the diabolical. 
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 quarantined.  The difference is localized subjectively.  False experiences translates to false 
divinity, with the usurping ego makes the self a slave to its own self-declared kingdom.  As in 
the line quoted in chapter one from Wings of Desire, “every man waves his one-man state flag in 
all directions.”82
The association of ego and projection is strange, given that Jungian psychology – which 
most directly influences this genre – maintains firmly that it is the unconscious that does the 
projecting, and the ego that brings it to conscious awareness, that provides insight.  While 
Freudian psychology theorizes projection as a function of the ego – and at the very least in the 
service of it – again, the unconscious is the principal agent.  It is interesting that the concept of 
the unconscious is downplayed in the angel books, whereas it is fundamental in recovery theory.  
It appears that the ego acts as the necessary target because it represents the shadow of the 
guiding philosophy of these books in general, which they need to debunk.  This is the philosophy 
of the self-made man, which they inherit from a long tradition of self-help in America. 
 In mid-twentieth century, the mind cure books merged with another strand of self-help 
literature, the success manuals of the nineteenth century.  These were Horatio Alger-type stories 
that preached the self-disciplined and virtuous pursuit of a “calling,” hailing the ideal of the self-
made man and the principle of self-determination. The twentieth century hybrid texts - Napolean 
Hill’s classic Think and Grow Rich (1937) and Norman Vincent Peale’s perennial The Power of 
Positive Thinking (1952) - replaced the emphasis on virtuous restraint with mental 
expansiveness, whether through alignment with harmonic vibrations (Hill) or through “prayer 
power” practiced repetitively throughout daily activities (Peale).  The most influential 
                                                 
82 Wendy Kaminer outlines the fascist potential inherent in such a view in her scathing critique of mind cure and 
positive thinking strands of self-help.  Likening these subjects to the Christian Science selves seen as “complete, 
self-enclosed ‘individualizations’ of God,” kaminer writes of a parallel with the state: “In the political realm 
envisioning every man and woman as individualizations of the state is the essence of totalitarianism” (55-6). 
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 contemporary example of this convergence is endocrinologist Deepak Chopra, whose theories of 
quantum healing - harmonic balancing with natural law - actually owe more to the less durable 
Hill than to Peale.  Like the New Thought trajectory, Chopra’s original focus on health has been 
redirected toward “success” self-help, and eventually spirituality pure and simple.  But, as New 
Age pioneer, he has also introduced something new to the genre.  His debut publication, 
Creating Health: Beyond Prevention, Toward Perfection (1987), opens with a quote from his 
mentor, the Maharishi Mahesh Yogi.  Later books suggest the Maharishi’s influence (particularly 
his emphasis on creating “Heaven on Earth”)83 in inspiring the essential tenet of Chopra’s 
thinking and his main contribution to the field of self-help (one to which the angel books are 
sublimely indebted): “In reality, we are divinity in disguise, and the gods and goddesses in 
embryo that are contained within us seek to be fully materialized.  True success is therefore the 
experience of the miraculous. It is the unfolding of the divinity within us” (Seven Spiritual Laws 
of Success 3).  This, ultimately, is where self-help psychology leads us: any system that claims 
infinite power for the exercise of the individual mind must invoke a supernatural basis for this 
exercise.  The ideology of material success as subject to intention, as so many contemporary self-
help seminars attest,84 must return to the spiritual as an enchantment of intention. 
The enchanted intention that positive thinking propounds is that of the sui generis, the 
self-made individual.  In America this value has always been curiously paradoxical; on the one 
hand, it represents a deep suspicion and mistrust of social values and influence, of social 
conditioning.  On the other, it requires the characteristics of the naïve to launch itself: optimism, 
                                                 
83 The Maharishi’s website includes a description of this project: “Maharishi’s Program to Create Heaven on Earth 
contains practical, simple, scientifically-proven, time-tested knowledge that can bring Heaven on Earth to any 
society.”  As with the self-help books, the practicalization of the metaphysical produces an absurdity clothed in the 
language of platitude. 
84 Paul Hellas, in New Age Religion, points out just how much the development of New Ageism intertwined with 
that of corporate culture. 
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 risk-taking, credulity.  The devil who preys on credulity is the ideal expression of the risks such a 
value runs, and acts as the “intimate enemy” of its subjectivity.  The internal, distrustful self – 
the one who projects its fears and suspicions onto others – threatens the naïve, intuitive self, by 
calling attention to its naivete, illuminating it as such through its own sophistication.  Any 
Cartesian system immediately falls prey to this problem. 
Descartes believed he had dispensed with the problem of gullibility that we witness in the 
self-help books by positing the idea of an infinitely benevolent God who could have no intention 
to deceive.  This intention was secured by the fact that the human could conceive of its own 
imperfection – and not discover itself subject to the self-aggrandizements that would surely 
belong to a demonic figure.  The argument that the worship of the infinite as a higher form of 
being could only have been placed there by just such a higher infinite being is of course 
tautological and resolutely fatuous, but it importantly defines the ground of human divinity for 
Cartesian rationalism.  “When I turn the mind’s eye toward myself,” the Cartesian ego says, “I 
perceive this likeness, in which the idea of God is contained, by means of the same faculty by 
which I perceive myself” (121).  This is not unusual language for Descartes – he speaks often of 
the turning of the will, directing his thoughts, being attentive.  These are all motions of intent, 
and it is in this faculty that Descartes bases his likeness to God, the supreme agent.  The 
terminology echoes, however.  As we saw, this is Augustinian rhetoric, and the concept of 
attention one that attempts to supersede internal division, the activation of the divine self that 
provides internal unity: “This whole within, this whole is the mind” (The Trinity Book X).  The 
angels are especially relevant to this idea; attendants of God, they serve also to pay attention to 
men.  They are, if anything, the expressions of attention, its image as act.  The cry of the subject 
for attention warrants the angels – both as the conversational “companions” that minister to our 
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 lonely neglect, and as the faculty of judgment, the power of attending, that we ourselves lack.  If, 
according to the recovery movement, the emblematic pathology of the 80’s was addiction, in the 
90’s it appears as ADD.  The essential act of the soul then appears as a self-attending, via the 
conversation with the angel. 
The parallels between Augustine’s and Descartes’ thinking on the topic of spiritual 
substance are well-known and in some ways quite striking.  Descartes himself commented on 
some points of resemblance, once they were brought to his attention.85  Nevertheless, for 
purposes of demonstrating what is at stake in questions concerning the relationship between 
Satan and spiritual substance - which is to say, what the consequences are of reading the devil 
specifically as a fallen angel - I will outline the major points of commonality.  The most 
overarching is their choosing to base their metaphysical world orders on an axis of truth and 
falsity.  In both cases the false is identified with spatial perception (or what Descartes calls 
“extension”) and the true with the self-evident existence of the “power of thought.”  This 
framework looks back to Aristotle’s original definition of substance (the Greek “ousia”) as 
“being-in-itself,” but understands such “self-evidence” literally.  Ultimate self-existence is the 
self’s evidence to itself - what could be variously described as self-awareness, self-
consciousness, self-reflection.  This is clear in their use of language.  Descartes, like Augustine, 
seeks to “turn the mind’s eye toward myself” (121) and “converse with myself alone and look 
more deeply into myself” as a way to gain knowledge of the “true.”  As the self-attending mind’s 
                                                 
85  See his letter To Colvius, November 14, 1640 (90).  Referring to a passage in City of God where Augustine also 
refers to the our knowledge of our own existence as the basis for our knowledge of God, Descartes expresses his 
gratitude for having “come together with Saint Augustine, if only to shut the mouths of the little minds who have 
tried to quibble with that principle” (91).  He remarks, however, that he differs from Augustine in that he uses this 
principle”to make it known that this I who is thinking is an immaterial substance, and has nothing in it that is 
corporeal” (ibid.).  As I have discussed, Augustine is elsewhere concerned to show the primacy of the soul, and 
would thus agree with the first half of Descartes’ objective, but he departs from Descartes in his complexity of 
vision.  Augustine’s much less placid I includes the corporeal as part of its defining agonistics. 
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 eye, human spiritual substance can only express itself in the first-person - as autobiography, as 
confession.86
The self-reflective soliloquy – the angelic conversation - is the necessary act of the soul, 
in which it separates and saves itself from material gravity.  But why?  For St. Augustine God’s 
grace is given freely with or without our petition, and for Descartes the cogito’s unique existence 
is already guaranteed by virtue of its being clear and distinct.  Isn’t individual reflection merely 
superfluous?  Such a question forgets, however, the importance that soul-saving (the counterpart 
to Satan’s notorious soul-hustling ) places on human understanding.  In order to fully participate 
in the divine, the self must grasp how its soul differs from other, material substances.  What, 
finally, is the principle that distinguishes spiritual substance?  What is this invisible something 
that makes us more than our physical parts?87  For both thinkers, the immaterial principle relies 
on a conception of being as responsible to “truth.”  According to this way of thinking, which 
originated in the “West” with the Platonic tradition, things are more or less real according to 
their fidelity to the universal - whether that universal is the God of revelation (Augustine) or of 
reason (Descartes).88  Though different and, as the religious debates in the Christian sixteenth 
century showed, potentially contradictory values, reason and revelation still share a function as 
                                                 
86  As Touched By an Angel’s Monica says, “You can tell a lie, you can live a lie, but you can’t pray a lie. . .” 
87 Locke’s famous description of substance as “something I-know-not-what” presents the idea sanguinely as an 
invisible friend, rather than an evil genius or seductive crisis.  Locke argues that if anything, immaterial substance is 
more certain a proposition than material substance.  In this sense he elevates determination by (ideational) quality 
above determination by (physical) extension.  “Lastly, if this notion of immaterial Spirit may have, perhaps, some 
difficulties in it, not easie to be explained, we have therefore no more reason to deny, or doubt the existence of such 
Spirits, than we have to deny, or doubt the existence of Body; because the notion of Body is cumbred with some 
difficulties very hard, and, perhaps, impossible to be explained, or understood by us.  For I would fain have 
instanced any thing in our notion of Spirit more perplexed, or nearer a Conradiction, than the very notion of Body 
includes in it; the divisibility in infinitum of any finite Extension, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in 
consequences impossible to be explicated, or made in our apprehensions consistent; Consequences that carry greater 
difficulty, and more apparent absurdity, than any thing can follow from the Notion of an immaterial knowing 
substance” (313).  Descartes’ disquisitions on extension do not come off well in this quote, though Locke retains the 
primacy of thought as less vulnerable to the sabotage of contradictory “difficulties” and the gravity of their 
consequences. 
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 transcendent principles of the material world.  In both systems of thought, only what conforms to 
the explanatory universal is truly held to exist, without illusion or deception.   
Though familiar, this qualification of existence is hardly an anthropological constant.  
The idea of deceptive being - which is the idea of Satan - springs from an essentially linguistic 
sense of the world.  The distinction between true and false is solely a product of how we talk 
about and represent things.  For the non-symbolic mind, things happen; their being is never in 
question.  Symbols, on the other hand, are judged according to their faithfulness to the things 
they represent.  Only in language can we actually “lie.”  Only the communicated thing may be 
betrayed.  At this point we can understand the significance of the impulse to penitential 
utterance.  Confession enters this debauched and sinister scene to name the lie and the system 
that conceives it.  As the language of the soul, it petitions the radiance of the “Word,” which 
seems to mean by and in itself - language as spiritual substance.  The confessional soul petitions 
the Word - not so that it may become, like it, free from contradiction - but so that it may see 
within its own compositeness the simplicity of pure being. 
This is pertinent to the style of communication which has been associated with the idea of 
angels.  Angels have generally been represented as simple, not composite, creatures - bodies 
without organs.  As Milton puts it, they have an “uncompounded” ontology.  As a consequence, 
they are imagined as communicating without language - directly, intuitively.  Their lack of 
spatial multiplicity reflects their freedom from the complexities of time; they do not think in 
sequence or in grammatical form, but immediately grasp the whole of a picture, the essence of an 
idea.  There is no gap between an angel’s thought and his expression, nor between the thoughts 
of one angel and their reception by another.  In this spirit John Durham Peters describes angels as 
                                                                                                                                                             
88  I should note that Augustine did not, like his flag-waving acolytes centuries later, oppose reason and revelation.  
Rather, in its right direction of the mind, reason prepares the way for revelation. 
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 embodying the dream of perfect, soul-to-soul communication, which he reads as the “inner 
speech” of telepathy.  Lacking material bodies, “angels understand each other in an 
instantaneous unfurling of interiorities. . .  They, of all beings, know no communication 
breakdown” (77).89
Encouraging the reader to imitate both the communicative quality of the angels and their 
revelatory effect on the human, the “exercises” try to balance the relaxation of perception with its 
attentiveness.  Such pop self-help staples as automatic writing, visualization, journaling, free 
association, and of course meditation abound.  Faithful record-keeping organizes the experience, 
while list-taking provides a springboard for continuing dialogue.  The universal approach is to 
reduce and separate usually integrated aspects of the creative process into a sequence of 
divination and reflection.  The reader first a) brainstorms an itemized list of emotional hangups, 
desires, responses, etc. (Ask Your Angels calls this a “spiritual laundry list”), or b) writes in 
stream-of-consciousness form - often as a letter to her angel - to meditate on a particular concept, 
and then uses either of these as a prompt for visualizing her life in the presence of angels.  The 
practical “can-do” aspects of writing are thus neatly segregated in time from the intellectual, 
                                                 
89 In his Essay on Human Understanding, John Locke magnifies these differences between human and angelic 
communication by elaborating the impossibility of the first comprehending the nature of the second.  “For that in our 
Ideas, as well of Spirits, as of other things, we are restrained to those we receive from Sensation and Reflection, is 
evident from hence, that in our Ideas of Spirits, how much soever advanced in Perfection, beyond those of Bodies, 
even to that of Infinite, we cannot yet have any Idea of the manner, wherein they discover their Thoughts to one 
another: Though we must necessarily conclude, that separate Spirits, which are Beings that have perfecter 
Knowledge, and greater happiness than we, must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their Thoughts, 
than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal Signs, and particularly Sounds, which are therefore of most 
general use, as being the best, and quickest we are capable of” (316).  Angels may speak in the tongues of men, and 
when they do so endow it with an intimate, visionary glow whose only human correlate is prophecy.  The tongues of 
angels, however, are inaccessible to men, for whom communication is an object of analysis and a problem for 
rational study.  The physicality of sign and sound join us, but also stand in our way; as a consequence we are both 
aided by and vulnerable to the angels and their transparencies. 
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 immaterial processes, whose place in the creative order becomes both mystified and 
mechanical.90
The angel self-help books, then, serve as the reflexive expressions of the self-help genre 
as a whole.  They allegorize the very idea of the reading process as an actualization of the will in 
all its freedom.  The difference is that the intelligence of the angel is presented as performing the 
reading function with the readers as they read.  The process of judgment is now in the hands of 
the universe; what instead the reader needs to learn is how to make the proper advances, how 
properly to become the subject-to-whom-angels-speak. 
 
The best minds of my generation destroyed 
 
“. . . who saw 
When this creation was?  Remember’st thou 
Thy making, while the Maker gave thee being? 
We know no time when we were not as now; 
Know none before us, self-begot, self-raised 
By our own quick’ning power.” 
(Milton’s Satan V, 856-860) 
In this last section I want to return to the image and ideas posed by the opening epigram – 
the problem of sin in a world of individual determinations, and her creation in the absence of 
God.  What happens to sin in a system that dispenses with the reality of evil?  If evil is only the 
privation of good, a mirage, what becomes of the shadow’s bastard daughter?  How does she 
exist in a world where the assertion of the self as a separate principle unto itself is not only 
wicked, but impossible? 
                                                 
90 Different images may be chosen to represent these processes.  There appears to be some dissension on the topic of 
“channeling”: whether when one hears the angels they are speaking to or through the subject.  The less religiously 
inclined a book is the more likely that it will choose “channeling” as an expression of angelic communion.  Much 
more ubiquitous is the language of spiritualized telecommunications: the telephone metaphor repeats throughout the 
genre, as well as the post-New Thought rhetoric of contact as “attuning” to angelic “frequencies” or “vibrations.” 
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 The self-help books, strangely, are not silent on the issue of sin; they continue to make 
recourse to dogmatic morality even in the midst of their “whole boatload of sensitive bullshit,” to 
borrow Ginsberg.  As equally as sin appears an illusion, illusion becomes a sin.  In this the idea 
of auto-production, of the self’s tautological self-reckoning, self-love, and ultimately self-
enclosure, threatens the sanctity of the infinite innerness they claim for absolute reality.  The 
nature of the illusion is to make us believe in limited physical possibility – in fact to think in 
terms of the physical and its inherent friction and limitations.  John Randolph Price, a former 
holder of “executive positions in business and industry,” writes in Angel Energy that the belief in 
scarcity (i.e. “whenever we experience a shortage of money”) is a “sin” because it violates our 
essential nature.  “Sin means ‘falling short of the divine law’ – and we certainly do place 
ourselves outside the law of abundance when we fail to acknowledge that we are that principle in 
action” (140).  As the reader becomes Peace in Howard’s book, so she is the principle of 
Abundance with whose angel she communes.  The idea of sin depends on this universal inner 
divine as the essential nature which it particularly violates; Price says as much at the opening of 
the section (“The Angels and Prosperity”).91  Kierkegaard, in writing of original sin, also 
requires the universal presence of the natural human in each individual.  In each of us sin begins 
anew – we are “participants” rather than “spectators” of Adam’s fall.  In this participation 
infinite freedom is seen as a principle inside the human, rather than the idea outside it towards 
which it moves, and which gives it being. 
This, at least, is the place where the angel books begin.  Anxiety is overcome by our free 
powers of concentration.  These books are aimed primarily at the would-be success, preaching 
that the law of cooperation overrides that of competition, that abundance and prosperity are 
                                                 
91 “In order to understand that unlimited abundance is a natural part of life on the third-dimensional place, we must 
accept the fact that God is fully manifest as each individual being” (139). 
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 matters for angelic attunement to “program,” that reality is merely a state of mind.  The shift 
from dependence to grace, recovered memory to turning of the attention, looks to the present 
rather than the past, a move we might read as occurring from ghosts as haunting traumas to 
angels as attending crises.  For it is the present that especially looks to the idea of soul as the 
arena of its particular self-questioning.  Why do I judge the world as I do?  On what basis do I 
act?  How is it possible that I act?  The crisis of the present is the crisis of the soul and its 
powers.  Above all the present beseeches that power of the soul to enter the moment, without 
which there is no perceiving nor deciding.  Thus questions about the attention’s own nature and 
potency beg the figure of the satan, as the present conjures the angel of the soul in order to know 
its own instantiation.  How is the head turned?  By whom, and towards what ends? 
These problems of the mind and invocation of the soul are necessary to the devil and his 
negotiations. These unseen but identifiable presences are his domain and his source of strength.  
To quote Rudwin again on Satan in the literary imagination, “His kingdom is the human mind, 
through which he directs the affairs of this earth” (245).  This is the master story, but it also 
provides a key to the theory.  Satanic judgment remains angelic in its ability to access directly 
the invisible force behind material operations.92  For Satan as for Descartes, the mind yields the 
world.  At stake, then, in answering the questions about the attention of the soul above, is a 
theory of reading.  The figure of the great deceiver and of the fallen attentio requires a particular 
hermeneutic in order for the subject to discover an alternative activator of the mind’s powers.  
This hermeneutic is premised on a demonic anxiety that substitutes the problem of true and false 
                                                 
92 What distinguishes the intelligence of the fallen from the beatified angel, however, is that the devil cloaks this 
unseen presence in language.  Whereas the angelic message seems to transcend language, Satan makes language 
seem transcendent.  This is why the Fausts of the world seek power through access to codes - whether of alchemy or 
oratory (as in The Devil and Daniel Webster), in order to render their hidden forces transparent.  Magic and art must 
become rationalized.  The lesson of the devil-compact and its initiation into taboo mysteries, of course, is that such 
knowledge is beyond reason, and so for the human mind it means death.  The only profit this language has for those 
136 
 for that of the (recovery-appropriated) good and evil.  Thus the problem of the source of evil is 
unveiled as a matter of existence, of mis-inteerpretation, and of the status of the very images with 
which we read ourselves. 
The spiritualist obsession is, like angelic consciousness, global in nature.  In line with the 
ecumenical project of the modernity/religion alliance, contemporary spiritualist treatments of 
Satan and of recovery exceed both Christianity and the United States.  A good example is 
Australian Hassidic Rabbi Laibl Wolf (whose credentials also include an LL.B and an M.Ed in 
Psychology).  Like other angel self-help experts, he also takes up the association of Satan with 
nonbeing.  He does so, however, in order to elevate the demon’s role in what could be called 
“spiritual recovery.”  In his “Meditation and Personal Growth” tapes Angels, Souls & Dreams, 
Wolf returns Satan to his original role as sanctioned tester, hired gun for God.  Drawing 
particularly from Kabbala, he explains that Satan is an “angelic form that’s much misunderstood. 
. . an angelic force totally subservient to God.”  He derives the the term sata-n from the Hebrew 
word listo-n, which means to test. 
Sata-n is what creates for us the test of life.  Bringing adversities or 
seeming adversities into our progressive pathways.  But these 
adversities, of course, are only really opportunities to draw from 
our inner strength.  So we find many stories, both in the chomash 
and [sic] of course you and I will experience these in our ordinary 
everyday lives.  Of Sata-n playing tricks on us, making things look 
much harder than they really are.  Sata-n also is the agency for 
punishment.  Punishment of course is reminder, for - sins?  But 
                                                                                                                                                             
who bargain away their souls (the premier figure of whom is the witch) is that, in Caliban’s words, they know how 
to curse with it. 
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 what is a sin?  We’re not using the antiquated notion.  Sin is 
spelled S-I-N, and you know what that stands for: Self-Inflicted-
Nonsense.  So that’s all it’s all about.  In fact, Sata-n is a mirage.  
But a very, very well-devised mirage that makes us seem to 
perceive obstacles when they are not. 
Wolf identifies this mirage as “attitudinal response,” and goes on to advocate instead 
reinterpreting reality through the use of the “right eye” –  a specific form of the “mind’s eye.”    
The right eye, as Wolf interprets Lubavitch theology, belongs to the right side of the cosmos 
which is giving, empathic, and nonjudgmental.  In terminology deeply resonant of John Price’s 
angel books, “Looking through the right eye is what most neutralizes Sata-n.  But we have to 
remember that Sata-n is really what you and I conjure up in our misinterpretation of a beneficent 
world.”   
Unlike his treatment of the other fallen angels, Wolf’s reference to Satan is more than just 
an excursion; it helps him set up the method of “personal growth” for the Angel tape (part one of 
the trio) and his appropriation of angels from their conventional use in orthodox tradition.  The 
self must be emptied of its own impositions, its categories of interpreting the world, in order to 
access the angelic forces (which he names as the four archangels, Michae-l, Gavrie-l, Orie-l, and 
Rafae-l).  Paradoxically, this self-emptying is the recognition of an emptiness that is already 
there.93  Contrasted with the fullness of ordinary life, the grand poseur-provocateur Sata-n names 
                                                 
93 Kierkegaard writes of anxiety that it is begotten by a nothingness, the “actuality” of the spirit.  It is an insight 
appropriate to the idea of immaterial substance: spirit relates to itself as anxiety, because it can neither do away with 
nor lay hold of itself.  It is an “ambiguous power,” and hence one to which – as part spirit – we ambiguously relate.  
“Dreamily the spirit projects its own actuality, but this actuality is nothing, and innocence always sees this nothing 
outside itself” (41).  External nothingness, a transcendence of nothingness, returns to us individually as sin.  The 
return is a crisis, a “discrimen rerum” Kierkegaard calls it, for in it we grasp our own innocence, which no longer 
exists, since “innocence only comes into existence when annulled” (36).  Like Satan, in this sin we see ourselves, 
and also know ourselves.  The self-knowing subject thus inhabits two realities, which are also unrealities: the reality 
of the self-image, which as soon as it is externalized and apprehended becomes vacant to our actual experience, and 
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 this seeming being and the purpose of its provisional existence.  As in so many of the angel self-
help books, the very idea of obstacle is revealed to be the obstacle.  The will is really free, 
subject only to the limitations placed on it by thought.  As Satan himself famously tells us, “The 
mind is its own place, and in itself / Can make a heav’n of hell, a hell of heav’n” (Milton I 254-
5).  All difficulty is merely illusion, brought about by the self’s judgments and (as in the case of 
the definition of sin) adherence to literal rather than spiritual law.  Where the “sin” of good and 
evil consists in an act of bad will belonging to the whole self, the “sin” of true and false, being 
and non-being, results from the self-engendering quality of bad perception as an individual act – 
the supreme act of the individual, sufficient unto himself. 
Thus self-making, the projection of the self as Sin whom we covet and abuse, emerges as 
the ultimate transgression.  Writing against their own historical function as vehicles toward 
personal wealth and entrepreneurialism, the spiritualist self-help books - manifest in the specific 
sub-genre of books on how to contact your own guardian angel – strive to re-imagine their own 
self-begetting, at the same time that they prove themselves deeply suspicious of the very idea of 
self-begetting.  Cloistered against the realm of the ego, these books’ soulful self-sanctification 
preaches angelically against the values that give them life.  If the whole idea of self-improvement 
stems from the ability of imaginative experience to develop our intellect, these books prove 
themselves highly ambivalent about that experience.  As an abstraction, an illusion, elusive and 
imagined and preying on our imaginations, their Satan sabotages the road to eternity.  He 
questions the status of the free mind in a world of universal individuals who seek to know 
themselves by converting experience to ideas and who approach such knowledge as a 
communion with the infinite.  He reflects back to these books their own self-authorizing status; 
                                                                                                                                                             
the reality of the knowing self, which anxiously contemplates the sin that is not-yet, that abyss where “freedom 
looks down into its own possibility” (61). 
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 he is the projective displacement of the idea of projective displacement, the illusion of illusion, 
the mirage of mirage.  He is the recovery of a nonexistent experience, and the selfhood of this 
nonexistence. In him the person is not concealed within memory, only to be retrieved by its 
exercise, but turned into a fantasy by doubt. 
This is the great deception of the self-help books, that, grounded in a radical interiority 
and separation of mind and world apparent in the psychic schisms within, their personalism can 
never actually be personal, because they are so desperate for the kind of absolute subjective unity 
that appears only in abstraction.  In reaching out for their angels, for spiritual dialogue, they 
reach for this principle.  They seek the voice that organizes the chaos of individual existence in a 
multiple world and addresses that existence as a singularity.   They seek truth, which is one, and 
discover it within a psychology that sees the cosmos in the personal soul.  Yet the specificity of 
that soul eludes them; the power to say that these thoughts are my thoughts, that the “I” is 
anything more than thinking itself – of thinking happening - is guaranteed only by the angelic 
conversation and its distant intimacy.  The interior angel is the sign of this power failure, the 
expression of what in such a system remains dependent on external grace and cannot be provided 
within.  As celestial allegory the angel speaks our absent personhood, speaks it in the very act of 
attending.  As fallen creature, as fraud, the angel claims this personhood for his own, baldly and 
without servitude.  As much as we petition a spiritual endowment of our selfhood, we fear its 
claim. 
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 4. The Necessary Fool 
 
 
 “I don’t understand a word!” 
 “Nor do I.” 
 Angelic intelligence reaches its defining limit in Michael Powell and Emeric 
Pressburger’s 1946 A Matter of Life and Death (released in the U.S. as Stairway to Heaven).  
Confronted with earthly forms of expression too banal to be rationally apprehended, these two 
departed souls confess their failure.  It appears the American pop song “Shoe Shoe Baby” has 
left them baffled. 
 The scene is heaven.  A trial – trying at once British-American relations, true love, and 
the capacity of the universe to deliver justice to the individual.  The premise of the romantic 
fantasy borrows from Here Comes Mr. Jordan, released a few years earlier.  Like the American 
film the British one spins its plot from a heavenly mistake, committed by one of heaven’s more 
foolish messengers.  But where in the first film the messenger has come too soon, impulsively 
seizing a soul before its time, in the second he comes too late.  Lost in the British fog, the French 
angel excuses his error by blaming “your infernal English climate.”  Damage has been done, of 
course.  In the meantime the young man, a pilot for the RAF, has fallen in love – with an 
American WAC – and refuses to accompany Conductor #71 up to the pearly gates.  Instead he 
convinces him to arrange a hearing.  The pilot’s English physician, recently and precipitously 
departed, pleads his case in front of the heavenly court, defending his client against prosecuting 
counsel Abraham Ferlon – the first American revolutionary to be killed by a British bullet. 
 Powell and Pressburger originally made A Matter of Life and Death  in response to a 
request by the head of MoI Films Divisions to ease tensions between Americans and British 
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 during the war and lay positive groundwork for their relations in the impending post-war world 
order.  The result was a narrative whose controversial climax adjudicated the matter of life and 
death in part by staging a confrontation between American and British civilizations.94  The 
cosmic question of the possibility of true love devolves to a question of character and reliability, 
which in turn begs the question of circumstance, culture, and identity, which finally warrants the 
question of a young Brit’s right to a stay of execution in order to marry a beautiful Boston-born 
girl.  The process is murky; in fact early on the judge asks, “Why do you stress their 
nationalities?”  But the enthusiasm of both attorneys and a vast audience of historical characters 
and contemporary servicemen and women overrides him.  In one of the pivotal moments each 
lawyer procures a radio in order to play, respectively, the Voices of England and America 1945.  
The Voice of England mumbles incoherently about cricket and the weather.  Everyone titters 
indulgently.  The Voice of America sings out: “Shoe shoe shoe baby / ow! / Shoe shoe shoe baby 
                                                 
94 In sync with the majority British and American opinion, the New York Times hailed the scene as a tour de force: 
“We haven’t space to credit the literary wit of the heavenly ‘trial’ in which the right of an English flier to marry an 
American girl is discussed, with all of the subtle ruminations of a cultivated English mind that it connotes” (see 
Crowther).  But the reaction in countries other than these two was not so enthusiastic.  Carlos Diaz Maroto of Spain 
condemned it as naïve propoganda that prevents a merely good film from becoming a masterwork: “El duelo 
dialéctico que se establece hacia el final de la película entre acusador y defensor es de una trivialidad e ingenuidad 
portensosas, e invalida el valor de una película que si no hubiese optado tanto por decir grandes cosas y se hubiese 
quedado en una simple y sencilla historia de amor sobrenatural, hubiera devenido en una obra maestra de este 
maravilloso subgénero. De este modo, lo conseguido es una mera buena película, lastrada por su primitiva inocencia 
ideológica” (see Powell and Pressburger Pages).  The USSR reaction more directly rejected the politics rather than 
the fact of the movie’s propogandistic mission.  In Sue Harper’s and Vincent Porter’s excellent article on the 
Muscovite view of the film, they explain this as a response to the pointedly aestheticist bent of the film’s “mensaje”: 
“What needs to be stressed is the complexity and the coherence of the ideological case made by Powell and 
Pressburger. A Matter of Life and Death is important because it represents a bid for intellectual power on behalf of a 
small elite intelligentsia. Powell and Pressburger are attempting to formulate, for old-style Tories, a response to 
possible post-war reforms. In A Matter of Life and Death they summon to their aid a range of cultural and literary 
resources, the most prominent of which is that of the English Romantic movement. In their attitude to individuality, 
history, and art, Powell and Pressburger replicate the ideas of Burke, Blake, Wordsworth and Keats. These writers 
were well assimilated into British cultural life; but here they were given an additional conservative ‘gloss’. In A 
Matter of Life and Death Peter Carter's subjectivity is structured so as to embrace the whole of culture and human 
history. With the closing of his physical eye before the operation, we are granted access to his "mind's eye", which 
contains both monochrome and Technicolor worlds, as well as the collected wisdom of Plato, Sophocles, and 
Bunyan. The film displays Peter's subconscious as the fertile location of that individual psychic power which 
provides social cohesion. Its propaganda aim is to suggest that what binds Britons and Americans together is their 
common history and their shared definition of individualism and culture.”  Furthermore it is unlikely that, in 
addition to their rejection of the Archers’ individualism, the Soviets had any taste for the angels. 
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 / Bye bye bye baby / Your papa’s off to seven seas.”  The response is dumbfoundedness; no 
established national joke accounts for this.  It is a moment of triumph for the defense – which is 
to say, for “life” over death – the moment when the sweepingly nationalistic prosecutor admits 
he cannot fathom his own country’s self-declarations, some centuries advanced.  The equivalent 
of even angels weeping, the dumbstruckness of the celestial legal system scores a point for true 
love against prejudice. 
In the process of making direct social and political judgments the heavenly bureacracy 
must become naïve.  A stranger to culture (entering GI’s ask, “Do you have USO shows here?” 
“No.”  “Okay we’ll stay.”) the supernatural world can encounter it only as an innocent.  
Consequently, angel texts seeking to comment on timely issues discover in their angels this 
communication of speechlessness.  The separation of speech from knowledge arises specifically 
from the contact between angelic and human worlds under conditions of pressure for both.  On 
its own the celestial world’s thinking and power are one – producing a logical omnipotence in 
which plans effortlessly work themselves, and laws and acts conform perfectly.  But when it 
must wrestle with the earthly world and its luscious senselessness,95 the heavenly adopts a 
necessary stance of unknowingness.  It is from this position of equating worldly ignorance with 
cosmic truth that heaven is finally able to speak its revelations.  In this way the mediating figures 
of angels and departed souls act as the Voices of Justice, essentially positioned to question a 
culture’s self-definitions and the very language of its self-understanding.  They tell us that in 
regards to the “common” currency of earthly civilization, the power of not understanding 
underlies the power of judging.  For it is precisely the common that the angelic naïf cannot 
know.  As unconditioned intelligences, separated from culture and experience, angels identify 
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 those things which they cannot intuit as conventions purely - conventions that exert a coercive 
and normalizing force.  It is their particular task as angels to help their charges overcome these 
conventions, to wrestle with those things that cannot translate to universals yet are positioned to 
usurp their role. 
Caught between the world of absolute laws and that of arbitrary nonsense, angels struggle 
with the human to empower the middle terrain between thought and the senses.  This terrain is a 
realm of fantasy unique to the human, but one which – metaphysically – calls out to the inhuman 
for its realization.  How the inhuman reaches it makes a difference.  As we saw in the first 
chapter, annunciating angels simply disclose their intelligence, hailing the prophet-subject by 
creating a momentary but profound chaos that ultimately assimilates new ideas to established 
structures.  Such collapse of intelligibility appears differently in stories of angelic wrestling.  In 
these stories chaos is presented as part of the fundamental order of life itself.  In its encounter 
with the angel the subject wrestles with the nature of mortal existence - with life and death as a 
matter of justice and desire.  As a consequence the subject must be relieved of his will rather 
than his despair, a discharge that pits angel and human in opposition to each other – in form, 
though not in interest.  For this is an educative wrestling match, occurring between teacher and 
student instead of rival and competitor.  Beholding in this struggle the fire of pure self-interest 
attempting to secure itself in an intelligible order, we find in these narratives of senselessness and 
suffering a supremely individualist but also communitarian gratification. 
 A Matter of Life and Death contains many of the semantic elements of classic angel 
narrative.  1) There is the angelic presentation of the book – where Conductor #71 (Marius 
Goring) makes the pilot Peter Carter (David Niven) a present of a book on chess at the close of 
                                                                                                                                                             
95 This irrationality is actually fully sensual, testifying to the inability of separated intelligences to comprehend  that 
which exists only in relation to the senses, at the same time that they are drawn to it in their encounter with the 
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 the film.  2) At the very beginning his neurologist Dr. Reeves references angelic vision: “I see it 
all clearly and at once as in a poet’s eye.”  Subsequently we discover that Peter Carter is the 
Peter Carter, an up-and-coming poet.  3) In their first meeting Reeves asks Carter if he believes 
in the survival of the human personality after death, a belief that – as we saw in Zoroastrian 
cosmology – accompanies the belief in angels.  4) One of the more magical and commented-on 
moments in the film occurs when the angel stops time in order to have his conversation with 
Carter (“We are talking in space, not time”), a sensation that would be echoed later during John 
Travolta’s dance scene in Michael.  5) The issue of crisis so familiar from the first two chapters 
also appears in A Matter.  The brain surgeon tells Dr. Reeves of planning Carter’s brain 
operation (which occurs simultaneously with the trial in heaven), “There’s no crisis for such a 
thing.  Any day will do.”  To which Reeves responds, “No it won’t.  I’ll tell you why I think it 
won’t and why there is a crisis.”96  Heaven may stop time, but it also insists on it, in keeping 
with its characterization as the site of planning and destiny.  “Your time was up,” Carter’s angel 
explains.  6) But above all, and significant for the angelic predisposition to chosenness and its 
engagement with the problem of personal existence, the film assures the power of the 
“uncommon man” (the poet, the one saved from certain death, even if by something so 
capricious as a soggy climate) to decide his fate.  Singled out by accident, Carter seeks to claim 
this exceptionality in the form of an indulgence for his special circumstances. The distinctions 
between a judgment based on eternal rules and one that acknowledges exceptions come to a head 
in the trial scene, where Ferlon admonishes Reeves to respect the “eternal law of the universe,” 
and Reeves responds, “This is a court of justice, not a court of law.” 
                                                                                                                                                             
human.  As the conductor angel says, “We are starved for Technicolor up there.” 
96 The movie bills itself as presenting a fantasy “which exists only in the mind of a young airman whose life has 
been shaped by war.”  The tension between scientific, psycho-neurological explanations (Pressburger’s brother was 
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 This pivotal conflict between universal law and the concept of individual justice is set up 
from the beginning.  Carter and the angel debate whether he must accompany his psychopomp to 
heaven – which he must, according to the law of both heaven and earth.  “Yes, but what is law?”  
Carter asks.  “Law is law,” the angel shrugs.  “Yes, but law is based on reason,” the poet replies.  
The distinction he makes is not a trifling one, and the main aesthetic thrust of the movie borrows 
its fire from it.  Because it is answerable to reason, justice privileges thinking over knowledge.  
Thus narratives of justice – unlike narratives of law - adopt a confrontational rather than a 
deductive approach to experience.  The angelic trial is the grand performance of this 
confrontation. 
 In his essay on “all-in wrestling” Roland Barthes identifies the attention to the 
“individual” as part of the wrestling world’s theory of justice, and its quasi-divine impulse.  The 
infraction of isolated laws to accommodate the individual moment bends us toward the sublime 
threshold.  This is the origin of the spectacular nature of the sport – the Jacob’s ladder implicit in 
the angelic wrestling match.  Justice, we perceive, pertains to what we see, rather than to how we 
play the game: 
But what wrestling above all is meant to portray is a purely moral 
concept: that of justice . . .  The idea of “paying” is essential to 
wrestling, . . . and the crowd is jubilant at seeing the rules broken 
for the sake of a deserved punishment.  Wrestlers know very well 
how to play up to the capacity for indignation of the public by 
presenting the very limit of the concept of Justice, this outermost 
zone of confrontation where it is enough to infringe the rules a 
                                                                                                                                                             
a neurologist) and metaphysical, fantastic ones is brilliantly handled, and heightens the affective play within the 
audience, who by it are made to yearn for the fantastic, rather than taking it for granted. 
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 little more to open the gates of a world without restraints. . . Justice 
is therefore the embodiment of a possible transgression; it is from 
the fact that there is a Law that the spectacle of the passions which 
infringe it derives its value. (21-2) 
This chapter is devoted to describing the homologies between the angelic trial as it is 
presented in Powell and Pressburger’s classic, and the idea of wrestling as Barthes understands it 
and as it leads to the deployment of wrestling angels in contemporary culture.  In suggesting “a 
world without restraints,” the transgressive, even criminal confrontation between angelic and 
human orders provides a forum for direct cultural critique within a metaphysical dramatization of 
abstract ideas.  Justice, Love, Hate, Fear, Forgiveness, these are as much players in the game of 
wrestling as they are principles that judge concrete issues and events.  If some of the critical 
reception of A Matter of Life and Death sought to adjudicate between the story of True Love and 
that of post-World War II international rivalry, it failed then to read the film’s essential project, 
and the thing that makes it so interesting.  The story of rules and roles in contest is inseparable 
from the fantasy and the romance; indeed, as Barthes points out, such a contest provokes the 
entry of the otherworldly.  The conflict between the “uncommon” and the “common,” so often 
allegorized within stories of individual exceptionality overcoming the social order, invokes the 
incursion of the sacred and the supernatural.  In order to create and establish new norms or codes 
of conduct the text must affirm the will and freedom of the individual who creates them, an 
affirmation that calls upon a purer power outside of and capable of challenging the worldly.  This 
power is both agent and witness, and blesses its audience as participant spectators and actors 
within the world to come. 
 In this chapter I am going to look at the representation of angelic trials – or, in more 
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 traditional terms, of wrestling with angels – in two very different contemporary texts.  CBS’s hit 
drama Touched by an Angel and Tony Kushner’s award-winning Broadway play, Angels in 
America: A Gay Fantasia on National Themes, would appear to set the poles in a spectrum of 
angel-appeal.  Where Martha Williamson’s TV show launches a broad-based, “non-
denominational” Christian emphasis on self-surrender to God’s love, Kushner’s duo of plays, 
Millenium Approaches and Perestroika, provides a secular-friendly appropriation of Kabbalistic 
spiritualism, historical critique, and homoerotic melodrama in the service of a return to 1930’s 
Leftist politics.  In the first text the angel is the divine luminary, in the second, a titillating flop.  
In their respective uses of the angel as voice of truth and foil for truth, then, earnestness balances 
camp to define the extension of the past decade’s angelic consumption in relation to social 
issues.  This cultural hyperbola widens its reach around two poles: the naïve appropriation of the 
angelic as the means of guaranteeing free will through the manifestation of a foundational and 
unconstructed truth, and the fabulous supplanting of such truth through the manifestation of a 
derivative and constructed image, with which the will must, nevertheless, grapple.  In the stretch 
between Touched by an Angel and Angels in America the wrestling angel alights on strikingly 
different domains of power. 
 This is not to say however that the two texts are at war.  Like A Matter of Life and Death, 
both Touched by an Angel and Angels in America narrate a story of crime and forgiveness, 
specifically crime that involves the problem of national identity.  Where Peter violates earthly 
law by falling in love with an American and heavenly law by surviving an impossible air crash, 
Kushner’s and CBS’s texts also involve themselves with the individual violation of larger codes 
of law.  In the case of the latter texts, however, the individual must conform to that law.  Both are 
much more concerned with self-interest as a threat to community and the relationships that 
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 sustain it, particularly insofar as it affects a community based on difference.  In this regard the 
two texts reach some sort of political accord.  For instance, one of the more interesting of 
Touched by an Angel’s episodes deals with a retired military officer who must learn to accept his 
gay son, and Kushner is as invested in a communality based on love and tolerance as 
Williamson’s devoutly sentimental series.  In fact it is precisely this investment in an ethics of 
difference and multiplicity that constitutes each text’s drama of justice and sense of personal 
trial.  Where they differ is in their treatment of their angels, and with that their attitudes towards 
consensus and desire.  Where Touched by an Angel ultimately seeks to affirm the mechanisms of 
consent through the individualizing touch of the unconditioned angel, Angels in America is far 
more ambivalent.  In fact, it is ambivalence that is its final guide, not the naïve.  In rejecting its 
own angel, the play puts aside the possibility of grounding the relationship between the 
individual interest and the law of the group in any principle or structure.  Not understanding 
begins and ends with not understanding; the wrestling match between desire and consent 
produces a blessing, but one that remains unnamed. 
What places Kushner’s and Williamson’s shows together is their casting these issues of 
identity, trial, and belonging within a hermeneutic of death, specifically terminal illness.  The 
issue of inexorable determinism, apparent in the counter-mechanicism of the first chapter and 
anxiety about free will in the second, rears its head here in its most agonistic form.  In a context 
of group, rather than individual, sovereignty, encounter and conversation become all-out 
wrestling.  For this reason, all of TBA’s weekly protagonists and Angels’ central characters must 
learn to grasp their own identity through the other.  It is a struggle that is both mortal - 
demanding that we submit our individual autonomy to the encounter, and erotic - promising 
redemption of that autonomy through love.  In other words, in order to exert power socially the 
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 individual identity must become active by engaging his own immortality, the judgment of one’s 
self through the unprejudiced eyes of death.  This is why the threat of dying is so central to each 
of these texts, apparent in Angels in the dominating presence of AIDS and in TBA through the 
persistent thematics of terminal illness in general (notably cancer).  Metaphorical treatments of 
terminal illness also about, however.  In Kushner’s play, Reaganism and its associated doctrines 
and in TBA, addiction, loss of faith, and prejudice, all take on the role of a death sentence. 
The pluralistic world of conscious difference, which is a world of conscious struggle, 
provokes this fascination with individual doom: in a system that sets up generalities as a mode of 
social understanding the effort to claim exception (to claim the blessing) requires a personal trial.  
Just as the idea of the individual pre-determined death sparks the battle for justice in Powell and 
Pressburger’s British classic, so does it provide the terrain for the ethical and political wrestlings 
that drive American stories of angelic trials today.  And, just as topically the struggles of the 
doomed individual makes possible a meditation on the fate of the balance of nationalisms and 
power in an emerging global order in A Matter of Life and Death,97 so do these struggles seem 
necessary for Angels in America’s and Touched by an Angel’s commentary on identity politics 
and national life during the global-conscious post-Cold War era.  The personal confrontation 
with one’s own singularity - in leading to the realization that any universal connection must pass 
through death - is suggestive in times seeking to comprehend and judge new structures of 
                                                 
97 The most striking moment of this occurs during the selection of the jury.  With a presumption of balance and 
fairness, the jury of six is chosen based on national diversity of peoples who are neither British nor American.  The 
result – citizens of France, Germany, Russia, China, Punjab state, and or course Ireland – convinces Dr. Reeves that 
perhaps it is in his client’s  interest to choose a jury of Americans rather than of former rivals and colonized 
countries.  The joke mounts when the new jury, all of American citizens, reveals itself as members of each of these 
same ethnicities (with the sole substitution of a Mr. Jackson, descendent of Africa, for the Indian).  Unlike Carlos 
Maroto, footnoted above, I would argue that the political allusions do not weaken what would otherwise be a 
charming fantasy-romance; on the contrary, the fantasy-romance via a story of angelic visitation facilitates an 
exploration and critique of a changing postwar international order.  This objective may have proved less compelling 
for a Spanish movie critic, however, since much “topical” storytelling holds direct interest primarily for those to 
whom it is overtly relevant. 
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 relations among competing groups.  Necessarily a question of mediating general and particular 
identities within a competitive context, the preoccupation with justice manifests itself expressly 
within fantasies of immortality and otherness.  The individual and the law must reckon with love 
and death. 
 Such reckoning takes its most potent and alluring form in regards to the topic of race, and 
it is this particular aspect that I focus my analysis on in this chapter.  Both Tony Kushner’s 
drama and Martha Williamson’s hit series present fantasies of difference and community 
involving the differences in religion, gender, nation, political affiliation, and sexual orientation, 
but it is in their treatment of what is still in this country probably the most complex of internal 
differences, that each reveals its topical project.  While Kushner offers up a “gay fantasia,” gay 
life and culture functions more as an affective influence than a subject of struggle.  In Touched 
by an Angel, the religious urge is the hunger that drives the show and only rarely itself an object 
of analysis.  In other words, the two forms of identity that most obviously define each text do so 
as modes of expression, rather than as primary issues of engagement.98  Each is the presumed 
language and system of values within which the audience judges the stories of individual trials.  
These stories range across a wide ground, but it is arguably in relation to the issue of race – 
especially African-American - that they express the greatest tension and the most forceful 
treatment of justice.  Race in both texts becomes a privileged site to work out problems of self-
determination posed by other issues and in other ways.  In the TBA episodes on lynching and 
Angel’s depiction of its designated black characters, we see race acting as a kind of “terminal 
                                                 
98 The character of Joe, a Mormon who learns to accept his repressed homosexuality only during the course of the 
play, is an obvious exception.  But his difficulty functions more as a foil for the problems of the openly gay 
characters who must wrestle with subtler and in some ways more challenging angels.  And in Touched by an Angel, 
the angel Monica rejects pietistic structures for the central mode and reigning idea that gives them (and the show) 
life: “I’m not talking about religion, I’m talking about God.”  Talking about religion suggests talking about 
something concrete; talking about God could more accurately be described as talking through God, talking through 
the gesture towards God, as God is supremely that which is unknowable. 
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 identity” that at the same time uniquely enables personal agency through an angelic substitution.  
The black characteres, we find, speak more as divine messengers than the angels themselves, 
being endowed with a profoundly judicial grasp of historical tragedy and melodrama.   In 
Williamson’s and Kushner’s distinct treatments of race and death, their respective angels of 
order and excess appear in the most distress and find their worthiest combatant.  By participating 
in trials involving race in America, the wrestling angel isolates racial truths as essential crucibles 
of American current, public, and historical identity.  These are truths that like the divine are 
knowable only negatively: in the moment of foolishness, in the absence of consent, and through 
understandings that cannot – in fact must not – be understood. 
 
Part I: Apollo 
In his essay “On Dreams, That They Are God-Sent,” the first century Jewish philosopher 
Philo of Alexandria describes three kinds of wisdom.  He does so through allegorizing a sacred 
genealogy, identifying the first three fathers of the people of Israel with each kind.  Abraham is 
the learning that comes of guidance, Isaac, “self-instruction,” and Jacob, the attainment of virtue 
born of “industry and practice, in accordance with which were his labors of wrestling and 
contention.”  Philo uses this moment to distinguish Jacob when he is called son of his 
grandfather Abraham, the student, from Jacob after he has earned the new name Israel and is 
called son of his father Isaac, the natural.   
 Philo’s exegesis is intended to make a point about “the nature of things,” that is, to 
suggest how the practice of learning becomes the inheritance of being, and the difference this 
makes in a narrative of naturalization, rights, and mobility.  He points out that Abraham is a 
migrant, a stranger in a strange land, whereas Isaac inherits the land he was born in.  Primarily 
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 stories of contract and property rights, the chapters of Genesis dealing with Jacob’s early 
manhood describe the condition of his own wandering, including God’s promise that his 
offspring shall cover all the corners of the earth and his labors toward this end, and his 
consequent return home to become the leader of a people.  For Philo’s diasporic 
cosmopolitanism, these struggles and eventual transformation make Jacob the leader of the 
people (or rather make his people the people): he is the nominal founder of the “race of wisdom,” 
the “inheritor of all the parts of the world,” and “a common good to all men.”  Jacob’s status as 
“common good” is directly tied to his transformation from student to natural through his 
revelations of the stairway to heaven during his flight into exile and his wrestling with the 
unknown man who appears to him during his return. 
As it appears in the stories surrounding Jacob, angelic activity is twofold.  The first takes 
place in his dream-vision of the ladder of God, with angels ascending and descending.  The 
context is one of a classic annunciation – a divine address honoring the recipient as sacred 
patriarch- or matriarch-to-be in the form of covenant and promise.  The psychological imagery 
supports this, the ladder of imagination reaching up between the individual and the universal.  
What sets this instance apart, however, is that the Lord directly gives his message.  Our attention 
thus is drawn to the angels as images, not messengers; we apprehend these supernatural backup 
dancers purely physically, in the spirit of a distinction once made by Virginia Woolf’s in her 
essay on the cinema: “For some reason, the shape of a thought is more appealing than the 
thought itself.”  What is not as clear is the relationship this experience has to the second of 
Jacob’s angels, the one who appears as a man and wrestles with him through the night, on the 
eve of his reconciliation with his brother Esau.99  This is a trial for Jacob, rather than a 
                                                 
99 Technically Jacob’s second angel encounter is the morning before the night wrestling.  He approaches Menahim 
after covenanting with Laban, his uncle, and there meets two angels.  He declares the spot holy, and begins 
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 beholding.  In this scene he becomes for us a figure of suffering which – unlike Job – he has 
brought upon himself in his willingness to play the game of covenants and blessings.  For Jacob 
is as much hero as prophet.  His angelic experience is one of risk and daring as well as 
imaginative perception, and his own passion and ambition fuel the dramas of his history.100  He 
is a creature of his own self-interest and willful self-assertion who at the same time fathers the 
larger good.  This ambivalence in his historical role makes itself felt in his struggle with the 
unifying agent of the angel. 
I have chosen to begin with the drama of Jacob because it establishes the spectatorial 
nature of the power play between the common and the uncommon apparent in so many stories of 
human and angelic wrestling.  Jacob is emotional and melodramatic, the sympathetic criminal 
who usurps his brother’s power and then is forced to earn it.  The character of Roy Cohn in 
Perestroika refers to him (in what is also an appreciative self-description) as “a ruthless 
motherfucker, some bald runt” who “laid hold of his birthright with his claws and his teeth” (81).  
Jacob is a creature of nature and nature’s elemental struggle for survival, yet he is also diligent 
and patient – a visionary and seer, as well as a hot-blooded actor.  Redacted before the modern 
conception of justice, the story of Jacob appeals to us in our efforts to represent it.  In his 
struggle with the angelic other – with his own inheritance and potential being – Jacob 
demonstrates the necessarily imaginative component of the attainment of covenant and blessing, 
and the divine underpinnings of the social order. 
Touched by an Angel reveals its investment in pure nature almost immediately through 
the earnest transparency of its style.  The show’s flat characterization, forced plotline, and plain-
                                                                                                                                                             
negotiations toward the encounter he most anticipates, the meeting between him and his brother.  It is the night 
before this, amid great fear and distress (Gen. 32.7), that he wrestles with the anonymous man. 
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 dealing camerawork have provoked the censure of critics, but then it has never been interested in 
artistic criticism.  Ignored by the Emmy’s for a decade, CBS’s religious mainstay nevertheless 
garners popular awards, cult-like fan devotion, and, in 1998-1999, status behind only ER as the 
top ranked TV drama.  I would argue that the show’s resilient popularity exists not despite but in 
part because of its lack of artistic virtuosity.  The show is not unsophisticated – in fact its 
cinematography, editing, sets and costume design are almost sensuously smooth – but its affect is 
devotedly ingenuous.  Like much dramatic children’s television, it is characterized by a pure 
exhibitionism of character and feeling, expressive in its technical obsession with the dissolve.  
The bitter dismissals of God and self, breakdown confessions, and inspired beholdings all aim 
for a self-evidence and totality of presentation common to the didactic arts.  That which is fully 
exhibited cannot leave us titillated or provoked by the thought that there is something more than 
what is put before us, or that any character is less than utterly honest about their nature - even 
that aspect of their nature marked by deception or denial.  The drama thus becomes an object of 
intuition, not analysis, predicated on the disarming power of the naïve. 
 In the Critique of Judgment Kant argues that “an art of being naïf” is a contradiction.  No 
art can sustain this quality except for a moment, following which “the veil of dissembling art” is 
drawn over it again.  Touched by an Angel seems to choose, in its embrace of the naïve as a 
mode of its entirety, nature over art.  Produced by the same network that pioneered the latest 
round of “reality TV,” the show derives its adulating reception from this feeling of pure 
presentation, of a uniform wholeness, that induces the idea of the real. 
Naïvetë is the breaking forth of the ingenuousness originally 
natural to humanity, in opposition to the art of disguising oneself 
                                                                                                                                                             
100 He is, for instance, born clutching the heel of the brother whose title he will later usurp, and upon meeting 
Rachel, the woman for whom he will labor fourteen years under contract, he kisses her immediately, lifts his eyes to 
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 that has become a second nature.  We laugh at the simplicity that is 
as yet a stranger to dissimulation, but we rejoice the while over the 
simplicity of nature that thwarts that art.  We await the 
commonplace manner of artificial utterance, thoughtfully 
addressed to a fair show, and lo! nature stands before us in 
unsullied innocence – nature that we were quite unprepared to 
meet . . .  But that something infinitely better than any accepted 
code of manners, namely purity of mind, (or at least a vestige of 
such purity,) has not become wholly extinct in human nature, 
infuses seriousnes and reverence into this play of judgement. (202) 
In the reverse traffic of emotions occasioned by the naïve within art we move from laughter to 
tears, from what Kant earlier names animal “gratification” to spiritual “self-esteem” for the 
“humanity within us.”  Here we find a Jacob’s ladder illustrating the motion of our relation, as 
spectators, to the idea of the human as transcending the conventions and codes of social 
judgment.101  The opacity of “manners” bows before the self-evidence of “nature.”  This motion 
is certainly mimicked in Touched by an Angel’s frequent transformation of its protagonist from 
sneering skeptic, ensconced in the attitude and paraphernalia of their job or position in society, to 
humble believer, “nakedly exposed” under the light of angelic illumination.  But the show’s 
emotional exhibitionism also plays this up for its audience as each episodes shifts its “style-less” 
appropriation of the naïve from within the poetics of the sentimental.102
                                                                                                                                                             
heaven, and weeps. 
101 It is significant in this regard that here Kant chooses theater as his example, both because it is overtly a collective 
production, and also because German theater at the end of the eighteenth century self-consciously defined itself as a 
national art form. 
102 Friedrich Schiller makes a fast distinction between the naïve and the sentimental as opposite aesthetics, pivoting 
on the well-worn distinction between nature and art, respectively.  Nature simply expresses itself, where art seeks to 
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 In effecting this move from the perspective of experience to that of innocence, the 
educative project of the script becomes crucial.  For it is through its commitment to showcasing 
the innocence within social codes that the show makes its particularly angelic plea for social 
justice.  In this the show recalls Nietzsche’s description of Apollinian tragedy in The Birth of 
Tragedy as the glorification of the human will, which represents itself through the ordered and 
restrained expression of human suffering.  Apollo’s sense of order does not take away his feeling 
for art, however.  Nietzsche categorizes such expression as naïve, the dream-induced voice of  
the Olympian magic mountain.  “Where we encounter the ‘naïve’ in art, we should recognize the 
highest effect of Apollinian culture – which always must first overcome an empire of Titans and 
slay monsters, and which must have triumphed over an abysmal and terrifying view of the world 
and the keenest susceptibility to suffering through recourse to the most forceful and pleasurable 
illusions” (43).  Williamson’s melodrama discovers its polemic in just this force and pleasure, in 
the slaying of the monsters within the self which feed the social Titans.  The illusion is the angel, 
whose status as a fantasy that yet “correlatively”103 promises truth functions as the supreme naïve 
conviction of providence, in which justice is guaranteed by love. 
                                                                                                                                                             
represent or discover nature.  Schiller uses this to contrast the art of modernity from that of antiquity, and to name 
the exceptionality of the moment in which he is writing.  My thoughts on this have more in common with Friedrich 
Schelling than with Schiller.  He situates Schiller’s discussion of the naïve and the sentimental within a theory of 
modernity as a form of consciousness, rather than a period.  As a consequence Schelling argues that in fact the 
former can only be named from within the purview of the latter, just as the object exists only through the 
apprehension of the subject.  He writes, “Perhaps no modern, Shakespeare included, has attained the perfect 
indifference of the naïve and the sentimental (for, as I have already remarked, the naïve actually appears naïve only 
from the perspective of the sentimental).  The basis or point of departure here is always the juxtaposition of the 
subject and the object, that is, the element of the sentimental, except that in the object itself it is reduced to naivete” 
(93).  Schiller, and Schelling in agreement with him, sees the naïve as devoted to an aesthetics of the object, where 
the sentimental belongs to the realm of the subject.  As we can see, Schelling uses this distinction to undo the 
argument that the two modes must be (in fact can be) exclusive of each other. 
103 The word is Nietzsche’s.  About the relation between truth and fantasy in Apollinian tragedy he writes, “The 
Homeric ‘naivete’ can be understood only as the complete victory of Apollinian illusion: this is one of those 
illusions which nature so frequently employs to achieve her own ends.  The true goal is veiled by a phantasm: and 
while we stretch out our hands for the latter, nature attains the former by means of our illusion” (44).  I liken the 
harmony between nature and individual human to the concept of providence – which did not, in the culture which 
Nietzsche was describing – properly exist. 
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 Touched by an Angel tells the story of naïve education on two levels.  The overall plot 
follows the adventures of Monica (Roma Downey), a young intern caseworker angel, as she is 
guided in her tentative but sincere efforts by Tess (Della Reese), a crabby but tender wise-
woman angel, and aided by Andrew (John Dye), the mild-mannered angel of death.  Over the 
course of the series Monica matures from a neophyte who is always asking questions of Tess 
about what to do - much as a child does, to an angel of stature who asks questions of the humans 
from a position of knowing what not to do.  In much later seasons, as Monica’s finesse develops 
with her changing eyebrows and hairstyles, she is even given an intern for herself to train, the 
young Gloria (played by Valerie Bertinelli), also newly birthed into her role of messenger of 
God.  (Williamson’s program is consistent in depicting angels as beings unto themselves, not 
former humans.)  Monica’s evolution towards greater confidence in her own stature parallels that 
of the show.  When it debuted with uncertain promise in 1994, TBA was much more lighthearted 
about its purpose, funnier, self-reflexive, quick to play with its then oddball premise.  In one 
early episode, for instance, Andrew – having just been hung up on by a telephone operator after 
he mentioned that he didn’t have a last name – comments, “this three-dimensional living is very, 
very limiting.”  Andrew himself gains in prominence as the series matures; in the first season he 
doesn’t even appear in the opening widescreen credits showing the angels in action.  Later each 
episode will open with the famous prairie-rich image of the three angels sauntering towards us, 
hair blowing in the wind, to the tune of Reese singing “Walk with You.” 
 A walk with the angels requires a similar openness to the elements.  And this openness 
comprises the second educative storyline that Touched by an Angel follows – the repeated need 
of humans to confront “nature” as only the angelic stranger can articulate it, in order to exchange 
skepticism for faith.  The angelic mind that knows innately, rather than by experience, is the best 
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 and perhaps only occasion for the particular kind of education the human protagonists require – 
so the show tells us.  The time collapse of this “education” is significant: where Monica’s 
episode-by-episode tutorship follows a simple development model, that of the humans is 
epiphanic.  Here we are looking at a different image and idea of experience – one that is 
revelatory and absolute, and one where, as we saw in chapter two, image and idea are one.  In a 
sense the human subjects are being asked by the naïve angel to bypass their fidelity to learned 
knowledge and enter into a contract with truth – as it is given by the angel.  Such experience 
opens up a the possibility of what can only be called moral feeling.  Monica matures; her cases 
convert.  Because of this the angelic trial requires their participation physically, 
melodramatically, and with profound emotional display. 
 “Here in this rose, is my case.”  So Dr. Reeves puts forward to the jury a tear shed by the 
young WAC for her poet, captured by the conductor angel on the petals of a vibrant red rose.  It 
is brought before the high heavenly court as evidence of Peter Carter’s prowess and ability to 
produce true love.  In it we see the man’s struggle with the angel, even in his absence.  And we 
also see his passions.  As Roland Barthes says of such grandiloquent spectacle, “In wrestling, as 
on the stage in antiquity, one is not ashamed of one’s suffering, one knows how to cry, one has a 
liking for tears” (16).  By insisting on the tear as self-evident truth and the armature of just 
defense, angelic melodrama recasts suffering as the supreme expression of faith and conviction.  
Physicalized emotion becomes an engagement with the divine and a demonstration of our 
covenant with it.  In the absence of a clerical or ministerial authority capable of articulating this 
engagement as logos (and such an absence is quite marked in Williamson’s series), it is rendered 
through angelic self-presentation.  As Philo says in “On Flight and Finding,” the angel is the 
“convicter of the soul.”  Thus the trials of faith become sacralized as a struggle between the 
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 individual will and its indeterminate nature (the angel in the Jacob story never reveals his name), 
and through the subsequent socialization of that power through the angelic blessing (though the 
fight is not won and the opponent remains unknown, Jacob has obtained his new name and 
history is begun anew).   
In this context the angels must appear within the experience of trial.  So, in Touched by 
an Angel, they participate in the human drama as human characters, the new teacher or journalist 
or prison guard complete with letters of recommendation, career-specific knowledge, uniforms, 
and a car.  (Tess’s beat-up red convertible – which in one episode she gives to a transportation-
lorn character – is for a few seasons her emblem.)  The final revelation requires this veil of 
humanization.  As Monica instructs her new intern caseworker angel Gloria in the opening of the 
2001 season, “Oh, and never let anyone know you are an angel.  For it says here [she awkwardly 
opens the Bible and reads from it] ‘for so have some entertained angels unawares.’”  At each 
episode’s end, the annunciating angel glows, revealing her status and the words of truth which 
her light enables the protagonist to see, clearly and distinctly.104  In earlier episodes the angel 
even changes her clothes, appearing in luminous white evening dress.  The hero reflects back and 
all of a sudden he perceives his condition angelically, as part of a temporal totality, and thus 
perceives that even in his misery the angels have been there “all along.”  The outbreak of 
revelation almost always occurs in tears – sometimes a single tear – which testifies to the 
transforming acceptance of divine love and truth.  Both climax and conclusion present an 
unabashed display of human emotional suggestibility, reeducating the subject from skepticism - 
reminiscent of Jacob’s challenges to paternal authority - to a childlike wisdom (apparent in 
Monica’s episodal refrain, “God loves you”) and the practice of faith.  In this wrestling, which 
appears as a tense engagement with love from within the subject’s emotional exile, a new 
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 compact of connection and participation is defined and accepted, and – like the tear in Jacob’s 
thigh - his tears are its seal.105
 The liking for tears seems the essential drive behind Touched by an Angel – as basic, 
fundamental, and natural as the death drive or the sex drive.  Within fifteen minutes even a 
suspicious viewer may find that tears begin to pour – superficially, but inevitably, and 
completely separate from whatever judgments she, in her shrewdness, might make.  Skepticism, 
indeed, holds no power against faith.  Whether in those episodes involving children – lost to 
terminal illness, lost to the integrated family structure, or just plain lost – or in those dedicated to 
the drama of the child in adult’s clothing, the feeling of pity (and by extension of self-pity) seizes 
hold.  Perhaps the drive to tears is so mesmerizing because it is appeals to our sense of the 
natural rather than the primitive; that is, it is a drive that exists only as an effect of civilization.  
Or, to put it better, where the fire to sex and death grows and takes shape in competitition with 
civilizing impulses, the charged expression of “nature” serves as the ideal towards which 
civilization itself is driven.  In this way the sentimental passions define the experience of the 
innocent outside culture as the moral ground on which that culture depends.  They return us 
always to ourselves, feeling ourselves at the very center of the struggles to define the social 
world that we inhabit and, in our divine revelations, transcend. 
This idea that questions of the social in essence compute to a theory of individual psychic 
experience and display is far from new.  Conrad, in Heart of Darkness, holds an entire civilizing 
                                                                                                                                                             
104 It is worth recalling that Philo translates Israel, normally taken to mean “prince of God,” as “he who sees.” 
105 After this maudlin exercise the angelic tableau reassembles, always, around the image of a white dove.  It is as 
tasteless a device as it was in Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (but then Touched by an Angel is not interested in taste), 
yet in part because of this it serves the function of collapsing the presentation of infinity back to a particular thing, a 
unifying sign.  If the tear functions as this sign in relation to the human, the dove brings us back to the angelic 
vision.  We look up with the angels, and then the camera moves back and we view the angels together vanishing, 
now fully transparent.  Thus the angels of Jacob’s ladder moving up and down between earthly and holy anticipate 
the convergence of physical act and inner law, as it appears in his wrestling with the angel.  It is this convergence 
that in each episode releases the dove, and unites the human with the heavenly worlds. 
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 project hostage through the portrayal of an individual psyche in dissolution.  Ellison’s approach 
in Invisible Man is not far afield, though his psychic prototype is anonymous rather than 
impenetrable.  In either case nature commands its own language, which both narrators find 
themselves unable to speak, except through the discourse of the ironic.  These are high modernist 
texts, responding to histories of racism and imperialism with psychological self-consciousness, 
and an almost mournful sense of double-bind.  Heart of Darkness and Invisible Man represent 
perhaps the most prominent of those literary traditions where the single consciousness (indeed 
the very experience of isolated singularity) is seen to refract a larger social reality.  It could be 
argued that all of modernist literature takes this project and the double-bind – with its 
accompanying themes of paralysis and internal division – as the essential purpose of literature in 
the modern era.  And it is true that the idea of self as social mirror (in Joyce, the cracked mirror 
of history) is a modern one.  Within modernity, however, another tradition takes aim at this same 
goal, but within a completely different cosmology.  This tradition maintains an external gaze.  
Individual experience is accessible spectatorially, in the objectified act or what Bertolt Brecht 
calls the gestus.  The experience itself falls to the audience; it is the objectified emotion that 
triggers in us almost instinctively a set of feelings, not the process of identification on which the 
literature of interiority relies.  This is a different way of dramatizing the “split psyche” (referred 
to by Terry Lynn Taylor in chapter two) than the primarily psychological modernist portrayal.  
Our attention must turn to the object, innocent in its capacity to be wholly intuited, rather than 
the subject, in whose mind we discriminate the differences within ourselves. 
 Each episode begins with the angels in a tableau, as in the opening of many angel films 
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 watching the scene they are about to enter.106  We watch them watching, their responsive gazes 
witnessing for us the particular form of ignorance and injustice that tonight’s characters must 
confront, and its metaphysical solution.  In beginning always with the invitations of audience, 
Touched by an Angel invokes the sentimental mode; for as Ann Douglas points out, sentiment 
requires audience.  What is ultimately idealized and clutched to the heart is our own capacity for 
identification and pity,107 just as in Kant esteem for the naïve object is translated through the 
reception of the universal human to “self-esteem.”  The white dove that opens and closes each 
show evokes this translation of esteem, of the possibility of humanity’s ascent into the ether of 
love and fellowship.108  In this fluttery white object TBA becomes a show about us - watchers 
like the angels, and like them psychological actors in an otherworldly scene. 
 The framing of each episode works well in relation to personal stories of unremitting self-
interestedness and graceless action: the short-haired hard-boiled astronaut who ditches a little 
girl’s letter to God she wanted posted in space because she can’t deal with her own relation to 
death; the con artist father who drags his daughter from place to place, depriving her of 
friendship and an ice skating career; the religion professor who obsesses about finding the ark of 
the covenant (and in the course of the episode actually does find it) in order to advance his 
career.  But this naïve commentary is inadequate when the show’s subject turns to something 
more than the individual crisis.  In these cases the angel appears naïve not only in relation to the 
                                                 
106 Sometimes during an episode we will also enjoy surprise cuts to the angels perched in overarching places, like 
the top of a doorway, at the end of scenes where a character has exposed his weakness in a moment of judgment 
“alone,” and to the audience. 
107 See the introduction to The Feminization of American Culture. 
108 Objects figure constantly in the show as sentimental triggers, especially to evoke the past and its 
memorialization.  Objects also function in other ways, however.  One interesting use of objective symbolism occurs 
in “The Spirit of Liberty Moon” when a Chinese dissident attempts to get through customs on her way back into her 
native country.  She hands her passport tremulously to the customs agent, and as a diversion Monica – posing as a 
consultant for a toy manufacturing company – drops her briefcase.  It opens, and all sorts of wind-up toys spill out.  
She turns to the person in line ahead of her who has picked up one buzzing item and asks, “Excuse me, could you 
please hand me my chattering teeth?”  An allegory of fear, the teeth get her friend through the line and defuse our 
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 art of delivering the message, but to the language in which it must be delivered.  As Monica 
discovers, her sheltered apprenticeship – complete with training wheels in the form of Tess and 
Andrew -  becomes inadequate in the face of certain lessons.  Where the social order itself must 
decide, or where guardians of that order must wrestle with judgment and right action, her 
developmental orientation falls away.  Learning must come from risk, from entering into the 
danger.  Monica must lose her Apollinian contemplation and calm, and fall into the human world 
of excess and frenzy. 
 The episode “Black Like Monica” opens with the typical shot of the dove, fluttering in a 
tree.  From there we look down, however, through the branches onto Monica looking up at us, 
small and far below.  The camera dissolves – slowly – onto the image of her walking.  Her face 
is serious, almost stricken, and she walks purposefully.  As she moves forward the camera, 
tracking backward, pulls Tess into view.  She is seated on the left, holding a noose and crying.  
“Tess what is it?” Monica asks.  “How many times is he going to ask me to do this?”  Tess cries.  
Monica turns, and we see Andrew kneeling beside a dead black man in a field.  Monica turns 
back to see Tess declaring that she can’t do this one more time, she’s going home.  Monica looks 
bewilderedly at Andrew.  “She left, and I don’t know what my assignment is.”  He grips her 
shoulder, emotional.  “Yeah you do.” 
 This opening is unusual in several ways.  To begin with, our angels are not looking down 
on a human mess or tragedy, demonstrating in the exalted pose of their gaze the judgment that it 
is their tasks is to illumine in a different way through participation in the human world.  Instead, 
we see Monica diminutive and overwhelmed, the dove above and beyond her.  And her isolation 
is emphasized.  Usually the angels appear in tableau together.  Here the tableau is broken up – 
                                                                                                                                                             
tension at the same time that they hold it before us.  The tension will reappear later in more dramatic form as the 
dissident is about to meet her end at the hand of the authorities. 
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 appearing almost as an allegory of broken community and isolation.  The opening is meant to be 
read statically, as a whole piece.  Monica’s initial expression conveys the emotion of the 
situation even before she has heard of the news.  Tess sits, posed, as the shot reveals her – almost 
like a curtain parting to indicate something already there and waiting, rather than giving that 
profound sense of entrance that typifies more dynamic filming.  The pace is slow and restrained, 
a measured shot-by-shot experience that calls attention to the assembly of parts and to the voice 
of their arrangement.  Benjamin insists on the “disjunctive, atomizing principle of the allegorical 
approach” (Origin 208), the fragmenting operation which allows us to see a concept within a 
pictorial “configuration.”  What “Black Like Monica” accomplishes in its opening sequence – 
the experience of isolation as a necessary way of exposing the principles operating within a 
totality – sets up the project that the episode itself will follow.  Presenting a story of dual 
coverups and symbolic falsifications, the episode heads relentlessly towards exposing the rifts 
and fragments that, once exposed themselves, interpret the whole. 
My name is Monica.  I am an angel sent by God as a messenger of 
hope and peace and truth.  I am not magic.  I cannot predict the 
future; I cannot alter the past.  Whenever I am on this earth I 
always come in human form to appear more like you.  But I was 
never less of an angel, except once.  For one day in spring I 
discovered just how human I could be.  I don’t have wings you 
know.  But that day, God forgive me, that day I wished I did. 
Roma Downey’s Northern Irish lilt gives charm to her character’s position in this 
episode, the position of an angel weak before a situation that exceeds her comprehension.  To 
wrestle with it she must become human – not just appear as one.  This means living with the 
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 threat of mortality, in that mortality, committing a crime, and in that crime, wrestling with the 
problem of identity.  “My name is Monica.”  Where in the usual moment of glowing self-
revelation the intern angel appears to her human case not as Monica but as “an angel sent by 
God,” this episode emphasizes her individuality, her status as a named individual.  After all, only 
an individual being can die.  In a story of lynching and public coverup, Monica must also take on 
the threat of mortality in more than her humanity.  Not only does she become a human in this 
episode, she also becomes black. 
 “Black Like Monica” instantly references the nonfiction classic from the heart of the 
Civil Rights era, John Howard Griffin’s Black Like Me.  The entire project of his investigative 
journalism is itself a naïve one, pursuing the question of what it would be like “if a white man 
became a Negro in the Deep South” (7).  Griffin’s is a story of defamiliarization, loneliness and 
transformation, and also a story of danger.  A profound feeling of “dread” mounts throughout his 
travels as he walks in and out of threats to his life, finding himself longing to return to being 
white and to the belief in the warmth and goodness of his race that the experience of being black 
has rendered corrupt and illusory for him.  Hate and death lurk constantly, and the fact of his 
own limits as a white man are now revealed to him as the world reflects back his blackness. 
 Monica’s journey has a different source.  Her mission becomes clear to her when some of 
the leading figures in the small southern Illinois town discover the body in her presence and 
determine what to do with it.  Half white and half black, the “committee” – members of the city 
council – decide against the will of the sheriff (played by John Ritter) and his deputy to keep the 
matter quiet.109  Lavanda, a leading member of the city council, is planning a special dramatic 
                                                 
109 TBA’s orientation to the law is generally extremely positive.  In this instance the interests of local community 
(wanting to keep the matter quiet so as to avoid detrimental headlines at a time when it is petitioning the governor 
for a new bridge) is pitted against the disinterestedness of the federal state, which the sheriff’s office represents.  He 
and his partner claim the right to investigate – “hate crimes are a federal crime” – but is voted down by the 
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 presentation for Civil Rights day two days later - a drama of a local townsman who hid slaves as 
part of the underground railroad - to be performed before Rosa Parks, who is coming in as 
special honorary guest; this is the town’s opportunity to write itself into history.  Fairly certain of 
the men responsible for the killing, they resolve to delay making the matter public.  The victim 
was a stranger in town, ironically helping to build the sets for the performance, and he will not be 
soon missed.  Monica tries to intervene, asking the naïve question, “What was Mr. Moody’s full 
name please?” (a question that later, when answered, provides a clue as to the true identity of the 
slave-hider – as it turns out not a white man, but a free black woman).  Monica’s speech, based 
on what Tess later describes as “politically correct” rhetoric, has no effect, and they decide to 
lock her up into “protective custody.”  She spends a day in jail, silenced, dreams prophetically of 
another lynching, and wakes up in the night to discover her jail cell open, and her skin and hair 
completely altered.  She spends the next day in the town, her clothes the same but her accent 
changed, completely unrecognized, no white person ever even asking her name.  The naïve 
question for the human government now becomes one for the divine, “Why had God changed me 
at all?” 
 As Monica learns, she becomes black/human (and the politics of aligning one with the 
other are in conformity with the politics of the decade, which tend to define the human through 
the experience of identity-based suffering, located above all in the black slave) not to effect a 
change in the town as a black woman, but to effect a change in herself in order to accomplish her 
                                                                                                                                                             
committee.  Charlie, who is both a member of the city council and a volunteer deputy, is asked whether he’s going 
to vote in his capacity as the one or the other, i.e. for or against keeping the truth under wraps.  Federal power, the 
message goes, is capable of the objectivity needed to analyze local battles.  As the sheriff later remarks of the plan to 
put Monica (temporarily) behind bars, “I think it’s pretty interesting to deprive someone of their civil rights to make 
sure that Civil Rights Day goes well.”  Irony here acts as the naïve, in its capacity to point out what would, were it 
not for consensus and its received conventions, appear startlingly obvious.  The sheriff (played by the biggest 
celebrity) also reveals himself to be intuitive; after the Foley boys go after Monica he gets a hunch that they’re going 
to do it again, and keeps them under watch at the local bar.  When Monica finds him later she tells him that another 
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 mission as a white angel.  The “Foley boys,” perpetrators of the lynching, realize their attempt at 
publicity is being silenced in favor of that of the “nigger-loving” consensus, and decide to 
perform another lynching to secure the attention.  They light on Monica, and as she runs away, 
trips, and draws blood (the marker of mortality), she prays to God to make her white.  He does, 
they bypass her, and she breaks down, “Oh my God, I’m so sorry, I’m so sorry.”  She is so sorry 
because, as she later admits to Tess, she would never – if white – have prayed to God to make 
her black.  Surprisingly, mortality exists for her not as a division between angel and human, but 
between white and black – and the choice one between race-betrayal and personal survival.  She 
learns to appreciate with Tess, that “even an angel must be tougher and stronger and prouder if 
she’s to make a difference in black skin,” because black skin (presumably in a white-dominated 
world) makes it more difficult for her to perform her role as an angel: to be heard, to deliver a 
message.110  This is the trouble Monica begins with, not being listened to, not gaining attention.  
And it is curiously the function angels perform vis-à-vis the human: to pay attention, to bestow 
honor, and to name.  This is what the town wants for its history, the lynchers for their beliefs, 
and the angels for their God.  Monica performs this role in relation to Jackson Moody, in calling 
attention to the fact that he had a full name, in reminding the “committee” in her first speech of 
his death and suffering, his humanity.  But calling attention requires power, and without 
appearing as an angel, her power is minimal.  Only after she confronts her own weakness can she 
do as Tess enjoins, and say something “real,” a speech to the sheriff and deputy in which she 
                                                                                                                                                             
lynching is imminent, and he assures her that all is under control.  The state is thus quasi-angelic, except that as we 
later discover – like the angel – it needs to reckon with history and the prejudices it implants. 
110 Monica asks Lavanda if she were black would they have thrown her into jail, and Lavanda replies, “Honey, if 
you were black they wouldn’t have listened to you in the first place.”  Griffin reports a similar conversation between 
himself, three FBI men, and the owner and editor of the black Sepia magazine, which was sponsoring his project.  
“’Do you suppose they’ll treat me as John Howard Griffin, regardless of my color – or will they treat me as some 
nameless Negro, even though I am still the same man?’ I asked.  ‘You’re not serious,’ one of them said.  ‘They’re 
not going to ask you any questions.  As soon as they see you, you’ll be a Negro and that’s all they’ll ever want to 
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 confesses her own fears, which she says form the core of all racism, and asks them to confess 
theirs.111  They do, in a tense conversation, following which they are able to announce to the 
town just as the performance begins the truth about the lynching. 
 Touched by an Angel is all about truth, about confession and announcement.  This is its 
theory of justice, that telling the truth – particularly about the past, whether personal or historical 
– secures that contract between love and law, individual and group, that must be wrestled from a 
moment of crisis.  In his discussion of the coming together of the naïve and the modern,112 
Schiller describes the union of law and love - on whose back justice falls - as essentially angelic.  
“But only if both are joined one with the other – if the will freely obeys the law of necessity, and 
reason asserts its rule through all the flux of the imagination, does the ideal or the divine come to 
the fore” (85).  The angels, who in obeying eternal law also obey their own natures, act as the 
divine agents of this joining.  In their revelations the problem of just action finds its internal 
principle, the righteous human his own certainty and willingness to act.  In part this is the text of 
the angels’ message.  “God loves you” – the utterance to which every episode finally turns, and 
the motivator for the right action and truth-telling toward which every episode impels us - 
                                                                                                                                                             
know about you.’”  This pair of quotes articulate the extent to which naming and listening perform similar functions 
– that of attending to the particular self and recognizing individual rights and claims. 
111 After glowing to them and confessing her own fears she tells them, “You too must look deep into your own 
hearts and seek out that same dark corner.  And as hard as it may be, you must confess it to each other and to God.  
So please don’t worry about saying the right words, so long as you say the true words.”  And later, “For the color of 
Hatred is Fear.”  This is in sharp contrast to her earlier exhortation, which appealed to the listeners’ humanity and 
ability to find compassion for the sufferings of Jackson Moody.  She concludes her plea, “That he died today is not 
an inconvenient coincidence.  It’s a message that no one is listening to.”  How Tess could find this an example of 
“PC” is a little puzzling, except that politically correct discourse tends to invoke the ethics of humanism – to which 
TBA with its emphasis on human rights and liberalist tolerance generally makes appeal – where the second sermon 
does not.  Monica’s speech here differs in that now she asks each person not to identify with the other outside 
himself, but inside.  She is asking for self-exposure rather than reaching out, confession, not identification.  And she 
is asking each person to relate to the situation as a particular person, not a member of the species.  Just as the 
annunciating angel anoints the self as self, as specificity here in this and time and not another, with this name and 
identity and not another, now the messenger holds her subjects accountable for being specific beings who exists in 
this place and time, with this identity and not that, and in causing each of them to struggle with their own particular 
existence, makes them earn the blessing. 
112 Which, however, can never really be separated, as the naïve exists only from the perspective of the modern.  See 
footnote above. 
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 indicates more than just redemption and happy ending.  It also speaks the resolution of necessity 
and will through the union of “God” and “love,” a resolution which the subject mirrors in her 
own confession and tearful self-exhibition.  In this way it is significant that each angel represents 
herself as “an angel sent by God.”  Edmund Burke comments, “To represent an angel in a 
picture, you can only draw a beautiful young man winged; but what painting can furnish out any 
thing so grand as the addition of one word, the ‘angel of the Lord?’” (197) 
For all its emphasis on image, Touch by an Angel remains committed to the word.  Its 
source of power, drawing imagistically from Tess’s imposing presence, Monica’s tempered 
sexuality, Andrew’s nonthreatening ethereality, and the tears of each subject at the close of the 
episode, nevertheless delivers its coup de grace through the verbal utterance.  Angelic address, 
human confession, and above all telling the truth can only be verbal acts.  Truth and falsity can 
neither be thrown into question nor determined by the image.  Hence the dissident picking up the 
megaphone to speak the truth about her jailed husband, the astronaut delivering a terminally ill 
little girl’s letter to God, the science teacher father consenting to read his daughter’s paper on 
intelligent design theory, the black singer courageously singing a song directly concerned with 
lynching, all of these moments speak to the power of words as purveyors of the truth, within 
which crises of difference and mortality find their arbiter.  This commitment to truth as it is 
revealed through the word marks the show’s particular engagement with the naïve as the basis of 
justice.  This is evident even at the beginning of “Black Like Monica,” which opens with a brief 
debate about words.  As a child reads aloud from a summary history of the underground railroad, 
the white mayor and black director of the drama discuss the use of the term “Negro spirituals;” 
the director informs him that she’s “comfortable” with using the term over his proposed 
“African-American spirituals.”  He smiles and replies, “Well, I learned something today.  
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 Historically accurate beats politically correct.” 
In adopting this stance Touched by an Angel positions positive knowledge against 
convention, privileging language in its historical rather than symbolic role.  Such literalism is 
certainly naïve, and in moving from questioning bewilderment to confessional self-evidence, 
from critique of the committee to admitting her own fears and weaknesses, the intern angel shifts 
the attitude of her ignorance from the other to herself.  The ignorance presented is more total, 
hence more capable of gaining the attention she requires as “caseworker,” and which this drama 
of identity, surfaces, and disguise renders unusually difficult.  More than this, however, the 
attention of the individual angel must compete with the attention of public history, and it is on 
these terms that she must prove herself worthy, the human in her struggling with the angel, in 
order more effectively to deliver her message.  In the initial speech - where she is silenced and 
ignored - Monica hasn’t “glowed” of course, revealing her power as the power of God.  But it is 
also clear that in order to reveal herself as angel and most of all to speak as angel she needs to 
reckon with the powers of history which test her.  She does this prior to her self-revelation to the 
sheriff and deputy, in an encounter with Rosa Parks. 
 Celebrity culture figures prominently in Touched by an Angel.  Guest appearances are 
common, most especially (drawing on the lure of Della Reese) by famous musicians.  Charlotte 
Church, ‘N Sync, Celine Dion, Al Jarraud, and B.B. King appear in their own superstar 
identities; Wynonna takes on an actual character (and of course sings).  The fan culture is equally 
star-struck.  Fans are so swept away by the angels in their preacherly roles that they refuse to 
recognize its main actors – whose own backgrounds form a trinity of personal, social, and 
religious responses to the experience of death113 – as actors.114  Tales are legion of viewers who, 
                                                 
113 Della Reese has her own ministry in Los Angeles, John Dye was once an aspiring ACLU lawyer, and Roma 
Downey was orphaned very young as a lass in Donegal, Northern Ireland.  Of the three modes, the personal is the 
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 sharing the experiences of cancer, suicide, addiction, and death that the show most commonly 
addresses, write letters thanking the producers and actors for inspiring them to apply the lessons 
involving these traumas to their own reality.  Not only does life imitate art; it seems to need it.  
As a melodrama designed to cross the boundaries between fiction and nonfiction in this way, 
TBA swims in iconicity.  This makes sense – angels themselves already put out an iconic 
radiance.  Like many icons they soak up contradiction through the promise of transcendence and 
through the almost convulsive power of the sacred object.  Angels are not stars, however, but the 
powers that move the stars.  Their celebrity function is causal, not just affective.  Because of this 
they are never quite contemporary; like Clarence, in his outdated clothes, or Dudley with his 
outdated dance moves, or as we shall see, the Soviet bureaucrat angel in Tony Kushner’s Angels 
in America, angels tend to appear slightly anachronistic.  Successful representations of them 
emphasize their historicity, their power as motive forces – whether through the metaphorics of 
the automobile or through direct intervention in history itself.  An example comes from the one 
other time that Monica becomes black.  It happens in the episode “Without Tears: Living 
Sanctuary in America,” which intercuts between the story of a young black teenage girl refusing 
to kick drugs115 and confront the history of lynching in America by going to the exhibit of 
                                                                                                                                                             
most prominent, emblematized in the power of the biographic deathbed scene.  Downey’s father’s parting words to 
her were to remember that if she could endure the pain of seeing him die, she could do anything; Dye agreed to do 
the show after seeing through the death of a friend with AIDS; and producer Martha Williamson has used her own 
experience of her father’s death from pneumonia in 1991 to ground an episode in which a man’s children sing songs 
of God and hope to him as he dies, just as she and her sister had done (for further details of all these examples see 
Lipton et al). 
114 Downey apparently was rebuked by fans for appearing in extracurricular movies in which she kissed a man, and 
Dye has complained about not being able to appear in movies where he could be cast as other than soft and 
compassionate.  Describing the added annoyance of fans chastising him every time he takes a drink at a bar in Salt 
Lake City, where he lives during the show’s on-location shooting, he told People magazine, “If you expect me to be 
an angel, you really need to go to a shrink” (ibid. 92). 
115 As a strange coincidence we watch this episode about the high school drug scene as it is intercut with ads for the 
anti-depressant Zoloft and the pain reliever Imitrex.  The irony of this is deeply gratifying. 
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 lynching postcards with her grandmother, “Without Sanctuary,”116 and the story of Billie 
Holliday daring to sing “Strange Fruit.”  Monica, in a black cameo performance appearing as she 
does in “Black Like Monica,” it turns out is the nameless individual in the back of the audience 
who starts clapping at the end of the song, encouraging the rest of the crowd to clap and “Lady 
Day” herself to make it her “anthem.”  She tells the story of Lady Day to young Chanelle, who 
resists listening to “a story this wacked,” but ultimately yields her hard-bitten skepticism, fear 
and hatred to Monica’s illumination.117  The angel of history prepares the promise of tomorrow. 
 The sequence between Monica and Rosa Parks does not follow this pattern.  It is Rosa 
who changes things for Monica, and not the other way around.  After “Miss Wings” (Tess’s 
affectionate name for her) has had her breakdown before God, she runs through the streets 
looking for “Mrs. Parks” until she finds the sheriff and deputy standing before the Greyhound.  
She tries to explain, but can’t, and Rosa – spectatorial with enormous glasses and a subdued, 
watchful manner - appears at the door and beckons her onto the bus.  Monica glows to her, and 
recounts the exact same speech with which she began the episode: “My name is Monica.  I am an 
angel sent by God as a messenger of hope and peace and truth.  I am not magic . . .”  In her 
uncertain voice we hear how much her glowing is not revelation, but self-revelation.  Then the 
filming changes to a montage of silent shots during which she recounts her experience and her 
shame before the historic figure.  She concludes, kneeling before her, Rosa’s hand on her head, 
“I’ve betrayed both heaven and earth.  If I was white I never would have begged God to become 
black.”  “God is good, Monica,” Rosa tells her.  “He forgives and heals.  He heals angels too.” 
 The image of a white angel receiving benediction from a black woman is something of a 
                                                 
116 Her grandmother, we find out in the final scene, is the little girl in the white sailor dress featured in one of the 
postcards.  History is living, we learn, and still has a voice to guide us. 
117 Her response to this is refreshingly teenage.  “God sent me a white angel?!”  “God sent you a messenger in 
human form . . .” 
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 televisual event.  Rosa Parks, immortal in a way that Monica cannot be, absolves her of her 
humanity – of her mortality.  Rosa after all is immortal for her actions, for her historical 
existence as a specific individual (with a full name, please).  Monica is an angel, no full name, as 
the show points out.  Her immortality is given, not made - part of her very being as a creature 
who interrupts or redirects history, but does not live in it.  Except for one day, one spring.  For 
this reason the episode echoes the idea familiar from other angelic texts that heaven is inferior to 
earth.  To live in mortality, in time, in chance, and in death, is to possess a power that the angel 
cannot have, because it is a power born of experience - which is to say, of suffering, of the 
conflict between desire and law that is foreign to angels.  We see this theme resoundingly in 
Wings of Desire and its remake City of Angels, in the angel’s longing for mortal life and his later 
gratification – even when it means experiencing the pain of death, as it does for Nicholas Cage in 
the American film.  This longing is apparent also in the character of Dudley, in The Bishop’s 
Wife and The Preacher’s Wife, where the angel witnesses to the force and pleasure of those who 
learn through sensual, rather than intellectual, experience.  Likewise the wilful martyrdom of 
Rosa Parks testifies to the value of life even in its price.  It affirms with Nietzsche, in his 
description of the Apollinian will as mirroring the worth of human existence in its longing for it, 
that in the wilful struggle with mortal existence, “lamentation itself becomes a song of praise.” 
What we witness on the screen at this moment is an idea that challenges TBA’s self-
proclaimed pietism.  For in it we see the divine – fully illuminated as such – bowing before the 
historical.  Both are color-coded.  The mother of the Civil Rights movement wields the power to 
invoke the blessing for a daughter of God.  Justice, we behold, is stronger than grace.  Not only 
must the blessing be earned, but the power to give it as well.  In the encounter between the 
human angel and the angelic human, mortal and immortal judgment wrestle with each other, put 
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 each other on trial.  Monica’s human racism subjects itself to human truth, positioning herself as 
the fool – as all confession is the admission of foolishness, the self-realization of ignorance.  In 
seeing herself part of the mortality she is sent to earth to deliver, the angel judges herself through 
naïve systems of thinking.  That is, she judges herself through the other, outside the identity that 
defines her.  Because of this she can only receive mercy from the other, in its immortalized form.  
The moment leads her – and Touched by an Angel – from a poetics of the naïve to something 
else.  A different aspect of melodrama seeps in at the moment where divinity and history 
confront each other.  This is something that in a different context might be called “the fabulous.” 
The fabulous is not only a different aesthetic style, though still in the mode and yearnings 
of melodrama, but more importantly a different philosophy.  Unlike the naïve, the fabulous takes 
the perceptual nature of all knowledge for granted, arguing for truth without a truthful subject.  
Where the naïve seeks truth through the unknowability of the other as object, the fabulous 
recognizes that object only through its status as image.  Rosa Parks’ glasses call attention to this, 
as does her fame and our sense that this is not really Rosa Parks, though we believe it for the 
moment.  In this final moment the angel finds herself humbled before the image it is her job to 
empower.  She must find this power at the hands of something created, both mortal and 
immortal, real and imaginary. 
 
Part II: Dionysus 
Theater is as much a part of trash culture as it is high art.  It 
always is that.  And it’s incredibly important for people who are 
working in theater to always remember that it’s show biz and it’s 
sort of sleazy, and a lot of the traditions that you’ve inherited and a 
lot of the ways that you have at your disposal for telling a story are 
ways that were developed by, incredibly, sort of lowbrow, popular 
entertainment.  The theater always has to function as popular 
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 entertainment. . . it has to have the jokes and it has to have the 
feathers and the mirrors and the smoke.”  - Tony Kushner118
 
 The most important thing to know about Angels in America is that the angel is a fraud.  
Fabulously a fraud, in a way that the fabulous must be.  At the beginning of the play’s second 
part, Perestroika (the part where the angel is actually seen), Kushner informs would-be 
producers that “The moments of magic – all of them – are to be fully realized, as bits of 
wonderful theatrical illusion – which means it’s OK if the wires show, and maybe it’s good that 
they do, but the magic should at the same time be thoroughly amazing” (7).  The Angel of 
America marks the height of this magic, of the feathers and smoke.  She must be breathtakingly 
unreal, the enchantment of pure show.  In marveling at the angel we marvel also at the human 
(they do it with wires, but how do they do that?), yet her constructedness does not render her any 
the less marvelous.  Within Kushner’s self-proclaimed “Theater of the Fabulous” the angel is 
awesome and divine as pure spectacle, the ultimate of self-revelation and of our capacity for 
astonishment. 
She is also a mixed-up reactionary whom the play ends up exposing as narrow and 
absurd.  She appears at the end of the first part, Millenium Approaches, as an explosion of camp, 
a coup de grace of all the real hallucinations that structure the play’s movement.  During the 
course of Part II, however, we find her uttering grandiose banalities, neo-conservative, rigid, and 
hysterical.  By the time we get a glimpse of heaven we find the entire angelic community has 
become a farce: a crew of literally God-forsaken angels crowding pathetically around an archaic 
                                                 
118 In interview with Michael Cunningham (62).  He says something similar in a roundtable interview at 
Northwestern.  “The best thing about the theater is that when the angel comes through at the end of Millenium you 
see the wires, and that’s the magic of the theater . . .   For five seconds you are actually watching this thing swing 
down and saying, ‘It’s an angel!  I’m seeing an angel!’  Then you’re saying, ‘It’s a woman in a silly wig and fly 
wires,’ and that doubleness is the kind of consciousness that citizens of capitalism need to survive, and are 
constantly being winnowed away from.  Making stage magic is an important thing, and I think a lot of people of my 
generation have sort of reembraced that, and are doing that.  As part of that movement, I’m happy about that” 
(Kinzer et al 214-5). 
176 
 radio that doesn’t work anymore, waiting for Him to return.  Their intelligence is boundless – the 
angels can describe the various cathodes and anodes that make the radio work – but they are 
incapable of fixing it.  “I I I agree.  In diodes we see manifest the self-same divided human 
consciousness which has engendered the multifarious catastrophes to which We are impotent 
witness . . .” (128).  The undivided consciousness, pure mind, simple spiritual substance, is 
without God utterly deprived of agency.  Consigned to a spectatorial nostalgia, the angels – 
“Continental Principalities” - wallow in their resistance to progress.  The Angel of America is a 
qualified exception; she wrestles with her gay prophet in a sexually charged battle, before he 
ultimately gives back the Book (the “Tome of Immobility”) and rejects her.  The lame status of 
the angel’s message does not undercut her magnificence, however.  If anything, it is part of it.  
Her revelations exposed as foolish nonsense, they yield the blessing nevertheless.  For unlike its 
earnest appearance in Touched by an Angel, Kushner’s fabulous does not necessarily tell the 
truth, but it provides the struggle which does. 
“Listen to the world, to how fast it goes. . .  That’s New York traffic, baby, the sound of 
energy, the sound of time.  Even if you’re hurting, it can’t go back.  There’s no angel.  You hear 
me?”  (Perestroika 48)  Belize, a registered nurse and former lover of the presumably deranged 
AIDS victim Prior Walter, is telling him why he has not in fact been visited by an angel who is 
mysteriously dispensing reactionary propoganda.  In Prior’s visions the angel shrilly lobbies 
against progress, for stasis, against migration, for inertia.  She stands for the fixity of ideas and 
abstractions over the movement of time, for unchanging laws over existential particularities.119  
                                                 
119 Kushner renders the angel as a diva of a reactionary fundamentalism, almost grotesquely refiguring Walter 
Benjamin’s Angelus Novus.  Taken from a drawing by Paul Klee, the New Angel in Benjamin’s hands is presented 
as a helpless spectator of the wasteland of human history.  In the Gershom Scholem poem that acts as an epigram to 
Benjamin’s ninth thesis on the philosophy of history, the angel says, “If I could stay timeless time I would have little 
luck.”  The poignant and futile yearning to accommodate human action to its ideal (and with the image of the angel 
being blown backward into the future its counterpart suggestion that ideals move forward faster than realities) 
becomes in the angel and her dated cohorts an image of obsolescence.  Progress, Belize and New York City tell 
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 In doing so the angel – traditionally an emblem of memory and immortality - articulates the 
dying man’s desire to hold back the progress of his disease.  Belize reminds him that death and 
life are inseparable, that immortality is just an illusion, like the angel.  Belize is wrong, however.  
There is an angel; the audience knows it – it’s why the audience is there.  But it is important that 
the play gives us this dual perspective: at the same time that Angels visually exults in the 
presence of the angel, verbally it tells us angels don’t exist.  Realism and fantasy run neck and 
neck – not in an uncanny relation, as they do in A Matter of Life and Death where it is up to us to 
decide what is hallucination and what magic - but playfully.  This is central to the play’s 
fascination with history and to its attempt to grapple with a contemporary moment that it 
understands as historical, but which is not yet available to understanding.  Viral injustice – 
striking without cause or reason, is paired with highly rationalized threats within the social order.  
The virus quickly unfolds a story of the incommensurability of life and law, in which caprice, 
figured by the fantastic, meets state power, rendered by realism.  Within this tension Kushner 
offers us an ultimately humanist vision in which the characters of the play emerge as the real 
angels, articulating through an ethics of the personal a power that the laws of heaven and earth 
fail to grasp or control. 
 When he first applied for grant money to write Angels, Kushner described it as a play 
about “AIDS, gay men, Reagan, Roy Cohn, and Mormons” (Cohen 219).  And to some extent, 
this is still true.  The 2003 HBO broadcast of the play was anticipated in terms that emphasized 
subject matter over aesthetics: The New York Times represented it as potentially scandal-creating 
                                                                                                                                                             
Prior, is not reducible to intention; it exacts its judgment temporally rather than rationally, in human not angelic 
experience.  If Angels in America finally commits itself to a relationship with progress, it does so through an 
embrace of its thunderous opposite, an embrace that is both attraction and struggle.  In fact, the play suggests that 
this wrestling is decreed by the very nature of progress, the movement toward the ideal.  For all its difficulties and 
betrayals, the idea of progress confronts the essential problems of race and time that baffle the angelic order, and the 
paradoxes of constancy and change that for Kushner comprise the motion of love. 
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 for its criticism of the Reagan administration, and USA Today devoted its preview article almost 
exclusively to the play’s resonance for addressing the AIDS crisis (much of the article, in fact, 
does not discuss the play but the current status of the AIDS epidemic, domestically and 
worldwide).120  The assemblage presents indigenous historical events that seemingly resist inter-
relation, and yet Angels relates them.121  Set in New York, the play integrates the stories of a 
Reaganite Mormon homosexual law clerk in denial, a man who betrays personal and political 
allegiances by leaving his lover with AIDS, and a power-mongering gay lawyer who sent the 
Rosenbergs to the chair, now himself facing death by euphemistic “liver cancer.”  The problem 
of neo-fascism contemporary with the late 1980’s surfaces within its playful juxtaposing of 
fantastic camp and wry realism.  It may be in this sense that theater critic John Lahr credits 
Kushner with having created an “original, impressionistic theatrical vocabulary to show us the 
heart of a new age” (133).  Or he may be responding to something else, a certain vocabulary of 
character development and interaction (the playwright’s notes to Perestroika remark that this 
“must be” an “actor-driven event”) that indeed strikes at the heart of the “New Age.”  For, as 
Kushner has more than once commented, this is above all a “fantasia” on relationships.  Even the 
political drama appears as a problem of interpersonal connection and communication.  These 
become the play’s primary objects of thought, with connectedness hypothesized as the site of 
                                                 
120 See Rich and Gardner respectively.  Rich comments specifically that “If ‘Angels’ reaches an audience typical for 
HBO hits, it could detonate a debate bloody enough to make the fight over ‘The Reagans’ [also an HBO production] 
look like an exhibition bout.” 
121 The first blatant example of this is also the first fantastic incursion in the play.  Prior, who is dying of AIDS, and 
Harper, the Valium-addicted wife of a closeted chief clerk, meet when his dream encounters her hallucination.  It is 
unclear to either (and the audience) whether he is in her hallucination, or she in his dream.  In other words, it is 
unclear which fantasy is more capable of encompassing the other’s reality – or not. 
 HARPER:  . . . I’m a Mormon. 
 PRIOR: I’m a homosexual. 
 HARPER: Oh!  In my church we don’t believe in homosexuals. 
 PRIOR:  In my church we don’t believe in  Mormons.  (Millenium 37) 
At this point only fantasy born of extreme suffering (and its solidarity) can bring members of these communities to 
mutual recognition.  Later in the play, this will be effected by a Brechtian realism which fantasy both catalyzes and 
serves. 
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 encounter and struggle,122 and communication as the agonistic display of inner life.  In another 
discourse, to say that Angels in America is about relationships is to say that it is about 
communion.  Not a mystic communion, breathless, still, and tautological, but a confused 
communion, an urban communion.  Jokes and sex are our best hope within a society based on 
pluralism and progress, which is to say, conflict and instability.  Like jokes and sex - and perhaps 
indicated by them - the question of the relationship between fraudulence and love looms 
centrally within the play’s exposition of the problems and possibilities of difference. 
 As in Touched by an Angel, explorations of social and communal justice through 
questions of difference and perception converge on the issue of ethnicity.  The play opens with 
this.  The first part, Millenium Approaches, begins with a recognition of the extent to which a 
type of fraudulence is inseparable from American history, of necessity the history of migration, 
assimilation, miscegenation.  Louis Ironson, a word processor for the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals and the play’s prodigal son, is at the funeral of his grandmother in the Bronx.  He is 
there with his partner, Prior, whom he is about to leave when the AIDS gets too much, betraying 
four years of love and trust.  He is also there incognito, pretending to be straight – and ironically 
so, as he is so busy playing butch to his cousin Doris he fails to notice, as Prior does, that “cousin 
Doris is a dyke.”  This net of irony appears only after the opening scene, however.  At the 
beginning, we are sitting with Louis and Prior, watching the rabbi unveil the hard truth: 
Hello and good morning.  I am Rabbi Isidor Chemelwitz of the 
Bronx Home for Aged Hebrews.  We are here this morning to pay 
respects at the passing of Sarah Ironson, devoted wife of Benjamin 
Ironson, also deceased, loving and caring mother of her sons 
                                                 
122 This is a consistent fascination for Kushner.  His latest play, Homebody/Kabul, explores the relations between 
local and global through the theme of “interconnectedness.”  This is an expansion of the theory, only implicit in 
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 Morris, Abraham, and Samuel, and her daughters Esther and 
Rachel; beloved grandmother of Max, Mark, Louis, Lisa, Maria . . 
. uh . . . Lesley, Angela, Doris, Luke and Eric.  (Looks more closely 
at paper) Eric?  This is a Jewish name? (Shrugs) Eric.  A large and 
loving family.  We assemble that we may mourn collectively this 
good and righteous woman.  (9-10) 
It is significant, of course, that it is Sarah, the first Jewish matriarch, whose legacy has been 
assimilated by other tongues and traditions.  The rabbi situates this nominal breach of 
authenticity within a story of the crossing of the Ashkenazi to America, and insists that despite 
the “Goyisch names” of Sarah’s descendents “in you that journey is.”  History competes with 
contemporaneity in ways that anticipate Prior’s own desire to hold back the clock, as it is taken 
to task by Belize.  “Descendants of this immigrant woman, you do not grow up in America. . .  
You do not live in America.  No such place exists.  Your clay is the clay of some Litvak shtetl, 
your air the air of the steppes. . .” (10).  Not only are there no angels in America, there is no 
America for them to inhabit.  The Rabbi is saying something more powerful here, however.  Let 
us first consider the ambivalence of this beginning.  In this sense it is more of an induction in the 
Shakespearean style than a beginning (we almost expect Sarah Ironson to wake from her deep 
sleep halfway through the play and request an ale). 123  Through this convention the audience is 
informed that the play it is about to see is a mirage, a fabula where the drama itself invents the 
place, where reality belongs to the imagination.  And this is precisely the Rabbi’s point.  History 
depends on the imagination, on the representations of fantasy, just as nation does.  Kushner’s 
stage directions about the angel accentuate this privileging of the image.  In a similar vein, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Angels in America, that globalism itself follows and extends the logic of the interpersonal. 
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 original British production chose to display an American flag in the otherwise “pared-down” 
background.  The Rabbi is not so much telling us that there is no America, as that because it 
retrieves its history from other sources, it has none of its own.  As a consequence, the play’s 
opening threatens, the relation between identity and society is always undetermined, unless 
grounded by the laws of the past. 
Louis will say something very similar later in Millenium, in conversation with Belize – 
who, as an African-American, represents a different kind of immigratory judgment.  (His 
response to the angel’s diatribe against migration is to point out, “Some of us didn’t exactly 
choose to migrate, know what I’m saying,” (Perestroika 47).  We enter the scene with Louis 
monologuing about democracy in America.  His very scattered speculations on the topic of race 
– drawing from anecdotal hidden staircases and trapdoor generalities – are worth quoting in part 
to get a sense of the play’s ironic but tender presentation of Louis the Betrayer.  Kushner has 
himself commented that he saw himself in Louis more than any other character, evident in the 
gentleness with which he treats his character’s struggle with having committed the crime of 
abandoning a dying lover.  Louis’s failure to follow “the hard law of love,” as Belize later puts it, 
is directly tied to his latent race prejudice.  For instance, in this speech note how it is not even so 
much Louis’s ideas that get him into trouble, but his commitment to generalization – in all its 
forms - that gets in his way.  Just a few scenes earlier, in his final showdown with Prior before 
leaving him, he tried to justify himself: “You can love someone and fail them.  You can love 
someone and not be able to . . .”  To which Prior responds, “You can, theoretically, yes.  A 
person can, maybe an editorial ‘you’ can love, Louis, but not you, specifically you, I don’t know, 
I think you are excluded from that general category” (78-9).  As in A Matter of Life and Death 
                                                                                                                                                             
123 Appropriately, The Taming of the Shrew (whose Induction I am recalling here) is also a play concerned with 
deception and its various “crossings.” 
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 and Touched by an Angel the question of justice on earth as in heaven again leads us directly to 
the preoccupations of angelic existentialism.  The problem of actuality, action, decision-making 
is comprehensible only in terms of the specific “you.”  History and democracy, themselves 
stories of the individual act, follow suit.  
I begin partway through Louis’s marathon monologue, where he is responding to a point 
of Belize’s about the monolithic power of “White Straight Male America” being “not 
unimpressive.”   
LOUIS:  Well, no, but when the race thing gets taken care of, and I don’t 
mean to minimalize how major it is, I mean I know it is, this is a 
really, really incredibly racist country but it’s like, well, the 
British.  I mean, all these blue-eyed pink people.  And it’s just 
weird, you know, I mean I’m not all that Jewish-looking, or . . . 
well, maybe I am but, you know, in New York, everyone is . . . 
well, not everyone, but so many are but so but in England, in 
London I walk into bars and I feel like Sid the Yid, you know I 
mean like Woody Allen in Annie Hall, with the payess and the 
gabardine coat, like never, never anywhere so much – I mean, not 
actively despised, not like they’re Germans, who I think are still 
terribly anti-Semitic, and racist too, I mean black-racist, they 
pretend otherwise but, anyway, in London, there’s just . . . and at 
one point I met this black gay guy from Jamaica who talked with a 
lilt but he said his family’d been living in London since before the 
Civil War – the American one – and how the English never let him 
forget for a minute that he wasn’t blue-eyed and pink and I said 
yeah, me too, these people are anti-Semites and he said yeah but 
the British Jews have the clothing business all sewed up and blacks 
there can’t get a foothold.  And it was an incredibly awkward 
moment of just. . . . I mean here we were, in this bar that was gay 
but it was a pub, you know, the beams and the plaster and those 
horrible little, like, two-day old fish and egg sandwiches – and just 
so British, so old, and I felt, well, there’s no way out of this 
because both of us are, right now, too much immersed in this 
history, hope is dissolved in the sheer age of this place, where race 
is what counts and there’s no real hope of change – it’s the racial 
destiny of the Brits that matters to them, not their political destiny, 
whereas in America . . . 
BELIZE: Here in America race doesn’t count. 
LOUIS: No, no, that’s not. . . . I mean you can’t be hearing that. . . 
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 BELIZE: I . . . 
LOUIS: It’s – look, race, yes, but ultimately race here is a political 
question, right? Racists just try to use race here as a tool in a 
political struggle.  It’s not really about race.  Like the spiritualists 
try to use that stuff, are you enlightened, are you centered, 
channeled, whatever, this reaching out for a spiritual past in a 
country where no indigenous spirits exist – only the Indians, I 
mean Native American spirits and we killed them off so now, there 
are no gods here, no ghosts and spirits in America, there are no 
angels in America, no spiritual past, no racial past, there’s only the 
political, and the decoys and the ploys to maneuver around the 
inescapable battle of politics, the shifting downwards and outwards 
of political power to the people. . . 
BELIZE: POWER to the People!  AMEN!  (Looking at this watch) OH 
MY GOODNESS!  Will you look at the time, I gotta . . . 
LOUIS: Do you. . . . You think this is, what, racist or naïve or something? 
BELIZE: Well it’s certainly something. . .   (90-2) 
Like the Rabbi Louis denies America a historical past, except insofar as it appears 
politically.  From the perspective of his cynicism, in America spirit and race are only 
instrumental fictions, not ends in themselves, having their own internal laws and powers.  
History is not living (as we see for instance in the ghost of Ethel Rosenberg who visits Roy 
Cohn), but represented, part of a mechanical ploy.  For Louis, history in America is absence and 
fabrication, a substanceless creation on behalf of the few and not the whole.  And so, in the midst 
of his racist naivete, he utters the phrase that gives the play its title. 
It is interesting that the title’s seemingly enchanting affirmation – “Angels in America” - 
appears only in negative form.  At first it seems simply like an invitation to scoff at Louis’s self-
indulgent blindness.  These are, after all, the most neurotic set of speeches in the play.  Here 
Louis offers a mental hysteria that rivals that of only Woody Allen himself.  He tells stories but 
stops short of spelling out their meanings.  It is as if he’s afraid to articulate them, or can’t, 
relying on details like fish and egg sandwiches to speak for themselves when in fact they betray 
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 the limits of his theorizing.  His language is a mess, halting and tripping over itself on its way to 
yet another dash or ellipse.  Louis’s whole diatribe is motivated by the urge to erect and take 
refuge in universal claims and sweeping pronouncements, to generate a theory of America.124  
Behind this is a need to come to terms with his (ex-) lover’s AIDS, a disease whose history and 
power escape the influence of reason and its universals.  Theory for Louis is the nervous return 
of an outdated machinery that he insists on using the more he experiences it as threatened.125  Yet 
he uses it in the name of progress, of a progressive “shifting downwards and outwards of 
political power,” which is to say, of an idealized conception of historical movement and change.  
This flow of ideas submerges the presence of race and of spirit, at the same time implying that 
America’s racial and spiritual pasts are homologous or intertwined.  Within Louis’ neo-liberal 
rhetoric, both are smoke and mirrors screens for political opportunism, against which an 
authentic political sensibility positions itself.  “When the race thing gets taken care of,” 
suggestively, the nation’s political destiny will manifest itself.  And it can do this because - 
unlike England with its preserved beams and haunting past - “there are no angels in America.”  
For Louis, even America’s civil war casts a shadow over race relations on European rather than 
American soil.   
This is the conclusion we might arrive at after the first night, having seen only Millenium.  
                                                 
124 Louis’s idealist approach is more directly indicated in the more direct Perestroika.  In Act Four, Scene One Prior 
rebuffs his attempts to “make up.”  “You cry, but you endanger nothing in yourself.  It’s like the idea of crying when 
you do it.  Or the idea of love.”  Later he will refer to Louis as not being able to “handle bodies.”  Love in Kushner 
is physical, particular, and dangerous – like AIDS.  Hence Louis’s inability to deal with his partner’s disease appears 
as a discomfort with love’s necessities, with love as necessity.  A patriot in the tradition of the founding fathers, 
Louis prefers love as freedom and as concept.  Ironically, however, his understanding of the political as theoretical 
misses the boat.  Roy Cohn describes politics earlier in very different terms: “This is gastric juices churning, this is 
enzymes and acids, this is intestinal is what this is, bowel movement and blood-red meat - this stinks, this is politics, 
Joe, the game of being alive” (Millenium 68).  A Kushnerian materialism suggests, even in theory, you can run but 
you cannot hide. 
125 In this he presages the attempts by the angels in Perestroika to monitor activities on earth through a decrepit 
1940’s radio whose vacuum tubes keep bursting.   Ironically, the event they are trying to comprehend is the 
Chernobyl disaster.  As in Planet of the Apes, civilization seems to be possible within a binary of either a backwards 
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 Only in a Louis-like state of confused ignorance about the relation of the present moment to the 
past could we say that America has no spirit beyond material interests and the self-serving 
jockeying for power.  But, as we find later in Perestroika, Belize agrees: there is no angel.  There 
is no past,126 just “the sound of time.”  What do we do with this concatenation, in which the 
play’s fool and its hierophant come to the same conclusion, and one which is at cross-purposes 
with the play’s theatrical mission?  How do we understand both of these voices, the voice of 
ignorance and the voice of experience, negating the presence of angels? 
 To answer this question requires analyzing the role that Belize plays in Angels, and the 
play’s treatment of race through this characterization.  The character of Belize is, with Harper – 
Joe’s valium-addicted wife, the most interesting in the play, and, with Prior’s angel, the most 
fabulous.  In this vein he is also among the most feminized, in a cast dominated by men.  His 
style of speaking is the most flamboyant and the least macho, and even his name suggests 
woman and fabulation in a single breath.  “Belize,” we are told in the cast of characters, is a 
“drag name that stuck.”  In Belize as well as the angel we see the feminine as the essential affect 
of fantasy – its demonstration and its condition of possibility.127  Like Monica, with her long hair 
and tailored outfits, the play’s feminized characters are sexualized without really being sexual.  
But in Belize we also see fantasy and fabulousness through the contours of race.  Significantly, 
the character who plays Belize also plays the character of Mr. Lies, Harper’s jazz-affected 
                                                                                                                                                             
fascism or a progressive but destructive anarchy.  In rejecting the angels, Prior – and Kushner’s play - clearly choose 
a trajectory of hope within the latter. 
126 Right before the coming of the angel Prior has been visited by the ghosts of three prior Prior Walters, three of a 
long line of similarly-named ancestors across the ages (our Prior is the 34th).  In rejecting Prior’s angel Belize also 
implicitly rejects her harbingers, Prior’s priors, and the idea of individual ancestry itself.  In particular, as “prophet” 
Prior is given to understand himself as somehow fulfilling an anticipatory family destiny in grappling with the 
various plagues in Euro-American history; Belize, who would not know his ancestry prior to the crossing, rejects 
this as well. 
127 By and large this is true of all the female characters in the play, including in addition a mad prophet homeless 
woman, the spirit of Ethel Rosenberg, and the androgynous angel.  The one exception is Hannah Pitt, Joe’s mother, 
who is clinically sensible, hard, and pragmatic.  “An angel is just a belief, with wings and arms that can carry you.  
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 imaginary travel agent friend who spirits her to the location of her choice during her valium trips.  
The one black body on stage visibly calls attention to itself as occupying the realm of perception.  
When he is attending Roy Cohn, dying of AIDS in the hospital, Roy – who flaunts his racism as 
if it too were drag – mistakes him one night for Satan.  He calls him the “bogeyman,” a 
“schvartze toytenmann,” and his “negation.”  The monstrous and ghostly echoes are deliberate.  
When Roy finally waves him off, the play references Dickens’ A Christmas Carol: “Yeah.  I 
know you.  Nothing.  A stomach grumble that wakes you in the night” (Perestroika 77).  Like 
Marley, whom Scrooge initially dismisses as psychosomatic illusion – the hallucinatory 
symptom of a “piece of undigested beef,” Belize is a spirit come to haunt.  Unlike with Ethel 
Rosenberg, however, Roy cannot get the better of him (in the final scene between Roy and her 
ghost he tricks her into playing mutter and singing to him).  Like Marley, Belize appears as a 
fantastic reality challenging self-interested narratives of personal power through the shapes of 
their own shadows.   Within a seemingly private fantasy world, he suggests something larger. 
Roy’s fearful projections are telling, given that it is Belize who – overcoming his 
contempt for Roy and his red-baiting past – tells him the truth about AZT and the afterlife 
(heaven is a creole urban gender-flaming San Francisco).  And in his eulogy for Roy he is given 
perhaps the most crucial line in the play, and one which illuminates the kind of wrestling most at 
stake in Kushner’s humanistic politics and one which ties it to Touched by an Angel’s 
sentimental moralism: “He was a terrible person.  He died a hard death.  So maybe . . . a queen 
can forgive her vanquished foe.  It isn’t easy, it doesn’t count if it’s easy, it’s the hardest thing.  
Forgiveness.  Which is maybe where love and justice finally meet” (Perestroika 122).128  Of all 
                                                                                                                                                             
It’s naught to be afraid of” (Perestroika 103).  Her realism, however, is also accentuated by her brusque, almost 
masculine manner and tone.  In style, Hannah is something of a dyke. 
128 At the end of his earlier interchange with Louis in Millenium he says something similar.  Predicting the coming 
of snow he asks Louis if he can smell it.  “LOUIS:  Smell what?  BELIZE:  Softness, compliance, forgiveness, 
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 the characters Belize has an almost angelic power to name things, like Rosa Parks to grant 
mercy, to point out the right way.  Belize’s association with an external marvelous or uncanny 
gives him a revelatory power, particularly for those characters with an enclosed, nepotistic 
ethics.129  But Belize’s role in general, vis-à-vis all the characters, seems to be that of soothsayer, 
unflappable sage.  Critics have commented on Belize’s privileged relation to moral truth, not 
only within the play, but for the audience.  David Savran, citing other both mainstream and 
academic drama critics,  remarks of Belize that “his is the one point of view that is never 
submitted to a critique,” and that as such he is the play’s “purveyor of truth” (30).  Framji 
Minwalla puts it more elegantly: “he is the rational, articulate fulcrum around whom other 
characters revolve. . . the most moral and stable character in the play” (104-5).  Like many 
American texts from Uncle Tom’s Cabin to Driving Miss Daisy to most recently Bruce Almighty, 
the sensitive black soul illuminates white ignorance and passes on the benediction bought of his 
own (and his race’s) suffering and struggle. 
Minwalla is interested in making a more metaphysical claim, however, that as the play’s 
only African-American character included within the inner circle, Belize occupies a position akin 
to that of master signifier.  He is “a cipher, an enigma, a blankness,” less a character than an 
“iconic representation.”  I do not entirely agree.  Minwalla too easily assimilates this character’s 
blackness to the field of its reception, without acknowledging the dual nature of that blackness - 
and of Angels in America’s politico-aesthetic project.  Belize is both character and icon, 
privileged within the visionary world of the play without at once losing his particular voice.  
                                                                                                                                                             
grace” (100).  This is something Louis can’t quite learn, as later he tells Prior that “Maybe what I did isn’t 
forgivable,” but asserts that it is yet “reasonable,” still seeking justice and justification through reason rather than in 
appeal to love. 
129 One of the differences between Roy’s and Prior’s visitations - visitations that accompany the manifestation of 
AIDS - is that, ultimately, Prior doesn’t need his.  His “urge to run” following the angel’s appearances precipitates a 
relapse, but these journeys out also give him “more life,” the blessing of a cosmopolitan, communitarian America. 
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 Huffy, penetrating, and performative, that voice is distinguished among the various players by its 
consciousness of the other.  He is perhaps the only character more aware of his environment and 
hs audience than himself, appropriate for a nurse and former drag queen (and later a former 
former drag queen).  This is perhaps the essence of Kushner’s theory of the fabulous – the ability 
to comprehend and dramatize both causality (the wires showing) and revelation (still thoroughly 
amazing). 
BELIZE:  Oh cheer up, Louis.  Look at that heavy sky out there. 
LOUIS: Purple. 
BELIZE:  Purple?  Boy, what kind of a homosexual are you, anyway?  
That’s not purple, Mary, that color up there is (Very grand) mauve.  
(Millenium 100) 
In the context of African-American self-understanding, Belize becomes almost a necessary 
choice to play the prophet of the play’s fabulous realism, for this other-consciousness is his 
historical inheritance.  W.E.B. DuBois writes famously, “the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born 
with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world, - a world which yields him no 
true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world” 
(5).  Note that Du Bois does not describe the Negro as being the other world’s revelation; rather, 
the other world becomes a necessary and inescapable means of his own self-knowing (and, 
philosophically, the means of self-knowledge in general).  The Negro is not so much 
“America’s” double as he is its doubleness, its wrestling against its own mortalities through the 
immortal other, its wrestling with reality through the imagination.  Born of fiction, double-
consciousness expresses itself as a subjective agonism130 which Du Bois – and Kushner – 
                                                 
130 Describing the progress of the Negro pilgrim, Du Bois continues a few pages later: “In those sombre forests of 
his striving his own soul rose before him, and he saw himself, - darkly as through a veil; and yet he saw in himself 
some faint revelation of his power, of his mission” (9).  Self-revelation approaches truth increasingly as it shifts its 
reference from the other world to the action of the self, from self-perception as idea to self-perception in act.  This is 
the truth that Belize tries to convey to Louis, and one that is unnecessary for him to convey to Prior, who like Jacob 
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 identify with prophetic knowledge.  Implicitly, then, for the Negro and for Belize, race becomes 
the imperative connection between appearance and truth. 
The spirit of America past, present, and yet to come, Belize speaks to the ideas that 
comprise its self-definition, the way of reading that is America.  Significantly, his revelation is 
also an essential statement of the play’s moral and ideological project, as well as one of its most 
frequently quoted lines.  At the end of his conversation with Louis, Belize tries to help him 
define love, in the process explaining why political theory is not the answer to his ethical 
struggles.  “I’ve thought about it for a very long time, and I still don’t understand what love is.  
Justice is simple.  Democracy is simple.  Those things are unambivalent.  But love is very hard.  
And it goes bad for you if you violate the hard law of love” (Millenium 100).  Moments later, 
Mr. Lies (played by the actor playing Belize) will tell Harper something similar about fantasy, 
that it too has its laws that must not be violated, as impenetrable as they may be.131  “Even 
hallucinations have laws,” he says.  Fantasy does not mean limitless possibility, just miraculous 
transportation.  As fantasy’s agent, Mr. Lies – like an angel - moves us to a different order of 
existence.  It remains an order, however, with its own hierarchy and principle of hierarchy; our 
powers remain limited by the differences within it.  Such fantasy echoes what Coleridge said of 
the action of fancy, that it is really a “mode of memory emancipated from time and space,” as 
distinguished from imagination, a “living power” and “prime agent” of creation that can “build a 
world” and “make an order.”  Harper, hallucinogenically transported to Antarctica, seeks 
                                                                                                                                                             
en route to his own self-revelation as Israel, learns this through his otherworldly encounters and struggles, face to 
face. 
131 Harper wants to “make a new world” in Antarctica, where he has taken her, to erect a city, “an enormous city 
made up of frontier forts, dark wood and green roofs and high gates made of pointed logs and bonfires burning on 
every street corner,” etc.  Mr. Lies cautions her, “No timber here.  Too cold.  Ice, no trees.”  And She says she wants 
to stay forever, but he reminds her, “Ice has a way of melting . . .”  He spurns her advances because it would violate 
the rules of the International Order of Travel Agents.  And he insists that in Antaarctica, never, ever, will she find an 
Eskimo.  “Respect the delicate ecology of your delusions.”  She doesn’t, however.  In Perestroika she violates their 
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 imaginative sovereignty, the ability to build her own world, just as Louis seeks in America the 
freedom of association that would transcend fancy’s “law of association.”  As Louis describes 
his “political” nationality, America refers to a theory of historical change in which change is 
freed from history.  It is Belize’s job to remind him of that history, of the limits of sovereignty, 
the price of building a new world.  The laws of America, designed to rationalize and unify, are 
general, abstract, pure and overarching.  Against their universal, theoretical transparency Belize 
gives us the “law of love,” mysterious, ineluctable, the law of the prophets and the priests. 
“I’ve thought about it for a very long time, and I still don’t understand what love is.”  At 
the end of the road we find still a question, an ignorance and an incomprehension.  Belize too has 
his naivete.  The power of origination and originative certainty must be inaccessible, he suggests, 
as inaccessible as the presence of God.  Angels’ theater of the fabulous seems to follow this 
insight; the fabulous, like drag, consists always in imitation, in combining and separating, 
playing with the given in recognition that it is only within the given that we have the power to 
grasp something immortal.  For the fabulous as for the diva, immortality is derivative.  Like the 
presence of Rosa Parks in Touched by an Angel or Ethel Rosenberg in Angels in America, the 
fabulous dramatizes the divine power of the other, as icon and as historical agent.  Thus drag 
artists tend to perform celebrities of an other era, who have already been canonized as founders 
of a particular cultural movement or aesthetic style.  This is a particularly human iconicity.  In its 
inclination toward transcendence the human is capable of something the angel isn’t: 
ambivalence.  As the Angel Australia says, “We cannot solve Conundrums.”  Living on the edge 
of the gender line and the color line, Belize more than most of Angels’ characters witnesses to 
such ambivalence, and to the necessity of choosing, committing, and enduring within it.  In this 
                                                                                                                                                             
supposed laws by gnawing down a pine tree where there should be none.  It turns out to be a real tree in Prospect 
Park, and she gets arrested.  “Mr. Lies (Vanishing):  The Law for real.” 
191 
 investment we can see why Belize, for different reasons than Louis, rejects the angel.  Where 
Louis finds angels irrelevant to an ideal of America justice based on naïve principles of 
disinterestedness,132 Belize sees them as dangerously not interested enough.  In their rigidity and 
adherence to simple ideas, the Soviet-style angelic bureaucracy fails to translate.  Unlike the 
iconic person they do not cross time and space, but remain paralyzed in the apparatus of the 
moment.  Devoted to the process of imagination yet deprived of God, the separated intelligences 
cannot act at all.133  By definition without experience, they prove themselves incapable even of 
fancy, which in Belize’s – and possibly Kushner’s – cosmologies is all that is left us. 
Yet Kushner too is ambivalent.  Despite its cautions against angelic excesses, the play at 
the same time is genuinely fascinated by them (as well as beautifully researched on the nature of 
the angel as figure).  And, by a winning irony, the very characters that refuse angels show 
themselves to have the most in common with them.  Louis would like to traffic in angelic 
intelligence.  Belize describes him to himself later in Perestroika: “Up in the air, just like that 
angel, too far off the earth to pick out the details.  Louis and his Big Ideas.  Big Ideas are all you 
love.  ‘America’ is what Louis loves” (94).  Louis’s are the angels of paradise, inhabiting a 
system of pure laws which, in a wholly intellectual world, are always adequate to events.  Truth 
and justice are the same.  It is appropriate that, in identifying with Louis, Kushner also identifies 
one of the weaknesses of his play – its conceptual narrative, in which people wrestle with ideas 
and only occasionally each other (and, in the case of Louis and Joe, wrestle with each other over 
                                                 
132 Louis’s idea of justice cannot comprehend viral caprice.  His thinking remains in a system of reward and 
retribution.  “It’s not fair.  I fucked around more than he did.”  In this sense Louis has the most in common with the 
projected audience of Touched by an Angel, in demonstration an inability to comprehend how it is the good die 
young. 
133 This loss of imagination, and its connection to a theater of the fabulous, can be seen via the angel’s costuming.  
In the 1993 Broadway production Ellen McLaughlin, the actress playing the angel, appears in a Romanesque, 
sweeping gown with drooping sleeves and with a wingspan greater than her height.  Her appearance is, as Prior 
defines angels, devoid of imagination, “both fabulous and dull all at once.”  The same might be said for her 
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 ideas).  His stimulation for the project was itself an idea: what happens when the lover of an 
AIDS victim wrestles with the idea of leaving him, and on what basis?134  As the Rabbi says in 
response to Louis’s question about “someone who abandons someone he loves at a time of great 
need,” “Why would a person do such a thing?”  This is exactly the question that Angels literally 
seeks to answer.  Like Louis, the play itself wrestles with ideas and with the angelic other as 
idea.  “The fabulous” in this context is at bottom a speculation, a logical enterprise, rather than a 
fantastic conceit.  Kushner himself finds this not only appropriate, but necessary: “We have to 
recognize that human beings are as much creatures of ideas as they are of materiality, and that 
we need ideas.  Wallace Stevens is very important.  We live in – we are made of – words.  God is 
the imagination” (Kinzer 214). 
Given a conception of God as the Logos, the Word, Kushner argues for a reading of the 
imaginary through the verbal.  This is a radically intellectual project, perhaps more than an 
artistic one – Brechtian in origin, and profoundly oriented toward consciousness and social 
change.  As a result, it ultimately explains the play’s major dramatic weakness, which is to avoid 
providing that kind of single-minded affective satisfaction that Touched by an Angel, for all its 
faults, strives to deliver.  But it also lands us at the heart of Kushner’s political and philosophical 
mission in this context, to write a play about AIDS, gay men, Reagan, Roy Cohn, and Mormons, 
and at the idea that unites them.  This is the idea of the relation between suffering and freedom, 
and it is most apparent in the doubling between the Angel of America and Belize.  For, while 
ostensibly the double of Prior’s externally imposed physical trauma and also of Louis’s self-
                                                                                                                                                             
message, the new law that is visited upon Prior.  Its apocalyptic splendor and fierce, absolute totalizing make us 
gasp; yet, like drag, their magic is in their familiarity, of the known brought to extremes. 
134 Specifically, Kushner in interview comments on the rarity of gay men walking out on lovers with AIDS.  “I don’t 
actually know anyone who has.  I wanted to write what I wrote in Angels because I felt it was something that a lot of 
people were afraid of, and that a lot of people weren’t talking about” (Cunningham 72).  He accentuates the danger 
of such a choice later, referring to Louis as someone who “dares to do the unspeakable to see what happens when 
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 imposed mental one, the angel at her most expressive speaks to an experience she (literally, with 
coughs and stutters) cannot articulate, but which is for Belize a necessary reckoning within his 
life in America.  In America, as Harper later realizes in relation to the Mormon migration, 
movement comes from “devastation.”  We assume this devastation in Belize (“I am trapped in a 
world of white people,” he proclaims as he exits swishily) while we perceive its conversion to a 
distinct sense of time and motion: cutting short conversations, ushering other characters in and 
out of scenes, saying things like, “We have to move fast.”  The sound of New York traffic.  This 
sound, somehow neither material nor conceptual and somehow also both, suggests the isolation 
that defines suffering in the world of the play.  In its dynamism the moment dies to us 
immediately, is immortalized and made divine because it cannot be wholly known or contained.  
It is what the angel, who naively would like time to slow down, nevertheless inspires despite 
herself in her conveyance of material urgency: “The great work begins.”  Will exists only 
phenomenally and in relation to death.  Free and alone – whether bed-ridden in an apartment, 
crying in the men’s room, or simply, angelically, appearing in the door135 – it exists on its own.  
And in a play that more than anything is about immaturity and power, being on one’s own 
appears as the final, and very American, truth. 
And at the end we find that Belize too, for all his protestations, has an angelic 
counterpart.  She arrives in a different way than the first angel: predictably.  Instead of fanfare, 
screeches, eight vaginas, a “bouquet of phalli” and divine self-importance, we see a simple statue 
at a fountain – the Angel of Bethesda.  “I like them best when they’re statuary.  They 
commemorate death but they suggest a world without dying.  They are made of the heaviest 
                                                                                                                                                             
you do it” (ibid. 73).  In many ways, the play too does exactly this, in the experimental spirit of seeing what 
happens, a spirit of boldness and adventure and moral transgression. 
135 The HBO version very dramatically portrays Belize’s (authoritatively played by Jeffrey Wright) first entrance at 
the door of Prior’s hospital room,stunning  in bright leather jacket and feather boa. 
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 things on earth, stone and iron, they weigh tons but they’re winged, they are engines and 
instruments of flight” (Prior in Perestroika 145).  Belize’s echo is an angel of the earth, and the 
laws she brings – of gravity and aerodynamics – are operational, rather than conceptual.  She is a 
force and expression of life, but one which acknowledges death in the representation of that 
force.  This is appropriate for Belize who as drag queen – immortal as icon, rather than person – 
addresses the necessary material limits of the person.  For Belize the ability to act in time 
presupposes a social imperative, the ability to accept the physical, personal reality of death as an 
essential principle of human connectedness and solidarity.  (At a funeral for one of the “Great 
Glitter Queens,” a victim of AIDS, Prior becomes upset, calling it a “ludicrous spectacle.”  
Belize, on the other hand, finds it “divine.”  For this Prior calls him a “death junkie.”)  Belize’s 
counterpart, the Angel of Bethesda, testifies to the failure of the heavenly angels, the failure of 
an intelligence divorced from historical and mortal ruptures and, hence, from genuine 
participation in human affairs. 
The statuary angel is a living contradiction then.  But she is also a unification of 
contradiction.  Appearing in the final minutes of the second part of Angels, the Angel of 
Bethesda returns us to the beginning of the first part, in a way that brings Jewishness and 
America together.  There to commemorate the naval dead of the Civil War and suggesting in her 
very name America’s capital, she is also a Jewish mythic figure.  As Louis and Belize 
(orchestrated by Prior) both tell us, she appeared during the days of the Second Temple, and 
where she landed a fountain shot up, endowed with great healing powers.  When the Romans 
conquered the city the fountain ran dry, but it is said that it will flow again, when the Millenium 
comes.  In this figure history and ideas meet; America exists, and so do angels in America.  And 
it is in her meditation that Prior turns to the audience members and blesses them.  “Bye now.  
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 You are fabulous creatures, each and every one.  And I bless you: More Life.136  The Great Work 
Begins” (146). 
 
In wrestling, nothing exists except in the absolute, there is no symbol, no allusion, 
everything is presented exhaustively.  Leaving nothing in the shade, each action discards all 
parasitic meanings and ceremonially offers to the public a pure and full signification, rounded 
like Nature.  This grandiloquence is nothing but the popular and age-old image of the perfect 
intelligibility of reality.   
What is portrayed by wrestling is therefore an ideal understanding 
of things; it is the euphoria of men raised for a while above the 
constitutive ambiguity of everyday situations and placed before the 
panoramic view of a univocal nature, in which signs at last 
correspond to causes, without obstacle, without evasion, without 
contradiction.  (Barthes 25) 
Prior has earned the right to bestow on his audience this divine unity and intelligibility of 
experience.  In his wrestlings with the angel, which is to say in wrestling with the temptation of 
accepting her message, he appropriates her grandiloquent power for his own humanist message.  
His rejection of her is declamatory, delivering the endowed book back to heaven while 
demanding the blessing.  In essence, he wins.  In Kushner’s version, it is the angel not Jacob who 
                                                 
136 In interpreting the blessing the angel confers upon Jacob, Kushner in Perestroika acknowledges himself indebted 
to Harold Bloom’s analysis in The Book of J.  Writing in his capacity as a literary critic (the book’s dust-jacket tells 
us he is “America’s foremost literary critic”), Bloom argues that Jacob’s exile represents the falling away from the 
blessing of Yahweh (conferred or enacted by the angel); more precisely it represents the failure to stomach the 
limitlessness – he calls it boundary-lessness – of such blessing.  He interprets “more life,” the original meaning of 
the blessing, to indicate something close to the eternal or immortal, in his suggestion that the sublimity of God 
cannot be born, in every sense of the word.  “And yet, in J, the Blessing is always partly ironic, and frequently 
attended by fraud.  Usurpation after all is Jacob’s mode, as in some sense it will be the way of Jesus.  Jacob too is 
one of the spiritually exuberant who bear away the Blessing by a kind of violence” ( Rosenberg and Bloom 211). 
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 tears her thigh, and the delivery of the blessing – more life – means denying the angelic message, 
rather than taking the name it bestows.137  The angelic message itself is a kind of 
messagelessness, an emptiness or absence underneath the fabulous trappings.  This is the point of 
her fabulousness – an organizing lie at the heart of appearance.  As the conclusion of Kushner’s 
two-part epic tells us, the real angel of America is an angel of stone, who represents the very act 
she cannot perform. 
The failure of the angel and the allure of the angel (she stimulates an erection in Prior, who 
has long been dormant) preach the doctrine of fancy, and a theory of the social based on it.  Done 
with imagination, with revolution and re-creation, art and empire, she points to something more 
modest but, for Tony Kushner, equally passionate.  This is the power of memory separated from 
time and space, a specific historical iconicity within which the social body might take shape.  At 
the end Prior declaims, “This disease will be the end of many of us, but not nearly all, and the 
dead will be commemorated and will struggle on with the living, and we are not going away” 
(146).  Wrestling with the immortality that can only come from dying, the country faces its own 
judgments in this terrifying joining together of love and death.  Angels hang heavy over these 
judgments.  No longer potent figures of historical origination, the only thing they are good for, 
Angels proposes, is to give the past continuity, bless it with more life.  In a “time of Crisis and 
Confusion,” as the Angel herself puts it, the question of change and continuity looms largest, our 
powers of selection most taxed.  This is a question the angels cannot answer.  Rather, in 
wrestling with them we make it for ourselves.  We create our own power to bless, our own truth, 
and our own love. 
                                                 
137 Bloom makes an interesting interpretation of the angels’ bestowing the name “Israel” on Jacob, that perhaps 
Israel was the angel’s name.  He refuses, after all, to give it.  The identification between the two would then be even 
stronger.  Whether this is what the text itself implies, the angel is always to some degree one’s other, thus it always 
bears the name of our own potential, which we have to then earn by wrestling it from him. 
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The death of God left the angels in a strange position.  They 
were overtaken suddenly by a fundamental question.  One 
can attempt to imagine the moment.  How did they look at 
the instant the question invaded them, flooding the angelic 
consciousness, taking hold with terrifying force?  The 
question was, “What are angels?” 
 New to questioning, unaccustomed to terror, 
unskilled in aloneness, the angels (we assume) fell into 
despair. 
- Donald Barthelme, “On Angels” 
 
 In many ways, neither Touched by an Angel nor Angels in America is “art.”  Each 
subordinates the avenues disclosed by its presentation of an imaginative world to an already 
determined didactic purpose.  This is the secret behind the TV melodrama’s resolutely style-less 
yet mannered pursuit of epiphany, and behind the Broadway hit’s attempt to find the dramatic 
idiom of “theory.”  Witty, creative, and completely entertaining, Tony Kushner’s play 
nevertheless attempts to translate the genre of the novel of ideas to performance, with the result 
that the performance itself is deprived of any inner engines.  Both texts devote themselves to a 
conceptual, moral goal, evoking emotion by this means where aesthetically it should derive from 
the action itself. 
 Each work has its artistic moments, however.  Touched by an Angel recalls scenes of a 
little girl staring at the rain shelter door as her brother is locking her in to protect her from her 
abusive father, Andrew the angel of death in the corner quietly catching her eye; an astronaut 
floating in outer space, cut off from her shuttle, trying not to use up all her oxygen; a Chinese 
dissident cowering in the corner of her prison cell as fellow inmates bribed by the powers-that-be 
try to brutalize her, the white-clad figure of Monica kneeling over her, in agony, protecting her 
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 from the blows.  Angels in America yields up tableaus that are not so much fleeting as typical: a 
bed-ridden Prior enclosed in his apartment, whose roof the angel bursts climactically; the angels 
themselves myopically clustered in their corner of bureaucratic heaven, trying to receive 
communications from the world via an outdated radio set; and finally the circle of friends 
gesturing towards the statuary Angel of Bethesda, an object rather than an agent of thought, mute 
and staring in her encasement of stone.  All of these imagistic legacies play into a recurrent 
feeling – the hit of claustrophobia that fascinates so much of contemporary angelic literature.  
From the famous scene in which George Bailey declares, “I’m shaking the dust off this little 
town” to the scene where he accuses Potter of trying to enclose the town like a “scurvy little 
spider,” from Damiel in Wings of Desire, trapped in a sphere of influence but devoid of touch, to 
the angel encounter books’ trope of the car broken-down or smashed like a chrysalis, and from 
the angel self-help books’ urge to transcend the body to its fear of entrapment in demonic 
deception, angelic texts tend in their different ways to lurch around a poetics of confinement.  
Such confinement can be intimate and erotic – we might think of Angels in America’s Joe and 
Louis hiding out in bed – as well as terrifying.  This is the fundamental narcissism of the angelic 
benediction, which attracts us with the delights of Satanic pride as much as it traps us in an 
isolated and subjective universe. 
 The contribution of Touched by an Angel and Angels in America to a tradition of angelic 
enclosure is specific.  In Williamson’s show we see the angel standing surrogate for the abuses 
of imprisonment and in Kushner, even more powerfully, the angels discover their own 
confinement, one which appears by the end as more constricting even than being bedridden by 
AIDS.  The backward-looking pure intelligence that is safe from death and corruption 
nevertheless cheapens its own power because it cannot tell truth from illusion.  The death of God 
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 and universal principles, the play suggests, strips the angelic mind – and its assumed coherence 
of rational law and free will – of any divinatory certainty.  Where in Touched by an Angel we can 
see the beginnings of angelic self-enclosure in its assumption of the human form (Monica’s 
experience of being black is at once a claustrophobia and an agoraphobia), in Angels in America 
this imprisonment is completed by the absence of any ultimate authority or final cause – of any 
source.  The problem of causelessness, epitomized by the randomness of the virus, provokes the 
emergent representation of angelic impotence and provinciality. 
 As far as angels are concerned, impotence and provinciality are actually the same thing.  
In general and consistently, the angel emblematizes potential being unfolding itself – suddenly 
and completely spread out before us.  For such a figure to be represented as limited in her view 
of what is possible, which happens in both Kushner’s text and (temporarily but suggestively) in 
Touched by an Angel’s “Black Like Monica” episode, necessarily means negating her agency.  
The angel’s view is powerful and unique in at once encompassing past, present, and future.  To 
be stuck looking backward – whether at American racism or Soviet-style Communism – 
demeans her before the human which has overcome its own past, and which alone can make its 
own history.  Historical agents and martyrs like Rosa Parks and Ethel Rosenberg thus appear in 
positions more capable of giving the blessing than a fallen Monica or the clueless Angel of 
America, while contemporary ones like Prior choose to reject the messenger and her entourage in 
favor of non-transcendent struggle and the gaze of an angel that does not pretend to be anything 
other than stone. 
 Thus Tony Kushner’s intense duology leaves us where it began: with the image of Walter 
Benjamin’s angel of history,138 looking back at the skyward-growing repetitions of historical  
                                                 
138 The famous description in the Ninth Thesis in his “Theses on the Philosophy of History” (in Illuminations) is 
taken after a picture by Paul Klee entitled Angelus Novus, which Benjamin owned and which fascinated him 
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 destruction as he moves horizontally into the future.  In this image idea lurches heavily away 
from reality, possibility from actuality.  Torn from its angel, human history cracks, revealing the 
essential contradiction between its revolutionary ideal and its unproductive, even decadent 
reality.  At the scene of such a contradiction, we perceive in the distance a bodiless spectator – 
like the subject of the angel self-help books – imprisoned in his own gaze.  The messenger who 
ushers in the new within the terms of the old finds himself impotently blown backward by the 
winds of change.  For the “Theses on the Philosophy of History” as for Angels in America, 
“progress” is stronger than “destiny.” 
 Benjamin’s angel of history is one of the most potent allegories in a century that has 
seemed at once fascinated by allegory and disdainful of it.139  This may be part of its appeal.  For 
it is an allegory without God and even of the absence of God.  In the spirit of Benjamin’s own 
writing on allegory, the famous scene of angel, time, and wreckage portrays the critical distance 
between idea and thing. The angel-ideal moves ever further away from the history whose spirit 
he would speak for and to which he belongs.  In the face of such inhibited communication, 
                                                                                                                                                             
throughout his life.  He even titled an early ‘20’s journal after it.  The picture itself shows only the angel – wide-
eyed and staring; the description of the entire scene including the wreckage of the past is Benjamin’s own invention.  
For those readers unfamiliar with Thesis IX I include it here.  It follows a poem by Gershom Scholem which 
translates as,“My wing is ready for flight, / I would like to turn back. / If I stayed timeless time, / I would have little 
luck.”  The thesis follows: “A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as though he is about 
to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating.  His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are 
spread.  This is how one pictures the angel of history.  His face is turned toward the past.  Where we perceive a 
chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of 
his feet.  The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed.  But a storm is 
blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them.  
This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him 
grows skyward.  This storm is what we call progress.” 
139 John Milfull offers a timely contextualization of the popularity of this, the most utopic of Benjamin’s work.  
Discussing Benjamin’s “Messianic dreams” he writes, “Malamud’s perception that in the twentieth century we have 
all become Jews is in need of an update; since 1989, those of us, at least, who cling to such utopias have all become 
Benjamins” (129).  The inclusion of 1989 is apt and important, and relevant to the current fascination with angels 
that opens with the close of the Cold War, but Milfull’s reading – I think mistakenly – focuses on the corporate 
decadence of the eighties rather than on the change in world order and its mode of articulation that the collapse of 
the Cold War created.  A Benjaminian utopianism looks forward to emergence out of destruction, within a 
historical-cultural dialectic; it is not a rationalist critique of current modes of production and analytic imagining of 
something else. 
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 history produces the angel’s opposite: detritus, waste, garbage.  An allegory that refuses to make 
agents of concepts, the “Theses”’ tableau is without pedagogy or redemption.  Would-be 
transcendence, we see clearly before us, paralyzes history. 
In The Origin of German Tragic Drama Benjamin elaborates his hermeneutic of the ruin 
through the distinction between an allegory of correspondence and an allegory of configuration.  
For Benjamin the idea of a thing – of a work, or a culture – cannot be represented in a fixed 
relation to material reality, because it would be impossible to construct a unity from the 
collection of correspondences that trace a path throughout it.  He is not interested in that 
representational form of allegory where characters embody concepts; that only allows us to read 
qualities, not situations.  Instead, he develops a “theological” mode of allegorical reading in 
which the players and parts form a conceptual whole: hence we see the idea in the “arrangement” 
or “configuration” of formal elements in the concept.  Such a configuration, made up of 
fragments, is fully exposed to us, but only in its status as ruin.  The floor plan is not visible in the 
structure – where it is only immanent - but in the decay of the structure.  “Whereas in the symbol 
destruction is idealized and the transfigured face of nature is fleetingly revealed in the light of 
redemption, in allegory the observer is fleetingly revealed with the facies hippocratica of history 
as a petrified primordial landscape” (166).  And again, “Allegories are, in the realm of thoughts, 
what ruins are in the realm of things” (178).  In ruin, decay, and above all, catastrophe, allegory 
reveals not only the concept immanent in things and deeds but the observer who contemplates 
them, calling history by its name.140  Where a doctrine of correspondences ultimately reaches 
                                                 
140 Irving Wohlfarth has a wonderful write-up of Benjamin’s famous image in terms of decadent modernist 
cosmology.  (Referring to the historicist concept of “homogeneous, empty time” proper to modern idealism): 
“Benjamin calls such a conception of history vertiginous, because it seesaws between two antithetical 
phantasmagorias – that of infinite progress and that of infinite repetition – which coalesce in the bourgeois dictum 
‘Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’” (200).  Wohlfarth distinguishes the latter, which he aligns with 
Nietzschean eternal return, from the pile of wreckage perceived by the angel of history: “To put it schematically, the 
doctrine of progress is an escapist daydream; the hallucinatory vision of eternal return is a nightmare that recognizes 
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 toward liberation from the finite world, configuration presumes the impossibility of such 
liberation, promising only the gift of seeing into the world in all its finitude. 
This seeing is precisely what Benjamin’s allegory of history offers.  But while his image  
presents before us the deadly spectacle of confinement even in flight and even for angels,141 it 
does have some positive content.  In the spectatorial eyes of the angel we see a way of reading 
the decay.  For as a poetics of the fall,142 allegory never ceases to take its eyes off of the scene of 
waste and destruction, and in fact looks to this destruction as its own scribe.  It recalls an 
imagined and original ordering impulse, poignant but also formidable in its naïve conviction that 
merely by arranging things, they will come to life.  Few aesthetic forms are so claustrophobia-
inducing as one of these allegorical arrangements, whether in writing or art, yet they also have 
the power to strike us to the quick and hold fast, tearing open for us new worlds, thoughts, and 
feelings.  That allegories can do this is in part due to the fact that, in trying to capture the ideal in 
the real, they portray reality fantastically.  The supernatural and the marvelous are, in an allegory 
of configuration, not quite graspable, but never too far away. 
 This amalgam of order, supernatural presence, and life force follows angels in any 
particular form, whether it be revelation, of pure reason, or of struggle.  But peculiarly these 
elements appear most strongly when the angel is least an angel, that is, when it is itself a ruin.  
                                                                                                                                                             
itself as such, but only from within, while the angel has fully awakened to the nightmare, without, however, being 
able to escape it” (201). 
141 And paradoxically as a result of too much openness.  The detail in the ninth thesis is significant here, that the 
angel cannot fly because he cannot close his wings.  It is as if the angel has been frozen before us as angel (in the 
full reach of his span, seemingly representing the height of his power), and is fixed before our gaze as such.  The 
closing of the wings is also a disappearance – in Wallace Stevens’ words, the angel is “half seen, or seen for a 
moment.”  This is the angel of reality, however (see “Angels Surrounded by Paysans”).  The angel of history is not 
of the moment that opens and closes, but belongs to the past, to the moment prior after it has already petrified.  The 
resulting ruins also open their idea, their angel, to full view as a result of their petrified bondage.  Thus the angel 
tells us more about itself by the very fact of its not being able to fly. 
142 See for instance Edwin Honig’s description of allegory in Dark Conceit as searching always for paradise 
regained (108).  Honig understands this postlapsarian urge to express itself as the forging of a new order, ideal, and 
imaginary world: “For the allegorist the re-creation of authority necessitates a critical view of reality, a re-
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 As Benjamin insists about allegory - that not only does the ruin not befoul the revelation, but the 
ruin is the revelation - so does the ruined angel more clearly manifest those elements that define 
angels in the full display and exercise of their power.  It is the ruined angel that will be the fourth 
and final type that this dissertation will describe.  Such ruination is indissolubly tied to bounded-
ness, limitation, the situations that produce claustrophobia, for the enforced passivity that results 
is exactly the ruin of the angel, a figure of agency and free will. 
As a self-negating representation, the passive, constrained angel is not common.  This 
figure appears in the second half of the twentieth century at the same times as the others – 
immediately after the Second World War, and after the collapse of the order that that war 
ultimately inaugurated.  But it does not populate multiple genres as do some of the other figures 
– most especially the annunciating angels.  Almost always it is adopted by texts with a self-
consciously aesthetic sensibility, refined, and above all, modernist.  The cheesy City of Angels 
would be an exception to this, but this movie about an earth-longing angel exists only as a 
remake of arthouse-chic Wings of Desire, and in Nicholas Cage it turns surprised melancholy 
into a sodden mournfulness.  By and large, ruined angels take wing (or fall clumsily) in texts that 
adopt as their primary existential attitude an assumption of belatedness between the event and its 
contemplation, a fundamental schism that expresses itself in other ways – as a split between sign 
and meaning, origin and tradition, subject and object.  This is the modernist project generally, 
postlapsarian, a too old consciousness attached to a too young experience, seeking to express 
itself in a culture it perceives as defined by the reverse.  Within the literature of this period a 
specific means of addressing these issues arose, however, that took as its goal the potential 
within these splits to forge new associations; these associations – both free and freeing – were 
                                                                                                                                                             
examination of the objective norms of experience in the light of human ideality.  It includes the making of a new 
version of reality by means of an ideal which the reality of fiction proves” (109). 
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 characterized by a creative discontinuity which was seen as essentially capable of grasping and 
making perceptible the discontinuities at the basis of human (and modern) experience.  The 
initiating poets called this movement surrealism, a movement that later, in relation to the political 
insanities of Latin America, spawned the highly influential contemporary form called magical or 
marvelous realism. 
 Most of the ruined angel texts of the current era in the United States are poems, and most 
of these poems are surrealist-influenced.143  The fascination with angels roughly coincides with 
the surrealist revival in this country, and angels in general – let alone angels of the kind that this 
chapter is focused on - tend to appear more frequently in poems with a surreal affect or 
orientation.  Few of these are properly surrealist; the movement adopts that title as forebear, but 
participates more in the thinking of marvelous realism, which – though it shares with surrealism 
a fascination with the irrational, unpredictable, and inhuman forces of experience – probes the 
cosmos rather than the mind.144  In Latin America and Spain (whose literary traditions are still in 
close conversation with one another) these representations are not limited to poetry, but extend 
also to fiction, particularly short fiction.   
                                                 
143 Surrealism influenced American poets – including Frank O’Hara and John Ashbery - just following World War II 
– precisely when it was losing its hold in Europe.  Following the publication of Robert Bly’s translations of Spanish 
and Latin American poems in 1972 and his own experiments in this form of writing, subsequent poets began to 
adopt some of the conventions and ideas proper to that tradition (see Leaping Poetry).  These poets included W.S. 
Merwin, James Wright, and – a poet whose work I engage later in this chapter – Mark Strand.  Willard Bohn 
explains the project of what has informally been dubbed the “New Surrealism.”  “Surrealism, as adopted by well-
known poets in the United States, shed much of its overt political positions, particularly its reliance on Marxism, and 
instead focused on the rhetorical processes of defamiliarization, disjunctive constructions, and collage. Partly 
adopted as a method of responding to the corruption of language during the Vietnam War and as a response to a 
growing dissatisfaction with academic poetry, as well as a response to and a result of the burgeoning market for 
works in translation, the most evident processes of surrealism were seized upon.  Nonetheless, recent poets in the 
United States share the goals of continental surrealism of transforming the process of seeing and of sensory 
liberation.” 
144 It may be inaccurate, albeit compact, to define the divergence between surrealism and magical realism in terms of 
their theories of mind and cosmos.  Surrealism is invested in a structuralist view that seeks to bring the irrational 
mind of the unconscious to rational, conscious experience.  Marvelous realism, on the other hand, lends itself better 
to a “poststructuralist” sensibility, though one that is politically tutored.  Such writers understand the irrational as 
part and parcel of rational thought and system.  Such surrealist techniques as “free association” need not be 
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 The current poetic investment in a neo-surrealist enterprise145 is especially important 
when positioned against the other major trends in contemporary poetry.  The poets who write 
most about angels are not part of any of the most prominent contemporary movements: the New 
Formalism/New Narrative, or the Confessional revival – especially the latter.  In fact, two of the 
better known poets who write about angels, Billy Collins and Stephen Dunn, are anthologized in 
a collection of essays about autobiographical poetry as gadflies of the genre.  While most of the 
essays in After Confession: Poetry as Autobiography (Sontag and Graham, 2001) are exploratory 
or celebratory in approach, Collins’ “My Grandfather’s Tackle Box” and Dunn’s “Degrees of 
Fidelity” stand out in their criticism of poetry as a form of life-writing.  Collins situates such a 
project within the “history of ego,” which he traces from Rousseau to Wordsworth to the present, 
and in the rejection of the “immediacy” of a language of the present for the “aesthetic intimacy” 
purchased by the language of memory.  Engaging the distinction between memory as history and 
memory as invention, Collins advocates that, following Robert Frost, the poet retain in her self-
exhibiting the “delicacy” to “stop short.”  For Collins the sense of limit is a poetic imperative and 
a matter of aesthetic principle.  Dunn too recognizes the value of the limit in the poetry of 
personal disclosure: “most poems about family should be put in a locked closet” (176).  But 
where Collins blithely suggests that an “imaginative liberty” that may “fly over history” rewards 
this nostalgic check, Dunn regards writerly finitude as the essence of poetic life.  “The dead free 
us as much as the living constrain us,” he writes, but adds that constraint is useful.  Dunn is 
                                                                                                                                                             
cultivated and released, because these associations are already given and understood as part of what we understand 
to be “order.”   
145 Charles Borkhuis terms this tendency “parasurrealist.”  He attributes the return of surrealist approaches in poetry 
of the 1990’s in part to the legacy of poststructuralist sensibilities that challenged the other major experimentalist 
arena in modern poetry – language poetry.  “If surrealism’s return in later textual poetry has been prepared in part by 
structuralist and postructuralist theory, it is also true that the germ of the structuralist revolution was already in 
surrealist writings.  The emergence of a parasurrealist tendency in today’s textual poetry may be a sign that language 
writing is still too narrowly rooted in cognitive processes and that what postlanguage poetries are seeing is a more 
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 uninterested in the liberation from trauma or the past that memory-driven poetry often promises.  
Instead, a worthy poem asserts itself as the “cry of its own occasion.”  This is the core of his 
poetic philosophy, but could function more globally as the motto of any poem that deals with the 
past through the lens of angelic constraint and ruin.  For the cry – the yelp of being when it 
reaches its own limit – is not necessarily opposed to the representation of memory or history.  It 
simply cannot escape the destruction that any such contemplation requires.  Where confession 
sees in the present the repetition of an originary moment made whole in memory, what might be 
called the occasional does the opposite; its memory breaks apart, siezes a moment from the past 
as it strikes the limit of the present, and searches for beginning in singularity rather than echo.  
This disjunctive view of experience is essential to both the surrealist and marvelous realist 
projects, apparent even in poets like Collins and Dunn who are not technically surrealist, and 
guides the treatment of history and reality in the texts I shall discuss dominated by images of 
angelic lapse. 
In this chapter I will be looking at literature from both North and South America and 
from the two major postwar time periods relevant to angels – American poetry from the Forties 
and Fifties and again from the late 80’s and 90’s, and one short work from Latin America.  In 
doing this I intend to describe one of the major – if not the major – attitudes that define the poetic 
angel tradition in America, using the “magical realist” short story as a road map and analytic 
tool.  Gabriel García Márquez’s story “A Very Old Man with Enormous Wings,” first published 
in 1955, has little of the chilling melancholia of Benjamin’s angel or of the majority of postwar 
American angel poetry.  Its tone is wry and uninvested.  But in the chaos of its “primordial 
landscape” and the destruction of its battered angelic “observer,” García Marquez’s fable 
                                                                                                                                                             
contemporary, scientific model of intelligence, one that is more widely dispersed throughout the entire sensorium” 
(252-53). 
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 exposes and makes perceptible the idea of the angel that grips both Benjamin and the 
contemporary poetic scene.  Marvelous realism –inheriting surrealist thinking - is especially 
adapted to this allegorical goal; as Charles Borkhuis comments, surrealism “postulates an ideal 
or absolute reality – a super-reality toward which all of its actions are directed. . .  This 
philosophy of essence keeps orthodox surrealism on a vertical axis, working to transform base 
metals into the alchemical gold of a truer reality” (244).  Allegory’s destructive idealism finds 
expression in the spontaneous revelations and beholdings that constitute surrealism’s courtship 
of the absolute.  When read allegorically, the configuration of these elements in García 
Márquez’s story reveals the spectator that makes the angel a spectacle, the reader that makes it 
readable - in “A Very Old Man”’s objective, intuitive arrangement of angelic ruination, we find 
the angel’s angel. 
Paradoxically, then, we behold in the aged and comical farce of the story’s angel the 
defining angelic function of making history, to put things in time, turn time into event, and usher 
in a world of distinctions and degrees through the ordering power of its gaze.  It as if we can only 
completely perceive the angel’s idea in the absence of this power.  Thus in the allegorical ruin a 
negative theology lurks: in attempting to portray an infinitely unknowable order through another, 
allegory suggests that the best we can know of something is in its negation.  The angel - like 
ruins, damaged and blown apart by time - is no exception.  In perceiving it foiled of its divinity 
we see more clearly the nature of that divinity, and its power. 
 This chapter approaches the figure of the ruined angel with the spirit of negation in mind.  
However, its method will take up the other side of allegory that works in consort with negation: 
the parabolic.  Allegory is distinct from the parable in that its elaboration of two worlds is more 
complex; its goal is conceptualization rather than generalization.  Yet it shares with the parable 
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 an insistence on producing meaning between two levels, one of which escapes the other and is in 
effect always pursued by it.  Both begin from the position that ignorance is not impervious to 
truth; it simply does not have within itself the means of accessing it.  Thus allegory and parable 
function as possible affirmative forms within a doctrine of negative theology.  This is how the 
via negativa expresses itself given the necessity of presence, of the physical, and of story, for 
human cognition.146  Mystical affirmation, the great angelic theologian pseudo-Dionysius insists, 
functions as an intermediary by which the reader proceeds deductively towards “that darkness 
which is beyond intellect.”147  Where negation emphasizes the differences between things, the 
parabolic, anagogic mode is guided by their similarities (both “parable” and “parabolic” derive 
from the Greek parabolē, to compare).  It is for this reason that my exegesis of the poems will be 
through story, and through the isolation of guiding parts of it that bring together the various 
incarnations of the angel of distress.  I start within a presumption that an incompletely knowable 
reality can only be known in its incompleteness through the presentation of fantasy.  García 
Márquez’s marvelous realism and the surrealist revival that sponsors the poems guide me in this.  
In them the physicality of deformation, bondage and decay find convincing expression while at 
the same time raising questions about the convincing – about truth and believability and the 
infinities of an imprisoned spectatorship.  These are the affirmations that these works embrace as 
the very mark of limitation, and which I follow in the structure of this chapter.  Their shared 
vision of an “angel in distress” speaks at once to the possibilities with which the marvelous 
                                                 
146 The great Medieval Jewish theologian Moses of Maimonides argues in The Guide of the Perplexed that only the 
philosophical thinker can think truly negatively – for the masses, parables must suffice.  These cannot be interpreted 
literally, however, lest they lead to falsity.  So Maimonides demonstrates through his own analysis of parables how 
they could lead, through careful exegesis, to the brink of knowledge which negative theology posits between the 
human and the divine. 
147 See “The Mystical Theology,” 139.  The soul, Dionysius says, aims to get to the point where it finds itself 
“speechless and unknowing,” much like the angelic naïve discribed in chapter three.  Similarly, this state requires an 
experience of the self through the other.  “Here, being neither oneself nor someone else, one is supremely united by 
a completely unknowing inactivity of all knowledge, and knows beyond the mind by knowing nothing” (137). 
209 
 invests reality, and the pathos by which reality fails to regard it for what it is, and pushes it away.  
The angel whirled further and further away from the self-destructing focal point of his gaze 
becomes himself the shrinking point on the horizon, disappearing from our eyes and petrifying in 
the imagination of the past. 
 
Modifying Claws 
 Benjamin’s angel of history has exerted such force in contemporary theory, cultural 
studies, and literary production, that it can seem at times unnecessary and perhaps impossible to 
perceive him as part of a larger legacy or tradition.  He must, like the revelation that angels 
bring, be his own beginning.  Indeed, it is difficult to find a similar evocation of angels prior to 
twentieth century modernism.148  Within Benjamin’s own thinking, however, the figure reveals a 
genealogy. For the melancholy angel is not Benjamin’s only angel.  He has an antecedent, a 
more sanguine one, who tells a different story of intelligence and confinement.  This angel 
embodies the destruction that the later angel sees, and his relation to the human is active and 
personal.  Yet he derives from the same image and source.  Benjamin’s enigmatic, angelic alter 
                                                 
148 The origin of the genuinely stricken angel (not the angel merely posing as a person in distress) is long and 
winding.  At the end of the eighteenth century angelology had fizzled in a Swedenborgian burst, and when taken up 
a few decades later, angels took partly human shape.  Doppelgangers of the romantic man of action, they assumed a 
role for the most part unoccupied since the days of intertestamentary Biblical literature, in which the “sons of God” 
make love to the daughters of men. (Gayle Shadduck describes this tendency in English romantic poetry, in 
particular Lord Byron’s Heaven and Earth, Thomas Moore’s bestselling The Loves of the Angels, and George 
Croly’s The Angel of the World, establishing a tradition that would later cross the channel – influencing Vigny, 
Lamartine, and Hugo – and be “kept alive” in French poetry well into the next century.)  These erotic angels acted 
more as gods than angels, and in ceasing to occupy a messengerial, hermeneutic role prepared the way for the 
rarefied, purely conceptual allegorizations of feminine purity belonging to the Victorian Age.  Angels of the 
nineteenth century thus destroyed the possibility of uniting action and intelligence in angelic form.  In this they 
presaged some of the major theoretical revelations of the new century.  The amorous power to pierce, to fix and grab 
hold of, could not be conjoined to human rationality in the face of Saussure’s critique of representationalism and 
Freud’s splintering of the self-interpreting psyche.  If Nietzsche had only shortly before declared the death of God 
(the unity of reason and will), these events established it.  Consequently the angelic, as a means of human 
allegorization and integration, calcified, and any treatment of angels had to take stock of this calcification and 
patiently unearth what it had to say. 
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 ego in the small piece “Agesilaus Santander”149 is an earlier interpretation of the Klee painting 
Angelus Novus, which inspired the “Theses on the Philosophy of History.”  Agesilaus Santander 
is an angel of exalted destructive power.  A demonic figure (Gershom Scholem has persuasively 
interpreted “Der Angelus Satanas” as an anagram for The Satanic Angel or Satan’s Angel), he 
looks back to Benjamin’s treatment of Klee’s Angelus Novus in the 1931 essay “Karl Kraus.”  
The passionate voice of the ephemeral and of material humanism, that essay’s New Angel 
nevertheless “preferred to free men by taking from them, rather than make them happy by giving 
to them.”  His is a tough but necessary love.  For in the vision of this angel we learn to 
“understand a humanity that proves itself by destruction” (Reflections 273). 
The gesture of “taking from” is both destruction and origin; it calls attention to the 
essence it seeks to plunder.  As in Benjamin’s ruins, the seizure of a thing by time opens up its 
source and governing idea.  In a different way than the annunciating or wrestling angel, then, this 
creature still serves his charge as the image of his own perfection and possibility.  The difference 
is that the violence of this attention – already evident in this dissertation thematically in the 
images of wrecked cars and struggles over life and death – is expressed as a menacing hostility 
built into the representation of the angel itself.  We discover that this angel is emblematized by a 
feature that the later New Angel distinctly lacks: where the signature of the later angel would 
undoubtedly be his transfixed eyes, the earlier angel surprises us with his claws.  These claws are 
part of the original picture – as are the pointed ends of the angel’s wings, wings like bats – yet 
they leave almost no trace in the later writing.  We find only the ruins they leave behind, the 
claws that pierce becoming wings that cannot flap.  Something else does their work, or in failing 
to, reveals its nature.  In order to understand what this is, however, we need to know them in 
                                                 
149 It was written in exile in Ibiza, Spain, 1933.  In his biographical interpretation of the piece, “Walter Benjamin and 
his Angel,” Gershom Scholem finds in its anxiety about past and future, poverty, and personal identity an 
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 their original setting. 
“Agesilaus Santander” is a notoriously puzzling piece of writing.  Part mystical treatise, 
part love letter, and part psychoanalytic fable, the two page essay (significant enough, however, 
to boast two drafts) defies ready penetration.  It begins with a (pseudo-) autobiographic 
description of the origin of the name.  Aegesilaus Santander, we are told, is the narrator’s 
Kaballistic secret name whose image the angel is.  It was given him by his parents as protection, 
in prophetic anticipation of what it might later mean for a Jewish writer to be so easily located 
and identified.  “This is why they gave me two names in addition to my first name – eccentric 
names which showed neither that a Jew bore them, nore even that they were his first names” 
(712).  These “prophylactic names” are also meant to appear eventfully, as a momentary 
utterance or invocation in which the angel appears to sing his worship of God and then is 
allowed to “return to the void.”  But like the later angel who cannot close his wings, the divine 
visitation has been stayed.  The narrator has fixed him to the wall, preventing him from the 
occult disappearance that is his due.  Engaged in battle with the man whose nature he expresses, 
the angel releases his “feminine aspect” to in turn hold his captor in thrall – as he is held fast by 
him.  But this gains the angel no release.  For (and I quote here from the first version of the text): 
He may have been unaware that in doing this he brought out the 
strength of the man against whom he was proceeding.  For nothing 
can overcome my patience.  Its pinions resemble those of the 
angel: they need but a few movements to hold it stationary in the 
face of the woman whom it is determined to await.  But my 
patience has claws like the angel and razor-sharp pinions, and 
makes no attempt to pounce on her whom it has sighted.  It learns 
                                                                                                                                                             
elaboration of Benjamin’s experience as a refugee. 
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 from the angel and sees how he embraces his partner with a glance, 
but then retreats in a series of spasms, inexorably.  He draws the 
angel after him on that flight into the future from which he has 
emerged.  He hopes for nothing new from that future, other than 
the gaze of the person to whom he keeps his face turned.  
And so, scarcely had I seen you the first time than I 
returned with you to where I had come from.  (713) 
In this early treatment the images of the “Theses” are already apparent.  The angel is 
paradoxically moving into the future while staying still, gazing not at this future but at the object 
of his other self, towards which his being intends.  As in the tableau from Thesis Nine, the scene 
is parabolic - geometrically parabolic.  In this figure the eye moves ever distantly from the fixed 
point of its beloved and the axis of its desire.  The reach toward infinity remains focused on the 
point of origin, on the finite and physical.  The focus is like the recipient of angelic benediction 
familiar from the first chapter, a seed that in Benjamin’s dialectical hands configures both the 
future and the past.  Angel and demon similarly move towards the origin and away from it at the 
same time. 
Unlike the angel’s, however, the demon’s point of origin is individual, not collective.  
“Agesilaus Santander” is after all a love poem as well as a meditation; reflections on time as 
messianic (as opposed to eternal) serve a personal narrative of the self’s self-declaration to the 
other.  Such reflections are not quite generalizable into allegory, comprising rather the story of a 
person’s relation to his time (it begins with the issue of secrecy and Jewishness) than the relation 
of a time to itself.  In this sense the piece is life-writing, not philosophy, and maintains its hold 
on a particular experience of historical reality.  We see this in the presence of the claws, still 
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 ready to seize experience and capable of doing so.  Almost the opposite of the Ninth Thesis’s 
spectatorial lament, the claws seem to have more in common with the “Theses”’ monadology – 
the delivery of a “shock” to the “configuration” of history, whereby an image of the past “flashes 
up” in brief but total illumination.150  The monadology of claws is a monadology of the future, 
however, of lying in wait, and though their power is a divine one, it still reflects the individual 
will.  Endowed with such power and such reflection, the destructive power of the claws exhibits 
a tenacity that is also an immobility.  Benjamin’s angel and man hold still – stationary as 
purposive seduction, or the seductive exercise of purpose.  Fierce and erotic, the patience of man 
and angel tears a moment out of its continuum, waiting for that other moment of its liberation, 
when image becomes act. 
Giorgio Agamben has invited a reading of the claws in “Agesilaus Santander” as the 
mark of Eros.  Unlike Scholem, who reads the figure a wholly diabolical, de-angelized Satan, as 
Scholem had suggested, the demon for Agamben is a demon-angel hybrid.  Drawing from 
Plutarch and Giotto primarily, Agamben concludes, “Benjamin’s figure of the angel with claws 
and wings can therefore lead us only into the domain of Eros, that is, not a demon in the Judeo-
Christian sense, but a daimōn in the Greek sense” (141).  “The Greek sense” defines the daemon 
as a personal spirit or familiar, on the one hand, and on the other, as the middle agency between 
gods and men who mediates communication between human and divine and is responsible for 
sudden or undetermined changes of events (love’s arrows symbolize the arousal of movement or 
action when reason and concept fail to provide immanent cause).151  Destruction, in other words, 
                                                 
150 Benjamin’s use of the term “configuration” in the Seventeenth Thesis is a telling echo of the Origin.  A moment 
with all its “tension” yields to those who would pierce it the mysteries of its existence, source, and possibility. 
151 In Plato’s Symposium Eros is described even more clearly in the role of the angel: “This is the power. . . which 
interprets and conveys to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men, and to men the commands and rewards of the 
gods; and this power spans the chasm which divides them, and in this all is bound together, and through this the arts 
of the prophet and the priest, their sacrifices and mysteries and charms, and all prophecy and incantation, find their 
way” (135-6).  The reference to “binding together” is most striking, suggesting that the claws of the daemon perform 
214 
 is not the work of malevolent spirit or bad will, but arises from the claiming of the self through 
ones daemon-genius – whether angel, demon, or lover.  The secret name - which in Benjamin’s 
words “gathers all the forces of life unto itself, and by which these forces can be conjured up and 
protected against outsiders” - can only be brought into being by the destruction of a certain 
humanity proper to the public self, especially the public self of the writer.  This is demanded by 
the personal angel whose claws scratch out a writing of inhuman patience, of retreat and holding 
back, cabalistically naming the possibility of transformation and return. 
 The inscriptive action of the claws recalls Benjamin’s discussion of allegory in The 
Origin of German Tragic Drama.  In setting up his distinction between the symbol and the 
allegory he quotes Schopenhauer’s description of the hieroglyphic nature of allegorical pictorial 
representation, which treats it as equivalent to the representation of a word “in large clear letters 
on the wall” (The World As Will and Representation 1, 237, quoted in Origin 162).  
Schopenhauer uses this to dismiss allegory as an abstract, rather than artistic, medium, as a 
handmaid of the concept, by which it limits our understanding of the material world, and 
collapses the particular to the universal.  Benjamin, on the other hand, finds in the allegorical 
hieroglyphic an expression of that petrifying action he considers so necessary to our 
understanding and use of history, a process that isolates history from time and its mortalities, 
converting the phenomenal to text.  The reader of this petrification is the distant angel.  As 
George Steiner comments in his introduction to the Origin, “through allegory, the Angel, who in 
Paul Klee’s depiction, Angelus Novus plays so obsessive a part in Benjamin’s inner existence, 
can look into the deeps” (20). 
For Eros, however, such hermeneutic spectatorship is only half the story.  The 
                                                                                                                                                             
the same role as the idea of substance, unifying particulars and generalities into a whole so that the soul may judge 
and, in judging, act. 
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 petrification is already present in his claws; where the angel is the reader, he is the writer, the 
writer who gazes at his work while “drawing it after him.”  The works he produces are distinct.  
An erotic rather than a philosophic expression of a crystallized and crystallizing history, the 
demon-angel calls attention to the role of the fantastic and the fictional in history - to magnify 
the act of creation through the unshirking representation of its danger.  Destruction hovers above 
origin, like Agesilaus Santander waiting to pounce on a moment that is not yet.  This 
“melancholy and fantastic relationship to existence” (“Kraus” 266) belongs to the daemon’s 
angel, but also to something else.  Angelic claws also evoke another creature of flight and 
finding - not just the demon nor the god of love - but the bird of prey. 
 
 The poetic association of angels with birds of prey has a special place in the Modernist 
poetic project.  From Rilke’s “almost deadly birds of the soul”152 to Wallace Stevens’s “Bird 
with the Coppery Keen Claws,” the guardian and the predator merge imagistically during the 
period roughly contemporary to Benjamin’s writings.  Stevens’s parakeet/paraclete in particular 
invokes the Benjaminian idea of the terrible patience of the angel-demon, “His tip a drop of 
water full of storms. / But though the turbulent tinges undulate / As his pure intellect applies its 
laws, / He moves not on his coppery, keen claws” (12-15).  Providence is a long way off, where 
– as chapter three began to describe it – laws and blessings cannot contain each other, and the 
idea of the angel as pure intelligence who is also an attendant spirit poses a serious and perhaps 
inviolable contradiction.  “Who, if I cried out, would hear me among the angels’ hierarchies?” 
Rilke asks in the opening line of the Duino Elegies.  The pure intellect is indifferent, truly 
disinterested, yet if we would have it pierce the void we discover that it answers with its own 
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 will, one that crushes ours.  “And even if one of them pressed me / suddenly against his heart: I 
would be consumed / in that overwhelming existence” (First Elegy 2-4).  It is as though, after 
years of representing angels in terms of providential judgment – whether by chosenness or 
struggle – the poets had decided that judgment could not, after all, be separated from passion.  In 
order for the universal and the particular to meet they had to do so through feeling, feeling that 
was less than love and prior to intuition, but that was also more than desire and after sensation. 
The claws inherited from the daemonic return to articulate this something that the 
modernist angel, a stormy drop and unruly pinhead, brings to the small point with such violent 
infinity.  It is truly the threshold between the angels in their heavenly hierarchies and the human 
on their confused earth, a threshold that something inhuman but also physical (and physically 
powerful) would uniquely inhabit.  In their initial form these are the angel predators, who stay 
time as mortal challenge and disruption; in metamorphosis, however, the angel can no longer 
stay timeless time.  Conceived on the other end of the event, where the gaze of history replaces 
the grip of prophecy, its patience appears as the patience of endurance and surprise rather than 
anticipation and cunning.  The later angel relinquishes will for love – for only in this way can it 
herald the messianic and a new order of time that, because it explodes the sequence of things, has 
no need for the will that would hold them together.  With will the angel circles around and then 
enters the human world, its action and its temporality.  With love it leaves it, and leaves it 
exposed. 
Almost thirty years after Benjamin finished the “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” 
Gabriel García Márquez wrote what has become in English his most frequently anthologized 
short story, “A Very Old Man With Enormous Wings.”  This “tale for children” is a classic of 
                                                                                                                                                             
152 The Duino Elegies is a series of poems about angels as elusive figures of the terror and wonder of existence, in 
which the mysteries of the threshold take violent and intense form – belonging to us personally and yet wholly alien 
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 marvelous realism.  A decrepit angel falls into the courtyard of a humble seaside family, a 
happening with no explanation except that offered by a neighbor woman, who tells them that he 
must have been coming for the sick child but was knocked down by the storm.  Angels appear, 
she implies, not because of their power but in moments of weakness; they are visible insofar as 
their wings are impotent.  The angel is unceremoniously kept with the chickens, quickly becomes 
a local spectacle, the family charges admission, and eventually the angel is upstanded by a 
human-turned-tarantula, the locals having become disillusioned with his absurd miracles.  He is 
forgotten, and then one day becomes well and departs, disappearing into “an imaginary dot on 
the horizon of the sea.”  The surrealist relation among people and things, the inclusion of the 
supernatural, the diversion from and perversion of natural reason, and above all the interpolation 
of daily with historical time - all the elements of the genre are radiantly present in this story.  The 
story’s simultaneously de-familiarizing and naturalizing project, evident in its depiction of the 
angel/very old man, suggests a way to relate Benjamin’s two angels.  A parable without a point, 
the story depicts its hapless angel as the ruins of the bird of prey, and lets those ruins speak for 
themselves. 
 At first, García Márquez’s angel would seem an unalloyed echo of the melancholy 
Angelus Novus.  The first paragraph suggests this, positioning its angel as falling, Icarus-like, in 
view of a scene of disaster and decay: 
On the third day of rain they had killed so many crabs inside the 
house that Pelayo had to cross his drenched courtyard and throw 
them into the sea, because the newborn child had a temperature all 
night and they thought it was due to the stench.  The world had 
been sad since Tuesday.  Sea and sky were a single ash-gray thing 
                                                                                                                                                             
and ruthless.”Every angel is terrifying,” the most famous line announces. 
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 and the sands of the beach, which on March nights glimmered like 
powdered light, had become a stew of mud and rotten shellfish.  
The light was so weak at noon that when Pelayo was coming back 
to the house after throwing away the crabs, it was hard for him to 
see what it was that was moving and groaning in the rear of the 
courtyard.  He had to go very close to see that it was an old man, a 
very old man, lying face down in the mud, who, in spite of his 
tremendous efforts, couldn’t get up, impeded by his enormous 
wings.  (Collected Stories 217) 
At the level of detail, this passage immediately suggests figures of the modernist aesthetic 
project, a project also evident in the famous passage from Benjamin’s “Theses.”  The sense of 
waste is prominent, apparent in the impotent waste of the angel’s enormous wings, in the swarm 
of dead crabs, and in the “single ash-gray” merging of sea and sky.  The angel happens as a 
consequence of this formlessness, descending amid an infinity of dead crabs and an 
undiscernable horizon that indicate his genealogy as a creature of the sublime.  We witness in 
him, however, not a sublime power – his ineffective enormous wings indicate capacity without 
power – but a sublime paralysis.  The angel is impeded, immobile – a feature that later in the 
story will be characterized as patience, “the patience of a dog who had no illusions.”  This is in 
fact his “only supernatural virtue,” and it calls us to look differently at the images of decay that 
not only surround the fallen angel but make his story, bringing us back toward the destructive 
daemon of “Agesilaus Santander.”  For instance, after having roused him with their stones, 
feather-pulling, and hen-pecking, the community realizes “that his passivity was not that of a 
hero taking his ease but that of a cataclysm in repose” (221).  The potentially destructive power 
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 of the angel awaits, allegorized twice in the story by the presence of an isolated condensed 
sharpness.  In one instance, at the story’s end, the angel has become just a dot on the horizon, a 
point into which the vastness of the sky is packed.  The other is at the beginning, where he is 
ushered in by the wash of crabs, dead, only their hard skeletons left.  Here T.S. Eliot’s image 
scurries underfoot: “I should have been a pair of ragged claws / Scuttling across the floors of 
silent seas” (“Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” 73-74). 
Like Eliot, García Márquez does not force the moment to its crisis.  Claws are never 
directly mentioned, but the angel is consistently referred to in terms of a bird of prey.  These 
references progress evenly throughout the story.  In the second paragraph we are told of his 
“buzzard wings,” later they are compared to those of a hawk, an airplane, and a “sidereal bat,” 
and in the final paragraph, his self-exorcism from the household, the angel rises to the sky “with 
the risky flapping of a senile vulture.”153  These heatedly increasing images define his 
relationship to the family he adopts, and the message his changing presence clumsily delivers.  
Though the angel begins in quarantine in the chicken coop (erotically titillating the “fascinated” 
chickens and eventually the obsessed locals), by the end he has become an unwanted household 
intimate, patiently devouring its peace.  We see this change visually.  After the ravages of nature 
eventually destroy the chicken coop he begins to wander about what has now, from the funds he 
himself produced as five-cent attraction, become a mansion.  At this point, the angel becomes 
demon. 
                                                 
153 Robert Hayden’s poem based on this story, “For a Young Artist,” also mentions the angel in the context of bird 
of prey.  I quote from the last five stanzas, to give a sense of the context and movement from the angel as patient, 
monstrous predator to a moment in the pure geometry of flight.  Hayden begins in the chicken coop: “In the dark his 
heavy wings / open and shut, stiffly spread / like a wooden butterfly’s. / He leaps, board wings clum- / sily flapping, 
big sex / flopping, falls. / The hawk-haunted fowl / flutter and squawk; / panic squeals in the sty. / He strains, an 
awk- / ward patsy, sweating strains / leaping falling.  Then - / silken rustling in the air, / the angle of ascent / 
achieved” (33-47).  Here the angel is “hawk-haunted,” haunted, potentially, by memories of its former bird-like 
freedom, and by the chicken wire that, claw-like, pens it in. 
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 The angel went dragging himself about here and there like a stray 
dying man.  They would drive him out of the bedroom with a 
broom and a moment later find him in the kitchen.  He seemed to 
be in so many places at the same time that they grew to think that 
he’d been duplicated, that he was reproducing himself all through 
the house, and the exasperated and unhinged Elisenda shouted that 
it was awful living in that hell full of angels. (224) 
Aquinas’s idea of the instantaneous, discontinuous movement of angels here 
metamorphoses into a parodic torment.  Importantly, it does so through the conceit of the old 
man still capable of and insistent on reproducing, and hence a scourge on the family-impulses of 
the young.  Relentless and repetitive, prey becomes predator.  In this way the figure upsets the 
self-definitions of modernity and its relationship to what it calls progress.  Within the story of 
such a “very old man” the modernist self-consciousness of age becomes contaminated by the 
references to a (shaky) predatoriness; such predatoriness is usually associated with youth, with 
personal power rather than social status.  The man of unknown experience reflects the showy 
mansion back to itself, outdoing it in its newness and as a sign of limitless and excessive 
reproduction.  As the unwished-for alter ego of the family, the angel also reminds it of the waste 
and decay that progress leaves behind, yet to which it is nevertheless ever and parabolically tied.  
He affronts the household as almost a zombie - a living death.  For the daemon’s essence is in 
living; his claws firmly pierce the present with a patience that, like vultures endlessly circling, 




Deformation and Decay 
“And also the watch heard them talk of one Deformed.  They say he wears a key 
in his ear and a lock hanging by it and borrows money in God’s name, the which 
he hath used so long and never paid that now men grow hardhearted and will not 
lend nothing for God’s sake.” 
-Much Ado About Nothing 
For the most part, contemporary poetry does not represent its melancholic angels in their 
demonic original.  These angels have already collapsed, revealing themselves as flightless or 
misshapen in some way.  There are a few exceptional references to the bird of prey in poems 
from the 1980’s: James Galvin, in writing of a provincialism in which angels have “learned their 
own angelic disbelief,” concludes with the image of “So many owls made of pollen / Wintering 
in a stand of imaginary timber,” giving the title to his collection Imaginary Timber (“Everyone 
Knows Whom the Saved Envy” 29-30), and Robert Hass’s “Privilege of Being” describes angels 
above, themselves the return glances and activity of “human longing,” staring at the human scene 
below where “two beings with evolved eyes, rapacious, / startled, connected at the belly in an 
unbelievably sweet / lubricious glue, stare at each other, / and the angels are desolate” (13-16).154  
Already in these poems, however, we see the claws metamorphosing into the gaze.  It is the 
couple’s eyes that are rapacious, not their hands.  Birds of prey may clasp “lubriciously,” but 
they are notable most of all for their piercing gaze, and the limitlessness of their spectatorial 
attention.  They angels are “desolate,” mired by their own “disbelief” in imaginary worlds that, 
like the helplessly spread-eagled Angel of History, lack the ability to puncture reality. 
                                                 
154 Compare also Brandon Mendoza Som’s “Still Life: My Grandmother Smoking in Bed” (2002), which begins, 
“Talking to angels is not unlike falconry.”  As in Hass’s poem and Benjamin’s short piece, Som associates the 
angel-predator with desire, “The whole of our want always circling, like falcons” (9).  A line further on suggests 
how this desire is still present in the image of the angel of history, for “If light desires nothing then it walks away / 
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 More to the point is an earlier poem by Donald Justice.  Part of the angel uspurge in 
poetry of the immediate post-World War II era, his simply titled “Sonnet” from 1950 shows in 
its pure form the stakes of representing powerful and piercing angels, and the legacy it creates 
for the more typical forms of the later angel poetry.  Writing about the human urge to 
transcendence from within an inevitable enclosure, Justice gives us a view of the angel when it is 
still predatory - that is, when it is still capable of delivering and making good the historical 
occasion potential in the human act.  The cry of such occasion in its very beginnings, which are 
the beginnings of history itself, “Sonnet” opens by announcing the feature of Eden that most 
defines its nature – the walls.  Here the legendary cherubim with their flaming swords anticipate 
the later fixation with claws, also semantically noted in the poem.  Their power, we see, comes 
from the power (true of both grasping and of flight) of opening and closing, just as the power of 
divine revelation requires at the same time the power of sealing-off, withdrawal, and limitation, 
in order to maintain its status as mystery.  Justice’s poem gives us both this divine presence and 
absence, emblematized in the final image of the threshold: 
The walls surrounding them they never saw: 
The angels, often.  Angels were as common 
As birds or butterflies, but looked more human. 
As long as the wings were furled, they felt no awe. 
Beasts, too, were friendly.  They could find no flaw 
In all of Eden: this was the first omen. 
The second was the dream which woke the woman: 
She dreamed she saw the lion sharpen his claw. 
                                                                                                                                                             
without looking back” (12-13).  The angel insists on looking back, even as the storms of progress de-claw his 
capacity to sieze the world below him. 
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 As for the fruit, it had no taste at all. 
They had been warned of what was bound to happen; 
They had been told of something called the world; 
They had been told and told about the wall. 
They saw it now; the gate was standing open. 
As they advanced, the giant wings unfurled.  (1-14) 
The final rhyme marks what Justice has in his classes referred to as an electric jolt, that line at 
the end that sends shock waves through the rest of the poem.155  Here the wings of the cherubim 
are their own messianism, executing judgment – always the judgment of the boundaries of what 
is knowable to human discovery.  They enforce the invisible law that exists in the face of visible 
freedom.  What Adam and Eve discover is not the unknowable, however, but the limits of the 
human.  These limits are also the threshold of the divine – the walls that only begin to be 
articulated as such with the appearance of perfection and the vision of the claws.  The angels 
reveal themselves in place of the walls; they express the presence of limits when they are not 
seen.  They are, in a sense, the messengers of Adam and Eve’s claustrophobia.  When the fall 
from imagination to reality has at last occurred, when the gate has opened, then Adam and Eve 
finally see them.  Then the angels open their wings, signalling the beginnings of temporality and 
the history that is, already, out there. 
The opening of the wall, accompanied by the angels unfurling their destructive power, 
suggests the ruin of Eden.  No longer a whole within which earthly paradise “corresponds” to 
heavenly, Eden becomes itself the spoiled and impenetrable border between human action and 
divine grace.  Now in the tattered configurations of history, Adam and Eve look back on the 
ruins of what once kept them in check, the architecture in whose destruction the human is 
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 revealed in the essential naivete of its passion.  The burial of Eden is the birth of the world.  
Mark Strand, in the long poem Dark Harbor which I discuss more fully later, has a line 
evocative of this scene: “A shadowed glass held within its frozen calm an image / Of abundance, 
a bloom of humanness, a hymn in which / The shapes and sounds of Paradise are buried” 
(XXVIII. 22-24).  We find the fullest expression of the human in its song of paradise lost.  This 
latent lament is foreshadowed by the opening claws and the unfurled wings, both evocative of 
the unfurling of scrolls and the message-bearing power the angels would henceforth assume.  
Here Justice’s poem is proto-allegorical, likening the power of inscription to the exposure of a 
thing in its state of collapse.  The writing is on the wall – in the revelation of the wall itself at the 
moment of the fall. 
Where the poets of the mid-century are more interested in representing the event of 
divine encounter and of human fall, the 1990’s American poets are post-lapsarian, primarily 
looking at angels as creatures of post-wanting, post-potency, almost post-mortem.  Theirs is not 
the moment of judgment or anticipation, but the moment of frustration, captivity, and confusion.  
Their angels either do not fly, or fly amiss, or fly away.  Above all, they are deformed, corrupted 
by a humanness that un-wings them.  Once perfect creatures, each a species unto itself, the 
angels now are malformed members of a species, partially realized examples of an idea where 
before they expressed the perfect unity of idea and act.  The relations between human and angel 
darkly and magnificently depicted in the angel-eros – relations that used the potency of the 
daemon to empower the human – resulted in the weakening of the angel.  In waiting for history, 
the angel is surprised by the gathering forces of history’s ideology, and loosens his hold.  Thus 
the former Scholastic emphasis on angelic perfection and individuation, apparent in the idea of 
the angel as active intelligence, decays into the image of an enforced passivity.  In this image we 
                                                                                                                                                             
155 I would like to thank Scott Silsbe for this reference, as well as for calling this poem to my attention. 
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 view – perhaps for the first time – the idea of corruptible immortality, in the spirit of “A Very 
Old Man.” 
Three poems stand out in representating this angelic corruption.  The first, like Justice’s 
“Sonnet,” comes from the midcentury angel rush.  A.R. Ammons’s “A Crippled Angel”156 
anticipates the poetic representation of the melancholy angel that would dominate the 1990’s.  
Like García Márquez’s story the poem is told from the perspective of human encounter and 
human destruction, neatly moving from the problem of lameness to the glory (and almost 
simultaneous effacement) of ascent.  As in Donald Justice’s “Sonnet,” the final spread of wings – 
the emblem of completion - signals death, but in this case it is the death of the angel, not the 
human.  Significantly such death is allegorically enabled by the references to industrial 
production, in which the figure of Time is embedded: 
A crippled angel bent in a scythe of grief 
mourned in an empty lot 
Passing by I stopped 
amused that immortality should grieve 
and said 
It must be exquisite (1-6) 
The poem continues its marvelous configuration of an allegorical idea.  “Immortality” grieving 
takes shape as a weary dragon, a retired daemon, and the breakdown of the machine. 
Smoke came out of the angel’s ears 
the axles 
   of slow handwheels of grief 
and under the white lids of its eyes 
                                                 
156 “A Crippled Angel” is listed in the 1951-1955 section of Ammons’s Collected Poems. 
226 
 bulged tears of purplelight 
Watching the agony diffuse in 
shapeless loss 
I interposed a harp (7-14) 
As the speaker takes up the harp he becomes the emblem of the lyric poet that the lyric poet 
himself must kill.  As in Justice and Strand, for the poet to sing, paradise must die.  “Bent in a 
scythe of grief,” the angel is also his own grim reaper, brought to his knees by the “shapeless 
loss” of poetic form (and which the harp “interposed” resuscitates).  The Benjaminian obsession 
with a formless piling-up of historical events returns in this image of a dragon-hoard of grief - 
dragons themselves Satanic types.  But in music the fire of the dragon and perhaps of hell (where 
indeed immortality does grieve) opens upward.  A Renaissance quotation follows this slow 
beginning of flight, in the suggestion of Botticelli’s Venus rising from the sea.  “Grief sounded 
like an ocean rose / in bright clothes” (20-21).  The poet answers Venus as Cupid, becoming his 
own erotic messenger and daimon of the violence that writing must claim if it is to burn its script 
into the wall of immortality.  The speaker does this by shooting the angel as it rises in the sky – 
the predator become the prey. 157  Crippled in agony and loss, immortality is made vulnerable to 
mortality.  “Taking a bow I shot transfixing / the angel midair / all miracle hanging fire / on 
rafters of the sky” (26-29).  The dragon-angel of despair shares the same fate as Agesilaus 
                                                 
157 Writing half a century later, David Berman in “Snow” also describes an angel-poaching.  The speaker here is 
wandering with his little brother across a field, making up stories.  “I pointed to a place where kids had made angels 
in the snow. / For some reason, I told him that a troop of angels / had been shot and dissolved when they hit the 
ground” (2-4).  From there a causal fiction evolves: Who shot them? A farmer.  Why?  They were on his property.  
“Snow” then concludes via a series of asides that renders the poem simultaneously intimate and social.  “When it’s 
snowing, the outdoors seem like a room. / Today I traded hellos with my neighbor. / Our voices hung close in the 
new acoustics. / A room with the walls blasted to shreds and falling. / We returned to our shoveling, working side by 
side in silence. / But why were they on his property, he asked”  (11-16).  From the freedom of a walk in the field to 
the imputation of the bounds of property, the angels of imagination and childhood are transfigured as trespassers of 
reality and worldly relations.  Snow – at first the passive substance in which forms inhere also encloses, limits, and 
destroys those limits.  In the relations between working neighbors the sounds of “blasting” evoke either war or the 
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 Santander nailed to the wall or the angel of history locked in fixed flight.  In attempting to make 
immortality subject to mortal will, to appropriate it for our power (in this case the power of 
poetic creation), we forget that it can no longer be immortality. 
The melancholy poetry of the contemporary scene generates its own life from the ruin of 
the angel.  In Ammons’s case the poet revives the crippled angel to a burning, destructive power 
of flight and song only to “transfix” him in his poetry.  The ascension of the Angel-Eros provides 
for the poet the arrows by which his daemonic force may be taken and assimilated, as in the 
beliefs of the cannibals that by eating their noble opponent they thereby accumulate his strength.  
The poetry presumes here an identity between angel and poet, like “Agesilaus,” consisting of a 
scriptural alterity.  The poet’s angel is his other as it appears in writing, which is to say, at the 
bleeding point of the agonistic between life and art (Charles Rosen understands in Benjamin’s 
theory of biographical interpretation the necessity that the two are never in a state of 
correspondence, rather “the artist shapes his life and his experience to make his art possible,” 
138).  In this way the angel provides the occasion for the poet to name himself, heroically.  By 
the time of Stephen Dunn’s “Retarded Angel,”158 however, the battle cry has become an elegy, 
for the hero-poet is himself in ruins.  Landed fully in the 1990’s, poetic angels show no sign of 
their former power.159  The ruins of writing itself confront the writer at the moment of his 
                                                                                                                                                             
wrecking ball, and the walls surround them (not between them as Frost would have it) in ruins.  The walls of snow 
are post-lapsarian walls.   
158 Dunn’s collection that this poem arises from, between Angels, also includes a poem entitled “Hawk,” describing  
a bird of prey circling and crashing through the window, testimony to the limitations of human exegetical language 
and the primal power of poetry, removed from and above the earth “where the air is such a lie,” and which is alone 
capable of possessing it.  “Guardian Angel,” the poem that begins his collection, also picks up the theme of angelic 
ineffectuality in relation to the human world: “Afloat between lives and stale truths, / he realizes / he’s never truly 
protected one soul, / they all die anyway, and what good / is solace, / solace is cheap” (1-6).  And later, “When the 
poor are evicted, he stands / between them / and the bank, but the bank sees nothing / in its way.  When the meek are 
overpowered / he’s there, the thin air / through which they fall.” (19-24).  Like Kushner’s, Dunn’s angel can only 
function as falsity, invisibly complicit with oppression and injustice.  “Trying to live beyond despair,” the guardian 
angel nevertheless absorbs the debasement he seeks to save. 
159 The historical age that subordinates art to truth demands of the poet a revelation of this truth – of the essentially 
human, in the service of which language as expression must submit to violence, in particular the violence of the 
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 composition, in the language of fallenness and decay with which he articulates his social role.160  
So the poet regards his angel as the flightless silence of his own reckoning.   
Wordless with a message, 
you sit on our shoulders 
off-balance, one wing 
 
apparently useless  (1-4) 
The result of some “accidentally brilliant” agency, Dunn’s “damaged” angel gazes patiently at 
the speaker.  He denies argument and judgment and urges no real change, his restraint matched 
by the duration of his travel - “years perhaps / of landing elsewhere” (20-21).  In his half-winged 
stationary gaze the deformed angel presents the human to itself as its own threshold, and his 
muteness is the cry of this crossing, sustained for so long it has become inaudible. 
Voiceless, flightless, and lost, these qualities describe modern literary angels as they are 
epitomized in García Márquez’s story and as they continue to land elsewhere across the years.  
Mark Strand’s section XXXV from the long poem Dark Harbor presents these characteristics all 
at once and in beautifully condensed form.  He does so by invoking a physical condition which 
ought to be foreign to pure intelligences: being sick. 
                                                                                                                                                             
passing of time.  Rosen explains in reference to Benjamin’s work on the Trauerspiel: “Every critical reading should 
move toward that moment when the work appears to exist for the sake of the philosophical truth within it: it no 
longer exists for itself, and it therefore loses its charms.  It reaches the condition of the inexpressive” (151).  It is in 
this inexpressivity, apparent in the Baroque treatment of allegory that so fascinates Benjamin, that a work’s essential 
nature – its “idea” – reveals itself. 
160 Michael Blumenthal’s volume Dusty Angel brings together both these ideas, the subordination of the poet to the 
witness-journalist, and the difficulty for poetry to revolutionize language.  In “The Happiest Man in the World” he 
explains, in reference to the Balkan War, how history “no longer seems to have much need for poetry / among 
angels or demons, or what once passed for friends” (17-18), and in “Stones,” he continues the politics/poetics 
binary: “But I have always hated stones / and loved words, / and held to the deep illusion / that words could wound 
and heal / as no stones can, that one day / there will be a revolution of words / in which the angels will come / to 
sing with the vipers, / and even the dark flames of greed / will be doused by the right syllables / spoken in the right 
places” (5-15).  But in this poem the viper-angel, the transcendent predator of words, is waylaid by thieves, and 
allows the speaker only a poetic and empty hope that one day someone will turn the words into stones. 
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 The sickness of angels is nothing new. 
I have seen them crawling like bees, 
Flightless, chewing their tongues, not singing, 
 
Down by the bus terminal, hanging out, 
Showing their legs, hiding their wings, 
Carrying on for their brief term on earth, 
 
No longer smiling.  (1-7) 
In the half-light of the half-world – the liminal port of transit where everything feels like it’s a 
step behind its own happening - physical corruptibility displays itself.  Like Dunn’s one-winged 
angel, Strand’s angels hide half themselves, showing their legs only, and casting the aura of 
Edenic illumination only in passive sleep and shade, only as the potential message that arrives 
without being read.  Dallying too long in the human, these angel-insect-dharma bums can only 
turn their corruption and their silence into Eros.  They “drift into the arms of strangers who step / 
Into their light, which is the mascara of Eden, / Offering more than invisible love” (8-10).  They 
are almost human, existing in and for the dark harbor of another’s arms – almost human, except 
that for them humanity is a sickness, and the body “the pure erotic glory of death without 
echoes.”  In the belatedness of the crippled, the retarded, the sick angel, time also decays, piling 
on top of itself as if searching for the echo of immortality, and at the same time ravishing its 
absence. 
Dark Harbor is, as the book tells us, a single poem, a series of meditations elaborating 
the ideas of memory and possibility, past and future.  Section XXXV, “The sickness of angels,” 
arrives at the crest of a sequence of images of evanescence uniting moon, stars, dreams and 
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 prophecies.  These staples of surreal-chic contemporary poetry prepare us for the occasional 
everyday-fantastical moment: “Someone is playing a tape of  birds singing. / Someone has fallen 
asleep on a boxcar of turnips” (XVII. 8-9).  But the poem (and even in its forty-five segments 
Dark Harbor is still its own poem) is too coherent and conceptual to be truly surrealist.  Place 
and situtation vary only between constituent poems, and return always to the intimations of 
luminosity promised by the speaker’s unchanging age and attitude.  They are poems about voice 
and thus – while like surrealist poetry they move receptively – ultimately their receptivity 
presumes a unitary and stable subject.  The tone also has none of that revolutionary jubilance so 
often found in surrealism.  Reflective, rather than immediate, Strand’s poem focuses on “grief,” 
“melancholy,” “mourning.”  The surrealist sense of freedom above all is missing.  We find at 
best only a qualified freedom, angels in the bus stop giving love instead of revelation.  Within a 
context of inexorable limitedness (“It is true, as someone has said, that in / A world without 
heaven all is farewell” XVI. 1-2 and “The Beyond is merely beyond, / A melancholy place of 
failed and fallen stars” XLII. 17-18), the angel turns half-human.  Immortality grieves, wingless, 
watching its light bounce off the walls. 
In her book on surrealism, Anna Balakian describes the ultimate aim of the movement as 
a scientific one: in science’s ability to grant “metaphysical destiny” to human physical creation it 
affirms “faith in the human potential to master the universe” (45).  The faith (and the hubris) here 
is dazzling.  More provocative is her reading of the actual project and consequences of 
surrealism, which though they may stem from this grand philosophy, take on their own life.  This 
life will continue in and invest the often tragic but highly creative vision of marvelous realism.  
For, in its embracing of the possibilities of objective chance, the “infinite expansion of reality” 
into the realms of the imagination, and cultivation of absurdity as a means to truth, surrealism 
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 opens the door of the relation between subject and object.  Nothing limits human invention, so 
long as the human creates the artistic tools to bring phenomena to reveal their mystical essences.  
Surrealism, then, is a sensory-epistemological project that, Balakian notes, initiates a revolution 
of language.  The kind of marvelous realism that influences contemporary poetry, however, is 
less concerned with language as a force whose capriciousness may be appropriated as a source of 
illumination, than in the ways that language reveals in its very conventions a force that goes 
beyond itself.  (Octavio Paz makes a similar point about García Márquez, that he “doesn’t 
change the language” in the way that the initiators of the tradition did.  “[Neruda and Vallejo and 
Borges] started a new tradition, he comes at the end of an old one . . . the rural, epic, and magic 
tradition of Guïraldes, Quiroga, José Eustàcio Rivera.”)161  There is much to be said about why 
in the English-speaking world One Hundred Years of Solitude is regarded as both the premier 
and prototypical “magical realist” novel, but this relationship to language of which Paz speaks is 
perhaps the most telling reason.  For marvelous realism is also importantly concerned with the 
subject-matter that is generally identified as “decadence.”162  What Balakian terms the “creative 
principle” of surrealist metaphysics the later movement recasts as the exploration of decadent 
fecundities.  For angels, this means a creaturely physicalization in the domain of selfhood - that 
is, in the body of the human. 
Right from the beginning of “A Very Old Man with Enormous Wings” the creature is 
introduced to us as part human.  “On the following day everyone knew that a flesh-and-blood 
angel was held captive in Pelayo’s house” (218).  His humanness is determined by both 
ecclesiastical and scientific authorities.  The local priest decides on examination that he is “much 
too human,” being afflicted with foul smells and parasites, and the local doctor finds he has 
                                                 
161 See his interview with Selden Rodman in the the latter’s Tongues of Fallen Angels, 143. 
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 examinable, if impossibly diseased, organs.  “What surprised him most, however, was the logic 
of his wings.  They seemed so natural on that completely human organism that he couldn’t 
understand why other men didn’t have them too” (223-224).  The naïve literalness of marvelous 
realism asserts itself here: where the surreal image would unearth the fantastic within the human, 
“A Very Old Man” treats the fantastic as unassumingly as it would a new disease.  Marvelous 
realism is what the supernatural looks like within the apparatus of the known.  The banal limits 
of everyday life enclose the angel; in fact we do not find his initial deteriorated presence so 
surprising, as much as we do his geometric sublimity at the end.  The language itself leads us to 
expect such supernatural deterioration, to find it as “natural” as the monstrosity of enormous 
wings.  Immediately, the first paragraph naturalizes all unknown experience through a kind of 
syntactic obliviousness.  “The light was so weak at noon that when Pelayo was coming back to 
the house after throwing away the crabs, it was hard for him to see what it was that was moving 
and groaning in the rear of the courtyard” (217).  There are no introductions.  The fact of there 
being something in the courtyard is referred to unassumingly as something already known and 
registered, “que cuando Pelayo regresaba a la casa después de haber tirado los cangrejos, le costó 
trabajo ver qué era lo que se movía y se quejaba en el fondo del patio” (La Increíble y Triste 
Historia 11).  Narrative perception skips a step: we do not learn that the thing is before we learn 
more about it.  Another writer might tell us first, “Pelayo heard something moving and groaning 
in the rear of the courtyard.  The light was too weak, however, for him to tell what it was,” but 
that would signal a different kind of story, one where the unknown could actually exist as such, 
where causes and consequence would appear in order,163 and where angels would retain their 
                                                                                                                                                             
162 The work of Juan Rulfo is probably the best example of this inner necessity of the form, the short story “Luvina” 
and his major work Pedro Páramo especially. 
163 The first line of the story is an only slightly less strong example of this: “On the third day of rain they had killed 
so many crabs inside the house that Pelayo had to cross his drenched courtyard and throw them into the sea, because 
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 accustomed grandeur.  Instead, pest and smells, diseased organs, mental and physical idiocy, 
these are the wreckages we expect of our angel.  In the failure of the human logic and judgment, 
apparent in an inability to order experience and to recognize divine eventfulness when it 
happens, the angel must conform to the human, and, in the process, contract its own disorder. 
The failure of human reason and evaluation appears first in the carnivalesque misrule of 
the story’s language, but more dramatically in the plot as well.  The angel, deformed but still 
supernatural, is relegated to a sideshow attraction next to something that is only bizarre: the 
spider-woman.  She is in fact a kind of spokesman for the human, an institutionalized carnival 
attraction who, unlike the “bird-man” (who speaks in an unknown “hermetic” tongue), divulges 
self to public through that great mediator, the confession.  “She was a frightful tarantula the size 
of a ram and with the head of a sad maiden.  What was most heartrending, however, was not her 
outlandish shape but the sincere affliction with which she recounted the details of her 
misfortune” (222).  Hers is a misfortune with a moral meaning, for it was a heavenly lightning 
bolt changed her to a spider after she attended a dance without permission.  The allusions to 
Kafka’s “Metamorphosis” and “The Hunger Artist” are ironic, as the spider-woman’s triumph is 
a triumph of only mundane translatability; she is not genuinely monstrous or grotesque, but 
touching, a fallen woman rather than a fallen angel.  In adulating her the crowd acts precisely as 
a crowd, privileging received generic and didactic conventions as they appear in this cheap 
allegory of human frailty.  “A spectacle like that, full of so much human truth and with such a 
                                                                                                                                                             
the newborn child had a temperature all night and they thought it was due to the stench” (217).  While they would be 
more receptive to such an illogical presentation, even most children would know that the most important thing to 
learn is that the child had a temperature, that the killing of the crabs is incidental, and that any normal storyteller 
should begin with the stench - not “Al tercer día de lluvia. . .” 
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 fearful lesson, was bound to defeat without even trying that of a haughty angel who scarcely 
deigned to look at mortals” (ibid).164
The rich humor of the narrative voice here calls attention to the spectacle as a very 
different kind of allegory – an allegory of foolishness, of human susceptibility, official discourse, 
and consumption.  The distant angel, mute and unfathomable on the other hand, suggests 
something else.  He presents the ultimate deformation of the angel - an allegory of passivity.  
Cloistered in a chicken coop, losing feathers, decrepit and incoherent, the carnivalized angel is 
neither messenger nor agent.  What in the daemon’s clawlike immobility appears as a matter of 
choice, becomes in the caged angel’s passivity an expression of circumstance.  And it is there 
that we need look for an idea of participation that the angel in distress can offer – in a theory of 
history which the angel’s own gaze has to show us. 
  
Looking Backward 
García Márquez’s work has often been read within the genre of the carnivalesque.  In 
fact, its relation to the world-in-reverse is assumed as part of the dynamic of magical realism as 
well as exemplary of his own thematic preoccupations.  And yet carnival, as the formalization of 
disorder and heterogeneity, is opposed to angels and their narratives.  Where angelism solemnly 
proffer distinction, carnival chases it away with gleeful uncrowning; where the one orders 
hierarchy, the other invites leveling. Angels and carnival are on either side of the 
Dionysian/Apollonian divide.  Carnival is public, the language of the marketplace, whereas 
                                                 
164 The narrator continues, contrasting her reinscription of the social order with the angel’s disordering presence in 
that world.  “Besides, the few miracles attributed to the angel showed a certain mental disorder, like the blind man 
who didn’t recover his sight but grew three new teeth, or the paralytic who didn’t get to walk but almost won the 
lottery, and the leper whose sores sprouted sunflowers.  Those consolation miracles, which were more like mocking 
fun, had already ruined the angel’s reputation when the woman who had been changed into a spider finally crushed 
him completely” (222-223). 
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 angels appear in solitude, in the cloister, the home, the car, or – in the case of “A Very Old Man” 
– the rear of the private courtyard.  Both essentially fantastic genres, they articulate otherness 
through vastly different means.  For angels, the other appears in and through history, for 
carnival, through nature and the body.  Thus angelic incorporeality levies the principle of 
substantial being, of immaterial unity and totality, against the other’s “material bodily 
principle”165 in which life appears in its incompletion and incoherence, in the holes and cavities 
of perceptive experience.  Angelic ascent invertedly mirrors carnivalesque debasement, and so,  
tellingly, carnival embraces for its figural representative the devil and his masque.  Freedom for 
the angels means loving conformity to universal law; for devil mas’, freedom is its own law and 
self-determining principle.  The world of carnival is the whole world, at once alien and familiar.  
As a consequence, and most fundamentally perhaps, the aesthetic modes of the two appear in 
dialectical opposition.  Bakhtin, engaging Hugo’s writings on the grotesque, reminds us that the 
grotesque “aesthetics of the monstrous” is essentially “a means of contrasting the sublime,” at 
the same time that “the two complete each other” (43).  For Hugo, this completion is Beauty, 
whose lover Cupid is. 
“A Very Old Man” asks us to view the antinomies of of history and nature, birth and 
death, angelic and grotesque together.  This was certainly the project of the age that made 
carnival an art form, and that also produced a very specific kind of angel which, one could argue, 
could only be born within a consciousness of deformity and decay.  The Renaissance emphasis 
on renewal, rebirth, and the natural man found expression both in the universal experience of the 
carnival world and in the innocent figure of the cherub.  The pierced body with its sensitive 
orifices submitted to a monstrous, predatory knowledge at the same time that a sublime news 
                                                 
165 This comes from Mikhail Bakhtin’s famous writings on carnival in Rabelais and His World.  He defines the 
carnivalesque aesthetically as the  “bodily awareness of another world.” 
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 was being heralded by messengers who knew no touch, though they might provoke it.  This 
dialectic would appear in terms of proximity to the human.  The world as universal was 
predicated on an ideal of intimacy - Bakhtin points out that carnival makes no distinction 
between reveller and spectator, for all participate in the event - whereas the universal intelligence 
assumed a distance between them, whose role it was to mediate.  Born within a world that 
conceived itself as a totality of human experience, the little cupids found themselves doomed to 
spectatorship.  At the edge of the action, these figures absorb the distance that might interpose 
itself between viewer and subject, expressing it in their ornamental positioning and in their 
transparent gazes – passive and dreamy and very far away.  As “A Very Old Man”’s narrator 
says of Pelayo’s bird-man, “The angel was the only one who took no part in his own act.” 
The English “act” translates “acontecimiento,” event.  The evolution is telling.  Cherubs 
are the occasion for a participation that they do not share, appearing in paintings as little 
potentialities inevitably separated from the action that they herald.  Children are after all the 
emblems of possibility and of the inexperienced thought which it embodies.  We see this idea 
especially in nativity paintings, where the baby angels allegorize a birth that is “written” as idea 
in the infant Messiah.  But their function is generalizable too.  So often in paintings of this 
period, cherubs entice our gaze toward the central tableau or object, always divine; these playful 
and peripheral adornments seem to hold up such sublime subjects with their eyes, binding them 
as Socrates’ daemon binds earth and heaven.  Their primary act is to see, and to see inwardly - 
despite the titillating quality of their bodies so uninhibitedly displayed.  Belying their impish legs 
and serene bottoms, their expressions are, more often than not, melancholy.  The best 
representatives of this are also the two putti-images most widely circulated today - in calendars, 
refrigerator magnets, figurines, etc.  The detail from the bottom of Raphael’s Sistine Madonna 
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 (1513) shows two cherubs leaning on a shelf contemplating a nativity above – one watchful, his 
chin on his crossed arms, the other in the attitude of pensée, his chin in one hand, looking 
upward.  Rosso Fiorentino’s Musical Angel (1522) is more dramatic.  His face is buried against 
his lute, which he is softly plucking, two dark half-closed eyes staring at the frets, hair tousled, 
red and white wings aloft.  In the depiction of these cherubs the playful body is paired with an 
expression of contemplation.  Little bodies with big eyes (and often just their heads are 
represented), they establish reflection as an almost voluptuous condition, full unto itself of all 
states of the soul and passages of time. 
The cherub’s reflective inwardness calls attention to the intimate interiority of 
experience, but its gaze need not also be a mournful one.166  What is the source of cherubic 
melancholy?  Why are these frolicky creatures so sad?  And how is it that, in post-Romantic eras, 
they become so very old? 
  
These questions return us to Benjamin.  In his essay on Kraus he distinguishes the poesy 
of rhyme from that of a more properly angelic tongue, which finds its focus in the name:  
Language has never been more perfectly distinguished from mind, 
never more intimately bound to Eros, than by Kraus in the 
observation “The more closely you look at a word the more 
distantly it looks back.”  This is a Platonic love of language.  The 
only closeness from which the word cannot escape, however, is 
rhyme.  So the primal erotic relationship between closeness and 
distance is given voice in his language: as rhyme and name.  As 
                                                 
166 It is interesting to note that while often playful, cherubs almost never smile.  And frequently, they are not playful. 
238 
 rhyme, language rises up from the creaturely world; as name it 
draws all creation up to it. (267-268) 
Rhyme, having its basis in physical sound, provides a productive scaffolding for thought and 
communication, a movement from things to ideas; the name, whose action is to totalize from 
above rather than to generate from below, invites the “creaturely world” while yet remaining 
distant from it.  In his distinction between rhyme and name Benjamin begins to anticipate the 
angel of melancholy that would later become for him the New Angel of the drawing.  Under the 
sign of Eros we see the cherubic intimacy with which language is bound, an intimacy between 
the uttered sound and the “creaturely world.”  The cherub is in and of this world, yet he sees 
beyond it.  The more closely these creatures resemble the human in its native state, the more 
universally they embody this human, the “more distantly” they gaze at their inhuman source.  
From this gaze – the only remnant of the daemon’s claws - the erotic dialectic emerges, which 
draws our attention to the other angel.  From far away (and in the later incarnation, in the process 
of being blown farther) the angel seeks to redeem or “draw up” the natural world, to give it its 
nobility as name.  The cherub’s pensive response to its close contact with the natural world is 
given form in this sublime angel who looks toward the things of this world, rather than away 
from them.  It is when the latter fails to absorb them to itself, fails to redeem these phenomena as 
symbols, that this distance becomes age.  Once born the angels could grow old. 
Benjamin’s definition of the sacred name as a binding force that must be protected 
belongs to the second of the two version of “Agesilaus.”  The first, written a day earlier, says that 
the name is that “by which these forces can be conjured up and protected against outsiders.”  In 
the first version the name protects the self’s life-forces against a hostile exterior; in the second, 
this “prophylactic” quality (a term omitted in the second draft) has disappeared.  Now it is the 
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 name itself that needs protection, rather than the forces that it coheres.  In shifting from name as 
guardian to name as emblem, Benjamin implies that it is not the possibility of life that is so much 
under threat by the fascists as the possibility of naming, and with that, transformative action.  
Under this allegorical argument, the angel itself also becomes less important as guard than as 
condition.  But as condition it is vulnerable.  In the evolution from bird of prey to melancholy 
spectator, the angel sees more deeply and names more truly, but what he sees strips him of his 
potency.167  Benjamin’s earlier work gives some indication why.  In his discussion of the 
evolution of melancholy in the Trauerspiel, Benjamin attributes it to the institutionalization of 
the belief in grace devoid of works, which he identifies in the seventeenth century Lutheranism 
of the Trauerspiel dramatists as well as in earlier Calvinist theology.  For Benjamin, 
Lutheranism’s secularization of daily life makes of human choice and action a nullity by 
rendering “the soul dependent on grace through faith.”  This, at least, is the insight forthcoming 
for those who, like the angel of history, see events as a whole.  “For those who looked deeper 
saw the scene of their existence as a rubbish heap of partial, inauthentic actions” (Origin 139).  
We can see this partial-ness of action, which the ruined angel expresses, in the chicken coop and 
the storm of “progress.”  From the position of transcendence into which the reflective subject 
was thrown, his relation to the world appeared decadent and its history, destructive.  He could 
fall only with the creation of such a position, and with it the depths for him to fall into. 
                                                 
167 This is also Nietzsche’s analysis of Hamlet’s much-debated hesitation to act.  Writing against the Coleridgean 
view of Hamlet’s hesitation, Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy argues that it is not merely the prince’s 
contemplative spirit that creates the hesitation, but the nature of the truth that that contemplation uncovers.  I quote 
from the whole of the famous passage.  “In this sense the Dionysian man resembles Hamlet: both have once looked 
truly into the essence of things, they have gained knowledge, and nausea inhibits action; for their action could not 
change anything in the eternal nature of things; they feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that they should be asked 
to set right a world that is out of joint.  Knowledge kills action; action requires the veils of illusion:  that is the 
doctrine of Hamlet, not that cheap wisdom of Jack the Dreamer who reflects too much and, as it were, from an 
excess of possibilites does not get around to action.  Not reflection, no – true knowledge, an insight into the horrible 
truth, outweighs any motive for action” (60). 
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 Historically the angel has been viewed as the active intelligence which brings a being into 
existence as such, and then guards that existence.  He hails the subject as agent, bringing out of 
him the exertions that earn the name of blessing; we saw this in the third chapter, and see it again 
in “Agesilaus Santander.”  The latter figure, however, in framing this exertion as waiting, 
holding on to time rather than entering into it, opens the way for the enforced passivity that the 
later angel of history epitomizes.  Looking backward – as the philosophy of history always must 
– this angel still names the activity of his subject, but names it as “partial.”  We see this in the 
angel’s own distance and inability to participate, but also in the human’s attempt to hold on to 
and possess time – to “stay timeless time.”  If memorializing angels (such as Kushner’s Angel of 
Bethesda) bless the past with existence, the angel of history appears at the moment of a failure of 
memory.  For judgment, whose failure is portrayed so whimsically in “A Very Old Man with 
Enormous Wings” – depends on memory.  The absence of distinctions apparent in the leveling 
mass of waste and decay, the “rubbish heap,” the pile of “wreckage upon wreckage,” calls us to 
notice a problem of memory and time, articulated through images of grace in all its palpable 
capriciousness.  This is the problem that Jacqueline Osherow describes in her brooding “A Poem 
about Angels.” 
The poem speaks to an intimate yet universal subject, implicitly her own interior self.  
The addressee, the poem tells us, has traveled far yet, of all her experiences, wants only to write 
a poem about angels. 
Not because they are winged and white and haloed 
And in many paintings very beautiful 
But because you have seen many things and remembered 
Only angels.” (2-5) 
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 Neither the parapets nor, later, the mountains, are fixed in memory (despite the subject’s writing 
them down).  “Only the angels are intact, marble / Or otherwise, recorded” (13-14), as the 
narrator sets it, “by some lucky visionary / With a paintbrush” (15-16).  Only the angels are 
“petrified,” to use Benjamin’s term.  But they are not yet ruins, not yet exposed – and it is partly 
for this reason that the subject wishes to write about them.  Poetry follows the photograph in 
order to expose, to grasp the origin in a way that the image cannot.  Writing, Osherow suggests, 
belongs to ruins – particularly the ruins of walls, both ancient and medieval – whereas the 
immortal and intact exist in visual representation, the apotheosis of script.  But visual memory 
has failed her.  “You have seen many things and remembered / Only angels” (4-5).  And this is 
the other reason she wishes to write a poem about them – as a petition to sort the unclear and 
disordered remembrances, to bring back the lost images.  But, she discovers, the angels too are 
primarily absent, only random presences in the technological record of one’s personal history. 
All you know is how impossible it is 
Without them.  The stones conspire against you 
With the heavy clouds, and everything through glass 
Or, worse, that cracking memory, flashing tents 
And camels in between the high pink towns 
Of, was it Tuscany, as if the slides you never took 
Got all mixed up.  Only occasional the empty screen 
For you to fill with all your angels.  (21-28) 
The reader can hear, reverberating within, the mournful echo of this “only occasional” empty 
screen.  Like the “rare, random descent” of the angels long-awaited in Sylvia Plath’s 1960 
“Black Rook in Rainy Weather,” the human subject can act only in answer to the angelic call, the 
occasion for creativity within a mind haunted by a confusion that is itself imaginary and 
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 immaterial.  This is the other side of the angel self-help books, asking their readers to clear their 
minds and create within themselves a perfect emptiness – as if (from the perpsective of the 
melancholic) emptiness could be created.  Instead, Osherow mourns the absence of emptiness 
amidst the clutter and confusion of images piling up that are, she thinks, an indication of 
“Tuscany” – Tuscany, itself the ruins of the Renaissance, the cultural and artistic center of the 
time period filled with so many paintings of angels.  Again, the need for a screen to fill with 
angels echoes the absence of an ordering principle that would effect remembrance, gather it up, 
call its name across the cracks of memory of the world traveller168 and the glass encasings of 
museums. 
Osherow’s poem ends with the disappointed failure of the angels to answer her call, or 
indeed to do anything at all.  We see them now on their own turf, heavy with such mundanities 
as gardening and the feeling of boredom.  God is “old” and “disappointed.”  The angels play 
their harps mechanically, and greet the full moon with the feeling of dread that “another month” 
has passed and they have “done nothing.”  This busy-ness, passive mechanicism, and other-
directed anxiety about productivity, the narrator suggests, are what keep the angels from exerting 
real agency in the world.  The problem is that they do not sing like poets.  Apart from the random 
moments when they drop their harps (their instruments, their machines) and hum a “long-
dreamed psalm,”169 the angels inhabit the time of the everyday, the quotidian reproduction and 
                                                 
168 This idea is emphasized at the beginning of the poem that gives Osherow’s collection its title, “Looking for 
Angels in New York”:  “All this traveling around and I’ve learned / Nothing less obvious than this: that each / Piece 
of the world has something missing” (1-3).  Globality as she sees it is riven, “The space between the / Continents 
seems eerie now,” and riven in particular by the plurality of visual experience without anything to hold it together, 
only the occasional empty screen.  It is interesting to speculate what the Renaissance as “quotation” might mean 
here, perhaps as an idealized vision of world-consciousness in which global artistic centers cohere a historical 
movement that in hindsight is named as totality: the Rebirth. 
169 Billy Collins describes in a similar way the anachronism of the poetic angel from a contemporary perspective of 
labor.  At the end of his “Questions about Angels,” devoted to the legendary medieval question about the number of 
angels that can dance on the head of a pin, he resolves the matter: the answer is one.  “One female angel dancing 
alone in her stocking feet, / a small jazz combo working in the background. / She sways like a branch in the wind, 
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 repetition that is antithetical to the creative eventfulness of history.  In this fall into workaday 
temporality moments comprise a formless mass; they do not exist individually, and hence are 
unavailable to memory and judgment.  As the pile of the unsorted past grows skyward, the angels 
sink into an almost eternal torpor, except that for them the immortal songs (their poetry, the 
forms of poetic expression) are still, potentially, available to their intuition. 
“A Poem about Angels” details the failure of angels, expressing and taking place within a 
problem of globality and experience which in turn appears as a crisis of memory.  The lapse of 
angelic participation spells trouble, but the very thing the speaker laments – the “cracking 
memory” – contains within itself the possibility of a different idea of participation regarding 
angels and history.  Nancy Eimers’s “Black Angel” shows us how we might begin to imagine 
this idea.  Like Osherow, Eimers presents the past as a problem of angelic intelligence.  And like 
Osherow’s, Eimers’s poem also speaks to a sense of the world as it opens from the unreachable 
(just barely unreachable) position of angelic eyes.  But she adds a deformity that we have not yet 
seen – angelic blindness.170  Those eyes that see the world are blocked.  The angel is now not 
even a spectator; we assume that role.  The first line of the poem establishes this for us: “You can 
see her across the graveyard. . .”  With the individuating power of the angelic gaze gone, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
her beautiful / eyes closed, and the tall thin bassist leans over / to glance at his watch because she has been dancing / 
forever, and now it is very late, even for musicians” (30-35). 
 
170 Another notable example of angelic blindness from the contemporary scene is Charles Wright’s “Mondo 
Angelico.”  In this poem he describes fish as “aquatic angels,” possessed of an almost bodiless angelic vision that is 
at the same time supremely – almost haughtily – worldly.  The fishy eyes take in the wreckage heap of human 
existence thus:”Like lost thoughts, / they wouldn’t remember us if they could / Hovering just out of touch, / Their 
bodies liminal, their sights sealed. / Always they disregard us / with a dull disregard” (12-17).  An instance from 
contemporary creative non-fiction, Chuck Kinder’s “meta-memoir & mythopoetic travelogue to Almost Heaven” 
entitled The Last Mountain Dancer also depicts blind angels.   In the chapter “Hotel Angel” two rednecks bent on 
revenge are waylaid by their enemy’s mother, who describes how after her twin sister was brutally raped and 
murdered she started making these little angel dolls (12-15 hours a day) to remember her and to make ends meet.  
All the dolls have one thing in common: “Where faces should have been the angel dolls were featureless, blank and 
smooth as eggs” (368).  The reason echoes Osherow’s “occasional blank screen” for her own angels.  “The fat lady 
always left the face blank so it could be filled by the memory of them who looked upon it” (368).  In this case the 
gaze of the human possesses individuating power, where the angel proves itself incapable of communication. 
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 angel reflects the rawness of the world around her.  No longer able to look into the depths or the 
interiors of things, she forces us to confront them in their primitivity – their barbarism, their 
blunt surfaces.  Her revelation is her own limitedness, the cage that surrounds her.  If you would 
discover the secret of the world you live in, she tells us, look to the nature of that cage. 
Eimers chooses as her voiceless, eyeless figure the inevitable memorial angel on a 
headstone, but it is a memorial that we do not see in relation to an individual grave.  Rather, it is 
described from a perspective of distance, as if this one angel was the angel for all the dead – and 
the living.  In such a capacity the angel appears in a state of fall, as if to reconnect herself to 
some concrete thing beyond her dominion of generalities.  She appears in echo of Benjamin’s 
angel of history - “Almost spread, her wings are caught / mid-flare, one breath behind / a lift into 
corrosive air” (4-6). 
But she is as pure a shock 
as the sky’s primary, unfinished blue 
that pulls away from her in all directions. 
She turned black years ago –  
one night for grief or faithfulness 
with the patient instinct of chemicals, 
copper and oxygen, toward something 
more gradual than white. 
Her eyes are simple. 
un-irised, as if her sight had failed 
at specifics: how formal and serious 
we are, the wrinkles in my shorts, 
your ruffling tiers of hair. 
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The afternoon stalls, 
wanting to see as barely 
over headstones, driveways, hills 
of houses groping down to ours 
any one thing we close our eyes 
not to forget.  (11-29) 
In the ruins of the angel we begin to judge ourselves.  Right when the speaker notes that the 
angel’s sight has failed, she turns to herself with clarity and precision: “how formal and serious / 
we are” (21-22).  The angel’s failure to judge specifics produces in the human a self-reckoning 
urge not to forget, and a potentially transformative urge to discover something worth 
remembering.   
The blind angel prompts these urges in us specifically as her spectators.  In beholding the 
ruined – turned black, sightless – angel, we receive a pure “shock.”  The “any one” impression 
we look for, this shock appears as a singularity that enters and illuminates the world of decadent 
distinctions – distinctions that “we,” with our “wrinkles” and “ruffles,” our close-up 
distinguishing of “headstones, driveways, hills,” tiredly think through and die in.  We perceive 
the details of the branches and, overwhelmed by such details and such seeing, “close our eyes not 
to forget.”  In such a world and such a subjectivity the only possibility of not forgetting is 
through the Benjaminian jolt, jolting us out of an impoverished continuum, a petrified set of 
codes and conventions within which we no longer really judge the world.  The patience of the 
earth-bound angel (“not rising but sinking to earth”), enables this shock, almost as sacrifice, for it 
is her patience, her duration over time, that gives her her color.  Startling black against the blue 
sky, the angel (while impervious to the senses and their chaos) is still bound to the world and its 
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 corrosions.  In the fields of no escape, the “un-irised” vision of the angel has this to tell us: that 
the most powerful agent of perception is not impression, nor even the ability to rationalize 
impression, but that invisible moment in between, where the intuitive faculty flashes before us 
the idea of a thing separated from its appearance and from our recollection of it.  There is 
possibility, the angel suggests, for revelation without freedom, if we are willing to attend to this 
separation of idea and thing.  Such separation is, poetically, the moment of blind prophecy and 
intuition.  But it is also, historically, the scene in which past and present are discontinuous, 
history and progress at odds.  Or where, in the words of Gabriel García Márquez’s Nobel Prize 
acceptance speech explaining the origin of marvelous realism, we “lack a conventional means to 
render our lives believable.”171
I will explain what I mean through a final engagement with “A Very Old Man.”  Though 
fiction, the story leads us to a perspective that like poetry isolates things from their causal 
connections.  Beginning with causal disorder, the story ends with causal irrelevance, a radical 
discontinuity that like Eimers’s “shock” depends on the transfer of the spectatorial gaze from 
angel to human.  With the departure of angelic attention we get our irises back again. 
By the end of the whole absurd saga the Pelayo family has come to experience the 
angel’s omnipresence as a kind of violence, an extension of that patience that is the hallmark of 
the bird-man’s standoffish remove.  Their initial fame begins to break apart with the angel’s 
exposure as an unreliable miracle-worker.  The prospect of his imminent death alarms them, for 
nothing so grotesque as a dead angel had made demands of their practical universe.  “And yet,” 
                                                 
171 García Marquez credits this “outsized reality”as being specific to Latin American history and experience.  It is “a 
reality not of paper, but one that lives within us and determines each instant of our countless daily deaths, and that 
nourishes a source of insatiable creativity, full of sorrow and beauty, of which this roving and nostalgic Columbian 
is but one cipher more, singled out by fortune.  Poets and beggars, musicians and prophets, warriors and scoundrels, 
all creatures of that unbridled reality, we have had to ask but little of imagination, for our crucial problem has been a 
lack of conventional means to render our lives believable.  This, my friends, is the crux of our solitude” (135).  This 
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 the final paragraph begins, the angel survives, grows wings, and disappears awkwardly into the 
sky.  Elisenda watches him, her vigilance registering the event as fact.  “She kept watching him 
even when she was through cutting the onions and she kept on watching until it was no longer 
possible for her to see him, because then he was no longer an annoyance in her life but an 
imaginary dot on the horizon of the sea” (225).  The original Spanish emphasizes the geometry 
of this distance.  From being “un estorbo en su vida,” he becomes “sino un punto imaginario en 
el horizonte del mar.”  This is perhaps the only instance in the story where the bird-man appears 
as angel, and not as some vagrantly human entity (an old Norwegian sailor is the favored 
presumption in the story).  Paradoxically he must disappear in order to be seen, and, more 
importantly, he must cease to be a  spectator.  Now he has become an image in the human mind, 
erasable and yet infinite.  In turn Elisenda has become the spectator, providing the first (and last) 
interior moment in the story, watching the angel disappear from time and its spectacular 
narratives. 
In keeping with the angelic sighting the final moment is also the only moment given to 
the reader completely disjointedly, without eventual transition or explanation.  This 
disjointedness is the sign of angelic freedom, purchased at the price of his participation in the 
world.  It is given to the reader pointed and quick.  We find in the penultimate paragraph that the 
angel is half dead, and then shift to the final paragraph, beginning in medias res: “And yet [sin 
embargo] he not only survived his worst winter, but seemed improved with the first sunny days” 
(224), rejuvenating as suddenly as spring. 
Though disordered, the rest of the story follows the conventions of narrative, using 
transitional, hypotactic language to order, qualify, hierarchize: “On the following day,” “The 
                                                                                                                                                             
quote is perhaps the crux of a speech that, throughout, astonishes with its imagination, its commitment, and its 
power. 
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 angel was the only one. . .,” “When the child began school. . .”  And yet the final outcome – the 
outcome which the rest of the tale has spent anticipating, suspending the question of whether, 
after such decadence, what flight? – is arbitrarily dodged and reduced to an imaginary 
geometrical point.  This final abrupt move – a linguistic deus ex machina172 - could be read in 
many ways.  In the context of the parabolic nature of the tale, however, it recalls Paul de Man’s 
definition of allegory as pretending to “order sequentially, in a narrative, what is actually the 
destruction of all sequence” (“Pascal’s Allegory of Persuasion” 69).  Foreshadowed by the 
story’s first syntactic convolutions, the final abrupt move acts as the destruction of all pretense.  
It is, ironically, revelation.  For this reason the issue of causelessness is irrelevant – it appears 
only momentarily as a way of calling our attention to the angel’s self-revelation as disappearance 
into the imaginary.  We have after all, psychologically already been given the cause for the 
angel’s miraculous flight: the angel was crushed by the tarantula woman, his reputation “ruined” 
by his own failure as celebrity.  Summarily, the town strips him of the power to command 
attention that is his estate as angel.  “And that was how Father Gonzaga was cured forever of his 
insomnia and Pelayo’s courtyard went back to being as empty as during the time it had rained for 
three days and crabs walked through the bedrooms” (223),  we are told three paragraphs before 
the end.  In his own ruins, the angel finds the motive-force for flight.  It is not his reasons that are 
                                                 
172 Benjamin’s discussion of Karl Borinski’s ponderación misteriosa, the “intervention of God in the work of art,” 
relates in a different way the consequences for angels of divine interference.  As in García Márquez’s story, such 
intervention enables the flight of the angel, which in allegory is also the flight of the human.  “Subjectivity, like an 
angel falling into the depths, is brought back by allegories, and held fast in heaven, in God, by ponderación 
misteriosa” (Origin 235).  Through a simple, mechanical “and yet,” time is petrified in the firmamant, affixed like 
mottoes before a thesis (roughly half of the “Theses on the Philosophy of History” are prefaced by mottoes), or like 
the watercolor of the New Angel, waylaid on the wall. Benjamin is too dialectical a thinker, however, to leave us in 
such fulfilled stasis; his angel is falling back into the sky, propelled by time’s ephemerality away towards a 
permanence he cannnot master.  His inability to “make whole” what has been torn apart echoes the inability of the 
German mourning-drama, the trauerspiel, to achieve that totality by which mourning itself would be conceived and 
resolved – returned and assimilated to its essence and origin.  Instead, the excesses and vulgarity of the genre resolve 
suffering in destruction, presenting only the ruins of the allegorical idea, the melancholy of the subject suspended in 
what, in his poem on angels prefaced to the ninth thesis,  Scholem calls “timeless time.”  Grace yields to gravity; 
neither allegorical inscription nor its angelic inscriber can bear its own weight. 
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 important, the story implies, but the shock with which we behold the angel rising from the 
stagnation of all reason.  Here time is arrested, it “stands still and has come to a stop” (Benjamin 
“Theses” XVI), held before us in order to attract our gaze to a sublime point of appearance that is 
also disappearance, of origin that is also a point of destruction.173  The reader of this arrest, 
singularly unconcerned with causality, “seizes the past “as an image which flashes up at the 
instant when it can be recognized and is never seen again” (Thesis V).  To her things appear 
whole and self-subsisting, alternately a welcome of abundance and the signature of a certain 
ruthlessness.   
 The temporal “stop” belongs to human, not angelic, perception.  It is important that at the 
end we watch Elisenda watching, the disappearance of the angel finally provoking her 
imagination in a way that, as a living presence in her world, he could not.  Finally she attends to 
the angel as such.  In decadent times, the story seems to say - times of disjunction between 
convention and reality, times both fantastical and banal – the angel exists only as a departure.  
For only then does he seem to possess the power that, at other moments and in other contexts, 
would be taken for granted – the power to command (and hence redirect) the attention of the 
beholder.  In times such as these we look to the angel’s limits, its loss, its emptiness, its 
mourning, for these describe our decadence and also our utopianism.  In the angel’s cage we see 
the partialness of our own actions, the wash of discriminations that prevents the fullness of the 
moment, but also the possibility of seizing the beginning that has always been there.  For this 
reason the angel must reduce to a point on the horizon, the singular instant where the past meets 
the future.  When the time is out of joint, the fullness of the angel’s participation in human affairs 
occurs at the point of his absence. 
                                                 
173Benjamin famously explains his investment in the interrelation of origin and destruction the Trauerspiel book, 
“Origin is an eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its current it swallows the material involved in the 
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 I want to close with a brief reading of a poet that, unlike those above, is both a neo-
surrealist and an historical poet.  In the spirit of this combination, he is also a writer about angels.  
But unlike many angel poems, his are deadly serious; Larry Levis has no patience for the strictly 
personal or the mysticism of the everyday, and every patience in the world for the slow, 
contorted strangeness of social recollection.  His method is fierce, but sustained.  He wrenches 
historical moments out of their continuum, using the angels of incompletion to examine them 
whole.  This is especially true for his two most compelling angel poems.  “Anastasia & 
Sandman” is a poem about Stalin and fascism and about the rhetorical apparatus of fascism, 
written as simultaneous nightmare and plaint.  The later “Elegy with an Angel” is an assembly of 
four vignettes that analyze the history of the New World and its inner-city reverberations.  In 
these poems Levis dives into the heart of the delay between angel and event, into the allegory of 
frustrated redemption, in order to discover a parable of our time. 
“Anastasia & Sandman” describes a world of allegorical absurdity.  A bureaucrat is 
recounting the days of Stalin before (as we discover later) an empty audience.  Interspersed with 
references to the “Committee on the Ineffable,” the “University of Flies,” and the “Committee on 
Solitude” is the story of a horse.  These mock titles pair institution and inhuman as an indicator 
of the surreal isolation that accosts the subject under terroristic rule.  The discourses of state and 
person come together historically: the peasants’ horses were confiscated by Stalin after he took 
over Romania, sent as meat to starving Poles, and then served as the ground of reality for the 
once-farmer-now-factory-worker (whose horse was confiscated) under Stalin’s rule. 
   “That horse I had, 
He was more real than any angel, 
                                                                                                                                                             
processgenesis” (45). 
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 The housefly, when I had a house, was real too,” 
Is what the man thought. 
Yet it wasn’t more than a few months 
Before the man began to wonder, talking 
To himself out loud before the others, 
“Was the horse real?  Was the house real?” 
An angel flew in and out of the high window 
In the factory where the man worked, his hands 
Numb with cold.  He hated the window & the light 
Entering the window & he hated the angel. 
Because the angel could not be carved into meat 
Or dumped into the ossuary & become part 
Of the landfill at the edge of town, 
It therefore could not acquire a soul, 
And resembled in significance nothing more 
Than a light summer dress when the body has gone. 
 
The man survived because, after a while, 
He shut up about it.  (41-60) 
The poem’s inflated allegories of institutionalized rhetoric and grand ideas contrast with the 
simplicity of the images of the horse and the angel, the light, and the landfill.  The latter expose 
the former.  They expose totalitarianism as life destroyed and regenerated, the waste at the edge 
of civilization, and above all as the angel’s bodiless emptiness and absence of power.  In this 
poem animal and angelic realities also contrast allegorically.  The reality of the horse is the 
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 steady survival of habit and habitat; that of the angel, the threshold of origin and destruction, 
poetry and slaughter.  For the “light summer dress” without a body is also the killing of the 
kulaks, and they speak the same non-rhetorical truth.  Though an emblem of substantial 
disappearance and insubstantial arrival, the angel is not, however, therefore irrelevant.  As in “A 
Very Old Man,” its own disappearance provokes an imaginative entry into the past.  There is in 
the sum of images a connection between the angel and the horse; in the speaker’s mind the angel 
crawls like a fly into the ear of the horse and from there into the brain of the horse and from there 
becomes for the horse a mist in the field.  After detailing this portrait of angelic immanence the 
speaker concludes that he has decided not to attend committee meetings anymore, because no 
one else is ever there.  In surreal isolation he discovers that “lack of conventional means to 
render our lives believable,” and so turns from the imagination to the absences of the 
imagination, to memory and its ruins. 
And besides, behind the angel hissing in its mist 
Is a gate that leads only into another field, 
Another outcropping of stones & withered grass, where 
A horse named Sandman & a horse named Anastasia 
Used to stand at the fence & watch the traffic pass. 
Where there were outdoor concerts once, in summer, 
Under the missing & innumerable stars.  (104-110) 
The mist, itself a ruined angel, leads directly through the gate of memory to a scene of passive 
spectatorship.  Here the horses of history gaze at the progress of traffic, configuring an allegory 
of absence and infinity that only the angelic imaginary points overhead can explain, or fail to 
explain.  
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 “Elegy with an Angel at its Gate” begins where “Anastasia & Sandman” leaves off, with 
the images of angels infinite and empty in the heavens, and their descent into the threshold of 
memory.  The poem uses this image to open a narrative of the angels’ fall from paradise into 
American life and history as they might be told by the very old and philosophical.  In this first 
section, “Muir in the Wilderness,” the angels speak directly to us. 
We were the uncountable stars, at first. 
We were nothing at first, and the light 
of what was already over still in it.  (1-3) 
“We were never the color-blind grasses,” the poem continues, never the clarity of the patterns of 
the snake or in the water falling and filling spaces where it wasn’t.  The poem proceeds through 
negation in order to arrive at that occasionalist beginning before beginning, a space of 
simultaneous infinity and emptiness before immediate existence, and through which we 
understand existence.  We get only as far as the fall, however (the mind cannot reach before the 
beginning of time, though it can presuppose it).  “One by one” the angels vanish from heaven, 
penetrating the things of this world, becoming part of this world: 
Part of every law,  
Part of each Apache heirloom for sale 
In a window, part of the wedding cake 
Part of the smallpox epidemic, part of God  (1. 22-25) 
In these partakings, the angels span historical event and memorabilia so that historical event and 
memorabilia become part of each other.  Part of love, and the parting of flesh, part of the 
slaughterhouse, part of summer, the angels finally become part of poetic references: 
Part of the fork in the road where we took 
Both directions at once to disappear in them, 
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 Into the noise that cuts us in half, part 
Of the noise, part of what doesn’t come back.  (1. 44-47) 
Angelic participation requires the angels’ own division and breaking apart.  Infinitely 
present in all possibilities, they cohere the fragments of time and the world through an emptiness.  
As The Wizard of Oz’s scarecrow puts it they go both ways, but “in order to disappear in them.”  
Recognizing chance rather than destiny, they are unlike those angels that appear in order to hail 
the prophet; these angels participate both in what happens and what doesn’t.  They are midwife 
and executioner, origin and destruction, the “nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.”  
The second half of the “Muir” section collapses this idea for us into a story: a story of a Cuban 
would-be revolutionary and his love that we are told could become a movie that the movie-
watching gape-mouthed audience the angels in the first half are part of will watch and be a part 
of.  Part of the movie and part of its audience, angels are part of the configuration of history and 
fantasy, and, particularly in relation to the gaze, the part that holds the parts together. 
Unlike his earlier angel poem, Levis’s “Elegy” finds possibility in the partial-ness of 
existence, and in the idea of angelic participation in it.  This is where his sequence of negations 
leads, to a theory of angels not only without God but – in contrast to Benjamin - without the 
messiah.  For Levis, the ruins of the past and the wreckage of the now are not distinguishable, 
and history’s angel may yet lead us through the present.  We see this in the following sections.  
They pursue the tale of an Irish immigrant to the New World and his experience of British 
colonialism - the famine and the religious oppression and the Atlantic crossing they provoke - 
through the image of an angel-figurehead that is still preserved after centuries.  These sections 
are intercut by “Stevens,” a poem imagining a rainy-day in Hartford where Wallace Stevens is 
getting a manicure.  As Stevens is “turning angels into air,” the poem is turning him into one of 
his own historical images (water reflected through the glass, “reflecting everything and the 
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 nothing in everything”) and into images from a progress he doesn’t yet know (“the background 
chorus / Of semis on the interstate,” 3. 14-15). 
The last section takes off from both these points, from “Stevens”’ afternoon and “Bunny 
Mayo”’s trip.  In “Like the Scattered Beads of a Dimestore Rosary” the speaker is walking 
through the kind of neighborhood slums spoken of proleptically in the third section, talking to an 
angel in the gate – an echo of the second section’s hanged soul on the gatepost of British justice, 
and here also an echo of the gate to a pre-genocidal past in “Anastasia & Sandman.”  The angel 
he speaks to is the double of that “wrong, other angel trapped in stone” which, like Wright’s 
fishes and Eimers’s corroded angel, “must stare out, stupidly.”  The speaker’s conversation 
addresses the issues represented by both these gates with a return to the poem’s opening image: 
The point is to live beyond all jurisdiction, 
To be the uncountable stars again, the shape 
Of the animal running through tall grasses. 
 
It is too late for either of us now. 
Angel in the gate, walk with me sometimes (4. 13-17) 
The speaker releases the “trapped” angel despite its belatedness and distance from its own 
bloody origin.  Immortality may grieve, but it nevertheless moves forward in its grief. 
If in choosing to free the gate’s dumbstruck and staring angel Levis here angles away 
from revolution and towards reform, it is at the same time an apocalyptic reform.  Angelic 
participation, however partial, illuminates possibilities of thought and reality beyond what we 
already know, through the emptiness of its beginning.  There is universality in this emptiness, for 
the melancholy angel’s issues are issues of civilization, both historical and contemporary.  In 
inviting his companionship the speaker seeks to converse with the melancholy of totalitarian 
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 order and disorder, bombast and absurdity, secrets and slaughter, to open its wings but also to 
close them.  It may be too late for either man or angel to be the shape of an animal and not a 
ship, but it is not too late for the angel to be brought back by allegories.  Be my guide, the 
speaker seems to ask, and show me in the ruins of this neighborhood, this reality, its essential 
truth.  Walk, angel, “the heavens behind you on fire,” and show me the house “Where eternity 
was no more than my hand / Scurrying across a sheet of paper, / Kindling blent to the music of 
its hush” (4. 78-80).  To the place where words are concrete and emblematic; where the fires of 
time and eternity destroy, but also inscribe; and where the angel of history redeems from history 
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